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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with Coventry in the period 19114. to 1939.
It is a study of the developments in the city's labour movement in this
period. It concentrates on the fortunes of engineering trade unions, the
Labour Party, the Co-operative movement, and the Communist Party. The aim
of the thesis is to explain the way the labour movement changed in these
years, and to draw attention to the shifts in working class consciousbess
that took place.
Although most of the thesis covers the period 19114. - 1939 there is an
introductory survey that covers the development of large scale engineering
in Coventry, and the growth of the engineering unions and the Labour Party
before the First World War. The thesis then follows the progress of the
unions during the war, and. explains the effect of the main war-time strikes.
The years after the war, upto 1922, are dealt with in detail, as these were
years of political and. industrial upheaval. The lockout of the engineering
unions in 1922 is als0 dealt with in detail, and the thesis looks at the effect
of the lockout on the AEU in particular.
Then the position of the unions in the period of set-backs and. defeats
after 1922 isoDvered, as is their eventual recovery in the 1930 ' s. A study
is made of the way the recovery took place, and the differences between the
resurgent trade unionism and the earlier unionism of the war and the early
1920's are shown. The thesis also looks at the effect of the General Strike
on Coventry. Throughout the thesis, an attempt is made to explain the changing
relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions, and account for
the gradual emergence of the Labour Party as the majority party in the city.
The victory of the Labour Party in the local elections is considered, and an
assessment of Labou& period of rule between 1937 and 1939 is given. The
role of the Communist Party in organising the unemployed in the post-war
years, and. its involvement in the unions, and. particularly the recovery of
the unions, is studied.
The thesis also covers the political life of Coventry in this period;
and. therefore deals with the Conservative and Liberal Parties and. the
coalition they formed against the Labour Party. It attempts to explain
the many different ways in which these parties exercised social and. political
leadership in Coventry. The work of the City Council in the fields of
housing and. education is studied, and emphesis given to the differences
in policy between the Labour Party and the other political parties, and. the
impact of Council policies on working class people.
The role of the Engineering Employers' Association is studied, and
the changes in its relations with the unions throughout this period. Atten-
ion is also given to its relations with the local political parties, and its
influence on Coventry in general. The internal discussion that took place
within the Coventry Co-operative Society in the 1920's is assessed, as is
its strengthening links with the Labour Party.
The thesis examines the way the development of mass production in the
engineering industry changed jobs and changed the role of the unions in the
factories. The response of trade union shop stewards to changix conditions
is examined., both in the period. of unrest during and after the First World
War, and. in the second. part of the 1930's. Technological change in the period
is only dealt with in its effects on employment, though a broad outline of
economic change is given.
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ICHAPTER ONE
Coventry Before the First World. War
This chapter covers the engineering industry, the growth of the
city, and, the growth of the labour movement in the years up to 1914.
The two decades before the war saw the rapid. expansion of large scale
manufacturing, and. the expansion of the population through migration.
This growth swept away the tradition of hostility to the factory system
that had existed., and. encouraged the emergence of craft trade unionism.
But because of the speed. and. rapidness of the growth of engineering, the
craft tradition did. not develop strong roots. Trade unionism grew, not
only among skilled engineering workers, but among semi- and, unskilled as
well. The Trades Council rapidly developed as the major force in the
labour movement, while the Labour Party was slower to grow.
I	 The Arrival of the New Industries
Coventry has experienced various changes of fortune over the centuries.
In the middle ages, the city was an important woollen centre, and. for a
time was the fifth largest city in the country. But by the end. of the
eighteenth century this trade had gone, and. the city had. lost any claim to
national importance. The silk ribbon trade, however, restored fortunes in
the nineteenth century, as did the lesser trades of clock-and. watchmaking.
Both these trades in turn declined after the 1860s, leaving a residue of
cheap labour that proved an attraction first to the bicycle trade, then
motors, then a range of engineering trades.
An account of the rise and fall of ribbon weaving in the city may be
found. elsewhere,(1) but a number of attitudes created by that industry
persisted for many years. The trade was characterised by a hostility to
2large scale production and. the factory system, and. the resulting prolifer-
ation of small workshops encouraged. a spirit of co-operation between master
and men and. political moderation. As late as 1857, out-work weavers, men
who worked at home in their top rooms, many of whom were small masters
owning a couple of looms, were able to impose their list of piece prices
on the factory owners, who were thus denied the right to pay their workers
a weekly wage rather than by the piece. The strike to enforce the list
has been described as "without parallel in nineteenth century England..
Weavers were so hostile to factories that successful attempts were made to
create "cottage factories" where a steam engine was used. to provide power
to a row of cottages, so enabling the weavers to enjoy the independence of
cottage prod.uction together with the use of power looms.
A lock-out in 1860 coincided with the Cobden treaty reducing import
du-ty on French silk, and. the weaving trade in Coventry fell into a peimanent
decline that forced. many outworkers and. factory masters out of the trade.
There was a partial revival in the l880s and. the trade survived into the
twentieth century, mainly on the basis of small workshop production. A
few companies still produce silk ribbons in the city, the chief one being
Cash' s and. Grant's.
The trade was concentrated in the northern and. eastern parts of the
city, principally in Rulluield.s, E)igwick and. Bbleshill, and. some charac-
teristic weavers' cottages can still be seen in these areas. 	 hi the
western side of the city, particularly around Chapelfields the watchmaking
trade flourished in the nineteenth century with the same mode of production
as in ribbon making, nanely home work or small workshops next to the home.
Surviving buildings show a master watchmaker would own a large house With
several cottages for his journeymen built on at the back, with the top floors
3given over to workshops. Watchmakers also had no enthusiasm for large-
scale production, and. this led. to a decline in the trade at about the sjne
time as the decline in ribbon weaving. However, by 1935 -there were still
53 watchmaking concerns in the city,though only two, Roiherham's and
Fred Lee and Co. were of any size.
In 1863, te Coventry Sewing Machine Co. was established in the city
to utilise the pool of skilled labour that existed. The venture did not
prosper, and in 1868 the company turned to bicycle production, turning out
copies of French models.	 One of the people involved in the enterprise was
James Starley, head of a family that played. an important part in the cycle
trade in -the city.
	
Tinder his guidance, the company changed.its name to
the Coventry Machinist Co. and concentrated exclusively on cycles. One of
the offshoots of the firm was the Rover Co. which produced the first "safety
bicycle"in 1885.
For some time the cycle trade was able to exist in harmony with the two
other trades: all were on a small scale, undercapitalised and, without any
clear division between skilled. worker and employer. E.W.Cooper, who claimed.
to be the first cyclist in Coventry, remarked. "at one time, when the demand
exceeded. the supply, the average mechanic with an attic and. a length or two
of 'gas pipe' soon became a full-blown cycle maker." 	 There was much -
overlapping of the trades, with a tendency for small manufacturers to move
out of the older trades into cycle making. In some cases, workers who
despaired. of becoming their own master in their own trade, established them-
selves in another, while a number of manufacturers tried to combine different
trades. At least one man managed. to combine all three of Coventry's -trades.
William Riley inherited. his father's weaving business and ran it for twenty
years before purchasing a local cycle company in 1890, running the two side
by side, before concentrating exclusively on cycles. 	 ie of his inventions
brought in the third. trade, for he experimented. with the fitting of clock
springs onto the back wheels of his bicycles to make them easier to cycle
uphill. It d.id. not appear to catch on. Like James Starley, he became
head of a family that played an important part in the development of
vehicles in the city.(6)
Cycle—making together with watches and ribbons provided, a social
organisation of work that cared. for the individual, providing friendship
and familiarity on the job. The Coventry Machinist Co. may have signalled
a new era in production for the city, but in its early years work was
conducted in the traditional way of working in small groups or gangs, often
cemented together by a paternalist master. The gang system was by no
means peculiar to Coventry, but was particularly strong there, even in
very small workshops where the master was also the gang leader. In the
bigger workshops, leading skilled men would act as sub—contractors, or
"piece gaffers".	 (This teim was common to all trades). They would be
given a price for a job and. would see that the gang they led shared out the
money when the job was done. For a time gang work seemed to go hand in hand.
with paternalism, and even new industries in the city succumbed to it. In
1896, Thomas Smith moved his forging works to Red Lane in Coventry, to
exploit the boom in the cycle trade. An employee at the time recalled,
"Chi summer evenings, you could see a great number of men and.
lads from the works strung out along the side of the canal
trying to catch fish. It all helped to make our happy family
atmosphere. We were like a little village then, all on our
own. Mr. Smith was like a father to us... Hard. -times were
in store for us but we were loyal to the Company because that
loyalty had been put into us as lads by Thomas Smith and, the
way he treated us. " ( 7)
5Obviously, official company histories tend. to favour these sort of state-
men-ts, but the recollections of the workers do not sound false.
	 It is
also worth bearing in mind how close the country caine to the centre of
Coventry,and. that much of the new labour drawn into the city in the period
before the War came from the rural areas of the Midlands, and brought in
rural traditions and ways of behaviour.
Eventually, large-scale production destroyed paternalism, but it did
not destroy- gang work, which continued to exist in sections of the motor
industry well beyond. the Second World War.
The situation of the three trades surviving alongside each other in
harmony, with similar traditions and attitudes, could not last, and it is
a tribute to the independent individualism of the Coventry worker that it
lasted so long. Watchmaking and weaving had lost the mass market and.
been forced -to concentrate on expensive high quality goods in small numbers.
Cycle making, in contrast, had. begin as a trade catering for the luxury
end of the market, but was soon found. to have mass market potential, pro-
viding that the method of production could be changed, and, the old atti-
tudes removed. In fact, there existed a number of strong forces that
were pushing the trade into expansion.
In the first place, the conditions were good. A strong and growing
market existed after the 1870s, while components and. accessories were
readily and. cheaply available from the Birmingham and Black Country area.
The prospect of substantial profits was thus very real.
Secondly, the nature of cyclemaking was such that an equilibrium
could not easily be achieved; the industry had to expand or risk collapse.
Manufacture of cycles stimulated a number of dependent trades, such as
6wheelmaking, chainmaking, steel tubes, tyres and. machine tools. These
trades in turn produced a constant stream of technical improvements that
made continuous updating of models necessary, aM also opened up the way
to motor cycles and. vehicles. These developments, taking place against a
background of fierce competition, needed financing by increased profits
coming from increased, production. Moreover, the existence of a large
number of suppliers with often unreliable supply records forced manufac-
turers to seek the specialisation and expansion of production and assembly.
Another factor was the introduction of new machinery which enabled
manufacturers to reduce their reliance on skilled labour, and. so save on
costs. F\ill benefit from new power presses, drilling machinery, hydraulic
stamps and elaborate lathes could only be achieved through more efficient
use on longer production runs, and by the establishment of separate machine
shops in factories. These new machines had a tremendous effect in an
industry used to the traditional methods of craftsmen. Cooper worked for
some years with Siarley at the Machinists Co., one of the most modern
factories in the Midlands, which had imported skilled men from Birmingham
and London to boost production. 	 ven here craftsmen scorned simple tech-
nical advances. Cooper tried to popularise the use of emery wheels for
polishing, and commented.:
"It will seem incredible, but all work had previously been
filed and polished by hand.. Profitting by my experience
in Birmingham as a brass worker, I was able to demonstrate
the advantages of 'Bru.magem bobs' (as they were contempt-
uously called) when high polish was required. I mention
this in no spirit of boasting, but as showing the conserv-
ative attitude of even first'class workmen at that time." (8)
Clearly a more cosmopolitan outlook on the part of management in the use
of new machinery could make substantial savings in costs, provided, that the
craftsmen could. be made -to change their ways.
7Finally, the most important factor was the availability of capital.
There was no shortage of people outside the city with money to invest in
promising ventures. Initially, the sums required to start production
were very small, but the requirements soon became stiffer. In the early
l880s, men could set up production with a capital of £100 or less, but
Alfred Herbert, at the end. of that decade needed a cheque for £2,000 from
his father together with an equal amount from a partner to buy up a ram-
shackle engineering firm and. begin the production of machine tools arid the
selling of French steel tubes. 	 However, this capital was sufficient
to allow hm to achieve a position of prominence in the industry in a short
space of time.
The trade could miage the reinvestnient of funds generated by trade,
but the rapid influx of capital from outside severely shook the trade and
provoked a number of 'bicycle booms' that were inevitably followed by
periods of overproduction and slump. These upheavals, destructive in the
short term, drove many small producers out of the business, and. allowed
for rapid rationalisation. However, the existence of outside capital
alongside local capital produced a number of potential problems, as the
splits on the boax1 of the Coventry Chain Co. between the London group arid
(10)the local group showed.
These pressures for expansion forced the cycle trade finally to break
with the pattern of small-scale manufacture established by the traditional
trades. Masters and craftsmen who could not or would not accept the
necessary changes were rapidly driven out of the trade. Cooper himself
left in disgust, in 1889, claiming that the piece gaffer system was being
exploited by the employers, who "were now able to play one off against the
other, profiting by competition. The trade, ceasing to become a novelty,
8was fast becoming a grim and stern business of supply and d.emand."
It was not only the employers who were changing: Cooper also noted the
rapid demise of the old way of working:
'9he pace was becoming too fast. I was but one of the
crowd now. The old. order of things was no more. The
shops mostly filled with strangers, pushing and. elbowing
each other, very little comradeship or unity: even trade
unionists were willing to forget fraternal obligations and.
join in the scramble for self." 	 (12)
Cooper's 'Bruinagem bob' had been the thin end. of the wedge which rapidly
turned the workshops into the dreaded factories; in fact the trade saw
the rapid. expansion of an aggressive factory system.
This extension of the factory rstem should not be over-stressed.;
many small-scale producers remained in business for many years. However,
in the space of a few years, large scale production became a reality, and.
a small number of firms became leading producers. In 1890 a handful of
factories in Coventry were setting the pace. By 1896 the Coventry
achinists Co. was claiming 1,000 employees. However, the larger manu-
facturers found. that it was impossible to reconcile planned production with
bouts of boom and over-production. In slump periods attempts were made to
diversify, and the natural market to turn to was that for motor cycles and
cars. Thus a number of the larger cycle companies became car and. motor
cycle producers. This change-over, which initially was a temporary one
to use up surplus productive capacity, became permanent for a number of
large producers after the prolonged slump in the cycle trade in the years
before 1898. Although the trade continued. to grow in the first decade of
the new century, companies that had. made the change did not change back.
Accordingly, there was a drop in the city's share of the cycle industry
from 49per cent in 1891 to 26 per cent in 1911, as the motor industry
took a permanent hold in the
9The change-over to motor prod.uction was facilitated by the fact that
cycle production had. brought a number of specialist accessory and compo-
nent firms to the city that could easily be switched to produce for motors.
Indeed the early motor cycles were merely push cycles with nall motors
attached., while the early motor cars had. a lot of parts in common with
cycles. The change-over allowed a number of specialist producers to
make very high profits for a number of years. Alick Hillstarted the
Coventry Chain Co. with a capital of £300 in 1896, but by 1915 it was
valued at £250,000. Alfred Herbert Ltd.. was the largest machine tool
company in Europe by 1914, and was entirely financed, by the profits it
made. Other companies that came to Coventry primarily to take part in
the cycle trade and stayed. to prosper in the motor trade were white and
Poppe, switching from tools 'to engine manufacture, Dunlop, and. the stamping
companies nith's and Brett's.
Although most of the companies to take up motor production emerged.
from the local trade in the city, the largest and the first came from
outside the area. This was the Daimler Motor Company which moved to the
city to take advantage of the production expertise that had. been built up
in the cycle trade. It produced. its first oars from a disused textile
factory in 1897, and. from the start concentrated. on expensive high quality
cars. In 1910 the company merged. with the Birmingham Small Arms company
to provide greater stability. By 1914 it was clearly the largest an& most
successful factory in the city, employing about 5,000 workers, and. producing
several thousand oars a year.'	 Other companies that started. off in
the motor business included Maud.sley, Standard, and. Deasey, but companies
like Swift, Lea Francis, Allard, Singer, Rover, Riley and. Humber all success-
fully made the transition from cycle production.
Manufacturers had 'turned. to the motor market to broaden their productive
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base, but in fact this market, like that for bicycles, was given to con-
sid.erable fluctuations, and manufacturers who made a killing one year
could be bankrupt the next. Of the 22 companies that entered the motor
vehicle industry in Coventry in the years 1901 to 1905, only 3 were still
in existence by the ].930s.	 (Rover, Standard and. Lea and. FraY1cis).6
The companies most likely to survive this period of uncertainty in the
trade were the ones that were best able to rationalise production. These
companies brought in specialised management, particularly in areas such as
costing, marketing and. output flow, concepts that were quite unknown to the
traditional worker. These changes meant a shift in power away from the
chargehand. to the foreman and later the manager, and from production engin-
eering to production management. In practice, this tendency developed
only slowly over a period of many years. Even after the War, the foreman
was a person of considerable authority, while the company controlled by
businessmen rather -than by engineers wee the exception. Nevertheless,
the tendency was there, and the gradual expansion of management authority
and control over production was seen to be a necessity by. the larger
companies.
In planning production, management could. either organise vertically
or horizontally; that is, they could either specialise in the production
or assembly of certain parts of the vehicle, or they could attempt to
expand their ownership of components producers, and try to produce as much
of their finished product as possible. Most companies tended to specialise
production, and. so allowed. a member of large component companies to develop,
but a few, like Daimler, liked. to produce as much of the finished. product
itself as was possible.
Management decisions would. depend on the sort of market they were
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aiming at, and. even before 1914 ii was necessary for companies to specialise
their market appeal. Daimler and Siddeley—Deasey specialised. in the
luxury traie, Hillman in small cars, while Rover, after running into diffi-
culty with the email car market, established itself successfully in the
large car market with the Rover 12 after 1911.
However specialised, virtually all of the car manufacturers found
-themselves dependent on other manufacturers at some point in time, for
supplies. Records of the Deasey company show that a high proportion of
its early payments went to supplies from other Coventry companies, and
included pajinents to motor producers such as Daimler and. Rover as well as
(17)
local components producers such as Rotax, Dunlop and. British Thomson Houston.
Demand was so variable that producers could easily over—produce certain items,
and. then sell off its surplus stocks to a competitor. This evened out
market swings, but also produced a crop of broken contracts and dissolved
business agreements when demand picked up and supplies were short.
This pushing together of companies,caused. by market fluctuations, led.
quickly to a number of mergers and. partnerships developing. As was noted
above) in i9iO Daimler merged. with the larger B.S.A. company in Lirmingham,
and shortly after also merged with the London—based Associated Equipment
Company. Daimler also ha4 a holding in Coventry Chain, one of its major
suppliers, and had two of its managers serve as directors for this company.
The Chairman of Coventry Chain was also chairman of Thomas Smiths, another
major supplier, -the bulk of whose products went to the Associated Equipment
Co. Thus a chain of companies could be linked, not only through direct
control, but through market -ties and individual contacts.
The motor cycle trade served as a transitional stage for many companies
moving from cycles to cars, and for a time some companies ran all three
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trades side by side. Some companies ended up by specialising in motor
cycles, though the only one to achieve any size was the Triumph company
situated in Priory Street. Other companies, not immediately connected
with the motor trade moved to the city before the War, as Coventry rapidly
built up an image of a city of skills and. profits. 	 In 1912, the British
Thomson Houston Co. arrived, and was the first large electrical engineering
concern in the city.	 It contributed to the motor trade, but most of its
output went into new fields such as telephones and film projectors. An
even more important acquisition for the city was the establishment of a
Courtaulds factory in Foleshill in 1904. This was in a fairly depressed
old weaving centre, while to the north there existed a number of coalmines.
Courtauld.s were hoping for "a supply of suitable and. cheap" female labour
from these communities, and they were not disappointed. 8	The plant
was immensely profitable, with a profit of over £300,000 in 1912, a return
on capital of 77%. The company had a virtual monopoly in the production
of artificial silks, and the Coventry plant, which produced viscose yarn,
employed over 2,500 by 1914.
Another important and. large new concern to move to the city was the
Coventry Ordnanie Works, jointly owned by Cammell Laird and John Brown,
and. established in the city in 1907 to manufacture guns for warships.
Thus by 1914 the old trades in the city had been dwarfed by new
industries. The basic ingredients for the city's later expansion already
existed before the War. In the space of less than two decades, the nature
of work in the city had been transformed as new industries, and with them
new factories had sprung up. There were still many small workshops left,
even in the new industries, and. it is well to remember that most of the
factories were small by later standards. But a decisive event had
13
occurred - large scale industry had arrived in Coventry, and. had. grown
at an extraordinary rate. This development had. profound social and
political implications.
II
	
Population Changes
The two sets of census returns in 1901 and. 1911 give us a reliable
guide to the changing social composition of Coveniry.	 The most
remarkable feature they show is the rate of population growth. In 1901
the population of the city was 69,97 8 ; in 1911 it was 106,349, a growth
of 52.4% - the fastest rate of growth in the his-tory of the city and the
fastest growth for any County Borough in the Kingdom. Until the boundary
changes of 1928 and. 1932, much of what is now Coventry was in the Foleshill
Rural District, to the north and east of the city, and the population of
the District grew by 35% to 23,000.(This changing of boundaries means that
many Coventry statistics have to be handled with care.)
Of the increase of 36,000 in the city, only one—third was accounted
for by natural increase; the remainder was through migration. The figures
for Foleshill show similar proportions. Until 1911 the city's popularity
was s-till regional, for -the largest group of migrants (10,600) came from
the rural areas of Warwickshire, while a further 5,600 came from Binningham.
Staffordshire and. Worcestershire provided substantial numbers, while in
contrast -the -total population in the city from Wales, Scotland and Ireland
was below 2,000. However, there were growing numbers from Lancashire and
Cheshire, and London, both areas with long established. engineering trades.
The structure of -the population is interesting. In the decade covered
by the censuses there was an increase in the proportion of young men. By
1911, over 60% of the inhabitants of Coventry were below the age of 30;
in 1901, females outnumbered males by 2,230, but by 1911 there was a
majority of 2,200 males over females. Sixty percent of the population
between the ages of 20 and. 40 were male. Although more females than
males migrated. to the city from Warwickehire, the male predominance
stemmed from the migration from further afield, being due to a large
number of single men coming in and to family men leaving their dependents
behind.
The city grew continually after 1911, and the population was estimated
at 119,000 in 19l4.(20) By this time only about half of the population of
the young city were natives, though the majority of the 'outsiders' were
native to the Midlands. The influx of workers into the new industries
kept up a continual pressure on accommodation, for the supply of new houses
did not keep up with the population growth. In many ways, Coventry was
well placed -to expand, for there was plenty of land. for building within
reasonable distance of the city centre in every direction. But the City
Council was reluctant to embark on -the hazards of local authority provision
of housing, and. private builders could not keep up with demand. By 1911,
5.3% of the population was living more than two to a room, and the density
of the population grew from 24.6 per acre in 1910 to ' 28.7 in 19141(21) The
result was that many young couples had to uind. lodgings rather than have
new homes, and many others were forced to live outside the city and ttavel
into work every day.
So much available land close -to the city centre was a result of the
survival through the nineteenth century of the commons that almost ringed
-the city, and were protected for usage by the freemen of Coventry. This
ancient practice in ithe past prevented the city from spreading outwards, and.
encouraged high density living in the city centre. In the nineteenth
century, land at the back of large houses was used to create cottages
and densely packed. alleys and. courts. By the twentieth century there
was accordingly a problem of overcrowd, insanitary slums in the city
centre.
In October 1913 the Liberal newspaper, the Coventry Graphic, spoke
of "the indecent, inhuman, and horrifying" conditions in many of these
courts, adding "only those who have taken a tour of the lower quarters
of Coventry can have any idea of the squalor, the hideous congestion, and
the repellent abodes than can be found therein. ,,(22) The City Council
took no positive action before 1914, and the Medical Officer of Health,
Dr. Snell, admitted that the provisions of the 1909 Housing Act on the
demolition of unfit buildings were not being operated due to the lack of
alternative homes for those who would. be made homeless.
As a result of Council inactivity, there was very considerable
variation in the health standards of the city. 	 In 1914 the infantile
death rate was 84.6 per 1,000. In Stoke and Hearsall, outer wards, the
figures were 63 and 64 respectively, but in the inner wards of Greyfriars
and. All Saints, the figures were 167.8 and. 132.9 respectively. The Annual
Report of the Health Officer made it clear that the variations were due to
housing conãitions.(23) In fact, the problem was limited. to a fairly
na1l area, and Coventry lacked. any large slum legacy of the industrial
revolution, for indeed. that revolution had. worn only a timid aspect in the
city. By average standards, Coventry was a healthier and. cleaner city
than most, though this was no consolation to the inhabitants of the courts
which survived. virtually untouched. until the drive against slums in the
].930s.
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Returning to the census figures, we can see the impact of the
engineering industries made on employment in the city. Table 1 shows
the main male occupations in 1911 and. the motor industry can be seen to
be already predominant. Nhule silk weaving and watchmaking accounted
for an important number of jobs, over half were in the engineering trades.
Table 2 shows the main female occupations, and shows the importance of
cycle production to female workers. It is interesting to see that domestic
indoor service was still the second largest category of employment for
women, despite the fact that -this employment was much less important in
Coventry than in the country as a whole. In Coventry the figure of 74
servants per 1,000 households compared to the figure of 175 for Warwick-
shire as a whole and. 371 for Royal Leemington epa.
Table 1:	 Main Occupations for Males 10 years and upwards in Coventry 1911
Numbers engaged in Occupa-tion...........37,322
Cycle makers, motor car makers
and. mechanics.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11,988
General engineering and machine
making................ ..... ..•... ....... 5,602
Building and constru.ction............... 2,909
Food, Tobacco, Drink and Lodging........ 2,058
Commercial or Business Clerks........... 1,584
Tool makers............................. 1,490
Watchmakers, clockmakers.....,......... 1,125
Silk manufacture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 1,032
Source: Census 1911 - County of Warwick.
Table 2:
	
Main Occupation of Females aged. 10 and upwards in
Coventry 1911
Numbers engaged in Occupation...........l3,060
Textile manufacture..................... 2,844
Domestic indoor servants................ 1,741
Cyclemaking... ......................... 1,476
Law, Commercial, Bank, Insurance Clerks. 963
Food, General Shopkeepers and. Dealers... 725
Dressmakers. . . .. . 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
	612
Source: Census 1911 - County of Warwick.
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II Political Parties
While the economic and social life of Coventry was changing rapidly,
political development was much slower, and. the political outlook, on the
surface at least, did not seem very different in 1914 to that in 1900.
The weaving trade left a strong mark on the city's political behaviour.
The small scale nature of the weaving trade and the lack of a clear ivi-
sion between master and. journeyman, produced an. open community in which
everyone who completed their apprenticeship became freemen, eligible to
vote in all elections, and to participate in the management of the freemen's
funds and the enjoyment of freemen's privileges. In the prosperous periods
of the nineteenth century weavers saw themselves as having more in common
with small masters than with unskilled working people. Although Coventry
had a popular franchise, its voters were content to return middle class
radicals rather than working men to Parliament. In 1837 Bell the Chartist
stood. in the General Election in Coventry but was heavily defeated by a
(24)Radical, and. left denouncing the freemen franchise as 'tshopocracy".
The link between weavers and. what became the radical wing of the Liberal
Party endured, and. even after the Cobden treaty had. severely damaged.
Coventry's trading position and caused great distress in the city, the
majority of the weavers stood by the doctrine of free trade, seeking only
a specific exemption for themselves rather than a general abolitioni25)
Yet Bell was right, for Liberal control meant that political power
rested exclusively in the hands of the middle classes in Coventry - the
tradesmen, businessmen, manufacturers and. local professional people.
Weavers might have supported, the Liberals, but there is no sign that they
made any impact on the local party apparatus. The various freemen's
institutions and. charities were likewise in the hands of the local worthies -
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the "shopocracy" leavened with a sprinkling of landed gentry and. manu-
facturers. As an instrument of social control the freemen system lost
much impact after the granting of the suffrage, but the political life of
the city remained, relatively free from working class influence well into
the twentieth century. However, when working people did begin to contest
elections, they seldom stood under the auspices of the Liberal Party.
Having participated in what was a long informal "Lib-Lab" alliance, the
labour movement in the city was well aware of the limitations of trying
to get working men to represent the Liberal Party, and so was ready for the
establishment of an independent party of labour. This contrasts with the
situation in Birmingham where a less well-organised and. more isolated
labour movement felt it necessary to go through a long lasting alliance
with the Liberal Party in the late iineteenth and. early twentieth century)26)
By the twentieth century in Coventry, the local dominance of the Lib-
eral Party had. disappeared, and the Liberals were in a minority on the City
Council. However, it would appear that the Liberals could still rely on
working people's votes in the general elections, for there was always a
Liberal M.P. despite the Conservative majority in the local elections.
Workers discriminated in their voting for there appeared to be no diinc-
tion between the local Liberal and. Conservative parties, either in policy
or in social composition. Both parties drew support from and. gave places
to four groups; small manufacturers, businessmen, professionals and. trades-
men. Political controversy thus frequently cut across party lines, and
many divisions tended to be between the "economy" factions in both parties,
who objected to virtually any form of public expenditure, and. the "rest"
who objected only to money being spent on most things.
Even those who were not of the "economy" group believed that public
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expenditure should be as low as possible, and as a result, civic amenities
were often of a poor standard. Indeed, one of the fiercest controversies
to rage before the War was whether the city could afford to have a Council
House or not. Shortly after 1900, land. was bought in Earl Street for
such a building, and shops were destroyed. But the retail element opposed
the scheme and the land. stood empty for ten years until the retailers won
a majority of the Council to support a plan for a building with shops on
the ground floor, and offices above. Despite local opposition to this,
it went to the Local Government Board, where it was turned down; the
President of the Board, John Burns stated that the city needed a more worthy
Council building. Eventually work went ahead. on the original plans in 1913.
The issue generated much heat, and. was the dominant topic at several
elections, though it appeared to cut across party lines. It is a good
example of the extreme cost consciousness of both parties, a feature of
the city which	 survived through the period.
Lack of political differences did. not stop the two parties from keenly
contesting local elections. Although it would frequently happen that less
than half of the wards would be contested, because of agreements between the
parties, those contests that took place were fought vigorously. In the last
two elections before the War, in 1912 and 1913, the percentage of votes cast
in wards where contests took place was 71.9% of the electorate and 64.7%
respectively. So fiercely did the two parties engage each other that lhe
elections became something of a scandal, and tales of bribes and free drink
-and car trips circulated.. After the 1912 elections, which appear to have
been particularly scandalous, the three parties (for the Labour Party was
then contesting seats) agreed. that all canvassing would cease on the evening
of the election, and. that no political activity would. take place on the day
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itself. This agreement was not revived, after the War.
After the 1913 elections, the Conservative Party had. 27 seats on the
City Council, including aldermen; the Liberals had. 16, Labour 2 and. there
was 1 Independent. (This was the highest number of seats the Labour Party
held. before the War). This was the last election until those in November
1919. The two major parties had an agreement dividing the aldermanic
seats between them according to the number of Councillors they had.. Thus
a resolution passed by the Municipal Committee of the Liberal Association
in 1913 stated:
"That Alderman Drinkwater be deputed to approach the leader
of the Conservative Party in the City Council, and. press
Councillor Snape's claims -to the Aldermanic Vacancy, and. to
give a pledge to support Dr. Soden for the next vacancy if (27)
they consent to support Councillor Snape on this occasion."
This was a regular occurrence, but the two parties kept quiet about these
fixes, and. made sure that the Labour Party was kept off the Aldexmaflic
bench.
In the 1930s, when it was clear that the Labour Party was likely to
become the majority party, local newspapers accused it of introducing
party politics into the Council Chamber. In fact, even before the War
the two other parties were organised. inside the Chamber as well as outside.
Both parties had their leaders, Municipal Committees, and some form of
discipline for councillors. The only difference between the two periods
was that in the later one there were serious political differences between
the main parties, while this was not the case before the War.
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IV	 The Co-operative Movement
If such a thing as a labour movement can be said. to exist, -then it
can be divided, into three constituent groups - the trade unions, the
Labour and other political parties, and the co-operative movement. A
survey of these groups in the city before the War does suggest -that there
was a common ideology and an overlap of personnel and. purposes that justifies
the use of the word movement.
Perhaps the weakest group, in texms of a sense of common purpose,
though the strongest economically, was the co-operative movement. Given
the co-operative nature of the work in the city's trades, and. the sense of
independence that was so strong in the nineteenth century, it is not sur-
prising that a strong co-operative tradition existed in Coventry. Co-op-
eration can be traced back at least to 1829, and an Owenite venture ran
in the years 1840-43. This was followed by -the Labourers and Artisans
Co-operative Society, established with help from Charles Bray, intellectual,
phrenologist, friend. of George Eliot, and. co-operator. Not only did. it
retail goods but it acquired land. for use as workmen's allotments. But
the slump in the l860s, combined with bad management, killed it off.
In contrast to the rather grandiose schemes in Coventry, a small group
in Foleshill established a more conservative co-operative society, which
later claimed to be the oldest surviving in the country - the Lockhurst
Lane and Foleshill Industrial Co-operative Society. Up to 1862 it protected
itself from the fluctuations of trade by remaining a closed corporation
limited to forty members. After 1862 it relaxed its membership restric-
-	 (28)tion.
In 1867, a group of young men from the West Orchard Congregational
Chapel, mainly clerks, weavers and watchmakers, formed the Coventry
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Perseverance Co-operative Society, with a membership of 48 and. a capital
of £64. Many of the founder members, including Joseph Hepworth, the first
President, came from the North of England and were consciously trying to
import a Rochdale-4ype society aimed at religious and moderate men. After
many early years of hardship, the society began to expand, and steps were
taken to provide a respectable image. Thus, in 1877, new headquarters
were established, in West Orchard, and the opening ceremony presided over
by the Mayor, ended with the National Anthem. As late as 1916 the first
historian of -the society declared "Politics and Religion have never been
(29)allowed to vex the Co-operative movement."
Notwithstanding this emphasis on respectable self-help, the society
came under attack from a least a section of the shopocracy. Its report
to the Co-operative Congress in 1893 stated that "it had been openly
attacked in the public press by several of the leading traders of -the city,
who have become jealous of the progress made by the society". The President
and Secretary of the Society, both employees of the Coventry Gas Company,
were forced on pain of diamissal to sever all their connections with the
(30)Co-Op?
This persecution did not interfere with the growth of the Society.
By 1908 the Co-op. owned large bakeries and. dairies, had about 10,000
members, a turnover of £240,000, and a dividend, that averaged. 2s. 6d.in
the £. This increase in size brought it to the attention of the trade
union movement, and trade unionists and Labour Party members began -to get
elected to the Management Board. In 1914 for the first time the Society
resolved that all its employees should become members of trade unions.
This decision can be taken as a sign -that the Society was prepared to identify
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itself with the working class movement, but -there is no doubt that it hail
moved very slowly in this direction, and. its commitment was still partial,
as the controversies after the War inside the Society showed. The religious
inspiration, together with the fact -that the Society preceded -the growth of
trade unions meant that it required. an
 effort to bring it into a position
of support for organised labour.
V	 The Unions
Before examining -the growth of modern trade unions in the city, it is
well to remember some of the peculiarities of employment in Coventry. The
rapid shift from workshop to factory meant that payment systems appropriate
to emall scale production were carried on by larger factories. In practice
this meant an early development of piece—work payment. Before 1914, there
was a gradual move -to piece—work in engineering and. allied. trades throughout
the country, but the move in Coventry was particularly rapid. Often it was
gang piece—work, but as the supervisors and foremen yielded some of their
influence to higher management, -the bargaining power of the gangs dwindled,
and -the individual worker had. to confront management. G.D.H.Cole wrote:
"The result of the dispute of 1879 was to give an impetus
to the movement for the introduction of piece—work and.
similar systems, and at the same time to give collective
sanction -to the method of purely individual bargaining
on all questions of piece—work prices. Under the curious
name of 'utuality", this method became firmly established.
over a considerable part of the industry." (32)
Thus there were national causes for the decline of -the bargaining power
of the gang. However, Cole went on to comment that the mutuality clause
was gradually subverted. as Workshop Committees appeared. to regulate prices,
and. a gang system would probably make it easier for these committees or
2for piece-work stewards to appear, though there is not enough available
evidence in Coventry -to make a firm statement on this point.
Piece-work systems were forced on the trade unions 7
 and caused
disputes well after the 1897 lock-out. In 1907, the tinsmiths at Daimler
went on strike against a premiun bonus system, but although they were out
for seven weeks they	 If these men 7 some of the most highly
organised in the Ci-ty, could not defeat new payment systems, then it was
unlikely that any others would. In fact, for most unskilled and- semi-
skilled workers, piece-work preceded effective trade union organisation.
Trade union opposition -to piece-work was based on -the fact that it
hindered the acceptance of a flat district rate. It also divided produc-
tion workers against themselves and against the skilled worker. The
skilled worker was confined to producing, setting, modifying arid maintain-
ing the production machines, while the semi-skilled worker worked them.
The former remained on a flat time rate, the latter went onto piece rates.
The groups of workers thus had. different objectives, with the unionised
skilled workers concerned -to preserve -their higher earnings differentials,
and the machine operators encouraged to act and negotiate individually.
Although it cannot be quantified, it seems that the early arid rapid
spread of piece-work in the city enabled the employers to develop payments-
by results schemes that were highly profitable to themselves. Mi example
of this is in the foundry industry. In 1922 the National Union of Foundry
Workers agreed with the Engineering nployers' Federation to accept payment
by results in foundries. In fact, most Coventry foundries alrea&y had
payment by results by 1922, and on terms that were more favourable to the.
employer than those agreed on in 1922. In particular, it was unusual in
the Coventry area for ny payments to be made for "scrapped castings" -
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jobs scrapped. due to faulty workmanship, while the 1922 agreement allowed.
time rates to be paid. Coventry employers found themselves in strong
opposition to the EEP, and tried to insist on the continuation of the more
favourable practices that they had. established..
Although the census does not help us, it appears that in the years
before the War an increasingly large proportion of the workforce in
engineering was regarded by employers as unskilled. In fact the term
"machine mind.er" could and did cover a wide range of skills, but both
employers and. craft unions, for their own reasons, were reluctant to
recognise this. The increase of semi— and unskilled workers in engineer-
ing was a national pattern, but again the move in Coventry appears -to have
been particularly strong. This large number of semi— and unskilled
workers made unionisa-tion difficult, but it brought the general unions
to the city.
Despite severe trade fluctuations, there is no doubt that wages in
Coventry were high, and. unemployment, for the most part, low. Again, it
is not possible to produce details to confirm this statement, and. the
seasonal nature of the motor trade meant that conditions of employment
could. vary from month to month. Nevertheless, high earnings contributed
to the migration to the city. But a major contributor -to high earnings
was excessively long hours; in spring and. autumn, peak production times
in the vehicle industry, great pressure was put on workers to regard overtime
as compulsory. The national agreement between the engineering unions and
the EEF was supposed to limit the hours of overtime to the generous figure
of 32 hours a mQn-th, but allowed work to fixed delivery dates or emergency
work to carry unlimited. overtime. The minute books of the District
Committee of the ABE in Coventry record the difficulties in trying to limit
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overtime to the national agreement, and the many occasions when overtime
working became excessive. Finally, in Aug.ist 1910, an agreement between
the CDEEA and. the five principal engineering unions in the city stated:
"In view of the special conditions of trade in Coventry,
the Enployers' Association are unable to agree to a
limitation of overtime in all cases to 32 hours per
month, but are prepared to agree to a maximum of 15 hours
in any one week, and that systematic overtime is to be
deprecated as a method of production, and that an effort
shall be made to observe as far as possible a limit of
32 hours per month." (35)
The agreement also stated that the basic week for day workers was one
of 54 hours, with work ending at noon on Saturday, and 45 hours for night
workers. Thus the maximum hours permitted by the agreement were 69 a
week. This excessive overtime has to be seen in the context of systema-
tic short—time working and layoffs in times of low demand.
In the skilled engineering trades in the city, the two dominant
unions were the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, and the Amalgamated
Society of Toolmakers. Nationally, the ASE was much bigger than the
Toolmakers, but in Coventry there was little difference in size between
the two. Both unions organised fitters and turners, though the ABE
organised other groups as well. There was no clear division between the
groups that the two unions negotiated for, and there 'were some ABE members
who worked in toolrooms. Both unions were organised in a similar way,
with power lying with the lay officials on the District Committees. Both
were very conscious of their craft status, and their officials tended to be
conservative in outlook.
Conservatism was particularly strong in the Toolmakers. Several
braxiches of the union, as late as 1914, refused to join the Trades Council
because of its policy of political representation for workers that was
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independent of the Liberal and. Conservative parties. Those who remained
(36)
to play a part in the Trades Council were men like John Chater, 	 a man
known for his moderate views. The only detailed figures of trade union
membership in the city before the War date from the Annual Report of the
Trades and Labour Council of 1913, which shows the Toolmakers as having
2,634 members (of whom 1,366 were affiliated -to the Trades Council) com-
pared with -the ABE's membership, recorded as 2,670, all affiliated to the
Trades Council.
The ABE also tended to support craft-conscious conservative policies.
Its Organising District Delegate for the Midlands before the War was George
Ryder, a man who appears to have been particularly severe in his attitude
to general unions. However, members of the ABE were sometimes outside
toolmaking and toolroom shops and nearer to the problems of production
than were members of -the Toolmakers' Society. Consequently the union
had to push for better organisation to overcome management use of piece-
work and. overtime.
Conservatism in -the craft unions meant first of all an acceptance of
-the existing trade union structure with its dozens of craft bodies, many
of them very small, in engineering alone. 	 It meant, a refusal to see a
common identity with unskilled or unorganised. workers or with women workers.
It meant a reluctance to see trade unions involved with politics, and a
desire to protect the trade through restrictions. The moderate conservative
approach was opposed by supporters of union amalgamation, supporters of
general unions and by members of -the political organisations such as the
ILP or the BSP.. The changing nature of industry meant that the conserva-
tism of the craft unions had the potential for acquiring a radical edge,
and during the War the craft workers were in the vanguard of the struggle
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in the factories.
Well before the War, the ASE had tried, to develop a shop steward
system.	 Initially the stewards in the city were little more than collec.-.
tore of union dues, but they gradually extended their activities to holding
a watching brief for the union on working conditions in the factories, and.
reporting to the branch or district committee. In some areas, especially
where piece-work was common, stewards began to break down the principle of
mutuality and take on and argue cases affecting their members. Advanced
factories had. set up stewards' or works' committees before the War, though
these were
In 1907 the District Committee of the ASE made a survey of the union's
stewards, and. it was reported that there were 21 in the district, though
only 14 of these were still operating. The stewards were spread over a
number of different factories, with the only concentration being at the
Coventry Ordnance Works, where there were four active stewards. (As a
relative newcomer to the city, the Ordnance had. to offer higher wages
initially than other firms, and. accept a stronger trade union organisation).
In July 1907, the District Committee took the novel step of trying to
establish a new type of stewards' system, on the basis of representation
of all the members; there would. be either one steward for each department
or one for about 50 members. The idea caine from reports of a similar
experiment carried out by the Glasgow District Committee, and it was
decided to concentrate on the Humber New Works and the Ordnance. Although
a shop meeting of Ordnance members was poorly attended, 8 new stewards were
elected, but the movement did not prosper, possibly because a long-drawn-
out dispute over pay at the Ordnance distracted the attention of the District
Committee. At any rate, the system did not spread out from the Ordnance to
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the other factories as was hoped. 8
	still, it shows that the Coventry
committee was in touch with other areas, arid 	 e keen to make changes if
rth could.
The dispute that occurred at the Ordnance in 1907 Was not particularly
significant, but gives an interesting picture of the problems facing craft
organisation in the city. The district rate for skilled workers at that
time was 8d. an hour, but men in the gun bays at the Ordnance were only
getting 8d. Moreover, the manager,	 was making life difficult
for union members, and. men asking for the district rate were being sacked.
One report to the District Committee states:
"Things were unbearable, they were being sweated and
bullied and as soon as their jobs were finished out they
had to go till fresh jobs were ready." (40)
In August the Toolmakers and AZE imposed a ban on overtime, and. got
the local Federation of gineering Unions, which had the ten main
engineering unions in the area in it, to impose its ban. By October it
was clear that the firm was getting round. the overtime ban by using boys
and unskilled workers, and. the Workers' Union, which belonged to the
Federation, was allowing its members to work overtime. The ASE resolved
that none of i-ta members were to start work in the gun shops for less than
the full rate, and those working there at 8d an hour were eventually to be
withdrawn. The Federation also took up this position. By December ii was
clear than. this action was not working and. that members of some unions were
in no mood for a dispute. A tense meeting of the Federation decided by
the Chairman's casting vote to call off the dispute, hiding the defeat by
calling it a postponement until a move for a general wage advance was to
be made in the city. The ASE objected to -this decision, and criticised
the Federation for inconsistency, and. also claimed that the "sectionals" -
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its word for -the other craft unions - had. allowed their members to start
work for 8. an hour during the dispute. Nevertheless, they reluctantly
agreed to call the dispute Off.(41)
So despite the existence of the Federation, the different craft unions
could still fall out, and. indeed the minute book of the ASE District
Committee recorded a number of complaints a about this time of the action
of other unions' members, while no doubt these unions would criticise the
ASE.
The dispute also showed how -the old. forms of struggle survived in the
craft unions. The District Commit-tee did not see its duty as being to call
a strike, but to impose a rate for the job, and force its members to achieve
-that rate. Indeed, an engineer not getting the district rate could. be
refused admittance -to the union. Much, then, still rested with -the indi-
vidual member, who had. the obligation to fight for his rights. This image,
of the independent craftsman standing up for his rights was rapidly becoming
a fiction, but in the period before -the War, blacking of goods and boycotts
were more important to -the craft unions as sanctions than were strikes.
In the con-text of large and. expanding factories, with a group of skilled
unions competing against each other and being threatexed by the unskilled, the
craft myth of the independent artisan faded away. The idea of respectability ,
which had played an important part in the opposition to the factory in the
nineteenth century, took a few knocks as well, and no doubt die-hard opponents
told themselves they were right, as they read in the Coven-try Sentinel(42)of
the celebration party given by the Daimler Company (the most respectable in
-the city) in honour of its newly-patented engine, the "Silent Knight". The
party turned out to be less than silent:
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The Daimler gave a party;
They had. piano playing,
And. speakers too, but very few
Could. hear what they were saying.
On Friday in the Drill Hall met
Two thousand hands or more,
And. most of them got very wet
As down the drink did. pour.
The Singers tried their hardest
To get a decent show;
The audience howled louder:
"Oh, oh, Antonio,"
And all of them grew the merrier
The more drink did they mop,
And. some fought with empty bottles
Till the constables made them stop.
The Daimler gave a party -
Where is that party now?
Where is the flowing whisky,
And the once infernal row?
Gone when the dawn of morning
Breaks on the scene of the fight -
Smashed chairs and empties witness
The joys of the "Silent nightZ"
No doubt the skilled workers at the Daimler, after they had. sobered up,
would have put the blame on the shiftless members of the Workers' Union, for
one of the most important features of the Coventry trasie union world was
the establishment of a strong Workers' Union in the city in the years
before the War.
This establishment was not easy. The Workers' tJnion was founded in
1898, and a branch was started in Coventry in October 1899, aiming at the
orgaxiisation of all grades of labour in all industries, but particularly
the unskilled worker. There are no surviving records of the early days
of the Coventry branch, but it is known that it struggled for survival
for several years. The Annual Report of the Union in 1907 shows that the
Coventry branch had an income of £90, which suggests only a couple of
hundred paid up members. W.H.Lissaznan, a prominent local socialist, was
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the branch secretary.	 The dispute at the Ordnance in that year,
already referred to, shows the weakness of the Union. It refused to
obey the Federation's instructions to ban overtime, and. when the craft
unions remonstrated, the Union replied that its members wished to co-
operate,
"But pleaded. that they were open to the danger of
all being cleared out en bloc as men of their class
were easy to obtain. The Union felt toOinsecure
to take drastic action as scarcely 10% of their
members were in benefit. They felt that the Federa-
tion had. scarcely given them the help they had. a right
to expect in orgaziising the unskilled men in Coventry." (44)
It offered to ban overtime only if the Federation would agree to a
rmpathy strike if Workers' Union members were victimised. This the
Federation was not prepared to do, and it was eventually agreed that
Workers' Union members would be allowed, to work up to 15 hours a week
overtime until it became financially strong enough to enforce Federation
decisions.
By 1912, the Union could be said. to have reached this position of
strength and. to have made a strong impact on wages and conditions in the
city. Between 1907 and. 1910 it more than doubled in size, and. after 1910
the rate of increase accelerated. In 1911 a second branch was formed,
and by the end of 1912 there were 4 branches, one of 'them exclusively for
women; in the same year the Union at last achieved recognition from the
CDEEà.. Increased, employment in the city allowed the Union to recruit
successfully, and. campaign for a minimum wage of 6d. an  hour for unskilled
engineering workers. (This was about 70% of the skilled rate). John
Beard., Midlands Organiser and General Secretary of the Union pointed to
the need. for high basic wages, saying "Conditions here are abnormal, men
have to travel many miles to work, owing to a shortage of houses, and 'the
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cost of living is apart from house rents, very high."	 A well
organised campaign culminated in a short strike at three of the largest
factories in the nployers' Association in May 1912, just at the height
of the spring production of motor vehicles. After a few days , the
employers gave way and not only conceded the demand for 27/— for a 54
hour week, but also agreed to recognise locally the Union as possessing
negotiating rights on behalf of unskilled workers. The Union had thus
established itself as a force to be reckoned with.
Beard commented that it was a "short, sharp, well—organised conflict,"
which, he claimed,
"Despite many obstacles, not the least of them that the
skilled workers refused to associate with us achieved 6d
per hour minimum in the cycle, motor and engineering trades.
nd again, in spite of the prophecies of the higher paid,
we are a recognised Union by the ployers' Association." (46)
Clearly relations with the craft unions were still poor, although the support
received by the Union included support from the craft—dominated Trades
Council.
As a result of the success, Beard. Was able to say that "Coventry men
may be taken as the leaders of this or any other Union, so far as wages
are concerned, though we have always to recognise that Coventry is an
expensive city for workmen to live •,,(47) In fact the new rate of 27/—
for 54 hours for unskilled men, although still well below the fitters'
and turners' rate of 38/— for 53 hours, involved a sizeable increase for
many workers, with some men getting an increase of up to 6/9d a week. Of
equal importance was the establishment for the first time of a single
district rate for labourers. Before the strike some of the labourers
were already getting 6d an hour, although this was not general, and
according to the Trades Council the men already on the rate played an
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important part in the struggle, for it stated that "All grades of members
nobly responded to the demand, the highest paid. members caine out in
support of the lowest paid.1I(48) It should be remembered that a year
later, in 1913, the Workers' Union was in the forefront of the Black
Country strikes, where the demand was for a weekly rate of 23/— for
unskilled, workers, so clearly even before the war relatively high wages
had been established.
It is likely that the Coventry success was an important encouragement
to union orgaxiisers and. strikers in the Black Country, and. it appears that
at the time Coventry was one of the strongholds of the Union, which was
mainly organised outside engineering, and. Coventry activists were able to
help in a number of disputes. This help was always needed, for while
the unskilled could. rely on help from socialists and a number of middle—
class sympathisers, (many vicars showed sympatby with the Black CQuntry
strikers), little help was forthcoming from the established. 'trade union
leadership. The typical attitude was expressed. by George Byd.er, Organising
District Delegate for the ABE, covering an area that included Coventry,
Birmingham and the Black Country. In the ABE Monthly Journal, writing
under the headline '!Engineering and the Strike, Plain Words to the Workers'
Union. A shilling and. a Button do not Make a Trade Unionist," he complained
'that the strike was being spread needlessly, and hinted, ai intimidation.
Men were striking without stopping to think where the dispute pay was
coming from, and were causing skilled men to get laid off. Even worse,
he claimed
"rhe Workers' Union is not so much directing the strikes
as following them, and is making members by the thousand..
Men who have resisted. all inducements to join the skilled
unions for which they are eligible are paying their shilling
entrance fee and consider themselves trade unionists as
soon as 'they can get a button in their coats."
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This is a back-handed compliment, for it is admitting that the Workers'
Union had. succeeded where other unions had failed, though there is no
evidence to suggest that the other unions tried. all that hard to recruit.
Ryder went on to say
"While the fight for the improvement of the conditions
of what is called. 'The Bottom Dog' claims the sympathy
and support of every trade unionist, we cannot be
expected to go into raptures of applause concerning
fitters, turners, smiths, etc., who have been content
to work for from two to five shillings under rate along-
side our members, and. having been thrown into a struggle
they did not seek expect to be hailed as valiant warriors
and to purchase their place among the elect for a shilling
entrance fee and threepence a week contribution." (49)
Written at the height of the Black Country struggle, this is a classic
piece of craft union vindictiveness, and contains most of the criticisms
that were levelled at general unions for several decades to come. The
concept of spontaneous unorganised action was one that Ryder found.
difficult to grasp, just as he was unable to understand the position
of the skilled worker who was too weak to use individual action to get
his proper rate of pay but had to rely on mass action. All Ryder could
see was irresponsible strikes that were likely to run down union funds,
and demands from unskilled men to try to achieve overnight what had.
taken the craft unions decades to get. Anyone can put a button on their
coat but only a member of the elect could. be
 a consistent and. responsible
unionist for life. Trade unionism, like salvation, was a matter of hard
work and. application. If a man was not a good. unionist getting his proper
rate, he had only himself to blanie. Ryder was a Councillor in Smethwick,
and a leading representative of the self-help wing of trade unionism as
opposed to the more activist wing represented. by the socialistic leader-
ship of the Workers' Union.
The Workers' Union in Coventry continued to grow right up to 1914.
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However it suffered. from the problem of a rapid. turnover in membership.
The financial position of the Union in Coventry in 1913 suggests that
over 2,000 new members joined in that year, yet its total affiliated
membership in six branches according to the Trades Council in 1913, was
only 2,166.	 It could. be
 that these figures were out of date, or that
the branches had not affiliated. their full membership, but the high level
of union entrance fees strongly suggests that there was a rapid. turnover
of membership.(50) By the outbreak of War, the Union had over 3,000
paid. up minbers, and. was the largest union in the city.
Politically, the growth of the Workers' Union was closely linked to
the growth of the Labour Party and socialist movements. Lissaxnan,
Poole, Morris, Mabbs, Alice Arnold., and. many others of the early champions
of the Union were active in either the ILl', SDF, or the Labour Representa-.
tion Committee. After 1913, the Workers' Union was given its first sub-
stantial vote on the Trades Council, though it still appears to have been
under-represented, but it was able to increase socialist influence on that
body, and. in 1919, the rather erratic socialist, A.E.Mabbs, a Workers'
Union member, was elected. Presid.ent.
The Union was mainly organised. in the engineering industry, but did.
try to organise outside it. It organised. the bus and. tram drivers, and
tried -to organise the workers a the Foleshill factory of Courtau].ds.
The company had a rigidly anti-union policy, wages were low, and conditions
poor. Nearly all of the unskilled workers were women, but even the male
engineers there were poorly organised.. Workers at the plant had to
suffer strong smells, high. temperatures, and. an atmosphere that caused.
temporary blindness to some of them. Local residents complained. of the
smells, and. the conditions there provoked Arthur Henderson to speak of
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them in the House of Commons. The Sentinel ran a campaign against
local conditions, describing them as "loathsome, injurious and degrading. ,,(52)
The Workers' Union made a number of attempts to organise the plant,
the most successful being in December 1913, when a strike occurred. over
the behaviour of a supervisor, but quickly turned into one of union recog
nition. After a few days out, the majority of the 2,500 workers went
back, but over 600 remained on strike for over a month. Vigorous picket-
ing produced a number of incidents, but the strikers eventually gave up
without winning recognition. It appears that the hard core of -the
strikers were men and, that the women were slow -to respond, especially in
view of the company's tactics which were to buy off key groups with higher
wages, and give bonuses at times of union pressure.'
Lack of success in unionisation may have been due to lack of coor-
dination between the Workers' Union and. the National Federation of Women
Workers. Both organisations were trying to recruit women, and appear -to
have regarded each other as rivals. Their attempts to recruit at
Courtaulds seem to have been carried on in isolation of each other. An
undated newspaper report, (but probably from the Sentinal in 1912) give
an account of a recruitment speech by Mrs. Young, a national officer of
the NFWW, during a visit to Coventry. She addressed a mass meeting of
girls, mainly from Courtaulds and the Ordnance, and. was supported on the
platform by several prominent members of the local labour movement, though
no one from the Workers' Union was present. There also seemed -to be an
important difference in tactics between the two unions, for Mrs. Young
favoured recognition talks with the Courtauld.s management without any
threat of union sanction. She claimed the manager of Courtaulds was
sympathetic "and he had expressed his willingness to meet the trade union
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representatives at any time respecting working conditions." To loud.
applause, she went on to denounce "the tyrannies of some of the foremen
and foremistresses," but said "If they found either foremen or forewomen
-taking undue advantage of their positions they could appeal with confidence
to their manager, who had assured her that his interest was entirely in his
workpeople."	 In view of -the fact -that the strike in 1913 was caused
by management's refusal to act against unpopular supervision or to recognise
the right of unions to represent the workforce, these assurances did not
amount to much. The episode suggests -that manr of the established, unions
in the city were prepared -to back -the actions of a respectable campaign
for recognition rather -than support the Workers' Union attempt to stage a
strike. In the event, both methods failed, and the plant remained Un-
organised. for many years, though organisation at Courtauld.s Engineering
was better.
In fact, despite the variety of jobs for women, the two unions made
little headway in organising them. The Federation was able to call
meetings and. organise branches in some of the textile concerns but found.
it difficult to keep them going.	 It had occasional successes, as at
J. Cramp and. Son in 1913, but in that year its affiliated membership of the
Trades Council was only 450, while the Women's Branch of the Workers' Union
had only 110 affiliated members.	 The Federation had had. a women's
organisation in the city from 1906, while the Women's branch of the Workers'
Union only dated from 1912. In the same year, the national membership of
the Federation was less than 1 5, 000 so the Coventry branch was one of the
largest in the country. Nevertheless, the majority of women workers in
the city, as elsewhere, remained. untouched. by trade unionism before 1914.
Among the other unions of importance in the city, the largest was the
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United. Kingdom Society of Coachmakers (later the National Union of
Vehicle Builders).	 In 1913 it claimed. 800 members in Coventry, and its
full time organiser throughout the period was E1ward Buckle. The union
had ma.e a successful transition from coach to car building, and. its
members included some of the most highly paid. workers in the city.
The Coventry branch was the largest branch in the union. Other craft
unions, with their 1913 membership, were the Steam gine Makers (400
members) the National Society of Brassworkers and Metal Mechanics (590
members) the United Machine Workers Association (400 members) and. the
Birmingham Operative Society of Tinpiate and Sheet Metal Workers (also
400 members).(56) This last body was the most aggressive craft unions
and. had. been the only one to fight the premium bonus system at the Daimler
in a long and ultimately unsuccessful strike in 1907. In 1909 it had.
seceded from the National Amalgamated Tin Pla te Workers, as it wanted
local autonomy of funds, and. the union was restricted to Birmingham,
Coventry, and. the South Midlands. Soon after 1909 the National Amalgamated.
established its own branch in. Coventry, and. although it did. not affiliate
to the Trades Council till after 1914, it appears to have had several
hundred members in that year. There does not appear to have been very
intense rivalry between the two unions, nor does it seem to have weakened.
organi sation.
Before the War, there were no large unions in the city outside the
engineering industry. In 1913, the National Union of Railwarmen had 370
members, the Co—op Enp1oyees had. 370, the National Union of Clerks 300, the
Typographical Association 269, the Carpenters and. Joiners 266 and the Gas
Workers and General Labourers 206. The various construction unions
probably had a fair number of members, but several were not affiliated. to
the Trades Council.	 Of the 12,800 affiliated Trades Council members,
some 8,500 came from -the vehicle engineering, and metal
The Annual Report of the Trades Council for 1913 also carried a trade
directory, which showed that the highest paid. group of workers in the city
were patterrmiakers, getting lO&d. an hour. They were closely followed by
Coachmakers and Panelbeaters on 9d. to 103. an hour, Coppersmiths (9d),
Woodcut-ting Nachinists (9d. to 101), Toolroom workers (9d), skilled pro-
duction workers (8d), Braseworkers (8-&d) machine hands approximately
7d., and. labourers 6d.. In fact many production workers would get higher
pay, through payment by results schemes. Electricians got the same rates
as skilled production workers, while skilled building workers got 9 an
hour. Corporation employees got up -to 6d an hour, but adult shop assist-
ants got between 4d and. 7d. They also worked up to 62 hours a week
(exclusive of meal breaks) while engineering workers had. a 53 hour basic
week. (58)
The fulness of the reports of the Trades Council shows the importance
of this body in the years before the War. Its size and influence increased
more rapidly than that of the Labour Party, and it could claim to be the
authentic voice of organised labour in the city. Its membership figures
show the rapid. progress trade unions made as industry expanded in the
years before the War. In 1907 22 union branches with less than 3,000
members were affiliated, but affiliated membership grew to 7,491 in 1911
and 12,847 by 1913, in 64 branches.	 This explosion of union member-
ship was partly due to an increasing number of trade union branches decid-
ing to join the Trades Council, but mainly due to a rapid extension of
trade unionism itself in the engineering trades. Even after accounting for
the rise of the Workers' Union, it is clear that there was still a very
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rapid advance in all sections. There is/sufficient evidence -to say
whe'ther this advance was characterised. by industrial militancy and strike
action, and. there does not seem to have been any great wave of unrest;
nevertheless, a growth of this size suggests very strongly indeed that
significant changes were occurring in the consciousness of working people.
Nationally, trade union membership in -the same period grew substantially,
though not at the same rate, and it seems safe -to conclude that Coventry
moved from being a city where trade unions had little power to being one
of the better organised cities (bearing in mind all the limitations this
implies) in -the few years before the War.
The Trades Council combined its rapid growth as -the organ of organised
labour in the city with a vigorous and wide ranging intervention in -the
political life of Coventry. This also reflected the very great change
-that occurred in the two decades before the War. The Trades and. Labour
Council, to give it its full name, was not established until 1890, which
is remarkably late for a city the size of Coventry, and in its early years
seemed to apologise for its existence by ensuring that it made no dramatic
political or industrial moves. There was no continuity with the weaving
trade unions, which were not affiliated to the Council, and. the impetus
came from -the cycle workers.	 Its first secretary, J. Crompton, was a
prominent Liberal, and the Council's main aims as described in its first
Annual Report was the modest one of '!Bringing to the notice of public men
subjects which individual societies could not have taken p with so much
(60) -	 -	 -
advantage;"	 in other words it was -to act as a lobby rather than unite
a working class movement.
In contrast, its objects as set down in 1913 were more detailed and
more self—confident. Its constitution stated
l2
By forming a permanent local centre for Trades and. Labour Societies:
1. To give increasing efficiency to the operation of such societies.
2. To afford assistance in defence of trade union principles.
3. To discuss and promote all questions benefitting -the members
of' such Societies, and the workers generally.
4. To give needed help to local Branches or Societies affiliated.
5. To watch over the local interests of Labour and. to take part
in national efforts to promote the welfare of Trade Unionists
and workers generally.
6. To use its influence towards amicable settlement of local
disputes. (61)
This gave the Council considerable scope, and the right to intervene in
all local affairs. A few years earlier, it had defined its scope even
wider and. run into a confrontation with the local Labour Party. In 1909,
four trade union branches disaffiliated from the Council complaining -that
it was -too involved in politics. 	 In 1910, the issue was settled, and
the Council "thought it wise to confine the operations of -the Council to
industrial matters only, and leave political action to that other body
of Trade Unionists formed for the purpose. ,,(62) This shows that the
Trades Council was making the running even in political affairs at -this
time, and the resolution was defined in -the narrow sense, to exclude party
politics, and not to exclude all political affairs.
Even the ban on party politics could, and had to be, got round. In -
the general election of 1912, the Council took the somewhat convQluted
position outlined below:
"That this Council, whilst unable to officially support a
Labour Candidate, yet is of -the opinion that an industrial
constituency like Coventry ought to be represented in the
House of Commons by a direct representative of the workers,
and -therefore recommends all organisations to give their
best support to the present effort now being made to secure
this object."	 (63)
The no party politics restriction was dropped shortly afterwards.
Although knowledge of the Council's activity is restricted by the
shortage of documentary evidence, it is clear that the two issues that
received, most attention, other than industrial matters, were housing and.
education. On housing, the Council expressed concern over the shortage
of houses for working people, and in particular landlords' attempts to
eject working class tenants from cheap property in order to renovate
them and let them at a higher rate. The City Council for many years
refused to have any housing policy at all, and refused to make any pro-
vision for evicted families except to offer the Workhouse. The Trades
Council also called for a municipal housing programme, and in 1910
formed a Housing Joint Committee with the Co-operative Society, the ILP
and. the Labour Party. A programme was agreed covering the following
points:- l.To insist on local: landlords maintaining their properties
in good repair. 2. To educate public opinion to the need for garden
suburbs for the workers. 3. To press the City Council for proper Town
planning schemes for the future, and 4. To advocate the completion of the
Narrow Lane Housing Scheme, and. provision for further artisans dwellings
with larger bedrooms and. gardens. A campaign around these points was
mounted, and may have helped in the completion of the Narrow Lane Scheme,
(64)
the City's first housing venture.
The Council ran a number of campaigns on education in the years before
the War, concentrating on secondary education, which it felt should. be
"full, secular, and iree.t(65)	 In 1907, it claimed that its pressure
had. won a large number of free places at Barrs Hill Secondary School for
girls. It ran a campaign to preserve free places at the other municipal
school, Bablake School, and to ensure that working class children enjoyed
the benefits of the old. charitable foundations. 	 In 1910 the Council
protested against making pire Day a holiday, though without success,
though next year it claimed that together with the Labour Party it
prevented a doubling of the fees at Bablake College.
Thus well before the War, the Trades Council was playing an important
part in developing and. articulating the policies of municipalisation and.
intervention that were to underly the growing popularity of the Labour
Party for several decades.
The Council also contributed. to more immediate working class causes,
through supporting strikes and individual trade union campaigns, by holding
meetings and organising collections. 	 In 1912, during the general strike
in Dublin, it held. a large protest meeting, and. collected a very credit-
able £336. for the strikers. (This was more than three times the annual
income of the Council). 	 It accepted. the job of finding homes for 32
children for the duration of the strike, but the scheme fell through, as
"religious interference took place. ,,(66) Like many other Councils, it
set up an Amalgamation Committee in 1911 to propagate the idea of fewer
and. larger unions. It is difficult to say how much influence this body
hail, as little is known of its activities.
The Labour Party
In contrast, the development of the Labour Party was slow and.
cautious. The Coventry Labour Representation Committee was formed in
1900 on the initiative of the ILP and. local trade unionists, and in the
period. before the War its function was mainly electoral - it tried. to
secure the return of Labour candidates on School Boards, Boards of Guardians,
the Magistrates Bench, civic charities and. the City Council.
Before 1900 there were active branches of the Social Democratic
Federation and. the Independent Labour Party in the city and considerable
rivalry existed between the two. The SDF and. later the British Socialist
Party, had its headquarters at Justice Hall, but the ILP had. its own
meeting room together with billiard room and. (tea) bar in Broadgate, and.
was probably the larger of the two, although estimates suggest that both
parties had a couple of hundred. members before 1914.(67) There also
existed small branches of the Socialist Party of Great Britain and the
Socialist Labour Party in the city.
Most ILP activity was centred. round. municipal politics, and they
were denounced by the BSP/SDF as reformists. Members of the Federation
were "active in the unions but never allied themselves with organised
labour politically." 68	The Federation refused. to help found the
Representation Committee, and stood under their own banner in local
elections, though not normally against the Labour Representation Committee.
Because one of the first Labour Councillors in Coventry was an SDF member
(A.C.Banningion, the local leader of the Federation), the SDF claimed. that
his ward, All Saints, should always be ax' SDF ward.. Nhen Bax'nington came
up for re—election in 1909, the LRC responded. by refusing to sponsor him,
(69)and he was defeated.	 It was typical of the opportunist and. sectariai
attitude of the BSP before the War to denounce other groups for reformism,
and then demand support from these groups in municipal elections. SDF
members achieved. some prominence in some unions and. had influence in the
Trades Council. This influence was generally used. to project the Trades
Council as a political as well as industrial body, in order to try to
undermine the ILP. which was influential in the LRC.
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Electoral progress was slow in the early d.ajs of the Labour Party.
Their first representative on the City Council caine in 1904, but only in
1913 were they able to elect more than one Labour Council].or per year.
In that year they achieved their best results ever, and. at the start of the
War they had four Councillors out of a body of 30 Councillors and 10
Aldermen.	 Of the four, one, Barinington, represented. the BSP, having won
back his seat, one, S.G.Poole, represented the IL?., and the other two
Harry Wale and. Arthur Hook, represented the trade union voice. Wale was
a Co—op. employee, Hook was a coachmaker, and both of them could be des-
cribed as being to the rigit of the Labour Party, representing the pre—
socialist element that could have found a home in the Liberal Party.
This meant that the socialist element on the City Council relied heavily
on Poole, who was the outstanding leader of Labour in these years.(71)
Poole was particularly concerned with the situation created by the
housing shortage, and. while the Corporation's housing policy was very
inadequate, without Poole it probably wouldn't have existed. The 'first
Housing Committee was not established until 1908, with Poole the Chairman.
By 1914 the Committee had established a small estate in Narrow Lane, and.
owned a number of individual houses, mainly in the Stoke area, totalling
about 200. When in January 1914 the Council decided to build another
198 homes, the Trades Council was moved to complain:
"We assert that there are at the present moment in Coventry
some 1,200 persons employed who are either compelled to
live out of town or to return home to their wives at week-
ends, and in addition that some 400 to 500 families are
lodging in other people's houses, waiting for the chance of
getting a house.
What after all, is 198 houses amongst so many?" (72)
Labour's achievements outside housing were even smaller, but they
forced the City Council to consider for the first time the question of
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extending public services. The Party campaigned for the municipalisation
of the d.ebt-rid.den tramway service, the need. for a new abbatoir, and a
new town hail. One practical achievement was to insert into Corporation
contracts a new fair wage clause which the Party claimed was one of the
best in the country.	 Thus the small Labour group quickly settled
into the pattern of pushing for gradual municipalisation, and an extension
of the Council's services of all kinds. The Annual Report of the Labour
Party in 1913 shows that it considered a wide range of municipal affairs,
including the disgraceful state of the public lavatories, and. the need for
urgent movement to improve them. There is little indication that the
Party was much involved. in other than municipal affairs, and. it seemed to
have accepted a de facto split between the industrial side of the movement
and the political side. This division tended to increase the pressure
on the Labour Party to remain purely as an electoral body.
In fact, by 1913, although it contested only a few wards in the
elections, Party orgaxiisation was fairly solid, with Ward. Committees in
every one of the 10 Wards, a Women's Labour League, and an Executive
Committee of 11. The Executive was composed of 3 delegates from the ILP,
1 ward representative, and. 7 trade union representatives. The organisation
ensured that the trade unions could control the party if they so choose,
but it understated. the influence of the ILP, and it also ensured a strong
right-wing leadership. All the trade union representatives were from the
skilled unions, and four of them were from the skilled Toolmakers' Society.
The President of the Party was Harry Wale, the Vice-President T.J.Harris,
the secretary Robert Barton, and. the Treasurer John Chater. All four men
were on the right of the	 The Annual Report for 1913 claimed.
that affiliations -to the Party was on the increase, and. that the ILP, which
served as the individual membership section of the Party, had about 250
members. With the ILP carrying out its own agitation, and trade union
affairs left to the Trades Council the Labour Party had no other field
than municipal affairs, and. had. no impact outside of elections. Many
years after its founding, it was still referred to as the Labour Repre-
sentation Committee.
VII	 By 1914, Coventry had a rapidly expanding trade union movement, a
growing Labour Party, flourishing socialist groups and a strong co-oper-
ative movement. Yet it is well to remember that the labour movement
was still in its infancy. 	 In 1914, the majority of working people, and.
8 of the total engaged in occupation in the city, were outside trade
unions, and the majority of working people, if they voted at all, voted.
Liberal or Conservative. Although the institutions of a modern labour
movement - labour and socialist parties, a Trades Council, trade unions
and co-ops. - had appeared., only a small nuniber of people were active in
them, and only a minority of working people were encompassed. by them. In
1914 most working people were not involved in any labour organisation.
However there is more to concepts of labour 'movement and class con-
sciousness than the counting of heads. The growth of the organisations
of labour was directly due to the sweeping changes that were occurring
in the economic and social life of the city. The forces that were trans-
forming Coventry were creating a vigorous capitalism based on the technically
advanced. industries, and at the sanie time were pushing workers together and.
widening the gap between worker and. management. The results of these
changes were, in the space of a few decades, to greatly stimulate the
separate organisation of classes in the city and break down the tradition
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of master and. man working and. living alongside each other. New social
relations were emerging that were affecting everyone; the development
of the organisations of the labour movement showed that for many people
this was a conscious change, but the changes were affecting all workers,
including those who were unconscious of the new forces at work.
The rapid technical and. social change that occurred in the two
decades before the war made, or appeared to make, very little impact on
the institutions arid the individuals who ran the City. The shopocracy -
professionals, retailers, merchants and all manufacturers, continued to
dominate the Council and local government, the churches, the charities,
the schools and the Guardians. The physical appearance of the city
refused also to change. The new factories and houses appeared on the
outskirts of Coventry, but the centre remained much as it had. done for
hundreds of years, although a bit more congested.. The rapid change in
the city' s industrial fortunes contrated.wit1. the apparent lack of change
in the political control of the city. This unevenness in development
meant that there tended to be a division between industrial capital and
the iall scale local capital. With a few exceptions, industrial capital
held. itself aloof from the affairs of the city.
The division between employers of labour and the shopocracy - or
Coalition as it was later called, initially hindered the growth of the
Labour Party. The growth of the labour movement before 1914 was mainly
the growth of the unions and the rise in membership and. status of the
Trades Council. This did not mean that political matters were ignored,
for eventually the Trades Council emerged as the body that carried out
many of the tasks of a local Labour Party. Nevertheless the labour move-
ment concentrated. on meeting the demands of the rapid expansion of engin-
eering, and. union organisation was the key task of the times. This
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subordination of politics meant that what political activity did. take
place outside the unions was linked very clearly to them. The Labour
Party grew up under the shadow of the Trades Council.
The rapid growth of engineering killed off the tradition among the
working class of favouring small scale skilled manufacture to large—scale
factory work. ()t of it grew a tradition of craft unionism as portrayed
by the ASE, the AST and the other skilled unions. But the early tradition
had been strong, and some part of it survived, and. there was barely time
for the craft tradition to develop before it too was threatened.
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CHAPTER TWO
The First World. War
Conditions in the engineering and munitions industry created a
tremendous growth in trade union membership in these years and. created.
many grievances that stimulated the emergence of a shop stewards movement.
There was division within the trade unions as to the form unionism should
take, and division over the way skilled workers were treated. The chapter
deals with the way the trade unions reacted. to the different pressures of
war, and deals with the effect of some major strikes on the development of
the labour movement.
I	 Industry at War
In' 1914 Coventry's Medical Officer of Health estimated the population
to be 119,000.	 In 1918 his estimate was 133,000, an increase of 14,000
(i)in the war years.	 This was substantial, but does not give the full
picture. Du.ring the ware many people lived in the villages in Foleshill
Rural District outside the city, or in munitions hutments, while many other
workers travelled. long distances into Coventry every day. The war years,
therefore, accentuated the population growth of the pre-war period. 	 -
Because Coventry had established itself as an important engineering
centre before the war, it was designated a munitions centre after war broke
out, and nearly all of the factories went over -to war work. By the end of
1915 the city's industries were on a full war footing..
Some of the car manufacturers remained in vehicle production, albeit
for military purposes. The switch-over was quite simple, and gave the
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manufacturers an advantage at the end. of the war, as they were able to
make a rapid transition to peaceful vehicle production. Tractors,
ambulances, buses, lorries, field kitchens and tank tracks were all pro-.
d.uced. in the city. Many of the motor companies began producing aero-
engines, and. thus established the aircraft industry in the city. Humber
also produced aircraft fuselages and. parts, and Daimler built the first
airfield in the city at the back of its Radford Works.
New factories were established, mainly as subsidiary plants for the
companies that already existed in Coventry. Other factories were greatly
extended; Daimler increased its manual work-force from 3,800 to 6,000
with 500 non-manual workers. A number of factories were opened. to meet
ammunition needs; these employed. women workers and needed few skilled.
engineers. Thus 1,hite and. Poppe opened a Filling Factory in Hoibrooks
(for the production and. filling of shells) employing 2,000 women workers.
Coventry Ordnance Works, besides expanding its gun production, opened up
another factory near its first for fuse-making, and took on 1,800 women.
Rudge hitworth took on another 1,500 women. Many of these women lived
in special camps of' hutments to the north of the city.
A new company moved to the city in 1915 - the French machine gun
concern of Hotchkiss et Cie, after its French factory had. been threatened.
by the German advance. Its factory in Gosford Street employed about
2,000 workers. Thus the productive capacity of the engineering and allied
industries grew very rapidly, while the tendency to large scale production,
already pronounced before the war, became even more dominant.
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II	 The Response to the War
The patriotic fervour at the outbreak of war existed among all
classes in the city.	 J.D.Sid.d.eley closed down his works for a short
time, and. insisted that all his young workers should go off to fiht.(2)
In September 1915, the Coventry Chain Company inaugurated a weekly
minimum wage of 35/- payable only to married	 The Co-operative
Society encouraged. its male workers to enlist, and. replaced them with
women.	 A few anti-German incidents occurred.; Yates reports the
looting of a shop in Lower Stoke owned by a German, while his Birmingham-
born wife precipitated. a strike when she tried to start work at the BSA
factory in Small Heath.
The Derby scheme showed. the strength of feeling on the shop floor.
The scheme was put into operation in 1915 to avoid compulsory service.
Men of military age were asked to attest to their willingness to serve
when called upon. In principle the scheme was a voluntary one; in
practice there was widesoale intimidation. Management threatened to
sack workers who refused. to attest, but the initiative in most workplaces
was taken by the workers themselves, who in many cases went on strike or
refused to work with non-attestors; in a number of cases workers were
attacked. by fellow-workers. George Hodgkinson, who was a pacifist, gives
a vivid account of the pressures that were put on him to attest, but points
out it did. not stop his shop electing him as its first shop steward a year
(6)later.
For most people, the political tone of the period was set by the local
newspapers, and. these were fiercely anti-German throughout-the war. The
Midland-Daily Telegraph mede it clear that it would not publish the views
of people it felt were lacking in patriotism, 	 and for a time tried to
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censor news about industrial unrest. At the time of the Nay 1917 strikes,
which were not reported., the editorial confessed "It is particularly hard.
at times to avoid. the making of some admission or the publication of some
report calculated to serve the enemy's purpose. t,(8)Whether the German High
Command. regu.larly scrutinised. the Midland Daily Telegraph as its editor
appeared to think is a matter of some conjecture, but fortunately for them,
and. for historians, national newspapers were less scrupulous, and as strikes
got national coverage, the Telegraph's self-denying ordnance soon lapsed.
Although, at least for the first few years, the overwhelming majority
of the population gave complete support to the prosecution of the war
effort, the war caused a number of upsets in the political life of' the
city. The sitting Liberal M.P., D.M.Mason, declared. himself a pacifist
and. against the ware and. was disowned. by the Liberal Party who found. a
pro-war candidate to oppose him at the next election. The lead.ers of the
three political parties issued a joint statement repudiating Mason's claim
to represent the city. This caused. a row in the Labour Party, for the
statement had. been signed. by Harry Wale, its President, without his con-
suiting the rest of the Executive. In fact, many members of the Labour
Party, and. the whole of the ILP were against the ware though to different
degrees.
In the labour movement, some of those who opposed the war did so
because they saw it as the result of imperialism. Others opposed all
wars in principle, and, refused to co-operate in any way with the military
authorities. Many others, however, were like Ramsay MacDonald in that
they deplored the fact of war, and. wanted a negotiated settlement, but
also felt that while it was on the war must be won. Thus MacDonald felt
able to join in recruiting campaigns, though this did not stop him from
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being the object of attack from many quarters. In Coventry, the Labour
movement divided into men like Harry Wale who had no hesitation in giving
whole-hearted. support for the war, and who played an important part in
recruitment campaigns in the city, a small group of pacifists, and a
larger group who took MacDonald's position. In this last group was
Dick Walihead, one of the most well known ILP orators in the country,
who had been adopted by the Coventry Labour Party to fight the next
election. Not surprisingly, there was a fierce battle in the local
party. T.J.Harris complained "Pacifists and Pro-war alike were each
more concerned with using the Party as an instrument for their respective
policies, than preparing it for the day of reckoning."	 Poole, the
pre-war leader of the Party, caine out in favour of the war, and thus
severed his connection with the ILP, who returned the portrait they had
of him.
For a long time, the Labour Party avoided making a definite statement
on the war. In 1914 an Executive resolution stated "That the Party,
whilst expressing no opinion with regard to the merits or demerits of the
present tiropean crisis, declares that it is the bound.en duty of all
citizens to support by every means in their power the efforts put forward
by the Government to alleviate the distress inevitably rising.t0)
Although the Labour Party records do not exist for most of the war, it
appears that it gradually came round to an anti-war point of view s
 for at
one public meeting in 1916, Wale attacked pacificts in the Party whom he
claimed were trying to drive him out, and he threatened to stand in the
next elections as an Independent.
After a number of meetings, a delegate conference of the Labour Party
in 1916 heard Walihead's position and. decided to 'Pledge its unfailing
61
support" to him.1)
	
However, it did. not give open support to his views,
and. was able to support Wallhead. on the one hand and. join with the other
political par-ties on the other hand. in sponsoring recruitment rallies in
the city. Also in 1916, Wale resigned. from the Presidency of the Labour
Party, and was replaced. by T.J.Harris who showed. more interest in keeping
-the Party together. In iigust 1917 a national Labour Party Conference
agreed to push for a negotiated peace and -the resurrection of the Second
International, and. this ended the most serious splits in the party.
Although the Labour Party organised protests against the tenns of
conscription, the shortage of food, speculators, and national service, it
did not flourish in the war years. Affiliations of trade union branches
increased., but activity declined. The 1916 Report commented that "the
Party has been condemned. to a policy of marking time," and attendance at
the monthly delegate meetings became so poor that the possibility of amal-
-	 -	 (12)gamation with the Trades Council was discussed. 	 The Liberals and the
Conservatives had. more or less gone into voluntair liquidation, and there
were no elections -to fight. It therefore had no role to play, despite
the fact that working Class struggles were increasing in intensity. By
1918 the Labour Party had still not won a place o,f leadership or authority
in the local labour movement.
The ILP did not regard itself as bound by the political truce in the
city. However it was only active in fits and starts. Like the other
parties, it lost members through conscription and long hours of work. In
the early years of the war it remained inactive, presumably because it felt
the political climate was not opportune. However, in 1916 and. 1917 it
organised a number of well—attended. meetings, addressed by national
leaders, and supplemented. them with regular outdoor meetings.(13)
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April 1917 Onwards, it suffered a marked. decline in activity, and. the
Party made no organised intervention in the big strikes in the city.
Doubtlessly, individual members at that time placed more importance on
their trade union activity than on Party activity.
The BSP did not survive the war in the city. H.M.Hyndman had been
in control of the Party for many years, and tried in 1914 to commit it -to
support the war. He was opposed by the majority, and. after a conference
in 1916 had reversed his policy, he and. his supporters left the BSP,
taking its newspaper with them. Most of the support for Hyndinan caine
from the Midlands, including Coventry. In the city, Arthur Bannington
had. played the role of a local Hyndman, and. won most of the local BSP to
his position. By 1917 he had a group of socialist ex-servicemen operating
in the city, very pro-war, and. very opposed. -to the ILP. BSP members may
have survived in the city, but there was no sign of them after the war as
an organised group.
The Military Services Act, the Defence of the Realm Act, and the
Munitions Act were seized on by some employers to intimidate their workers
into higher production. Men found. slacking at work ended up before
Munitions Tribunals, where they were fined, and. threatened. with conscrip-
tion. Worlanen who tried. to take one Saturday in four off work were fined
by the courts, despite the fact that the employers concerned and. their
supervisors always had. the weekends off, while dozens of women regularly
found. themselves in court being fined for lateness.(14) One firm, White
& Poppe brought so many prosecutions against its workforce that it tried.
to save time by getting the Munitions Tribunal to meet at its premises.(15)
One celebrated case that created a stir in the city was the prosecution
of a local Workers' Union official, George Morris, under DORA for withdrawing
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workers who were not getting the full rate at the Ordnance Works. He
was sentenced to three months hard labour by the magistrates, whose
chairman felt "they have a duty to the nation aid the Epire to perform."
In fact the employers were breaking the Munitions Act by not paying the
men the skilled rate, and this was admitted at quarter sessions when Morris
appealed. His sentence was quashed, but he was still obliged to pay £5.
The case aroused great concern in the trade unions in the city.6
A more vicious case received less publicity. A Belgian who had been
in the city as an engineering worker since 1915, and had. been sacked from
the Ordnance Works for being a revolutionary, was prosecuted under DORA
for circulating a pamphlet headed "I'o the Toiling Masses of France, Britain,
America and Japan," signed by Lenin, Trotsky, aii Chiherin. The prose-
cu-tion claimed it was a secret revolutionary document, but the Chairman of
the magistrates pointed out that it had appeared in the newspapers and that
he himself had read it. The presecution case was then to establish that
the man was a revolutionary, and this succeeded. The Chairman of the
magistrates, in sentencing him to six months, declared "It was not a political
crime, but a wicked attempt to bring this country into the condition of
Russia."	 e of the magistrates in the case was Wale. Although it
received attention among left—wingers, the case did not produce an outcry,
and. the man had to serve his sentence,
Other left—wingers to feel the weight of the law were members of the
ILP. The Party was allowed to hold meetings, but they were sometimes
stopped by the police who would check that there were no people avoiding
military service in the audience.
Support for the war effort was not incompatible with hostility to
those responsible for its organisation. As the war went on there was
6.
increasing dislike of the profiteering, food shortages, conscription,
new laws, restrictions on trade union activity, and. bureaucratic delay
that accompanied it. Throughout the later stages of the war, there
was a growing conviction in the trade unions in particular, that the
working class was bearing the brunt, and that others were profiting from
its sacrifice. This feeling was particularly strong over the acute
shortage of' food in the city, which coincided with steep increases in
prices.	 Clearly someone was doing very well out of the war.
Food shortages were not peculiar to Coven-try; the Commission of
Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, in its report in 1917 said that some
shortages had been widespread, and the accompanying price increases were
"(19)
"-the universal and most important cause of unrest.' 	 Food prices
nationally doubled between the summer of' 1914 and the summer of 1917, and.
this naturally caused a sense of grievance, particularly in 1917.
In January 1915, the Trades Council called on the Government to take
control of food supply and to fix maximum prices, and organised a demon-
stration over -the issue. There was not much popular support for such
action in the earlier days of -the war however. 	 Ia11head criticised the
"apathy of the mass of -the people" at a poorly a,ttended Labour Party
-	 (20)protest meeting in November 1916.	 In 1917, however, the continual.
rise in prices was combined with shortages. Government price controls
in the short tenn contributed to the scarcity of sugar, butter, margarine,
potatoes and meat. The situation in Coventry appeared. to be particularly
bad. as it seemed that the city was getting only enough food to feed the
pre—war population despite the fact that many more people were shopping in
the city.
Early in 1917, the WU began to push for either an increase in wages
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of £1 a week, or a 50% reduction in food. prices, but it was soon generally
agreed by the unions that the food. issue had. to be treated separately,
(21)
and. a campaign was launched to get price control and control of supplies.
The situation took a serious turn when beer supplies began to dry up. The
ASE DC passed. a resolution complaining of inadequate supplies. The West
Midlands Division of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest
reported. that its members "were frankly amazed at the strength of the
objections -to -the Liquor Restrictions," saying they came from teetotalers
as well as drinkers. Its report called for more drink, and an immediate
(22)
reduction in food prices as an essential step. 	 Arising out of these
reports J.R.Clynes was appointed Food Controller, and began to impose
maximwi prices on a wide range of commodities. A local Food Control
Committee was set up with representatives from retailers, the local authority,
the Co—op, the Labour Party and. the Trades Council. It is interesting to
note that the labour movement organisations did. not primarily blame the
retailers for the price increases, but denounced. speculating wholesalers
and producers. They were able to join amicably with retailers' repre-.
senta-tives on joint deputations to London.
In the second part of the year, food shortages got worse. Retailers
began their own rationing, long queues appeared. outside many shops, and.
men and. women left work early to join them. The local Food Committee did
not try, as some others did, to impose its own local rationing, but sent
a deputation to London asking for a national scheme.
The local trade unions decided. to take independent action, and. the
CEJC called. a strike on Saturday November 19, which meant that the strikers
were for the most part losing a full day. Nearly all the factories shut
down on the day, 10,000 people joined a march, and an estimated 40,000
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attended. a meeting in Gosford. Green. A resolution was passed. calling
for full Government control over commod.ities and. a price reduction of 5co.
Further action was threatened. if the demand.s were not met, but after the
Government took steps to see that the supply of food. to the city was
increased, no further action was taken.
The demonstration and strike was of considerable significance. It
showed that organised labour had taken the lead on the issues and. had
succeeded. in uniting most of the city behind i-ts demands. For maxy workers,
it was the first time -they had. been called. out on strike, and. for probably
all workers it was the first time they had used their power over food prices.
Workers were prepared. to co—operate with retailers and others in the campaign,
but were not afraid of taking independent action as well.
The strike was also significant, as it was used as a demonstration of
-the strength of the shop stewards, who led the contingents from the various
factories. As the local employers were refusing to recognise the stewards,
-the strike was an open show of the stewards' power, and. a threat of what
might happen.
The labour movement campaign for lower prices continued, into 1918,
but -there were no more threats of strike action 	 It concentrated on
trying to increase labour representation on the local Food. Committee, and
obtaining further restraints on price increases. The wage increases in
1917 and 1918 defused the issue to some extent, and. the shortages that
occurred in the autumn of 1917 were not repeated.
The Co—op naturally was particularly concerned with the rise in food.
prices, and. claimed it was especially hit by shortages. Membership of
-the society rose by over 3,000 in the first two years of the war, but it
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was only allocated food. at its pre-war level. The Co-op felt that
other retailers were trying to restrict its activities, and in return
called on food distributors to bypass retailers, and issue food direct
to consumers. The Co-op was also attacked. by the Excess Profits Tax
which was supposed. to hit those people making money out of the war. It
was decided that the Co-op dividend, was profit, though the Co-op claimed
the money was owned by the individual members of the Society, which could
not be treated. as a capitalist concern. As a result of these taxes, the
dividend fell from 2s 6d in the pound to 2s despite the growth in member-
ship and turnover. (23)
Having been majie to pay out tax on its "profits", the Co-op was
subject to a greater embarrassment in 1918 when it had. to supply food. and
provisions to the four hundred seamen that accompanied Havelock Wilson on
his strike-breaking errand to the city during the Eiibargo strike. George
Jarrams, the Co-op secretary, complained to the Divisional Food Commission
that as "The membership of theSociety is composed almost entirely of the
artisan class" they may not be expected to approve of this. Forther, the
Board of Management protested "against the use of the Society's supplies of
food for the purpose of assisting any person or persons engaged ostensibly
in interference in Industrial disputes," and asked. that in any similar cases
the Co-op be left out of supply rrangements.(24) By the end. of tBie war
the Co-op had been pushed. into a position where it had to defend itself
against other retailers and. attacks generally, by closer links with organised.
labour. Moreover, it claimed to feed half the population of the area, so
continued to be an example of successful working class initiative. Never-
theless, it remained a passive body, uncertain of its relationship with the
labour movement.
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III Housing Problems
It was not difficult to make extra food. supplies available to the
city, and. rising wages allowed people to survive rising prices, hence
the food. situation in the city caine to only a brief crisis, and then
subsided.. The housing shortage was more difficult to deal with, and.
the labour movement could. not be mobilised. around. this issue so easily.
The housing shortage was due primarily to the rapid. influx of new workers
into the city. The situation had already been difficult before the war,
and. continued to deteriorate throughout the war years. It was made more
difficult by the reluctance of the City Council to build. up a stock of
publicly owned dwellings in the years before the war. By 1914 Council
property amounted to only 179 houses and. 22 flats, in Stoke and Foleshill.
The situation was also made worse by a strike of building workers in May
1914. This was one of the longest strikes to have taken place in the
city.	 It lasted. over two months and involved. about 2,000 workers. It
resulted. in a big step forward for building workers' organisation in the
city, for it achieved. recognition for the Building Trades Federation and. l
an hour increase, but by the time the strike was settled, men were already
leaving to join the axed forces, and the shortage of labour was not made
up for the next four years, as the munitions factories could offer higher
wages. On top of this, shortages of materials soon occurred.
As a result, there was a reduction in the number of houses completed
in Coventxj from 927 in 1914 to 251 in 19l8.(25) At the same time the
programme of clearing unfit houses slowed down, as there was no alternative
accommodation.	 In 1914 116 houses were inspected. and. 54 closed down, but
in 1918 only 2 were inspected and. none closed.26) Thus the house shortage
condemned. a number of people to live in sub-standard conditions.
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To meet the demand. for accommodation, some landlords began to open
large lodging houses or hostels. 	 Only those places described as Common
Lodging Houses were subject to Council inspection, and. although most were
reasonably run, some gave cause for concern. In 1916, the Annual Health
Report referred to one lodging house which had been a factory and which had
been refused a certificate because of inferior lighting, ventilation,
closet accommodation and yard pavement. Despite the fact that it was
never certified, and the owner was fined £5 in 1917, the hostel remained
open throughout the war years, sleeping 126 men a night. 	 There were
also some 42 houses let as lodgings which "appear to be conducted more or
less as Common Lodging Houses" but were not subject to any inspection by
the local authority. They housed about 1,000 people.(27)
Another indication of overcrowding was the steady rise in the density
of population, from 25.8 per acre in 1911 to 32 in 1918, while the average
number of persons to each occupied house rose from 4.5 in 1913 to 4.8 in
(28)1918.	 As a result of overcrowding, many who wanted housing had to
make do with lodgings, and many who wanted lodgings had to make do with a
place in the hostels and municipal hutments that were erected north of the
city and became an eyesore in the years after the war. The pressure on
homes was so great that a survey in 1920, after the height of the pressure
had been passed, showed that one house in five in the city was taking in
lodgers, despite the fact that the large majority of houses were small
working class dwellings.(29) Fortunately, the general condition of Coventry
houses was good, as most of the housing stock was less than twenty years
old, and the slums were mostly confined to about 1,000 back—to—back houses
in the 339 small courts that existed in the city centre. The Medical
Officer of Health claimed that Coventry "probably possesses a larger propor-
tion of modernly built houses than any other large town in the countx)r(30)
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Nevertheless overcrowding had its problems, and. produced its strange
bedfellows. When Poole publicly claimed there were "beds which were never
(31)
cold" and rooms hired. in shifts, he was denounced in the local press.
Hodgkinson, who had moved to Coventry in 1914, knew the truth of the state-.
ment, for he had to share a bed with another; "We did not occupy the bed
together, but in shifts, sleeping 'box and cox' according to the vernacular.
Coming off the night shift I had to hop into a bed already warmed from the
body which had been in occupation during the night. This was bad enough,
but one morning after lying in bed. for a while the plaster fell from the
ceiling covering the bed like a blanket. 	 I was too tired to get up, there
was no alternative bed in any case, and I slept in that situation until the
afternoon. Upon wakening, my throat was like a lime kiln, my breathing
organs clogged up with the dust caused by the falling ceiiing.(32) This
incident obviously had a profound effect on Hodgkinson, for in his next
sentence he wrote "The incident set me furiously thinking about marriage,"
As a sober young man he had saved 50, and he and his newly—wed wife were
able to purchase shares in a housing association, and rent their own house,
but most young workers did. not have that kind of money. Those who could
not find any accommodation in the city had to live outside, and endure what
were sometimes very long journeys on top of the long hours of work.
In the early days of the war, the housing shortage pushed rents up, and
a protest movement began to develop. The Trades Council, which had. years
of experience of lobbying on housing, began to agitate for a rent strike
in 1914.
	
It underestimated. the difficulties involved, and overestimated
the strength of feeling, for its Annual Report, referring to a strike ballot
said "the number voting was so small that we can only conclude that the
workers of Coventry are perfectly satisfied with their housing conditions."
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The fault lay not with the workers, but with the Trades Council for
pursuing such an unrealistic policy.
Later in 1915, agitation began in a different form, and the Trades
Council was able to establish a Tenants Defence League as a subcommittee
of the 'Council to lead. the struggle against rent increases and to lobby
for rent controls. Before the struggle could reach a critical stage, the
Rent (War Restrictions Act) of 1915 was passed which limited rents to their
pre—war levels. 	 This effectively ended protests against rent increases,
except for occupants of new houses, which were not covered by the law.
The Tenants Defence League remained in existence, publicising the Act and
giving legal aid to tenants with recalcitrant landlords. It i significant
that what action had been taken by the labour movement was taken under the
auspices of the Trades Council rather than the Labour Party, which was not
inactive on the subject, but which lacked the standing and strength of the
Trades Council.
The Rent Act ended most of the protest, but did not solve the troubles
-that developed on the new estate at Stoke Heath. 	 It was a measure of the
acuteness of the housing shortage in the city that the Ministry of Munitions
asked the Council to build this estate, for it ment diverting men and
materials from the war effort,and it was a measure of the Council's attitude
that it did nothing until it was pushed into it by the Ministry. Most
munitions houses were temporary dwellings, but as the Housing Committee
pointed out, "In view of the acknowledged shortage of houbes which has
existed ifi Coventry for a number of years, and which is estimated by the
(Local Government) Board at at least one thousand houses, 	 they would
build 600 permanent homes. The Ministry was to be responsible for getting
the contracts but the land and houses would belong to the city, giving it
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its first sizeable council estate.
As was to be expected, the Council had its doubts, pointing out that
"the present is a very unfavourable time for building, owing to the high
cost of materials and labour" and that "the rents will of course, have to
be based upon the actual cost of the scheme when ascertained." 	 With
this proviso, the scheme was agreed, and the houses were built at 14 to the
acre compared with 22 in previous Council building. (Most private working
class housing estates were between 22 and 26 to the acre). 	 In the end,
599 houses and 10 shops were built at Stoke Heath, near the Ordnance Works,
and virtually all of the first tenants worked at the Ordnance, as that
comp&iy was allowed to select the tenants. The houses were built qu.ickiy -
too qiickly as was later found out - and the estate was filled by the
autumn of 1916. Within a few weeks the first organised protests began.
The basic grievance was the high rents, though later there were com-
plaints about the standard of the buildings. The rents were set at 9/6d.,
lo/6d., and ll/6d., depending on the size of the house, which me.ant they
were 2/- dearer than other council houses in Stoke, although they were
basically the same -type. The Council claimed they were charging an econ-
omic rent because the housing costs were greater due to war conditions. This
was misleading, however, as the Ministry had paid a grant of 20% to meet the
higher costs. The Stoke Heath Tenants Defence Association claimed that the
total costs were 30% higher than pre-war costs, so the extra cost to the
Council was only 10%, while rents were 25% higher. 
136) 
The argument was
complicated, for the Council could not put a figure to the final costs for
a very long time, and this enraged the tenants who felt there was a cover-
up going on.	 Poole, who was the only member of the Housing Committee to
back the tenants, said at one point "I have every sympathy with the tenants'
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protest against the rents, which are excessive, but the citizens generally
are not in possession of the facts that have led. up to the present points.
The problem was that the Housing Committee was not in possession of the
facts either.	 It was not until early 1919 that the Housing Committee
made any definite statements about the cost of the scheme, and even then
it did not give enough information.
The Housing Committee had no intention of subsidising the estate, and
no attempt was made to get money from the Coventry Ordnance Works despite the
fact that they were clearly beneficiaries of the scheme. 	 Poole alleged
that the high rents owed something to the fact that costs on the other small
estates were going up, but the rents were fixed, and so the Housing Committee
(38)
was compensating itself by charging extra at Stoke Heath.
The fact that the tenants were all recruited from the one factory
meant that the union leaders at work became the union leaders at home.
This meant that the Tenants' Association was able to begin work quickly,
and hold the support of the mass of the tenants. An experienced and
capable leadership existed, and the Association affiliated to the Tenants'
Defence League run by the Trades Council. It quickly threatened a rent
strike, and achieved a reduction in the rents of 6d. a week shortly after
the estate was opened.
This was only the start, for the tenants wanted much bigger reductions.
A number of meetings were held in the spring of 1917 with the Housing
Committee without any settlement, so in early May the Association conducted
a referendum which showed an overwhelming majority of tenants were prepared
to back a rent strike.	 Leaders of the Association, at a public meeting
attended by the majority of tenants, claimed that the Council were including
the interest charges and. the costs of the new roads in the
7A4
to receive satisfaction, the threatened rent strike began on I1ay 12th.
The Housing Committee circulated all tenants, claiming that any rent
adjustment would have to wait until the scheme had operated for a year, and
-threatening distraint and eventual eviction to tenants refusing to pay
rent.'	 This clearly did not have the desired effect, for a few days later
the rent collectors called on three hundred houses and. collected only two
payments. All the other houses displayed notices saying "Rent Strike in
progress, Collector need not call." The collectors were followed by pickets,
who were successful in persuading the two defaulters to join -the strike,
though it -took agroup of tenants burning hi effir to persuade one of
them.(42) The Association called. this rowdyism, and. the next time collec-
tors were in the area, they were accompanied by two delegates from the Assoc-
iation who merely took -the names of the very few who paid.
In the face of this united front, the Housing Committee backed down,
a Sub-Committee met representatives of the Association, and notwithstanding
all previous talk of it being impossible to reduce rents further, agreed.
with the representatives -to remove another l/ld. from the rents. This left
the Stoke Heath rents about 5d. a week above other rents, and although it
was less than the tenants had asked for, it was still a substantial victory.
A meeting of 1,200 tenants accepted the offer unanimously, and called off
the rent strike, which had lasted two weeks.
The rent strike occurred just after the May 1917 strikes in the
city, and was a reflection of the militancy that existed. at that time. It
represented an important broadening out of the economic struggles of wor-
king people,and a wider political understanding of the trade unionists who
helped run the Tenants' Association. This was con6olidated. in December 1917,
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when not only the Stoke Heath Tenants, but the Tenants Defence Association
at St. Georges Road. and. Severn Road, (other Council dwellings) declared
(44)
that they would pay no rent during the strike for shop steward recognition.
So tenants' associations came to be seen as part of the organisation of the
labour movement, and. the struggles of council tenants were linked to other
labour movement struggles.
The troubles at Stoke Heath did not go away. It soon became clear
that the houses had not been properly constructed - a number of tenants
had their ceilings collapse on them - and later disputes were more serious
and had a greater impact on the City Council, particularly the rent strike
at the end of 1918.
This was the only rent strike in the city during the war, so the linking
of industrial and. non—industrial struggles was on only a small scale. It
marked the beginnings of a consciousness of a separate community in Stoke
Heath, which suffered heavily from unemployment and repres5lve poor law
administration after the war. For the rest of the city, however, the
industrial struggle was the key factor in developing the nature of the labour
movement.
Iv
	
Unions and ShopStewards
Trade Unions grew rapidly during the war years. Recruitment had
been high before the war, but the number of trade unionists in the city
doubled in these years. There were about 13,000 workers affiliated. to
the Trades Council in 1913; by 1919 this affiliation was 27,457 while there
were several thousand in branches not affiliated. '	Membership of the ASE
went up by a half to 4,000, but membership of the ST went up much more
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rapid.ly, and. was about 7,000 in 1919. 	 Most of the other craft unions,
except brassworkers, saw substantial gains, but the biggest increase was
in the membership of the Workers' Union, which went from just over 2,800
to over 8,000. 46) The WIJ not only recruited unskilled and. semi—skilled
workers, but some skilled as well, and this was a source of great dissatis-
faction in the ranks of the ASE and. AST.
Some of the members of the WU were women while other women workers
joined the National Federation of Women Workers, which had. 1,000 members
in 1919. However, many women had left industrial work by 1919, so we do
not know the extent of unionisation ong women in the war; generally, it
seems to have been a lot lower than men.	 It also needs to be borne in
mind that while trade unionism grew during the war, there were very few
closed shops. Some factories were very poorly organised still, and there
were thousands of men and women workers not in trade unions.
Coventry trade unionists did not hold different attitudes to the war
from the rest of the population. They were for the most part prepared to
accept in 1915 the Treasury Agreement and later the Munitions Act by which
they gave up the right to strike, opposition to dilution and all forms of
restrictive practises for the period of the duration of the war. George
Ryder, the ASE ODD for the area was voicing the feeling of most when he
wrote
"We are faced with the alternatives of sacrificing for the
time being certain principles and. activities which are of
vital importance -to us in normal times, or of sacrificing
the lives of our comrades and endangering the success of
the allied troops by a rigid adherence to such principles
and activities, and I am confident that for the vast
majority of our members the former alternative is the only
possible one."
	 (47)
Most of the engineering unions in Coventry were affiliated to the
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Coventry Engineering Joint Committee, which was made up of delegates from
the different district committees, or branches in the case of small unions.
1hen the ASE DC decided to join, in April 1916, it demanded as a condition
of membership that vital issues could be settled only by card vote, arid
this was accepted.(48) Soon the only sizable union that was outside the
CEJC was the WU. This wanted to join, but was held up, primarily by the
ASE, which wanted to make a condition that all skilled engineers would have
to be transferred. to the ASE. The insistance by the ASE arid other unions
that only they could speak for the skilled and their determination to hold
on to their craft privileges which in some cases had been underwritten by
the Munitions Act was a source of constant division between them and the
WU.
In the early stages of the war, various individual disputes occurred
over the detailed application of dilution, but the principle was accepted
by union leaders, and in separate ballots conducted by the CEJC and the
ASE, by union members. Military service did not worry the skilled unions;
when the District Committee of Birmingham ASE asked the Coventry Committee
to join it in action against the calling up of skilled workers, it replied
that it had no problems. Skilled workers in the city showed support for
the Sheffield workers when one of their members was called up and threat-
ened to hold up dilution until the issue was settled. They accepted the
Trade Card scheme that settled the dispute without any complaints.
The first incident to arouse considerable anger in the city against
the authorities in their application of the war legislation was the prose-
cution of George Morris. As already mentioned, his sentence was eventually
reduced to a fine of £5, and had this not occurred it is likely that a strike
would have taken place. Even an ASE aggregate meeting voted for a strike.
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(This meeting was attended by some pecia1 constables, but after a d.is-
cussion the meeting courteously allowed them to remain )
	On the
evening of the day the appeal was heard, about a thousaid. ASE members
gathered	 the District Offices, and although no meeting had been arranged,
the DC felt it had better hurriedly convene one. The meeting passed a
resolution protesting at the fine at a time "while the employing classes
are allowed to evade the provisions embodied in the Acts of Parliament to
safeguard the workers who had. loyally forgone their hard won rights for the
Benefit of the Country." When it was discovered that an anonymous benefac-
tor had paid the fine for Morris, an amendment to the resolution was passed
criticising this action and threatening non—co—operation with the authorities
(50)unless Morris was given a free pardon.	 The threat was not carried out,
but the meeting gave a clear indication of the feelings of many workers;
they felt that they were making all the sacrifices while others made the
profits. From the time of this incident (January 1917) onwards, workers,
while not for the most part attacking the assumptions behind Government
policy, were much more open to the idea of fighting the application of these
policies.
Thus when strikes swept through the munition centres in May 1917,
Coventry was included. The cause of the strikes was the Government decision
to abolish the Trade Card protection scheme which had only been brought into
operation a few months earlier, and. the decision to extend dilution to pri-
vate work as well as munition work. There was very little private work in
Coventry, but feeling was running high in the city anyway, as the latest
Committee on Production pay increase had not applied in full to Coventry
workers. The strike in Coventry is of interest for it brought out into the
open the activity of the unofficial Shop Stewards and Workers? Committee
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Movement in the city.
The history of this movement can be found elsewhere.(51) In Coventry
the leading lights were members of the small group of SLP members together
with others mainly of a syndicalist leaning. They were supported by the
leaders of the Malgaxnation Committee which had existed in the years before
the war without having had- much influence. The local leader was Tom
Dingley,(52) who was helped. by various militants from elsewhere who spent
some time in the city - men like William Paul and Arthur McMaxius. The
Times later tried to make something sinister out of the natural displace-
ments that arose out of the war by claiming that a band of workers from
Clydeside "formed a nucleus of turbulent spirits which sought to force the
trade unionists of Coventry into Red. Revolt."
The Coventry Workers Committee had little influence until early 1917
when it helped. establish a Shop Stewards Committee at the Hotchkiss works
where Dingley worked. The aim of the movement was the complete organisa-
tion of all workers based. on the workshop, through shop committees, Works
Committees, local committees and a National Committee, known as the National
Administrative Council. The most important principles were direct represen-
tation at all levels, and all responsibility vested in the rank arid file.
The ultimate aim was the overthrow of capitalism, primarily through indu.s-
trial struggle. Many iii the SS&WCM saw little that was good. in the existing
trade unions.	 Dingley was particularly hostile to them, declaring,
"I aver that the old trade union has not only served its
purpose and outlived its usefulness, but that it is now
positively reactionary, and. is maintained, not in the
interests of the workers who support it, but in the
interests of the capitalist class." (54)
This hostility to unions meant that Dingley and his supporters did not work.
within the existing unions but preferred to build up alternative structures,
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although in practice they carried union cards, normally TjJU ones. 	 This
meant that the relations between the out—and--out revolutionaries and. the
militants who accepted the trade unions were not very strong. 	 It was
thus comparatively easy for the revolutionaries -to be isolated. from the
struggles inside the trade unions, and eventually from the rank and. file.
At the time of the outbreak of war, local union officials did. not
envisage much scope for shop stewards. The ASE had approached. other
unions to see if it was possible to strengthen stewards, and. it was gen-
erally accepted. that the steward system needed. to be expanded. But in
early 1917 the local unions did. not want stewards to be elected. by mbers
of different unions, nor did they want stewards to have powers to call
ind.ustrial action. The ABE DC rejected the Clydesid.e system of shop
stewards and. works committees, claiming they had. been failures. In practice,
this meant that the strengthening of the stewards was not seen as a priority,
and. so official action lagged behind unofficial. A meeting in February 1917
of AE members at the best organised plant in the city, the Ordnance Works,
revealed. very uneven organisation there. Different times and. rates were
accepted. in the different departments, some of whom had. stewards, some not.
One steward claimed he had. to represent 600 	 Yet only a fortnight
later the unofficial movement had. called a strike at the Hotchkiss factory
for the recognition of the new Shop Committee there.
The Hotchkiss was "a magnet for the rebels" and. had. a number of' short
stoppages in l917.(56) On 6th April there was a one d.ay strike to get all
toolroom work done outside the -toolroom at the proper rate. The CEJC and.
the Managing Director quickly settled this, but the Shop Commit-tee, which
had Dingley as one of the joint convenors, then raised. the issue of recog-
nition and when this was not granted. took the workers out again, where they
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remained uxrtil 11th Aprii. 	 This brought the "irresponsible shop
committee" as the CJC insisted on calling it, into direct conflict with
the official unions for they told their members to stay at work. Aif
Doherty, the District Chairman of the JZE also worked at Hotchkiss, and
only stopped work when he was forced to by the strikers.(58) On the 10th,
he hit back, for he managed to organise a meeting of only J3E and AST
members in the factory and. get a vote to return to work. The rest of the
workers returned the next day, after an agreement had been signed to hold
recognition ta1ks.	 This was signed also by Doherty, though he claimed
he was acting only as a witness. At a local conference called to consider
the situation, it was reported that CEJC delegates
"Were unanimous in expressing their disapproval of the
movement and its organisers, who were simply trying to
usurp the powers of the duly authorised local trade union
officials. They united in encouraging the management to
ignore absolutely the self—called Shop Committee." (60)
This attitude enabled the Ministry of Munitions to forge an uneasy
alliance of State, unions and Management to defeat the unofficial shop
committee. It was agreed to set up a joint shop stewards committee
approved by the unions and recognised by management, with very circumscribed
powers. This was opposed by the militants, but was set up anyway, and for
a time there were two committees operating at the Hotchkiss, with the
militant committee mainly confined to the fitting shop. This was the
first time that the unions had allowed this sort of joint committee to
operate, and. i-b set them thinking of spreading the idea. 	 It was also the
first time a local employer had accepted a shop stewards committee, and.
although the scheme was seen as an alternative to a more militant approach,
the Hotcbkiss management remained unhappy. The Ministry of Munitions
official commented
82
"Even that committee, (i.e. the official Hotchkiss one),
mild, as it was, and. non-executive in its powers, did. not
receive a welcome from the local employers, and the Depart-
ment is being b1aned somewhat by them for giving its
blessing." (61)
Although forced. onto the defensive at the Hotchkiss, the unofficial
movement registered an important success in bringing out the workers in
the May strikes. Trade Cards had. been issued to every skilled worker
in munitions, and. served as a gaarantee of exemption from military service,
so the threat of their withdrawal primarily affected skilled men. This
was certainly how the ABE saw it, and. in Coventry the DC tried to get a
National Conference called to consider united. action on the question, and
their newly-appointed full-time district secretary, Walter Givens, was
sent on a tour of the country to get support for the idea. A packed.
aggregate meeting of the ABE resolved that it stood. for
"The retention of the Trade Card or its equivalent, at
whatever cost and. hereby pledges itself to resist to the
utmost the taking of any of our members into the Army so
long as a single diluted unit remains in our trade." (62)
This sectional outlook was very different from that of the militants, many
of whom were the "diluted. units" referred to, yet it was the Coventry
Workers' Committee which took the initative in calling the strikes.
The CEJC and the ABE learnt that the Workers' Committee was holding
strike ballots in a number of factories, and circulars were sent out
opposing this. The ABE circular said "Notices to strike issued by any
body other than the District Committee could not be approved or recognised
by the Society, and. instructing shop stewards to influence members to
remain at work." At the same time as the circular was being distributed.
the majorit of workers in the city were stopping work.6
The Workers' Committee had brought the men out on Thesday 8th May, but
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could not keep them out.
	
On Wednesday, an aggregate meeting of the ASE
voted by 2,000 to 100 to return to work, and many others also went back
after a day.	 Other unions were not so prompt, and the CEJC found it
difficult to decide on a policy; it was in session Wednesday afternoon
and. all day Thursday. The majority of officials did not want a strike,
but the AST and. UMWP1. did. ( 64) Eventually, the majority view was accepted,
and a mass meeting at Highfield Road football ground was held on Sunday,
where it was agreed, by the twenty thousand or so who were present, that
those who were still on strike should return on Monday 14th May. So while
perhaps the majority of workers had gone back after one day, a substantial
number had been out for five.
A Ministry of Munitions official at the time commented that the Workers'
Committee contained "more of the ultra—socialist and pacifist type than of
-the shop steward type, ,,(65) but this was somewhat misleading. 	 On this
occasion, a number of the officers of some of the unions were working for
a continuation of the strike, and even a few of the District Committee of
the ASE. Not all of these gave their allegiance to the Workers' Committee,
but that body did have a nucleus of op stewards to guide its affairs.
The strike accentuated the differences between left and right on some
District Committees. On the ASE DC Alex Maddison and a couple of others
were working for a continuation of the strike, while Doherty, Ainsbury and
Givens, with the backing of the majority, were touring the Midlands seeking
to persuade others either not to strike or else go back to work.(66)Doherty
and- Givens reported from Leicester that "their presence and speeches had
much influence in keeping Leicester members at work.I(67) However, -the
militants in -the Workers' Committee who had made no effort to get on
District Committees, were isolated from this struggle.
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Strikes continued in many other parts of the country during the week
after the last Coventry workers went back, and. they gained a fresh impetus
when 10 out of the unofficial leaders were arrested on 17th May, with several
new districts joining in.	 Despite the fact that two of those arrested came
from Coventry (Dingley and Neil cassidy(68) from the Ordnaxice Works) there
was no further strike action in the city. 	 The WEE, to which the two belonged,
refrained from immediate action but resolved to organise a concerted strike
if the prosecution of the 10 resulted in convictions. The AZE held an
aggregate meeting, but decided not to take action; the meeting refused to
listen to a speaker from the unofficial Walworth Conference - the DC having
earlier decided not to send a delegate.(69) The release of those held in
custody after a couple of days removed the possibility of further strike
action, and also led to a national settlement.
The lesson of the May strikes was that notwithstanding the Munitions
Act and all the various pieces of repressive legislation that existed, frus-
trations about dilution, women on lower rates, long hours, and high prices
could build up into strike action without prompting on the part of officials.
Unless a concerted attempt was made by union officials, shop floor grievances
could be channeled in the direction favoured by the Workers' Committee.
This lesson was thoroughly learnt by the constituent 'unions of the CEJC,
and they came out of the strikes in a stronger position -to deal with the
unofficial element than at the beginning. The Workers ? Committee had
shown it could build on grievances, but as it had not been strong enough
to provide leadership, it was unable to control the strike movement.
During the summer of 1917, discussions on a new type of shop steward
scheme took place between the different unions in the CEJC, and (to the
axmoyance of the ASE) between the CEJC and the WEE. The final version of
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the scheme was accepted. by all concerned. at the end. of September.	 It
recognised stewards elected by all the membership of a particular shop
or section, whatever unions were present in that section. Thus an AST
steward could. represent ftE and. other union members as well as his own,
and- all could. vote in his election. 	 It also allowed stewards of unions
affiliated -to the CEJC to elect Chief Stewards, and. fon Works Committees.
At the same time, the CEJC retained its place as the "Executive Committee
over all Shop Stewards and Works Committees" and all stewards had to be
endorsed both by their union arid. by the CEJC and. receive an official CEJC
Steward-s Card. The duties of the steward. was to keep the members paid up,
attempt -to get lO membership, and. together with the Chief Steward, take up
shop grievances with management. Disputes not settled in the shop were -to
be taken up by the Works Committee, and. if need. be , were to go finally to
the CEJC, which alone had. the power to call strike action.
This scheme was unique to Coventry, and. was possible because of the
peculiar conditions which existed- in the city, the chief of which was the
comparative weakness of craft autonomy, and. hence the greater possibility
of akilleci and. semi—skilled. workers co—operating. The scheme gave more
power to stewards and. their committees than individual unions had done in
the past, and it also took power over stewards away from the union branch
arid. district committees, and. increased the authority of the CEJC.
As far as the Workers' Committee was concerned., the scheme did not go
far enough. Dingley eventually wrote a pamphlet contrasting the principles
of the CEJC with the principles of the Workers' Committee Movement. The
CEJC itself, he claimed., would- not succeed as long as it excluded. the WU,
arid. as long as it failed- to organise on an industrial basis instead of
having affiliations from many unions that had. a lot of members outside the
86
engineering industry, such as the National Union of Clerks and the Amal-
gamated. Society of Woodworkers. Moreover, the members of the CEJC "were
no duly accredited representatives of the workers in the workshop" as
they caiie from District Committees and branch committees; he also criti-
cised -the CEJC for refusing -to allow shop stewards to sit on it. 	 In con-
trast, the Workers'Committee Movement sought a revolutionary transformation
of society through industrial action, direct representation from the work-
shop on all union bodies, and all executive decisions to be taken by the
members.	 The militants therefore worked, in competition to the CEJC
scheme, but found themselves becoming increasingly isolated. Most shop
stewards were not prepared to question the authority of -their union's ruling
committee, or the CEJC, as long as they did not interfere -too much in work-
shop affairs. The refusal of the Workers' Committee militants -to work in
the CEJC scheme meant -that -they had no influence over the struggle for its
recogni-tion.
In October -the CEJC scheme was presented to the CDEEA, which referred
it to the Engineering np1oyers' Association, the national body. Unions
did not wait for official employers' recognition, but began -to sign up more
shop stewards at a rapid rate; in -the -three weeks from 25th September to
16th October the ASE gave credentials -to 74 stewards, mainly from COW, white
and. Poppe, arid DaimlerJ 72) Stewards -themselves began to force -the issue
of recognition. A-t the Daimler, there had been stewards in existence for
some time, but -they did. not come out into -the open until September when
they led a stay-in strike of 700 workers for -three days arid. two nights to
secure removal of a foul-mouthed foreman. This was done without union
backing, -though CEJC officials caine in -to settle -the dispute. 	 As a result,
Hodgkinson was elected Chief Convenor of the Works Committee and claimed at
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least de facto recognition from management; "I was given carte blanche
powers by the management to go into any shop in the works, to use the
telephones in the office of the foreman, and. if need. be to leave the factory
at any time to report the state of affairs to the District Secretary of the
Even here, however, the management gave no assurance that they
would recognise every steward elected by the members.
Thus in the autumn of 1917 the issue of shop stewards recognition was
coming to a crisis, and unrest among workers was increased. by the shortage
of food and. by a number of skilled. men being called up. There were short
stoppages at a number of factories, prompting the Ministry of Munitions
man to report "The air is highly charged. here, and very little will cause a
great blaze".	 On September 22nd., over 700 men went on strike at i'Jhite and.
Poppe, over the victimisation of an AST shop steward. The men soon went
back, but when the CEJO met management, they took up eight separate griev-
ances, ranging from deductions from pay for scrap to incompetent management -
a good. example of the number of d.ifferent grievances that were building
The question of stewards recognition was not taken up by the CEJC, as this
was still felt to be a matter for local negotiation.
In October the CDEEA rejected the scheme, and. the attitude of the local
officials hardened. They still felt that if they did. not give a lead, they
would. lose control to the militants. In order to "prevent the interference
of outside bodies" they began to push for recognition firm by firm, with
some successs	 The Manager of the Singer Works reacted. favourably to
the scheme, and., according to Givens, "even suggested. valuable ad.d.itions."6
However, on 19th November, a dispute over changes in the premium bonus
system at White and. Poppe produced a strike when the maxiagement refused to
meet a deputation of stewards. Givens and. Orrell, the AST official, were
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called in and. secured an arrangement whereby management, while still
refusing to recognise stewards would agree to meet them disguised. as "a
deputation of representatives." This was de facto recognition, but it
was not enough for the strikers, and the stoppage went	 The CEJC
met on the wednesday, and. again on the Thursday, this time with shop
stewards. It was agreed to hold a local conference with the employers on
the matter, and 6 officials and. 6 stewards were deputed. to attend. The
CDEEA refused to hold any meeting while the strike continued, and the dele-
gation of 12 met the strikers and. persuaded. them to return on the evening of
Friday 23rd November. 8	The local conference took place on the Saturday:
the employers, pointing out that national negotiations on the question of
shop stewards were pending, refused. to grant recognition in the interim,
but were prepared to accept "spokesmen" not directly involved. in the dispute
to represent workers. 79 A meeting of the CEJC and. shop stewards in the
evening rejected this and by a majority of only seven votes, agred on strike
action.	 (The vote was on whether to strike at once or give notice).
The decision had been made primarily by the shop stewards, and was
agreed by the full CEJC on Sunday. In reporting -to it, Givens urged "If
the matter was -to be kept in hand, it must be grasped immediately, and not
(81)left to drift into irresponsible handst'	 The prospects of m1itants
running the strike prompted the CEJC to resolve that "Being the Executive
body they assumed complete control of the situation, and. further that no
open air meetings should be held without their sanction.' ' Officials
remembered that during the May strikes there had been meetings on Pool
Meadow with some of the speakers attacking the union leaders.
Many union officials would. ha 've been happy with the compromise that
was possible, as would. many employers. The local Ministry of Munitions
I
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official also hoped for a compromise, and felt that the employers should
give way. He was afraid that "the men will eventually get what they want
by force majeure" and felt that it would be better
"To meet them halfway by the Department suggesting to
the Engineering Thiployers' Federation, as impartial
observers, that it is in their own interests they
should, for the duration of the war at least, in con-
trolled. establishments, recognise the very mild form
of shop committees set up in the Hotchkiss works." (83)
These, he felt, "tend to efficiency rather than otherwise." The official,
however noticed the militancy of the men, and sorrowfully reported that even
the Hotchkiss Committee was demanding recognition for stewards.
The CDEEA., as the official body of employers, was prepared to make only
minor concessions. It drew up a scheme of its own, which was not submitted
-to the unions, but seni to -the EEF. This would have recognised stewards
at the rate of about 1 per 100 workers provided they were over thirty years
of age, and. provided they would agree to spend all their time at work
engaged on busines of use to the employer. The only function of the
steward would be that he would be available for consultation by workers,
but under no circumstances would he be allowed to issue orders to fellow
workers. Finally the steward would have duties to management; it would.
be "an equal part of the Shop Steward's duty to foster and. maintain amicable
relations between the work people and. the management, and. any shop steward
wilfully and persistently attempting -to create illfeeling, or restrict
earnings or output will not be recognised by the firm as being suitab1e."8
The CDEEA saw shop stewards as a potential threat to management authority
on the shop floor.	 I-t was prepared. to accept a form of consultation, pro-
vided decisions of all kinds were left to foremen and. chargehands. 	 ploy-
ers everywhere felt this, but shopfloor power was of particular importance
where piece-work and bonus systems were so widespread; • unless management
0
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kept a close hold on the workers,wages would rise.
The strike began on 26th November. 	 Virtually all of the engineering
workers in Coventry, some 50,000, caine out on strike, including members of
the WtJ, though in theory they were not party to the shop stewards scheme.
Mainbers of the National Union of Clerks stopped work as well, and. this was
unusual enough to produce press comment. One startled correspondent
reported that clerks were "lolling about and. congested main thoroughfares,
mingling with the general body of strikers, and. priding themselves upon
the growing numerical strength and. power of their own trade union.4
Despite general hostility, some extremely virulent from the press, and
odd stunts such as the leafletting of the city from the air by people who
were trying to get a return to work, the strike was peaceful. The CEJC
decided not to hold any mass meetings; strikers met at their own union
meetings. A fund. was set up for women workers on strike, while an aggre-
gate meeting of the ASE recommended to the CEJC "to obtain the use of a
Hall to be kept open daily for social and organisation purposes amongst the
girls who are out with us so as -to prevent them congregating in the
(86)
streets."
The local branch of the Discharged. and. Demo'bilised. Soldiers and.
Sailors ed.eration campaigned for an end. to the strike, but the workers
had. a supporter in P.E.T.Wid.d.ring-ton, a vicar, and. one of the leaders of the
Christian Socialist Iovement. Widd.rington wrote letters to the press
calling for Industrial Democracy and declaring that the existence of shop
stewards - "the most important advance the workers have made for many a
long day" - was a step in that direotion.8
CEJC leaders kept up polemics with employers in the local press for
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the duration of the strike. The employers claimed that the CEJC scheme
had. never been accepted by them, and that they had never formally dis-
cussed it, though they admitted there had. been informal discussions. On
the other hand, Spicer of the Brassworkers summed. up the union attitude
when he wrote that the employers,
"By making a verbal compact to indirectly accept shop
stewards pending the Central Conference, and afterwards
issuing a circular to employers asking them not to recog-
nise shop stewards, committed a breach of trust, which
could be claimed to be the chief reason that caused this
stoppage." (88)
Union officials also tried to persuade the press as to the moderate nature
of their schemes, and. that it was not against any national agreement.
Doherty claimed
"We contend that the recognition of the shop stewards will
be in the best interests of employers and working-men in
the future. We claim that it will tend to better organisa-
tion and. better order in the workshops, and absolutely
eliminate the spasmodic strike idea which has been so very
prevalent in the engineering industry during the last twelve
months."	 (89)
He supported Spicer saying that the employers had. agreed to meet workshop
representatives "without enquiring too particularly as to whether the men
were shop stewards or not. This was regarded by us as an unofficial
admission of our principle." He claimed that a circular had. been sent
by the EEF to all the local employers "insisting that they should. not
recognise shop stewards in any way," and. that this had. caused the trouble.
This would. imply that a national settlement was necessary, but Coventry
workers were also aware that only they were on strike. Thus an aggregate
meeting of the ASE resolved that "We will resume work only when the matter
is settled locally and. -to our satisfactiont,.(91)
In the seven days of the strike, there were few incidents. There was
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a story that troops were being sent into the Daimler, and the ASE DC
passed a resolution threatening force with force, but it turned out that
they were a small number of soldiers sent to the Daimler to learn tank
work several weeks before the strike began and had not come out with the
others.(92)	 At the Humber, the Managing Director and the Works Manager
engineered a meeting of the strikers which was addressed by a chaplain who
had. been flown over from France for the occasion, and got a promise of a
return to work. James Reade of the CEJC and. George Morris of the WU were
able to call another meeting and stop the return before it could take piace.
Notwithstanding the resolutions that this was an issue to be settled
locally, the Ministry of Munitions was involved, and talks took plaoe in
London. However, it was not until local talks had broken down that serious
negotiations began in London on Saturday 1st December. Three delegates
from the CEJC with three shop stewards were joined in London by national
union officials and others (including Givens) and met local arid national
employers' leaders.	 On Saturday, after much discussion, the employers
were only able to offer talks on the issue after the men resumed work.
This was rejected by the union side. (hi Sunday the unions proposed that
the CEJC Shop Rules should be provisionally accepted by the employers for
period of twelve months, but this in return, was rejected by the
employers' representatives. Eventually, an agreement was reached on
Sunday evening. The workers were to return on Thesday 4th December, and
a local conference to settle the issue was to be held on the same day.
There was to be no victimisation, and the Government, for its part, was to
urge an immediate settlement of the issue nationaiiy.
The local Union representatives may have left thinking that an
immediate national agreement would solve the problem, but no national
93
meeting was to take place until 14th December, and. this was not brought
forward as a result of any Government pressure. The union side had. agreed
to call off the strike without any local commitment to recognition. This
may well have been criticised back in Coventry, for the mass meeting of
shop stewards on Monday lasted three hours before eventually agreeing to
call the strike off.	 In the afternoon, aggregate meetings of the unions
also supported the decision to return. At the ASE aggregate, a motion was
put "that we stay out until after Wednesday next, bringing out all the
Midlands and thus deliver a knock—out blow," but this was very heavily
defeated.
On Tuesday, therefore, the strikers returned to work, and. a local
conference began. Once again CEJC officials and shop stewards met the
CDEFJ and. discussed the Shop Rules. The employers' notes of the meeting
records
"The Unions stated that the Shop Steward's Rules were
prepared to enable them to deal with an outside movement
which threatened to get out of their control, and pressed
the point that their acceptance would. prevent accumulation
of grievances producing another labour crisis." (96)
Once again, the unions were showing their fear of the unofficial movement,
and acknowledging that they had been pushed into action. The employers,
however, made it clear that their objections to the Shop Rules were as
strong as they had ever been. They particularly attacked rules thirteen
and fourteen, which authorised shop stewards, Convenors and. Works Committees
to take up grievances with foremen and management. "It was pointed out,"
the employers' minutes record,
"That they meant the tearing up of all existing agreements
and. the introduction of an entirely new system of dealing
with vital matters between Eiployers and Workmen, including
the relegation of foremen to a status practically under the
control of the Stewards, and would produce an impossible
position." (97)
9'
The minutes concluded, on this section that "the view of the parties were
too far apart for any possibility of agreement on the subject." This
view of' the shop Rules was open to question, especially as a couple of
days earlier, Givens had been reported in the press as saying the scheme
"does not interfere in aaiy shape or form with the York Agreement:" normal
procedure would be followed if a dispute could not be dealt with at work,
but the aim of the scheme was to see that 'atters which can be dealt with
in the shop shall be so dealt with, instead of being allowed to be aggra-.
vated by long delays."8
The employers' attitude had not changed at all as a result of the
strike, and although the local conference lasted for several days no
agreement was reached. The unions could properly claim to have been
duped; they had wanted a local settlement and. had called the strike off
when they thought a local settlement would be possible. At the conference
in London, the local employers had claimed they had "an earnest desire to
secure a satisfactory settlement without prejudice to any general settle-
ment which may be arrived at at the Central Conference." 	 Yet at the
local conference the employers had. not made any attempt to get a settlement,
but had merely put off the issue until it was settled nationally.
Although there had been no local recognition as a result of the strike,
with national negotiations pending, the CEJC did not seriously consider
resuming the strike action. Thereafter, events passed out of its hands.
The agreement that was signed on 20th December by the EEF and. most of the
engineering unions went well beyond what the CDEEA would have offered, in
recognising stewards, giving them the right to -take up grievances, leave
their work, and take part in negotiations, but it did. not satisfy the CEJC.
It did not incorporate the idea of one steward representing all the workers
95
in the shop, nor did. it recognise shop committees. 	 The CEJC felt it was
inadequate, and continued with a campaign to get their scheme recognised..
Once the issue had been refused, they were not able to bring sanctions into
plar, so although they had. some success, most CDEEA members refused to
recognise it.
In practice, therefore, the Coventry strike had achieved little for
shop stewards in the city, though it hastened a national agreement. In
more general texms, however, it represented an important step forward for
the labour movement. It was the first time in the history of engineering
in the city that there had been a general strike against Coventry employers.
All the workers were brought together in a common struggle to try to impose
a new kind of organisation on management. It was a testing time for the
still young trade union movement in the city, and. although everything was
not won, unions gained in confidence as a result of the dispute. The CEJC
consolidated its position at the head of the movement in the city, for it
alone had run the strike, despite the fact that the CEJC scheme was not
recognised. The Workers Committee militants remained isolated. after the
strike, while the NAC of the movement made no intervention in the dispute.
CEJC leadership did not mean complete unity in the labour movement.
The WU had been solid. in the strike, despite the fact that it was not rep-
resented. in the negotiations. But when, a few weeks later, it again applied
to join the CEJC it was again rejected on the grounds that it had no right
to keep its skilled members. Moreover, there were tensions within the
CEJC itself, which emerged in the bargo strike in July 1918.	 In fact,
the strike for recognition was the point at which the labour movement in
the city was most united.. Later in the ware dissensions and fear of the
military call-up exposed the divisions in the movement.
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V The thargo Strike
In January 1918 the Government decided it would withdraw the Schedule
of Reserved Occupations, and. make skilled. engineers available for military
service, and. a Bill was introduced into Parliament for this purpose.
Skilled engineering unions led. the agitation against this, and. the left
wing in the unions found themselves in a difficult position; they did
not wish to contribute to a sectional struggle which sought to protect
some men while others were allowed to be called up, but rather wished to
conduct a broader campaign against the war itself. However, there was
little likelihood. of this developing quickly in the short term.
At the same time a further round. of dilution was begun, and again
the skilled unions led the protest. The first couple of months in 1918
saw a temporary falling off of orders in some workshops, and for the first
time for some years men were unemployed.. The CEJC called. for a ban on
(ioo)
overtime, and. opposed further attempts at dilution. 	 An aggregate
meeting of ABE members passed a motion stating
"That we refuse to submit to any alteration in the present
basis of Exemption from Military Service to those employed
in the engineering Trades, prior to the Government going
into conference with the Central powers with a view to
bringing about a cessation of hostilities.....
To rub the point in, a second. motion stated
"That the cessation of war is now possible and urgently
necessary and the members present are prepared to assist
in any general movement to attain that end.." (101)
At the end of January, there was much talk of a general strike in the
(102)
city against the dilution proposals and the Military Service Bill, 	 and
given the attitude of the ABE members this could have become a strike for
a negotiated. peace. The ABE District Committee appear to have wanted. a
strike, but the WU made it clear that this time it would not join in and
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ballots in the workshop showed that most skilled workers were not pre-
pared to stop. The ASE and some of the other unions felt that the CEJC
had not done enough to oppose the new dilution attempts, and there was a
big row on the CEJC. As a result, the four most important skilled unions,
the ASE, AST, TJMWA and. SEMS while agreeing to remain in the CEJC, decided
to organise regular meetings of their District CommitteeSseparately.
The ASE District Committee sent two delegates to the unofficial union
conference which met at Manchester to consider strike action, but the March
offensive by the Germans changed people's attitudes to the war. An aggre-
gate ASE meeting a couple of days after the Gennan offensive had begun
accepted the wishes of the Chairman when he asked that "No personal views
should be expressed either for War or Peace; that the meeting should keep
itself to the business in hand and. deal with the same with a view to the
interests of the whole Society," a very different position from that of
(1o3)the January meeting.
The new climate of opinion made it possible for employers to attack
militants in the factories. At the Hotchkiss, a number of workers,
including Dingley, were sacked, and protest strikes only led to more sack-
ings. Most of the workers refused to support the strikes, and. the local
union leadership refused to help. Givens and Orrell attended a shop
meeting, stressing they were there in an unofficial capacity, and urging
"that a broad view should be taken by the members and no hasty decisions
arrived at."
	 They proposed that the men ought to look for alternative
work, and. were backed up by the CEJC which called off the strike and
arranged a local meeting with the Ministry of Munitions officials to find
other work. (104) Needless to say, Dingley was not offered other work,
and. he had to leave the city and. take a job in a Birmingham factory under
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a false name.
The ASE, unable to get local concerted. action, carried. on a sectional
campaign that angered. many other trede unionists in the city. Givens, who
had. been in the post for only a few months, resigned. as CEJC Chairman
because he felt the ban on overtime was not being firmly operated.. At the
end. of March, the District Committee resurrected. its policy of regular
monthly meetings of its own stewards, even though CEJC stewards' meetings
were still carrying on. At their meetings, ASE stewards agreed. to try to
protect themselves from military service by supplying lists of names of
d.ilutees to Giver's, who in turn sent them to the Recruiting Officers in
the city.(105) The District Committee also called. on the Government to
set up a new recruiting tribunal in Coventry to review the existing exempt-
ions, to be composed equally of skilled workers and employers; everyone
who had entered the industry after August 1914 ought to be classed. as a
dilutee ar'd. made available for military service. In a period. of four
months, leaders of the ASE had gone from a position of opposing the war to
volunteering to act as recruitment officers, provided that it was the semi-
skilled and. unskilled. that were recruited. Their new sectional approach
meant co-operation with anyone, employer or government official, to see
that other union members were sent to the front instead of them. In turn
it produced a reaction from other CEJC unions and. from the vflJ. Militant
trade union action suffered., and. when a serious dispute did. arise, it split
the union movement in the city.
The Ebargo dispute began over a letter that was distributed to fore-
men in a number of large munitions factories on July let, and which rapidly
fell into the hands of, amongst others, the ASE District Committee. The
letter said that "In accordance with instructions received from the Ministry
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of Munitions, we are prohibited from engaging skilled men of any type."
This meant "any man in receipt of at least the Standard District Rates,"
although in theory, every worker doing a skilled man's job should have been
getting the skilled rates, even if they were themselves d.ilutees. The
letter urged foremen to make every effort "whenever it is necessary to
employ men, to make use of semi-or unskilled men i.,,(b06) The ASE had
a copy of the letter sent by the Hotchkiss management, and the Ministry of'
Munitions later claimed that the letter put the views of the Management and
not the official situation. The Hotchkiss letter had got the definition
of' a skilled man wrong, but it did not otherwise misrepresent the Govern-
ment's position which amounted to a new attempt to shake out skilled men
without any consultation with the unions. The letter immediately caused
confusion among employers and workers alike. Men who had left other jobs
to work at the four factories concerned - the Hotchkiss, Daimler, Siddeley-
Deasy and Triumph Cycle - found management there did not know whether to
(107)
take them on or not, and a number were turned away.
A hurriedly called meeting of the ASE Midlands Divisional Conference
resolved "that in any rationing of skilled labour that may be necessary,
(108)
the trade unions concerned sha]lbe the only authority we will accept."
The CEJC demanded a meeting with the responsible Ministry officials within
48 hours; these were produced, but were found to be unconvincing, speaking
"in a very halting and uncertain manner" and the CEJC resolved
"That if the embargo is not removed by noon on Monday
July 15th the workmen concerned will hand in a week's
notice to cease work until Freedom of action for skilled
workers in obtaining employment is restored." (109)
On Sunday 14th July this motion was put to a crowded aggregate meeting, and.
accepted, though some wanted an immediate strike.
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Notices were duly given, and. in the week that followed, prepara-
tions were made. The ASE District Committee recommended "that no
"iiopressure be put on unskilled me or women for support.' 	 / - a super-
fluous comment as the WIJ had already made it clear that its members would
not be striking. An ASE aggregate meeting resolved "any settlement
arrived at must be first accepted by a full meeting of District Committee
and submitted to aggregate meetings for approvai:ll	 However, the
week's notice made it possible for national union leaders arid Government
spokesmen to condemn the action, and. in the case of the latter, threaten
to conscript strikers.
On the day before the strike was due to begin, further meetings took
place. After discussion, the CEJC decided that if the Ministry of
Munitions official that they had met, a Mr. Langton, could get the Ministry
to agree to the holding of a National conference to consider the whole
question of the utilisation of skilled labour, they would be prepared to
call off the threatened strike. This greatly alarmed the ASE District
Committee which on the same day declared that "This D.C. insist that our
representatives on the J.C. must uphold at all costs the removal of the
"(ll2Enbargo pending a Conference convened nationally.'
	 / In the evening, a
reply Was received from Langton, which only offered a conference on the
utilisation of skilled labour "apart from the Enbargo", and. went on to
state firmly "the Government's considered policy in the matter of the
Ththargo scheme cannot be a matter for discussion,... the Ministry cannot
carry on the supply of Munitions -to the Troops without the
This letter upset many on the CEJC who wanted to call off the strike,
Reports from other areas showed that with the exception of Birmingham,
there would be no strikes, and that Midlanders would be going it alone.
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On the day the strike was due -to start, 22nd July, a meeting of the CEJC
with representatives from Branch Committees, District Committees, and
Works Committees rejected the letter from Langton, but voted by 87 votes
to 24 to recommend to aggregate meetings that strike notices be suspended
until a national conference of trade unions could be called "in order that
all skilled workmen shall cease work upon a given date. ,,(114) This
created a split amongst the unions, for the minority refused to accept
what they saw as a betrayal, and stopped work from the original -time set
for the strike which was 5 pm. that evening. The meeting itself was the
subject of much bitterness. It was unusual for the CEJC to call a meeting
of such a kind, and representation was uneven. The ASE District Committee
sent along only three delegates, but some of the smaller unions had. sent
more. Givens claimed bitterly that it was "a decision contrary to the
wishes of the members, and which decision was given by an enormously dis-
proportionate representation of small societies, and was proposed by a
Society not then affiliated.15) Read, the CEJC secretary, claimed that
unions could have called for a card. vote if -they had wanted, but that they
had not. Nevertheless, it is clear by the size of the votes that it was
the whole meeting and not just -the CEJC, where each union had only one vote,
that had taken the decision. As a result the minority of unions that had
the largest membership in the CEJC found -themselves at odds with -the rest.
In the week the strike lasted-, -the two sides of the CEJC used the local
press for the purpose of abusing each other.
On Tuesday 23rd. July, the AST held an aggregate meeting in the morning
and. resolved, to stay out on strike. After a heated meeting, an aggregate
meeting of the ASE, in the afternoon decided by a large majority to do the
same. On Wednesday, -the UMWA and SEM also decided to stay out. The four
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major craft unions were thus acting together. Their combined membership
was over 10,000 but most reports put the total number of strikers at
upwards of 16,000, so they must have been joined by some who disregarded
-the appeals of Read and other leaders of the CEJC. These tried to defeat
the strike by posting notices in all the workplaces urging the men to
remain in, by organiBing a local strike ballot, and an unofficial national
engineering conference for Thursday 25th July. But by that date the strikers
-	 (116)in Coventry had been joined by some 15,000 in Birmingham.
Nevertheless, the leaders of those who were not on strike played an
important part in reaching a settlement. The CEJC was partially respon-
sible for the conference of Joint Committees which took place at Leeds,
and which threatened strike action from 30th July. This threat, on -top
of -the existing strikes, caused a change of heart on the part of the Govern-
ment, Lloyd George promised -the establishment of a Committee of Enquiry
containing representatives of the four unions involved, and at the same
time declared that anyone on strike on Monday 29th July could have their
protection certificate withdrawn. This was enough to end the strike.
While about 10,000 met on Monday morning to vote to return, thousands more
were already back at work.
Although it had. only lasted a week, the strike had produced a violent
wave of hostility. Newspapers exaggerated the role of left—wingers, par-
ticularly the Daily Mail ("Every compartment of the men's lavatories was
found inscribed with the legend
(117
about one local factory).
'Strike to stop the War,'" it recorded
Posters were issued by the Ministry of
Munitions stating -that the strike was "xi attempt to overthrow the policy
of the State in a time of national danger." Havelock Wilson leader of
the National Union of Seamen, turned up in Coventry with several hundred
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seamen, and. marched them round, demanding a food embargo on the city - a
(118)
call unlikely to win local supports	 The recently appointed
Industrial Vicar in the city began his crusade against Bolshevism, still
a relatively new word. But it was the Government's threat which preci-
pitated a return.
The issue of the nbargo note was soon forgotten. In practical terms,
it had little effect on skilled workers, and the preliminary report of the
Committee of Enquiry, which did. not come out until a month before the end
of the war,was iet1y received. The dispute had. a longer effect on the
labour movement in Coventry. The CEJC did not perish in the split that
had occurred, but it lost a lot of its authority. Henceforth, local
district committees returned -to separate organisation, and the Joint Cornm-
it-tee was relegated to the role of a co—ordinating body for the compara-
tively small number of issues when joint action was felt appropriate. The
unique Coventry experiment had failed, and so much of the steam ran out of
attempts to get recognition for the CEJC shop rules.
r about three months after the Eknbargo strike it seemed that the
CEJC would collapse altogether, for some of the unions that had been out
were refusing to send delegates, and the .ASE delegates resigned from the
(119)Committee after a censure motion on Read had been defeated by one vote.
However, in October Read resigned, and shortly afterwards new delegates
were appointed by the .ASE. The skilled unions agreed to push for changes
in the method of voting on the Committee, and agreed. to meet separately,
if required, so their commitment was not total. In November 1918, it was
reported that the .ST were electing their own shop stewards in the work-
shops. This provoked a reaction from the ASE District Committee "as we are
still of opinion that the J.C. rules are the only rules under which an
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efficient movement can be maintained, tt(120)and it is possible that the habit
of shops electing stewards without worrying what card they held. continued.
in many places. Finally, at the end of December 1918, the ASE celebrated
the festive season by suggesting to the CEJC that an arrangement be reached
with the WJ to get them into the Committee. Had. such an arrangement been
made at the beginning of the war the history of the CEJC might well have
been very different, and the general struggles of workers in the war years
would have been more effective.
VI The General Election
The growth of class consciousness among working people found. a
political outlet in the General Election of December 1918. The election
was called in a hurry, after several years of inactivity on the part of
the major political par-ties. For the first time, a Labour candidate stood,
but Walihead was opposed by Banning-ton, who stood with the backing of the
local branch of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised.
Sailors and- Soldiers (NFDDSS). As the sitting M.P. had been disowned by
the Liberals, who were putting up another candidate, there were five con-
testing the election.
As a supporter of the ware Bannington had joined up in 1916. He had
risen -to the rank of sergeant by 1918 before being invalid.ed. home buffering
from shell shock. He soon recovered, and took over leadership of the
NFDDSS in Coventry, which had been established in 1917 and had. attempted. to
intervene in the strikes in the city to get a return to work. The Federa-
tion was an unusual body, being fiercely patriotic, with red, white and.
blue election colours, and very anti-Geiman, but it also claimed to be a
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revolutionary socialist body that would not accept ex-officers into its
ranks. For a few years after the war it had a substantial following
among ex-servicemen. Bannington made it clear that he was standing because
of Wallhead's opposition to the war, and. although he issued a socialist
programme, the issue was in reality one of whether he would succeed in
splitting the labour movement over the war issue. Here Bannington was
hindered by his BSP past. Supporters of Wallhead delighted, in remembering
the pre-war days when Bannington addressed. open-air meetings denouncing
the armed forces, urging his audience not to become "hired assassins at a
(121)
shilling a day" and distributing anti-militarist literature.
Only Poole, who had already severed his connections with the ILP, of
the city's labour leaders, came out in support for Bannington. Other
pro-war leaders such as Wale, kept in the background and remained loyal
to the Labour Party. T.J.Harris, the Labour Party Chairman, admitted the
existence of a "serious cleavage of opinion that has existed. in its (i.e.
the Labour Party's) ranks regarding the conduct of the ware" but he was
able to show that the vast majority of the leadership in the city rallied
to Wallhead.(122) This did not mean that the split did not provoke bitter-
ness; in fact Bannington and. Walihead. attacked each other so much that they
had little ammunition left to shoot off at the other three candidates.
Accusations and counter-accusations were made, and many came to accept the
charge that Bannington's candidature was "a plot hatched at the head office
(123)
of a large industrial firm in the city."
In -the event, the election was comfortably won by the Conservatives.
The new M.P. was Chairman of the Daimler Company. The votes casi were
Sir E. Manville (Con)	 17,380
R.C. Wallhead. (Lab)	 10,298
Sir C. Mansell (Lib)	 4,128
A.C.Bannington (NFDDSS)	 3,806
D.M. Mason (Ind.Lib)	 3,145
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Even with Banning-ton's vote added to his, Wallhead would. have lost, but he
had secured enough to encourage the Labour Party and. discourage Banning-ton
and. his supporters. It was the first election in the city under manhood.
suffrage, and while it is clear that many engineering workers had voted
against Labour, the Liberals had done very badly and. Labour had. emerged as
the main opposition. Givens was able to comment "We have driven the
capitalist parties all into one camp, and. for the future, however many side-
issues are introduced, it will be simply a fight between Capitalism and.
Labour.(124) In fact Givens was running ahead. of himself in purely elec-
tora]. terms - -the Liberals and. Conservatives continued. to compete with each
other, and Labour was able to benefit from this in 1923. His statement is
valid., however, as a general comment on political and. industrial developments
in the war years.
VII	 The war years had witnessed a rapid. growth in the power of the unions,
which for the first -time since the mid-nineteenth century were again able to
exercise great influence in Coventry. Thanks to the growth of the shop
steward movement, there was a qualitative change in the unions as well as
a quantitative. Shop stewards iored. the exclusive side of the unions,
and aimed at collective action for all groups. Instead of -the union being
a slightly remote body that operated for the most part outside the factory,
it had. become more substantial, and an accepted extension of the worker's
own work-activity. The shop stewards' movement made it more easy for indi-
vidual workers to contribute positively to the union, and so learn the value
of collective activity. Moreover, the skeletons of the trade union organisa-.
tions were given flesh by the addition of hundreds of active trade unionists
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to the collective leadership of the labour movement. The shop stewards
movement therefore constituted an important and. lasting addition to the
unions in the city.
however, while the war saw the extension of the power of the working
class in Coventry, this new power was not matched by strengthened organisa-
-tion. As the unions grew, the Trades Council lost its place as the leading
forum of the trade union and labour movement. The CEJC, as a purely indus-
trial body was able to provide leadership of a sort, but by the end of the
ware that too could not claim to express the views of the workers of the
city, but merely served to bring together the district committees only when
those committees wished it to. The CEJC had also failed in its attempt to
unite shop stewards behind a general union leadership, while the Workers'
Committee had. failed to unite shop stewards into a separate movement of
themselves. Authority was fraented between branches, shop committees
and district committees, with no organisation capable of guaranteeing a
united front in any struggle that was to come.	 In the political field, the
Labour Party was the accepted party to vote for, but had been virtually
inactive for four years. The co-ops and the tenants associations were
witnesses of important extensions of class organisation outside the factories,
but lacked importance because they were removed from industrial struggle.
The weakness of the craft tradition, compared to other engineering
centres, and the fact of thousands of semi- and unskilled workers in unions
prevented the growth of an autonomous movement led by revolutionaries - a
feature of other centres. Instead trade union officials were able to retain
leadership of the stewards by modifying the principle of exclusiveness. In
war-time conditions, however, when national agreements clearly discriminated
between skilled and unskilled, the craft tradition was strong enough to ensure
that the CEJC experiment did. not succeed. The general unionism that had
appeared was too new and weak to challenge effectively the craft unions.
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The craft unions themselves had. taken in semi-skilled workers, and had all-
owed skilled to do semi-skilled work. Developments in the r years had
accelerated the move away from skill in engineering, and this was gradually
cutting the ground from under the main engineering unions. Craft unionism
general unionism and revolutionary syndicalism had. competed in the war
years, but although the craft principles predominated, none of these move-
ments had fully stamped their identity on the Coventry trade unions.
Trade unionism was still a new experience for most workers, and. the
unions had. not had. to face a prolonged. dispute without the knowledge that
the Government would. intervene in some way. Given a division between
craft and. general unionism there was doubt as to whether the unions could.
maintain unity in any major dispute.
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CHAPrER THREE
Post war Political Struggles
Unemployed Struggles.
The slump in the British economy particularly affected those companies
that had. recently revalued their capital, arid, which produced for the luxury
market. Many of Coventry's firms did both, so for a time in 1920/1921
unemployment was higher in the city 'than virtually anywhere else. Both
unemployment and the big industrial struggles were seized upon by the new
Communist Party, which at least for a few years, convinced itself that a
working class seizure of power was possible. This chapter deals with the
way the CP thrust itself into the limelight for a few years, and. tried to
become a major opponent to the Labour Party. It also covers the deteriora-
tion of the ILP and the emergence of a professional Labour Party. The first
part covers the battles that took place over the issue of unemployment, the
second the growth of the CP and. relations with others in the labour movement.
From mid 1920 to mid 1921, unemployment in Coventry grew from l,55 to
1 2,534 . This meant that over one quarter of engineering workers were out
of work, with many more suffering cuts in living standards through short
time working.	 In November 1920, just as unemployment in Coventry had begun
to rise steeply the new Unemployment Insurance Act came into effect,designed.
to extend the state unemployment scheme. The Act was conceived before the
era of mass unemployment, and. failed to cope with the long term unemployed,
or with those who had not been in work long enough to quality for benefit.
Many workers, particularly while waiting for their benefit period to be
(1)
extended, were forced back onto the poor law.
Poor law relief dated from the Middle Ages, but by the 1920s was aimed
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at vagrants, d.estitutes and. the old. and. the infirm. Yet in June 1922
there were over 1 million insured. people claiming relief. Relief was
administered, by Boards of Poor Law Guardians, who were elected. alongside
local councillors. Although the Government had laid. down regulations
dealing with various classes of people, there was scope for local Guardians
to interpret the regulations in a generous or penny-pinching manner. Thus
at one time in 1922 a couple with two children on relief in Poplar, a Labour
borough, could. get 44/6d. plus rent and fuel payments, while a similar couple
, (2)in Stoke would be able to get a maximum of 25/-.
Most of Coventry was covered. by the Coventry Union Board of Guardians,
but there also existed a Foleshill Union njch covered the Rural District
of Foleshill, stretching round the east and north outskirts of the city and.
including Bedworth, Binley, Exhall, Foleshill, Keresley, Stoke and Willenhall.
In Foleshill, the local rural councillors doubled up as Guardians, but in
Coventry there was a division of posts and. the Guardians were elected
separately. The political composition of both Boards was similar. In
1919 some Labour Guardians were elected, but were in a minority in both
Unions. Foleshill Rural District covered. farming and. well-off suburban
areas, and. representatives from these were in the majority while the minor-
ity caine from Stoke Heath which had been dependent on the Ordnance Works
during the war and. which was heavily hit by unemployment after the war when
the factory closed. Stoke Heath was the only part of the District with
Labour Guardian representatives to the Board, though the tenants on the
estate were not united, as four candidates stood for two seats in the
November 1920 elections. All of the cand.idates were from the labour move-
ment, though party labels were not used. 	 Al Read, leader of the rent
strike, was elected along with Mrs. Thüly Smith, who became a long serving
Ii 7
Labour Councillor in the 1930s in Coventry. One of th other candidates,
Ben Fowler, became one of the leaders of the Stoke Heath Unemployed Comm-
ittee, which appeared. to have a leadership to the left of the labour
representatives on the Council and the Board..
The functions of the Boards were to draw up scales of relief, to deter-
mine the conditions that were to "be attached to relief, and. to supervise
the administration which was carried out by Relieving Officers. It was
the Relieving Officers who were the main targets of the unemployed, movements.
The first and most important organisation of unemployed workers in the
City was the Coventry Unemployed Workers Committee, set up in September 1920.
Its first event was when it lead a group of two thousand. workers to the
Armstrong—Siddeley works at Parksid.e where the unemployed went into the
firm's precinct and a meeting was held of workers and workiess. The meeting
was addressed by Tom Dingley, erstwhile organiser of the Workers' Committee
Movement, Harry &ery who was to be the leader of the local unemployed for
several years, and James Stewart, the recently appointed Midlands Organiser
of the Communist party.	 All three were (or were shortly to become)
members of the Communist Party, which had succeeded in taking a leading
role in the unemployed movement right from the start. The Party's use of
full time officials to address such meetings was soon stopped in favour of a
lower profile, but initially the Unemployed Committee was regarded as a great
success for the newly formed local party branch.
The week before the Committee was et up, The Communist, the weekly
organ of the CP, reported large meetings in the city and. staged that "Coventry
will be strong for Communism soon. A good working branch is in being and
will be heard of later 	 Readers did not have to wait long. The
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report from Coventry in the next issue was headed "The Coventry Unemployed.,
A Soviet Formed" and. informed the world that "Comrade Eknery had been
elected secretary of the local ojet.(6) This enthusiastic description
showed how the CF could be carried away by contact with a mass movement.
Some weeks later, The Communist published a statement from the Unem-
ployed Workers Committee headed "To the Working Class" which explained
itself and its organisation
"The Committee was elected at a mass meeting of unemployed
workers, attended by about 1,200 persons. 	 It is important
to notice that each member of the Committee is a delegate
subject to immediate recall...
All decisions as to activities, and. all resolutions either
emanate from the mass meetings - which most frequently is
the case - or are submitted by the Committee to the mass
meetings...
The Committee is determined not to lead the Workers into
side issues, but insist upon the overthrow of capitalism as
the only solution for unemployment and all the grievances
of the workers which arise from their status as wage slaves..."
(7)
The Committee had nine elected. members and three co—opted from the local
branch of the National Union of Ex—Servicemen. Although only a minority
of the Committee initially appear to have been Communists, men like Dingley,
Jackson, Preece and ery, all Communists, acted as leaders whether on the
Committee or not. As the above statement shows, the Committee was very
much influenced by the experience of the Soviets, and the theories of the
Workers Committee in Coventry, with men like Dingley and Jackson directly
linking the two.
This was a major coup for the small branch of the Communist Party,
and it tried to make the most of i-b with frequent open air meetings as
well as use of the Baths Assembly Hall. Local factories were visited and
workers used to resist overtime.
	 Town meetings were held, and there wer.e
demonstrations at the Board of Guardians. Town meetings were relics of
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feud.al Coventry rediscovered, by the Communists who could force the Mayor
to call a meeting if they could collect 200 signatures. One was held
on October 4th 1920 and the Mayor had to preside while virtually every
active members of the Communist Party in the area spoke to various reso-
lutions. Dingley proposed the establishment of a Workers Council, while
the main resolution called for the unemployed to take over disused. factories
to be rim under workers' control to produce goods ordered by a Russian Trade
Delegation that was to be invited to visit the city. The motion was not
lacking in ingenuity, but nothing came of it, the Mayor simply saying he
would pass it on to the proper authorities, whoever they werei(8) A year
later another Town Meeting set up a Coventry Russian 'amine Relief Comm-
ittee. It was good propaganda, but provided nothing material for the unem-
ployed.
In Augns-t 1921 a meeting of unemployed AEU members established a union
Unemployed Committee, with DC acceptance. The new body was not the work
of the Communists, who viewed with alaxi the prospect of several different
unemployed movements. At the same time the Rev. J.J. Aitage, who had
-the responsibility of being the Church's Messenger to the workers, which he
interpreted as leading the fight against Bolshevism, had. formed his own unem-
ployed movement. The AEtJ Unemployed Committee kept clear of this, and held
separate demonstrations, but also initially kept clear of the CUWC, and
called instead for a new Executive Committee for the unemployed, made up of
representatives from unemployed committees from different unions. Their
demonstrations -took place without support from the CUWC, which prompted
the editorial of the Midland. Daily Telegraph to point out that on demon-
strations "There was none of that unpleasantness of tone which was rather
marked in Coventry about twelve months ago."(9)
120
This pleasant state of affairs was merely an interlude in the
spring of 1921 several of the leaders of the CUWC, including ery, Dingley
and. Len Jackson had. been arrested. for making seditious speeches in various
parts of the Midlands, and this took some of the steam out of the Committee,
though the Stoke Heath Unemployed Committee continued to be active.
Armitage's organisation soon disappeared, and with the CtJWC becoming more
active again, relations between this body and. the AEU body grew more
cordia1. As the prospect for all out struggle with the Thiployers' Asso-
ciation grew, the unemployed began to discuss what role they could play.
The District Committee became so alarmed. at the activity of its own Unem-
ployed Committee that it called its leaders to a meeting to raise its
complaints.
Delegates from the AEU committee made it clear that some of them at
least also belonged to the CIJWC, the "Red Card Organisa-tion." cie pointed
out that a delegate Conference called. by the body and. attended. by repre-
sentatives from six unions had already drawn up plans for the lockout and
the Union Committee were going to support them. Alex Maddison, who was
active on both bodies said "that even if it came to split heads, they were
going to have Unity." He told the DC that they intended to co-operate
with the CUWC, whether the union approved or not. As Chapter Four shows,
the DC was most reluctant to accept this, but eventually gave way.(10)
There was thus the basis for a united movement, but this was weakened
less than a month later during the lock-out by the decision of the CUWC to
put up its own candidates in the elections for the Boards of Guardians.
This meant splitting the Labour vote, and naturally provoked a strong reac-
tion from the Labour Party.
Normally the Guardians' elections were quiet affairs, but the inter-
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vention of the CUWC coming after many months of political protests that
frequently centred on the Guardians gu.aranteed a lively election. J.T.
¶[yson, the secretary of the Labour Party, wrote to the Mid.land. Daily
Telegraph denouncing all the CUWC candidates as Communists and saying
that their aim was "To render the Poor Law unworkable", a their demands
(11)
could not reasonably be met.	 In fact, the Unemployed Committee wanted
work or maintenance at union rates, and. a scale of Poor Relief based on
the payment of 36/-. to a couple plus rent, coal and gas.2)
In reply one of the candidates of the Unemployed. Committee pointed
out that they had been elected by mass meetings, with "No creed or party
being considered to qualify for nomination." Len Jackson from the Communist
Party wrote to claim that only two of the nine CUWC candidates were commun-
ists and. denying that they had any plans to smash the Poor Law as they saw
unemployment relief as a national problem. He attacked the Labour Party
for being too much concerned with the impact of relief on the rates, and
also raised the question of who should. be  the candidate for the labour move-
ment in the next General Election. He claimed. that the Communist Party had
been the first -to put a candidate in the field., but that the Labour Party
had. ma3.e no attempt -to get unity. He said he was prepared to let the
workers of Coventry choose between Jack Leckie (Communist) and Bob Williams
(Labour) either through a public debate followed. by a vote or through a
ballot of union members, and. complained. that "It has been left to the Commun-
ist Party on every occasion to advance the views of maintaining a united
fron-t."	 Tyson replied by concentrating on the clash over the Parlia-
mentary candidates, and tried to dismiss as unimportant "The motley coterie
locally designated the Coventry branch of the
In the Board. elections that followed, the Conservatives, Liberals and
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Independents strengthened. their hold on the Board at the expense of Labour,
which gained one seat and lost three, and. saw its representation shrink to
four out of ficteen. The CUWC candidates did. poorly; all of them came
bottom of the poll and the only respectable results were at Swaxiswell,
where Alex Mad.dJ.son polled 257 votes, about 10% of the votes cast, and at
Stoke, where Tom Dingley polled. 497 which was less than 10%. The total
of the highest Labour votes in each ward (there were several seats in each
ward), gave a figure of 5,800; the CUWC figure was	 Although
it could. be claimed that this was making inroads into the Labour vote, the
votes were nowhere near sufficient to allow the CUWC to emerge as the major
opposition force, let alone win seats. However, they increased the turnout
of votes from 12% to 50%.
The voting took place at a momentous time in the history of the city.
The AEU lockout was in progress, and. the unemployed were being stirred into
greater activity by -the presence of Wal Hannington in the city, and the
arrest and imprisonment of the local CUWC leaders. The CUWC could organise
mass action, but it did not follow that those people who joined the demon-
strations gave political allegiance to the Committee's leaders. The CU1IC,
together with the Labour Party, must also have suffered by the fact that
voting for Guardians was limited. to the ratepayers and. the families of
ratepayers, and. excluded lodgers. The Communist leaders felt that their
record of activity, and the Labour Party's record. of inactivity justified
their putting themselves forward. as the true champions of the working class,
but this damaged the need for unity, and. anyway did not lead to electoral
success.
The leaders of the unemployed movement knew -that the problem was a
national one, and participated in national activity such as the establish-
ment of -the National Unemployed Workers Movement in April 1921 and the first
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national hunger marches in October 1922. Nevertheless, local issues
were of first importance and. the unemployed. had -to try to influence -the
Guardians. The issues they raised concerned the amount of relief, -the
way it was distributed, the conditions attached, arid the problems of
single men and. women and of strikers.
Some progress was made on the scales of relief, for on the whole the
Coventry scales were higher than average, and. certainly higher than the
scales in Poleshill. Thus when new scales were introduced in September
1921 a couple with two children living in Foleshill could receive a
maximum of £1 in cash and. 15/— in kind, while a similar family in Coventry
were entitled. to l-5s in cash and l9/6d in kind as well as l pints of
milk a day . 6 )	 Parthexore, Foleshill Goardians were stricter in
applying conditions, -though in both areas the Relieving Officers were
paid commiUsion of i% of all monies recovered from the families of
recipients on top of their salaries.
Coventry's scales were not the most generous in the country, and there
were plenty on the Board and in the city who wished. to ensure that they
did not rise higher than they had to. One member complained in February
1921 that "It is evident that we are fast approaching the line beyond which
there is a real danger of seriously impoverishing the people who have to
foot the bill.., the Guardians must draw a fini line between the provision
of absolute necessities and. the provision of relief which might in any way
(18)	 -be termed attractive." 	 Local business men kept up presure on the
Guardians from 1920 to ensure that money was carefully watched.. The new
rates of relief in September 1921 produced. a deputation of protest from
the Ratepayers Association which also produced material at the Guardians'
electionB calling on citizens to support Conservative and Liberal candidates.
The spokesman for the small businessman, Fred Lee, said. in November 1921
that "When he received some of the letters. addressed. to him by business
men, some of them of a heart-rending nature upon the subject of the impost
of high rates, it made him very depressed," and. he went on to attack the
Labour opposition who "think money drops from the clouds." (19) The
Guardians were continually looking for ways of reducing expense.
Relief was primarily aimed at the old, the sick, and the dependents
of paupers. Single able-bodied people were left to fend for themselves
or else enter the Workhouse. Thus the Board. decided. at the onset of mass
unemployment that "All applications from single able-bodied men be dealt
with by an Order for Asimission to the Institution and. that all relief
given in such cases be granted on loan(2	 This was following the normal
practice of Boards of Guardians but was qiite inappropriate at a time of
heavy unemployment. The Guardians were banking on the deterrent of the
Workhouse, for they could not have accommodated more than a small number
of single unemployed, and anyway, such accommodation would hinder the men's
chances of finding work. When a deputation from the CUWO went to the
Board the Relieving Officer reported to the Guardians that "The persons
compulsorily providing the relieving funds cannot be left out of account
and methods of relief should accordingly be framed with an eye to both
sides. Looked at in this way, it may in such times of widespread distress
become a question of what can be publicly afforded, as well as what Is
(21)
necessary to meet the needs of the distress." 	 This was clearly
opposed to the attitude of the CUWC that workers should not bear the brunt
of the recession and led to several clashes between deputations and.
Guardians. The Guardians soon modified their position to a slight extent
by providing relief in kind to able-bodied men who were willing to take the
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test of physical labour; that is, they had to be prepared. to do work in
the Institute grounds in order to get relief. The Superintending Relieving
Officer took a very frank attitude to this test when reporting to the
Guardians:
"While work of public utility would be aimed at, the principal
of the labour yard would be satisfied. by the mere application
of the test regardless of the fact whether the work were
necessary and useful or not. The plan may then be uneconom-
ical, and. it would certainly be not only often impracticable,
but in its effects on free labour as applied to the individual,
it is also of a degenerating tendency. Still, it is important
to consider the question of safeguards when relieving able-
bodied men..." (22)
But this policy was also impracticable, for whether the work was use-
less or not, there was a limit to what the Guardians could provide, and
they decided that instead of insisting on work "which is not of a bene-.
ficial nature" it would be better to get a larger employer such as the
Council to provide "work of public utility such as the repairing and cleans-..
ing of roads or the creation of new bacteria beds on the sewage farms etc. ,,(23)
The Council, in turn, was not prepared for such a task, and although a few
aiiall schemes went ahead in 1921 they were on a very provisional and. short
term basis. Test work was not systematically put in hand until December
1922, when political conditions were more favourable. Until then the
position of single men and women was very unclear. Some appear to have
been offered outdoor relief for work in the Institution, some were able to
plead special conditions such as dependents, and got outdoor relief, but
most were refused all but the Workhouse. After September 1921 it was made
clear that single people could. apply for relief but that there was no scale
for them and any relief was based on the discretion of the Relieving
(24)	 .	 .Officer.	 This confusion over single people was not atypical, 	 In the
early days of mass unemployment in Coventry there was great confusion due
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to the fact that the Guardians did not have any relief scale at all;
proper scales were not issued until the end. of January 1921, four months
after the onset of mass unempioyment.(25)
Outdoor relief was also withheld from strikers, and. again this brought
the Guardians into conflict with the CTJWC and. the labour movement in the
city. When there was a strike at Triumph Motors in May 1921, the House
Committee at the Coventry Union met and. decided that the regulations pre-
vented them from granting any relief to strikers, and- furthermore stated
that "Where relief is being granted to the wives and children of the men
concerned in the present trade dispute, that the husband. should first enter
the institution.I(26)	 should the striker refuse to enter, then the Insti-
tute would be offered to the rest of the family with the prospect of no
other form of relief. In the found.ryworkers strike at the beginning of
1920 the Foleshill Guardians took a similar attitude, but relented to the
(27)
extent of allowing strikers' families to get relief in the form of a loan.
Besides taking up the cases of the single and. strikers, the CUWC
lobbied for higher rates of relief, better administration,and. proper treat-
ment of people made to work. 	 Initially, it ha3. some success in forcing
the Guardians to concentrate their minds and actually agree to issue relief
to people who were not destitute, but when the Communist label stuck it
	 -
became more difficult to win concessions. When work started on the Memo-
rial Park, the Committee was able to negotiate a 2d. an
 hour increase and.
better conditions, but during the period of competing unemployed. movements,
a favourable hearing, together with improvements, were given to the non-
union group while the CUWC were ignored. The calibre of the demands made
by the non-union leaders can be seen by the inclusion of the suggestion
that local gentry be asked to provide rabbits for the unemployed.
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Some of the largest demonstrations organised by the CUWC were con-
cerned with political splits in the labour movement rather than with the
Guardians. During the AEtJ lock-out a conference of trade union repre-
centatives was called to nominate Bob Williams, the ex-Communist, as
the Labour Candidate in the next Parliamentary elections. This was
deeply resented by the Communists, who claimed that their own candidate
was acceptable to the trade union movement and. had been nominated by the
unemployed movement. This provided counter-claims from Labour supporters
including one that prospective members of the Unemployed Movement had to
commit themselves to support Jock Leckie, the Communist Candidate, in order
to join the movement. As a result of this ill-feeling CUWC supporters
at the conference challenged Williams' credentials and. this led to a
heated debate. As Harry Whitely, one of the CUWC candidates in the recent
elections was speaking, for the fourth time, Edward Buckle, the district
secretary of the Vehicle Builders Union was unlucky enough to be heard. to
(28)
say "Bugger the Unemployed.P'
A subsequent meeting of the unemployed asked him to come to their
meeting to explain, and when he refused, a crowd gathered outside his house
and carried on making speeches and. booing until dispersed by the police.
Rashly, Buckle took out a summons against five of the leaders of the CUWC
(Dingley, Heard., Preece, Whitely and. Arden) and at a magistrates court on
4th April they were found guilty of conduct likely to cause a breach of the
peace. They were ordered to find sureties of £10 each to be of good
behaviour for the next six months. They refused this, and. were sent to
prison for a month.
In court at the sane time was the unemployed leader Wal Hannington,
charged with making a seditious speech in the city in March. He was able
128
to get the final sentence reduced to a binding over to keep the peace
for six months. At first Hannington accepted this, but when the five
decided -to go to jail, he changed his mind and joined them. All six
were then taken -to Winson Green in Birmingham.(29) .t large crowd,estimated
at either 2,000 or 5,000 had. gone to the court to show support, and in the
evening a Free Speech Committee was formed and. a large torch—light pro-
cession took place.
	
Crowds gathered outside the Vehicle Builders office,
and the next day Buckle issued a somewhat ungracious apology. When this
was transmitted -to the prisoners in Birmingham they decided to be bound
over and. were quickly released.(30) The incident is best seen as a re-
flection of the turmoil of a particular stage of the engineers' lock—out,
when it was comparatively easy to create mass demonstrations. The incident
was also part of the public row between the Communists and. the Labour Party.
The strength of the CUWC lay not in its occasional stunts but in its
persistence in offering a voice and- an organisation for men who would other -
wise have been complete rejects from the world of industry, and in its
attempts to extract concessions from the City Council, the Lord Mayor's
Boot Fund, the Guardians and the unemployment offices. At one of the
early meetings of the Committee, all who attended heard a report from neg-
otiations with the Labour Enployment Committee, the Council management who
were employing out of work engineers on the Memorial Park, factory gate
meetings, and reports of negotiations about the quality of the food, provided.
by the Municipal Restaurant which offered free meals for children. One of
the people present complained that "We are doing what the Labour Councillors
should do" and a resolution was passed urging councillors to attend their
meetings.	 But they never did, ai-id. this was the strength of the CUWC,
far more so than activities of men like the first lea4er, H.M.Ehery, who
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later had to flee to Russia to avoid a prosecution for stealing arms for
the IRA.
The spirit and. the fight shown by the unemployed movement over the
years 1920-1923 was significant in that it changed, albeit in a nal1 way,
the political life in the city bringing the area of poor relief into the
political arena. Before 1920 the usual view of the Board of Guardians
was that it was a non—political charitable exercise carried out vluntar-
ily by the social leaders of the community as part of their social obliga-
tions, and. at some expense to themselves. It was similar to helping to
n.m the Mayor's Distress F\md, promoting building societies, charitable
bodies, and indeed, sitting on the City Council. The view survived long
after the unemployed movement had disappeared, but from 1920 onwards it was
challenged by another view, whereby the institution of the Guardians, the
Workhouse and. all the bureaucracy that went with it were seen as having an
essentually repressive function. Relief was dispensed but on such terms and.
in such a way as to humiliate and. degrade men and women. It was the non-
industrial counterpart to the bullying foremen in the factory. It followed
that its function was not purely social in any narrow way, but political,
one of the bodies used. by the dominant social classes to perpetuate their
dominance in the city. The Guardians' elections showed that most workers
did. not develop this attitude as far as the CIJWC would have liked, but there
appears to have been a wid.esprea4 belief that the thlardians were hostile -to
claimants. This view was not based on personal animosity, on a dislike of
the Guardians themselves. Indeed, although there were sharp disagreements
between the different sides, there was little personal conflict in the
struggles for decent scales of relief.
Here the situation in Coventry was quite different from that in
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neighbouring Foleshill Rural District, where some working people and.
unemployed. came to develop a deep hatred for the Relieving Officers and
the Guardians who stood behind them. As we have seen, Foleshill Rural
District contained. many of the outlying towns and villages that surrounded
much of Coventry, and. in the elections, the gentry and. shopocracy had no
difficulty in getting seats. But parts of Foleshill and the council
estate at Stoke Heath was in the District, and in these areas unemployment
and poverty was the greatest for the whole of the area, while in the rest
of Foleshill, poverty was not great. At a time when pauperism was at the
level of about one in nine of the City of Coventry, it was virtually non-
existent in nsty and Bed.worth but it was one in four at Stoke Heath.(32)
lIhat this meant was made clear in the annual report of the health conditions
in the Rural District by Dr. Harold. Webster in June 1922. He found. that
most of the children under the age of one were in a reasonable condition,
but went on to report:
"The condition of the older children, however, is not as
satisfactory. So many of those between one and five years
of age are below the average in size and weight, some of
them very badly so. Far too many of them also show signs
of rickets. These conditions must be attributable, to a
large extent, to the unemployment and distress in the district.
These children cannot be getting the diet they need.. Butter,
eggs, vegetables, and. fruit are, in many cases, impossible to
get on the income allowed." (33)
A month after the publication of the report, the relief scales were reduced.
as a result of the fall in the cost of living; the total relief paid in
both cash and. kind for the first child. in a family came to 4/— , while sub-
seciuent children were valued at 2/— a week. This did. not stop members of
the Board insulting those on relief; one of the more outspoken, W.H.Malcolm,
attacked the Stoke Heath Unemployed. Workers' Committee, saying it contained.
people !Who were not too scrupulous in the way they liked to be kept."
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This was typical of the statements made.
Another person who tended to have a low opinion of claimants was
W.E.Thomas the Relieving Officer, who was the subject of many complaints
from people who had. either been turned away by him or had been insulted.
At a Board meeting in September 1921 Thomas spoke of watching a young man
who had claimed relief; this man, he said, "Had recently been kept under
observation, and was seen to take a girl to a picture house." )
 Shortly
after that the Foleshill unemployed committee sent a deputation to the
Guardians, claiming that Thomas was refusing relief to people who took
part in demonstrations, and ha4 violently ejected people from the Workhouse.
The Labour members of the Guardians moved a motion criticising him but this
was de1eated. 6	Thomas implemented the Guardians' policy of not paying
ariy relief to strikers during the lock-out, and one Widay evening found
himself being driven out of the Foleshill Board Room by a crowd of strikers.
He claimed to the Board that he was forced to seek refuge in his local pub,
but to no avail, for when he went out, the crowd was still there, and
threatened to "throw him into a pit." They followed him home and demon-
strated outside his house. One of the people who was "molesting" Thomas
in this way was Benjamin Powler, who was one of the leaiers of the Stoke
Heath Unemployed Committee, and. Thomas retaliated by cutting off his relief.
Again, he was backed up by the Guard.ians,though this time only by a vote
of 11 to 10, the Guardians deciding that until Fowler apologised., the only
relief he and his family could receive would be in the workhouse. Despite
Fowler's refusal to accept this, and complaints from other sources, this
decision was not a1tered.
The attitude of the Guardians, and, of course, the high level of
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unemployment, quickly led. to the formation of a Stoke Heath Unemployed.
Committee, which soon became affiliated to the CUWC. A similar body was
set up in Fbleshill, but was not as active as the one in Stoke Heath. The
Stoke Heath residents had. had an organisa-tion during their rent strike in
1919, so it is not surprising to find an organisation quickly emerging in
1920.	 It won support from the local Parish Council, which called for
the rates of relief adopted by national conferences of the unemployed, move-
ment. The Parish Council also attacked the behaviour o the Guardians,on
one occasion complaining of the "Abhorrent and. despicable action of the
Pole shill Board of Guardians in the treatment meted out to the Stoke Heath
and Foleshill unemployed. ,,(38) The Parish Council had little power
however, and. this particular resolution was passed. over without comment by
the Foleshill Guardians.
One of the most important struggles of the Stoke Heath Unemployed. was
against relief in kind..	 In the early stages of mass unemployment, claim-
ants were given tickets to be exchanged at specific grocers' shops for
specific goods. This was objected. to because it put the claimants in a
humiliating position, and also because it made possible the exploitation
of their condition by grocers and. Rural District officials. Recipients
also complained about the poor quality of the food, but the Guardians passed
a motion stating "that butchers meat only be granted. on the special recom-
meiation of the District Medical Officer in cases of il1nessL'Not Until
September 1921 did. the Guardians agree to make payments in cash, and even
then relief was partly in cash and. partly in kin&. This was eight months
after the Coventry Board had. decided. on cash scales.
Poleshill quickly became notorious for relief in kind., low scales,
delays and. hostile questioning of claimants. This caused. the unemployed.
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committee to protest frequently, and as the Guardians would try to avoid
recognition of unemployed. organisations, this led. to clashes outside and
inside the Workhouse. On 14th September 1921 "A very considerable crowd
of unemployed men" marched. to the Workhouse, and representatives of both
the Stoke Heath Unemployed Committee and the LEU tried to get in to see
the Guard.ians.	 Eventually, three people representing both groups
were allowed in, and. they attacked the hostility of the Guardians to the
unemployed, and threatened to go beyond peaceful protests. Five days
later, at a meeting that decided on a scale of relief, another considerable
crowd turned up. Although they were spoken to by Alec Read and Mrs.Smith,
the Guardians refused to see them, and when the crowd threatened to break
in, the meeting was hastily adjourned, and departing Guardians had to run
the gauntlet of the unemployed demonstration. At the next meeting, a
crowd again turned up, but this time was confronted by 26 policemen, the
whole of the Foleshill division. The Guardians voted not to accept a
deputation. A few weeks later, the Relieving Officer, W.E.Thomas, was
giving evidence in court against a man accused of obtaining relief fraud-
ulently. He claimed that such behaviour was widespread, and asked for
the magistrates to make an example, which they did by giving the man three
weeks in prison for falsely claiming one week's rellef. 	 ]iring the
lock-out, trade unionists found the Guardians' attitude particularly
provocative, and. there were further disturbances outside the Workhouse.
The rapid appearance of the CtJWC in 1920, attracted some national att-
ention, and. also brought some of the Coventry leaders onto the national
stage, particularly Tom Dingley. When the first hunger marches began, he
played a leading role and. thus ensured that the hunger marches would come
into the Coventry area. These marches began in the autumn of 1922, and.
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were a desperate rearguard action on the part of activists to stem the
demoralisation that was sprading after a number of union defeats, par-
ticularly in engineering. They involved groups of marchers stajing in
London for months at a time, with various groups coming to reinforce them
as marchers went home. They were not very well organised., with the result
that for several months at the end. of 1922 there were small bands of
marchers from all over the country on the move at any one time, heaiing
for London.	 Once they got there, they joined, in demonstrations until
their local Guardians cut their relief off, or until they were rounded.
up by the police and sent homeby train. If this happened they would
sometimes then start again. Dingley was one of those sent back to
Coventry, but this did not deter him from setting off again.(42) The
Marchers relieS on the generosity of the local guardians for meals and
shelter while they were on the road, and across the country there were
arguments and. skiniiishes as marchers protested against their treatment.
One of the first group of marchers to come to Coventry was from Barrow,
and the Guardians agreed, at the request of the CUWC, to provide for them
for the night, after they had heard that they would be re-imbursed by Barrow
Guardians. The marchers' leader complained bitterly to the clerk to the
Workhouse about their treatment. He "strongly protested. against the treat-
ment which he stated. had been meted out to the marchers: the coarseness of
the food. and the manner in which it was served., and stated. that the treat-
ment from other Boards of Guardians en route had been much more humane in
every way, and hot meals had been provided." )
 The main objection was
that the marchers and their sympathisers had. been left to fend for them-
selves, with no hot food. The evening meal had. consisted of 1 lb of bread,
1 lb of corned beef, and. l- pints of tea, and. breakfast had been the same
I 3
except that tea had. been replaced. by coffee.' 	 The accommod.ation in
the drill hail was also criticised.
A deputation from the CUWC went -to complain to the Guardians after
the marchers had gone, but were refused entry, and. a letter they sent was
ignored. The protest that Jack Preece, leader of-bhe deputation, sent to
the local paper expresses the anger and hunüliation that unemployed leaders
were feeling due to the tougher attitude taken by the Guardians after the
lock-out. He wrote:
"It is typical of the cowardly conduct of the Board of
Guardians -that they refused to receive the deputation who
waited. upon them, and also typical of their discourtesy
that they allowed three ill-fed and. ill-clad men, namely
Messrs. Ward, Kingston and myself, to wait on the pavement
on a cold, damp morning, for one and a half hours outside a
warm and. comfortable Board Room, after which they decided to
send out a subordinate to convey to the deputation their
decision not to receive them. More despicable, in our
opinion was the decision to restrict the powers of the sub-
committee appointed to deal with the feeding of the marchers
to those of supplying such fare as bully beef and dry bread,
especially when we bear in mind. the fact tlha.t, in. some
instances the cost of whatever was supplied was recoverable
from other Boards of Guardians." (45)
Not surprisingly, Preece was unimpressed when the Board passed a motion
of thanks to the Unemployed Committee 2
In the next couple of months, two smaller groups of marchers, from
Rugeley and. Birmingham, were put up in Coventry, and. again were subject
to harsh treatment, this time being made to stay in the Workhouse, and
-treated as vagrant or casual labour.(46) A more serious incident took
place in February 1923. Hannington led. a group through the Midlands, and
the Ministry of Health instructed.the local guardians to treat the marchers
as casuals. At Rugby, the guardians refused to give the marchers more than
-the casual diet, so the marchers tricked the police, broke into the Workhouse,
and stole and. then ate, some jam. The march -then went on to Coventry, where
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it was thought that Hannington was to be arrested.. This time, however,
they were given school halls to sleep in, and were fed in the evening and
the morning at the Municipal restaurant, at an average cost to the Guardians
of 1/- per person per meal. Hearing that the police were out in force at
their next scheduled stop, Birmingham, which had. a reputation for police
infringements of civil liberties, the marchers decided. to spend. an
 extra
day in Coventry, and got the Guardians, after some persuasion, to give them
an extra meal. However, extra police were drafted in from Birmingham
during that day, and encircled the marchers at night.
After breakfast the following morning, the marchers were stopped on
the way out of the Municipal restaurant, and. an attempt was made to arrest
Rannington. This led to a pitched battle in the centre of the city between
police and marchers, and Hannington and. his men escaped and barricaded, them-
selves in the hail at Trinity school where they were surrounded by police
and. the fire brigade, who threatened to flood them out. Eventually dis-
cretion proved the better part of valour, Hannington gave himself up, and.
was later fined five pounds for organising the theft of the jam, while
another of the marchers, tried. at Coventry, got two months hard labour for
assaulting poiicemen. 	 The marchers claimed that they received better
treatment on the rest of their journey due to the publicity they got at
Rugby and Coventry, but the Coventry Guardians reacted against the marchers.
Henceforth, they decided., future marchers would be treated as necessltous
wayfarers. They would. be
 searched, made to have a bath, given a supper of
bread, margarine, porridge and. a hot drink, and a breakfast of bread and.
margarine and a hot drink. 8
	These incidents together with the events
in London, although they served as an attempt to rally working people
against the Poor Laws, made it easy for the press to blame the marchers as
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violent revolutionaries, and. it hardened the attitude of the Guardians
against the local unemployed. workers.
The issue that particularly concerned. the unemployed committee as
well as many trade unions in Coventry was the -task work scheme that was
brought into operation in December 1922. A previous attempt had failed
at the beginning of 1921 because the City Council had. not been able to
provide the work. Although by this time the peak of the unemployment
crisis in the city was over, a scheme of test work went ahead, using men
on relief to either improve recreation grounds, lay gas mains, do mainten-
ance work, improve Pool Meadow, or for some unfortunate workers, break
stones.	 The Guardians made i-b clear that the object of the exercise
was not -to find, jobs for those out of work but to check up on those receiv-
ing benefit, and by penalising them, force them to find. work. Thus it
was stated that the -test work was "For the purpose of testing genuiness of
the application for relief and. not for the purpose of supplying the
Authority with labour specially suitable for the class of work to be under-
takeriV	 The men were not employed, so there was no employers' liability,
no contract of service or National Insurance stamps. They were not paid.
wages, but merely required., if called upon, to give one hour's labour for
every shilling poor relief they received. For those to whom the scheme
applied, they were called. upon to work one week in two. Naturally, the
trade unions saw the scheme as cheap labour, but when they protested, as
the Trades Council did in February 1923, they received some strong answers.
The Clerk to the Guardians replied to the Trades Council by claiming that
the scheme was a generous ones compared with the alternative of the Outdoor
Labour Tee-b Order of December 1844, which would have put people in the
oriciiouse,(5°) (if the Workhouse had been big enough to hold them).
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In fact, most of the categories of work could not be seen as a form
of cheap labour undercutting union rates, as the work was unimportant and
pointless.	 Jack Preece, who tried to complain on several occasions on
behalf of the test workers, though with little success, wrote of his im-
pressions:
"The spectacle of weak, emaciated unfortunates - men whose
lives have been passed, in the main, in factories and.
shops - swinging a pick or shovel, up to their ankles in a
mixture of clay and water, with broken boots and. worn-out
clothes, is a pitiable ones and gives one pause to -think
whether any true economy will be affected by this wonderful
scheme which appears -to be the child of a phantasmic brain
These 'task workers' cannot carry out the work effect-
ively, and, in a short time, sections of the work, say, for
instance, the Memorial Park, will have to be completely
overhauled by men skilled in the work." (51)
When Preece and others were able to see the Guardians they complained
about the lack of drinking water, facilities for making tea, and shelter
for periods of bad weather, but in particular, the need for replacement
bOots.(52)	 The concession the Guardians made was to agree to provide
a hot drink at midday, and. to appeal to the public and Mayor's fund for
boots.
The trade unions and their supporters continued to attack the scheme
without much success. In March, the Trades Council raised the matter with
the Ministry of Health, but received no help. In April the Labour Guardians
tried -to protect union rates of pay, without success. In May, the Trades
Council went to the local authority gas workers Joint Industrial Council
in the West Midlands to complain that recognised rates of pay were being
broken, but without success. In the same month a number of branches of
different unions wrote to the Guardians complaining that test work "Is a
degredation of the standard of life of the workmen upon whom it is imposed,
by substituting cheap labour for -that performance of work which should be
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done at ordinary rates." 	 The resolutions were not even fully dis-
cussed..
By the spring of 1923 the backbone of the unemployed resistance to
task work and. other humiliations had been broken, mainly due to the fall
in the number out of work. By March 1923 there were only about 4,000
out of work in the city, about half the figare of the previous November,
which suggests a quite rapid recovery in industry. With the increase in
the number of new jobs, there was a decline in the authority of the CUWC.
Earlier, it had. been able to establish a broader body, a Trades Council
Unemployment Committee, which brought together representatives from the
unions and. Council with the unemployed, and. the body sent delegates to the
Guardians, but this fusion was a result of the decline in activity of the
unemployed movernent.	 So fast was the change in economic circumstances
and the decline of the CUWC that the National body was caught out, for it
had been agreed that the next Conference of the National Unemployed. Workers
Committee Movement would. meet in the city. Preece lamented. that Coventry
was
"A one-time centre of revolutionary activity, but today a
back-wash of deadly apathy and. indifference.
When the support of the local committee was something
like what 'it now ought to be, it was suggested. that
Coventry be favoured by a visit from delegates of the
Unemployed. Movement. That was before the slump which
followed. the engineers' lock-out, in which Coventry
unemployed played no mean part." (55)
The slump he referred to was primarily one of working class morale, for
the dislocation caused by the lock-out was short-lived. But this defeat
led. to thousands of workers leaving unions, and. most did not rejoin when
they got back into their jobs. A smaller unemployed movement found, it
more difficult to link up with militants in the workplace, and did. not
1)4.0
have the strength to d.ef eat a task work scheme imposed on people who had
in many cases been out of work for several years. The leadership quickly
found. itself high and. dry, and although there still remained. enough acti-
vists -to orgaxiise and carry through the National Congress of the Unemployed,
this effectively marked the end of the unemployed struggle in -the city.
As unemployed workers had very little economic power, it was not
surprising to find, that the peak period of activity and influence of the
unemployment movement was during the lock-out, when their labour could-be
put to use on picket lines, and the ability of -the GINO to bring signifi-
cant numbers of the unemployed into struggle on the side of the workers
and not against them was a major contribution to -the union side. Perhaps
more important in the long -term was the fact that the unemployed movement
propagated ideas about the right -to work or full maintenance, and was able
to develop a political consciousness that challenged -the right of the well-
to-do to declare themselves as overseers of the poor and Guardians of the
public interest. This developing of political insight in practical terms
did not lead to any major challenge to the ruling groups in -the city.
Indeed in the local elections in -the first half of -the l920s the Labour
group lost ground, but it contributed to the growing political maturity
of -the people who were later -to emerge as leaders of a stronger labour
movement.
However, the over-estimation of the revolutionary potential of the
situation, unnecessary revolutionary rhetoric, and the splitting of the
working class movement on the issue of unemployment were serious weaknesses
that detracted from -the achievements of -the unemployed movement. The
leadership overestimated the effect of unemployment on most workers. Some
workers were members of the "Red Card Organisation" accepting Communist
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leadership and, committed to support a Communist in the General Election,
at one period of time, and. then once back at work became non-unionised.
and outside the labour movement. Part of the explanation for this lies
with the special problems involved. in the organisation of unemployed.
workers; being removed. from the work process it could. afford political
flights of fancy, while for most workers whatever commitments made die-
appeared when the prospect of a job Was seen. Nevertheless, the strengths
and. weaknesses of the unemployed. struggles owed a lot to the political
leadership of the CF.
II	 The Communist Party
The fonnation of the Communist Party was an attempt to unite the
different revolutionary socialist groups that had welcomed. the Russian
Revolution. The BSP had not survived the war in Coventry, but elsewhere
was the major constituent of the Communist Party of Great Britain when it
came into being in August 1920. In Coventry, the most important group
that formed the nucleus of the local Party branch came from the SLP which
meant the people concerned had to make some fairly important changes in
political outlook to accept the line of the new Pa±'ty, particularly the
commitment to pursue entry into the Labour Party. The situation in
Coventry was also complicated by the divisions in the local ILP.
Nationally, only a minority of SLP members appear to have joined. the
Communist Party, but the opposite was true in Coventry. William Gee, who
was in Coventry at the time, was expelled by the SLP for being one of the
rebels who signed a Manifesto calling for unity with other left groups.
hen he attended. the branch meeting of the SLP in Coventry, the branch
112
decided -to accept the expulsion, but passed a resolution to the effect
-that "We reaffirm our decision to join the first stable Communist Party
that is formed, whether by the executives of present parties or of an
unofficial party that may be formed.,(56) 	 hen the CPGB was formed, the
majority of the SLP remained true to their word, and joined, as did most
SL1P members in Birmingham.
There were only about twenty members of -the SLP in the city, and the
minority carried on using the name. In November Jack Preece, who shortly
afterwards switched to -the CP., contested }Iillfields ward in the municipal
elections, and other electoral battles were undertaken although with very
little success in the early 1920s.
The people who were involved in the Workers Committee and not in the
SLP also came in-to -the CP, though again -there were not many of them. A
small number formed a Coventry branch of the C? (BSTI) and. did not join -the
CPGB until 1921. This meant that the early CP was dominated by men like
Dingley,	 ery, Preece and Jackson, people used to industrial conflict
rather than political struggle. Basil Thompson, whose job was to report
to the Cabinet on the activities of -the revolutionaries, had an agent in
Coveniry, who no-ted that the Coven-try CP were having difficulty swallowing
affiliation to the Labour Party, and. reported that a number of meetings
had "broken up in an angry mooã." )
 Although -this agent was given to
flights of fancy from time to time, he was very close to -the C? if not
actually in it, and. this particular report is likely to have been true.
Later, another ex—SLP member, Jack Leckie, came to Coventry from Scotland,
and. found himself -the CP candidate in -the General Election. This also
created problems, for he had been described in the SLP newspaper as "A
physical force Anarchist and ardent anti—Parliamentarian, who breathes
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dynamite and. talks red. armiesJ ,,(58)
Another slightly unusual source of recruits to the early Communist
Party was the ILP. After negotiations for a merger had. broken down at
national level, the Communist Party called. on the left-wing group in the
ILP to use its influence to bring local branches into the Party. cie of
the few places where this happened was at Coventry. The local ILP branch
voted. 92 to 73 to join the CP and. local Communists took this as a signal
to move into the ILP Club and. Hall and. change its name to the Communist
Club. The minority took the case to court, and won a Chancery case, and
the Communists had. to move out. The Chancery case revealed. some of the
names of the pro-Communist ILP members, and. it is interesting to note
among them that of Harry ETnery, ex-SLP so the majority vote had clearly
no-b been a completely spontaneous affair
	
Although we do not know
how many of the ex-ILP members stayed. for any time in the CP, and although
there seems to be a case for saying that many played no part in the work
of the Party, another small nucleus of activities had been drawn into the
Party.
Ex-servicemen were another source of recruits to the Party, but here
the stumbling block was the existence of the National Federation of Dis-
charged and Deinobilised Sailors and Soldiers, which, while sounding left-
wing on many issues, was also patriotic and. anti-Bolshevik. 	 It stepped.
up its activities after its intervention in the General Election in 1918,
and for the next year was very active and. ran candidates in the local
elections in November 1919. It excited. the police agent in the Coventry
left, who referred. to it frequently in the secret reports to the Govern-
ment. In May 1919 he claimed that i-b "Receives much sympathy from the
general public" while in June he reported. that its meetings were chaired.
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by trade union officers, and. it was considering linking up with a uion.6°
However, in late 1919 the reports mention that the more consistently left-
wing National Union of Ex-servicemen, based on Birmingham ,was gaining
ground at the expense of the other organisation, which in response was
(61)
tending to drop its political attitudes. 	 After much wooing, and the
placing of the right people in the right jobs, the National Union of Ex-
servicemen in the city began to co-operate with the CF on unemployed.
marches, where they operated as a workers militia on a few occasions,(62)
and eventually several branches were reported as going over to join the
C?. The credit for this victory was given to Bert Cresswell, who played
an important part in the development of the labour movement in the city.
However, as with the influx from the ILP, the new recruits did not seem to
have made a big impact on the party.
The Fortnightly reports on revolutionary organisations circulated. to
the Cabinet contain much that is of interest on the activity of the local
C?, which in the period 1920-1922 received special attention from the
authorities, possibly because in the city they were fortunate -to have an
agent with access to the left. Nevertheless, some of the reports are
quite wild. At the end of the war, for example, Thomson, the compiler
of the Cabinet bulletin wrote
"A Report, not yet confirmed, has reached me that 100,000
red flags have been made for distribution in Barrow and
Coventry and. the neighbourhood, and that the Shop Stewards
in these places intend to formulate a demand for a thirty-
two hours' week, a minimum wage of £6 for skilled and £5
pr week for unskilled labour, with a time limit for
acceptance, and that failing acceptance they will "down
tools" and proceed with the revolutionary movement." (63)
i a later occasion, a report says that Coventry extremists had plans to
seize the Drill Hall and various public buildings at a given moment. There
were about a thousand Irish and ex-servicemen organised ready to seize the
axs kept in the drill hall.(64) Although this is almost certainly pure
fantasy, it could either be the fantasy of the agent, or the fantasy of the
men he was reporting on. After all, some of the direct actionists like
Harry Thierr did. have big ideas. 	 (At one disruption of the City Council
meeting, ery explained from the public gallery that he thought the
building would make a useful centre for the Coventry Soviet.)	 Conse-
quently, all of the wild reports cannot be dismissed out of hand.
	 Other
reports do show a lot of knowledge about the work of the CP though not a
great deal of insight. The reports from Coventry show a marked tendency
to ove/act, being pessimistic and. optimistic by turns. Again, to some
extent this was a reflection of the feelings of the left. Perhaps the
perplexed comment that "Coventry has passed through cycles of extreme
revolutionary feeling" was as equally valid as other statements referring
to the political apathy of the city's workers.66
The Hands Off Russia Campaign in the city which ran from 1918 to
1920 was successful in putting out a lot of publicity and. involving some
trade union leaders.	 In May 1919 a very inaccurate secret report spoke
of the "disquieting" news from the city over the agitation for support for
the Soviet Union, and concluded "Coventry is a place where an-ti—Bolshevik
propaganda should be concentrated.' / Bu-t in 1920, co—incidental with
the birth of the CP, the Government stepped up its intervention in the
Soviet Union as there appeared. to be a real prospect of Polish collapse.
A National Council of Action was set up to pursue a strike against the
war, and. local Councils appeared as well. Within a week of -the National
Conference in London, A.E.Mabbs, president of the Trades Council, was
presiding over the first meeting of -the Coventry Council, with Len Jackson,
a Communist, the secretary.(68) A demonstration in Pool Meadow was large
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enough to require two platforms, and speakers ranged. from Hugh Frren,
the 'iioderate" member of the Board of Guardians, and councillors, to
Harry er.(69) Although the issue died. down when the Government re-
treated., in Coventry the campaign overlapped with the first mass meetings
arid demonstrations over unemployment, so the political temperature remained
at a high level, and. the newly-formed CP had. an excellent opportunity to
engage in mass work. Unfortunately, the unity shown over the intervention
in Russia did not continue over unemployment as we saw earlier. Thompson's
report in October 1920 claimed. that Eery in particular, as leader of the
CUWC was continually abusing local union officers, and this had. prompted
the establishment of an .AEU Unemployed. Committee in
example was when the AEU invited the local NP, Sir Edward Nanville, to
speak on the unemployment position in the city. The report in Solidarity,
probably written by Enery, said "It was an education for the workers to see
their 'labour leaders' on the platform with him and. to witness their crawl-
ing attitude".
The report went on to say that ery spoke, exposing 'capitalism in
all its nakedness, calling the workers to prepare for Soviets.
This was typical of the black and. white attitude -to subjects -taken
by the revolutionaries at the time
As a result of the successful inauguration of the CUWC, ar-id. of the
publicity it achieved., the CP made a special effort to build a dynamic
branch in the city. Thomson's agent complained. in November 1920 that the
city had. 'been treated as a forcing ground for the British revolution, (72)
and- it is true that it had more than its fair share of outside speakers.
Jim Stewart, the Midlands Organiser for the CF spent several weeks in the
city, and. McManus, Ebury, Gallacher and others turned up to address meetings.
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Most important of all, Jack Leckie was moved into the city to share the
leadership of the unemployed, movement.
However, in its early days, the CF was very small. Thomson's agent
claimed, the active membership in early October 1920 was about 15, but
admitted this was growing as "Many extremists are visiting Coventry,
which is regarded as suitable for the establishment of Soviet Control."
There was also a smaller group in the CF (BSTI). A month later the Party
decided not to select a candidate for any future parliamentary elections.
However, the small size of the local branch did. not stop it from making a
local impact in running the i.iinemployment committees, carrying on with the
Council of Action (after they had. died out in most other areas) setting up
a Workers Committee, and general agitation.
Party activity continued at a high level until about the spring of
1 921. During the spring and. summer of that year, Communists in the
Midlands,and. Birmingham in particular, were subject to increased police
pressure, and. many of their leaders were arrested.. In Coventry, Leckie,
Jackson, Dingley and. mery all got jail sentences of several months, though
not for activities carried out in the city. However, even in Coventry,
the police were always on the look-out for the utterance of seditious words,
which is what most of the Communists were being arrested for, and it was
necessary to have their own shorthand writer at all public meetings.
These arrests weakened. the activity of the small CP group )
 as did the
court case with the ILP which took up time and. cost money. (After the
case 1
 the Party was in financial difficulties until it was able to turn
up a sympathetic cinema manager in Nuneaton who gave it
	 Attempts
were made to use the prison sentences to build. support - when ery
returned from a sentence in Winson Green attempts were maIe to welcome him
back with a procession and. the band. of the CUWC - the "Red. Orchestra."
Shop keepers were invited to put out bunting, though it is difficult
(76)
to believe that any did..
From autumn 1921 onwards, the CP began to make up ground, and s
able to galvanise the unemployed movement back into activity, particu-
larly in Foleshill and Stoke Heath. In the period before the AEU lock-
out, the number of mass meetings was stepped up. This did not stop the
decline in Party membership in the city, as the non—active people who
had joined from the ILP and the National Union of Ex—servicemen left,
but the effective membership increased.. 	 A recognition of this
growing strength was the reversal of an earlier decision not to put up
a candidate in the next General Election, and the nomination of Jack Leckie.
This was followed. by a campaign to get labour movement organisations to
support his candidature, and this inevitably brought the CF into conflict
with the Labour Party. The conflict was exacerbated by the fact that
Labour's Candidate was Bob Williams, leader of the Transport Workers, who
had been expelled from the Communist Party for his part in the fiasco in
April 1921, when the transport union and. the railwaymen had. refused to
support the miners. This resurgence of activity did. not go unnoticed. by
Thomson's agent, who was described by Thomson as being "particularly well
informed.," and. who wrote as follows
"Violent speeches, (he reported.), by Tom Dingley, Leonard
Jackson, and other local agitators, which are now of almost
daily occurrence, take place entirely unchecked, and it is
generally thought that the seeds of serious trouble are
being sown in the city. Twelve months ago these extremists
had a comparatively small following in Coventry. They
were discredited by the great majority of the workers, and
there was very little sympathy for them when they were
prosecuted. The large amount of prolonged unemployment
amongst the engineering workers of this centre, however,
has made fertile soil for the Communist propaganda, and.
revolutionary doctrines are gaining much support of late.
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The national leaders of the Communist movement make a
special mark of Coventry, and such men as James Stewart,
Jack Leckie, ex—Colonel Malone, George Ebury, William
Gee, and William Gallacher, are so well known here that
they are almost regarded as local men. There is no doubt
that a great deal will be heard of these men during
Leckie's electioneering campaign. I wish th point out
the urgent need. for counter propaganda in Coventry at the
present time." (78)
Although the period of the lock—out saw the CP at its most vigor-
ous in the city, and they were able to make an important intervention,
there was never much chance of Leckie emerging as a serious rival to
the Labour candidate. The Labour Party claimed that Leckie had
received no support from the trade union movent in the city, '
	and
although the CUWC supported him, it was not without some disagreement
and dissention. Leckie was very much to the fore in the lock—out, and
so was presented with an ideal opportunity to get maximum publicity.
This was seized, but so enthusiastically, that the Labour Party were able
to accuse him of manipulating the lock—out struggles for his own ends.
Bob Williams, in direct contrast to Leckie, played no part in organising
workers, pickets and unemployed during the lock—out, but instead wrote
to the local paper to attack Leckie, "Whose efforts," he said, "Together
with those of the individuals with whom he is associated, I consider are
calculated to injure the political Labour movement." He refused to be
associated with .Leckie at meetings, or to take part in his demonstrations,
for "Whilst it affords an effective opportunity for the airing of political
views, too much political propaganda may weaken the morale of the men,"
Because of the wrong leadership, the less organised sections of those in
the dispute could be put off the need -to struggle and "Betray their
loyalty to their own organisation rather than be led away by the diatribes
of Communist propaganda. ,,(8o)
At the time, the contrast between the active candidate and the inactive
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one must have been to the advantage of Leckie, but in the confusion and.
defeat that followed the end. of the lock-out militancy disappeared, and
no doubt many workers were forced to accept the employers ? view that the
unions had been making essentially revolutionary demands for control of
industry. Reacting to the changed circumstances, the CP Executive
Committee decided to reverse their decision again, and in August 1922,
decided not to run a candidate, in the interests of left unity. 	 One
comment on the decision to drop the Communist candidate stated. that it
had caused a serious division in the Party, and took several meetings to
come to the final decision.(8 At the end of 1921, the Comintern called
for a united working front, and it was this new line which led. to the
calling off of Leckie's candidature.
This united front policy was not taken by most CF members to conflict
with the need for Communists to win leadership of struggles at local level.
Although the CP accepted the need. to work within the existing trade unions
it also sought to win union bodies at all levels to support for the Red
International of Trade Unions. It also ran the Workers' Committee move-
ment as a separate entity until June 1922. In practice this meant cam-
paigning against the existing trade union leadership, and trying to wrest
leadership from them. Thus in the miners' struggles in 1921, the Party
campaigned under the slogan "Watch your leaders" and warned of the dangers
of betrayal. In January 1922 Tom Bell in The Communist wrote of the
duties of Communists at work, saying that their role was to discredit the
trade union bureaucracy and "Communists must everywhere step to the front
and take the leadership. ,,(82) But in practice this could be read as
support for attacks on labour leaders that would ruin any chances of a
united front.
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In Coventry we have already noted that in the leadership of the
CUWC there was a tendency to overstress the revolutionary nature of
the movement and to criticise the trade union leadership, and. this
stemmed from the fact that many of the leaders of the OP locally caine
from organisations like the SLP and the CP(BSTI) which had rejected
policies such as the united front in the past. Although Communist
influence in the workplaces was very small - Thomson's agent thought
there were only six members of the Coventry CP still in jobs in December
192]. - they had some influence in the LJ.(83) Here most of the activity
was centredaround the Coventry Workers' Committee. Tom Dingley, who
had special responsibilities for the Workers Committee reported in Dec-
ember 1921 to the NAC of the Workers' Committee Movement -that there was
constant competition between the Committee and the OP locally, despite
the fact that the Committee was under Communist influence. 	 An addi-
tional source of confusion was the existence of a Coventry branch of the
Red International of Labour Unions. Whatever the case for its existence
at international level, in the early l920s it served only to confuse at
local level. The Coventry group, with W.H.Chalmers, a patternmaker, its
organiser, was one of the first local groups to be established in the
country.
Like the Workers' Committee, it was a propaganda body, and this
meant that the CP, the Workers' Committee, and. RILU were doing the same
sort of work, but operating separately despite all of them having a small
and overlapping membership. One of the amendments for debate at the
fourth CPGB Congress was relevant to the situation in Coventry when it
referred -to "small non-party sectarian bands outside or inside the work-
(85)
shop, which only duplicate the duties of Communist nuclei."
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The report of the Control Commission on the organisation of the CF
showed that there was virtually no connection between the work of RILU
and. the rest of the party.(86) Until the adoption of this report there
was no clear understanding of the way the different organs of the Party
were supposed to function, and this made it difficult for the leadership
to ensure that their policies werput into operation at local level.
Although the CF was refused affiliation to the Labour Party, it was
still possible in the early 1920s for Communists to be mbers of the
Labour Party and a number of CF members stood as Labour candidates in the
General Election. In Coventry a number of CF members were sent into the
Labour Party, but not titil after the lock—out. In 1923 a prominent
Communist, Bert Cresswell, stood as Labour candidate in the local elections,
and the next year got himself elected to the Executive of the local Labour
Party. It is significant that this sort of activity only happened in 1923,
for by then the dominance in the Coventry CP of the ex—SLPers and the
syndicalists had disappeared, and a different type of leadership was
emerging. Prior to this time, the nearest the OP had come to working
with the Labour Party was at the municipal elections in 1921. When. Labour
decided not to contest two wards, Graham and Dingley stood as unofficial
Labour candidates, though the Midland Daily Telegraph consistently
ref erred to them as Communists, and. this had. an  impact on the number of
votes they received. 8	All this meant that up to 1923 the Communists
neglected the opportunity that existed to influence the early days of the
Coventry Labour Party, and it was not surprising that their belated con-
version to the policy of the united front was treated with some scepticism
by the Labour Party. Some of the leaders of the Coventry OP in fact
refused to accept the united front policy. Cyril Taylor was the Party
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branch secretary for some years in the 1920s, and. recalled. the disagree-
ments between the branch and. the Party centre, and the arrival of Pollitt
to try to sort out the differences.	 Continued, political disagreements
was one of the reasons for the decline in the Coventry CP in the late 1920s.
III	 The Labour Party
A recent historian of the Labour Party has written "until 1918, and
for some time thereafter, the characteristic local organ of the Labour
Party was the Trades Council, acting either in that name or nominally
disguised as the 'Trades Council and. Labour partyt.88) This does not
quite fit the picture in Coventry. The Labour Party as a separate
entity remained very weak for a number of years, but the war had also
seen the decline of the influence of the Trades and Labour Council.
Before 1914 it could. claim to be the body that represented. the bulk of
the labour movement in the city, though there remained. a substantial min-
ority of union branches that did. not affiliate to it, but during the war
the CEJC emerged. as being the important executive body for the trade unions,
and. the Trades Council was not intimately involved in the disputes of the
war years. Although affiliation increased after ttie war, and. reached. a
peak of over 27,000 in 1920 it never regained its position as the most
(89)important forum of labour. 	 It still made an important political
contribution to the Labour Party, as it encouraged trade union branches to
affiliate and. send delegates to the Party, but in terms of activists, the
contribution of the ILP was greater.
McKibbin has commented. that "In Britain alone the left wing of the
working-class movement did. not emerge from the war in some way stronger
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than it entered it," and. it is true that ILP activity suffered during
the war.°	 Mevertheless, in the years from 1919 to 1921, there was
an energetic ILP branch in the city which was active in the Hands off
Russia campaign and the Council of Action. Reg Glover, who was then in
the ILP recalled the large number of well attended meetings that took
place in those years, and the feeling in the younger members of the ILP,
which he shared, that revolution was imminent.
	 Certainly, in this period
it cannot be referred to as "A haven for dissenting radicals from the
superior classes. ,,(91)
Much of the work that the ILP did was specifically its own work,
aimed at increasing membership, but it also contained people like Ellen
Hughes, George Hod.gkinson, J.T. yson, and George Morris who were active
in the Labour Party as well. The elections of December 1918, when Labour
put forward its first parliaiiientary candidate in the city, and polled
over 10,000 votes was a tremendous boost to the Party, and shortly after-
wards, in 1919, a man called Fothergill was appointed as the Party's first
agent and full—time secretary.
Nevertheless, the Labour Party's presence was primarily electoral.
In terms of day to day activity the other politicalparties were more
noticeable. The only political advertisement in the Trades Council Report.
of 1920 was not for the Labour Party but for the ILP.
	 0re of the reasons
Bert Cresswell joined the CP was because "The Labour Party seemed very
tame and had no Individual Menbership Section. If it had I never heard
of it for several years. ,,(92) Presumably this was one of the functions
of Fothergill, but he did not remain in the post for very long. Even in
the electoral field there was some confusion.
	
In the early post—war
years, the Labour Party tended -to take a very cautious approach to adopting
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candid.ates in the local elections, arid this led to a number of individuals
attacking the Party and standing as Independent Labour. This happened
-to Alice Arnold in 1919, J.T. Tyson in 1920, and George Morris in 1921.
The elections of 1919, the first in the city for six years, were of
great importance to the labour movement, but found it divided in several
different ways. The split over the candidature of Bannington in the
General Election was still there, and this led to two people standing for
the NFDDSS. Surprisingly, the Co-op decided for the first time to inter-
vene and put up three candidates. This was after consultation with the
Labour Party, and it was agreed that the two bodies would co-operate in
their campaigns.	 For reasons that can only be guessed at, Alice Arnold
refused to accept this, arid stood ainst the Co-op carididate in Swanswell,
and won the seat. Compared with 1913, the Labour Party put up more can-
didates, but still left two seats uncontested.
The results surprised and. delighted the Labour Party. 	 Including
Alice Arnold, they won six of the ten seats that were contested, arid the
NFDDSS won one. Moreover, Councillor George Pilkington, originally
elected as a Liberal, switched to the Labour Party. 	 Givens' remark, made
about the General Election, that all other parties were on one side, and
Labour on the other, in a straight fight between capital and labour, came
near -to being true in the local elections as well. The reporter for the
Coventry Graphic complained indignantly
"In Swanswell and Hillfields wards - I cannot speak of
others - there was an open alliance between the Liberal
arid Tory parties, and. I fancy this had a tendency to
increase the Labour vote. After all, we as Englishmen,
like fair play, and although I hold no brief for the
Labour Candidates I do not think this is altogether
playing the game." (93)
Indeed there had been a dramatic change in the political line-up at the
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elections. Instead of the two main parties fighting it out with Labour
sneaking a few seats, the Tories and. Liberals all but disappeared, to be
replaced by a single candidate for each seat called a Business candidate
or an Independent. The only place where this arrangement was not made
was in Stoke, where Ellen Hughes swept in for Labour with a majority of
nearly a thousand. over the Liberal who just finished ahead of the Conserv-
ative.	 (Apparently her slogan of 'Hughes your Lady Friend' was unbeatable. )(94
Thereafter, an electoral alliance existed. in all wards between the Liberal
and Conservatives.
Subsequent elections were a sad. disappointment for Labour. In 1920
they won three seats, none in 1921, one in 1922 and. two in 1923. Thus
only between 1919 and 1922 were there more than a tiny number of Labour
Councillors. There were a number of reasons why Labour did poorly after
1919, but part of the explanation was poor organisation. The small
Labour group on the Council was not, fact, a group, and did not meet as
a group.	 The electoral organisation was poor, and the decline of the
ILP	 reduced the number of activists.
Reg Glover was on the left—wing of the ILP arid saw the split in that
body as being between the young members anxious for revolution and the
older more conservative group. As far as he was concerned, the decision -
of the ILP not to join the CP dealt it a shattering blow as the young
activists left. This internal struggle in the ILP meant that the develop-
ment of the Labour Party was held up. ILPers were not the only members
of the Labour Party, there was also a small but influential group of ex-
SDF or BSP members, principally A.E. Mabbs, President of the Trades Council
for a number of years, and. then President of the Labour Party, J.T. rson,
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secretary of the Labour Party and the Trades Council, and. W..A. Binks,
who later becane a Labour Councillor. 	 Although they did not act as
a group, they were not well thought of by the ILP and. Hodgkinson saw
their influence as one of the reasons for holding back the development
of the Party.
Things drifted. until the spring of 1923, when Hodgkinson decided to
stand for the post of secretary:
"My candidature was strongly supported by the members of the
Coventry Branch of the ILP and. delegates from the organisation
to the General Management Committee were whipped up to attend
the next meeting. The Coventry Labour Party was little more
than a side show, and uneasy partner in an organisation which
embraced the activities of the industrial movement under the
wing of the Trades Council and the Tenants Defence League.
The ILP took the initiative to divorce the Labour Party from
the local Triple Alliance. A motion to that effect was
carried at the Annual Meeting and the Coventry Labour Party
became a separate entity. In that way the Party, as we know
it today, was born and at the same meeting I was appointed.
secretary of the newly constituted body." (96)
This is a little inaccurate. The Labour Party was already, in theory
at least, a separate entity.	 Since 1918 it had sent delegates in its
own right to the Labour Party Conference, had its own officers and con-
stitution and produced its own Annual Report. If it was the junior
partner of the Trades Council it was because that was what most of its
members wanted.. The ILP containing a high proportion of activists, was
in a position to stimulate the Labour Party, but up to 1923 had not seen
fit to do so. The inability to match the CF as a viable left-wing body
in its own right may well have been the reason for the ILP decision to be
more active in the Labour Party. Soon after Hodgkinson became the full-
time agent of the Party in September 1923 the ILP was able to strengthen
its influence with the replacement of Mabbs as Party Chairman.
Nevertheless, the establishment of Hodgkinson as a full--time worker
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for the Labour Party, and the separating of the jobs of secretary of the
Party the secretary of the Trades Council was a turning point in terms
of local organisation. The Furnishing Trades Federation put up some
money to pay for the secretary/agent, and he was able to organise the
election campaign -that produced the first Labour MP for Coventry, in
December 1923. Coming less than two months after the defeat in the local
elections, this was a major victory, gained because the Liberals and. Con-
servatives could not sustain their electoral alliance at a General Elec-
tion. As a result, the two candidates came within 10 votes of each other,
and Purcell won by a majority of 620 votes, polling over 16,000 votes,
about the same number of votes that Williams had. got in 1922. Equally
important was the fact that an active secretary enabled the Labour Party
to build up individual membership, and. in September 1925, it clocked up
a thousand members.
	 A circular issued. at this time referred to "The
Monthly Bulletin of Information, Which may lead up to the issue of a Local
Weekly paper. ,,(98) The weekly paper did not emerge, but the bulletin
came out in 1926.
The ILP may have breathed some life into the Labour Party, but at a
heavy cost to itself. With the development of ward Labour Parties,
Women's Organisations, and local and. City public meetings, the scope for
the activity of the UP declined. Although membership fees collected
are not a perfect guide, the fees dropped so substantially in the early
1920s that it is very likely that there was a large decline in membership.
In 1920, the fees for the year stood. at over £13, and this fell -to some-
thing over £3 in 1923, and although they recovered somewhat in the later
l920s, they never went above 	 Although it survived. for many years,
and even split from the Labour Party in the 1930s, its main impact was to
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try to push the Labour Party to the left. Here it was more successful
in General elections than local, and the Coventry Party quickly picked. up
the tradition of selecting left-wingers for parliamentary candidates.
Locally, however, the only Labour candidates that could do well in the
l920s were the right-wing Councillors.
When the CP showed more interest in working with and in the Labour
Party from 1923 onwards, it received support from the ILP. Bert Cresswell
was accepted as a semi-official candidate in the local elections in 1923,
and given active support as a Labour candidate in 1924, when he polled
more votes than any other Labour candidate. In the same year, George
Kingston, also a Communist, stood as a Labour candidate. This was in
defiance of the decision of the Labour Party Conference in October 1924
that no Communist could be a Labour Party candidate in local or national
elections, or be individual members of the Labour Party. The Coventry
Party continued to defy this last decision for another year, by nominating
Cresswell as delegate to the Conference in 1924 and 1925, but he was not
accepted as eligible. At the 1925 Conference, it was decided that Comm-
unists were not eligible for individual membership, and furthermore, that
existing members who were in the Communist Party would have to leave.
Hodgkinson went to the Conference as the Coventry delegate mandated to
vote against the proposals, but their acceptance meant the end of Comm-
unist involvement in the local Labour Party. 	 Had. the Communists been
more involved in the early years (though this would have been made diffi-
cult by the lack of Labour organisation) this decision might have had a
greater impact, and produced a greater response.
Although the Coventry Labour Party was slow at building up the Ind.i-
vid.ual Membership Section its underlying strength throughout its existence
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was its affiliation from the local trade unions. The Coventry Labour
Representation Committee had eleven trade union branches with 1,133
members affiliated -to it in its first year in 1902, and. this number grew
at a modest rate throughout the next two decades.(100) In 1914 it had
36 affiliations amounting to 10,500 members, and in 1919 there were 42
affiliated branches, though at the same time there were 78 union branches
affiliated to the Trades Council.0	 The new constitution of 1918
increased the power of the unions in both the local and national parties,
but in fact, the unions already had a predominant position in the Labour
Party before 1918. However, the establishment of an Individual Member-
ship Section, while it left power with the unions, encouraged a new type
of leadership. Oitside a fairly narrow range of trade issues the
political objectives of the local trade union movement tended to be vague,
and. the individual members were able to put flesh on the bones of local
policy. It was their effort and ability which determined the quality of
the local Labour Party and built the organisation needed to win seats.
Nevertheless the organic link with the trade unions meant that as the unions
grew, the Labour vote grew, and the Labour Party consolidated itself as the
party of the whole of organised labour. As we have seen, attempts by the
Communist Party to win the leadership of organised labour came unstuck
except in those areas where the trade unions and Labour had not bothered
to organise, particularly among the unemployed. Although the Labour Party
was developing and. going through. periods of strain in the early 1920s there
was never any time when the link between the unions and. the party seemed in
danger. In February 1919, T.J. Harris, one of the stalwarts of the Labour
Party, wrote to the Midland Daily Telegraph to severely critióise02) the
CEJC for holding a strike ballot over new working conditions, and l-hough
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this no doubt made him unpopular in some quarters, there was no sugges-
tion of a rift developing between the unions and the Labour Party on the
issue, or that Harris should. be disciplined by the Party. It had already
been clearly established that at local level the unions and their organi-
sations decided industrial affairs without reference to the Labour Party,
while the Party decided political affairs with increasingly less reference
to the unions despite the considerable overlap of personnel between the
two wings of the movement. The Labour Party Constitution increased
union influence in the Party in theory, but not necessarily in practice.
Other potentially rival influences were either weakened, like the ILP, or
excluded like the OP.
However, the individual membership section encouraged the growth of
people committed to the Party first, and unions second, and they were
the ones who worked out the politics and. strategies at local level. They
could lead the big unions whose votes dominated the Party, and achieve a
dominant position through the acquiescence of these unions.
The concept of two wings for the movement requiring two sorts of
organisation was one that dated from the very first days of the Labour
Party. The political groups like the ILP and the OP did. not challenge
this division but hoped to be able to link the two by providing a coherent
political leadership. But in fact neither were able to meet the challenges
posed by the political upheavals of the period. The CF began life as a
group of industrial militants, and was unable to create a significant
political grouping, while the ILP lost many of its industrial militants
and began to concentrate almost exclusively on national and local electoral
struggles. One group became an appendage to the trade union movement and
liable to limit its activities in an economist way, the other, through
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the Labour Party, gained some degree of autonomy from the unions, but
only at the expense of concentrating on a narrow municipal field, and
leaving the major priorities to be decided elsewhere.
These divisions on the left and the consolidation of the Labour Party
did. not mark any break from the political situation before or during the
war. Coventry Labour Party's basic aim had always been to complement
trade union activity by improving local social services. In 1916, the
Annual Report had stated
"The efforts of Labour in the past have centred around
wages, hours of labour, and conditions of employment.
More and more are these tending to be controlled by
political considerations, and therefore the policy of
a political Labour Party must be directed to the raising
of the economic status, to establishing advanced educa-
tional facilities, to ensuring security of employment
whilst in health and adequate maintenance during ill-
health and old age, combined with a perfect freedom to
each individual worker." (103)
Although coloured by war-time conditions, this general statement of aims
was as true for the 1920s as it was for the time it was writ-ten. The
difference was that the Labour Party in the 1920s had. comsolidated its
position, and- was just a little nearer the implementation of these aims.
The establishment of an individual membership, a process that began in
1924 was essential for the furtherance of these aims, but the consolida-
tion had come about by default. The upheavals of the war and the post- -
war strikes, the development of -the shop stewards movement, -the spread of
revolutionary ideas, and -the Russian Revolution had failed -to transform
the organisations of the labour movement, -though they had certainly left
their mark. As a result the reformist -trend in the labour movement
emerged from the crucial post-war years stronger -than ever, while -the
revolutionary wing of -the movement suffered defeats and political isolation.
The war and the post-war years brought many new people in-to the labour
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movement, and. brought many people in the labour movement into struggle
and. conflict for the first time and. this led to a general understanding
among more and. more people that social change was needed., and. that the
Labour Party was the vehicle for change.
The years of turmoil after the war not only saw the gradual emer-
gence of the Labour Party and the failure of the CP to escape from its
isolation for more than a short period, but led. to a reaction against
industrial and. political unrest. Both the Labour Party and. the CP went
into decline after 1922, but Labour's position as the only mass party of
the working class ensured that it would at some point recover. The CP
could. not rely on this.
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CEA.PTER FOUR
PART I
Post—war Industrial Struggles
During the ware craft unions had relaxed their control over work-
shop conditions and the nature of production. When the war was over,
they sought to regain control, not by returning to pre—war agreements
but by signing new agreements that could cover the many contentious
issues that existed.	 Coventry unions rejected the old., inadequate
agreements, and sought -to use their newly—acquired strength to extend
bargaining rights, and in particular, protect against unemployment.
The war had done away with the old rates of payments, and a chaotic
earnings system existed. 	 Some uniformity had to be reintroduced.. The
economic pressures on employers, however, particularly severe in the
motor engineering industry, determined employers to go on the offensive,
to intensify the attacks on craft strength that had taken place during
the war.
The years 1918-1922 therefore saw a crucial trial of strength between
the two sides, culminating in the lock—out of 1922. The result of this
dispute was a key factor in shaping the fortunes of the trade union movement
in Coventry for the rest of the inter—war period.. It is dealt with in
detail in the second part of this chapter. The first part looks at the
build—up to the lock—out, and examines the workshop issues that made the
'anagerial functions dispute" so important to both sides.
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After the War
A number of munitions factories closed down. These included
several shell and filling factories, the Coventry Ordnance Works, and.
the Hotchkiss.	 In most cases however, factories returned to pre—war
occupations, some quickly, and some slowly. 	 A number were able to
adjust to peace time easily, such as Rover and. Siddeley, while others
found the process very difficult. One historian wrote,
"The end of the war found an industry ill—prepared. for
bad times. Such plant as had survived was unbalanced,
and although engine shops had. expanded, the coach—building
shops, which had handled the car bodies, had almost ceased
to exist. There were far too many uneconomic firms, and
during the l92Os the car industry was forced to streamline
itself under the twofold impact of the slump and fierce
competition." (1)
This is a general picture, and there were individual companies that
were able to go against the trend. Although a number of companies, all
small ones, went out of existence in the early l92Os in Coventry, 12
companies moved into car production for the first time, and a number
were able to flourish, particularly the AlV±s.(2) The Siddeley—Deasy
Company claimed that it made the first post—war car in Britain, and. as
it was successful arid. the company wished to expand., it joined Axmstrong-
Whitworth in 1919 to form Mmstrong—Sid.deley. The company produced mainly
luxury cars, and was able to offset the slump in car sales in the 1920s
by its aero—engine work, and its main Parkside works in Coventry had a
night shift as well as a day shift throughout the
Trade was reasonable between 1919 and mid 1920, but every car company
was hit by a sharp and sudden slump in the autumn of 1920, and. car sales
generally were depressed. for several years. Even the successful companies
put workers on short time and closed. down production for short periods,
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while the less successful ones put their workers out of work indefinitely.
Car makers tried to keep up demand. by reducing prices. In January 1921
the Morris Cowley was selling at £525, but after a series of cuts this
figure was down to £255 by October l922. 	 Other car manufacturers were
forced to follow suit, though few could make as big cuts as Morris. The
new Rover Eight was priced at £230 in 1919 when it was first produced, arid
rose to £300 in 1920. Thereafter a number of cuts had. to be imposed., and
in 1924 it was selling at
This slashing of prices did. something to restore sales, but could
only be temporary unless wholesale economies could be introduced. En-
ployers had. to tackle the high costs of labour in particular. This was
done in two ways. The first, and immediate way was to impose wage reduc-
tions, the second was to reorganise the workplace by installing new machine
tools that could produce cheaply on a large scale when the market picked up.
The recession in Coventry between 1920-1922 was particularly acute.
Most of the car companies in the city concentrated on the production of
expensive qua1ity cars, with high labour costs and high prices. ?then
sales of these fell companies had. to make particularly severe efforts to
adapt to the new small car market of the late 192Os. It was generally
believed that Coventry was not best suited for the production of small
cars. when Morris first moved into the city, in purchasing the body-work
company Hollick arid Pratt in January 1923, it was to take over short rims
on specialised. body production:
"An underlying cause of this development has been that
Coventry labour costs and practices have militated against
the area as a centre for the mass production of bodies.
Accordingly, body production in this area has tended more
and more to be restricted to types of product where Coventry
craftmanship can be relatively economic." (6)
After 1920, employers needed. to reorganise the workplace whether producing
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small or large cars, and. -this inevitably led. to an attack on the unions.
II
	
Unions Push for Better Conditions
Trade unions in Coventry continued to grow immediately after the
war. The TJ was the largest in the city by 1918 and it continued to
grow rapidly. In 1918 contributions from the Coventry branches totalled
£11,494 while in 1921 total contributions for the year came to £33,765,
without there having been an increase in union dues in -the period.
However, the figures include the state unemployment benefit • But the
financial reports also pointed to the unions downfall. In 1918 there is
no record of any union unemployment benefit, and. the total disputes
benefit for the year was £5 l3s 4d. In 1921, dispute benefit cai1e to
£176 lOs 9d, and union out-of-work benefit to £7,724. In addition, a
further £16,023 was paid out as part of the state unemployment benefit scheme.
Thus over two--thirds of total income was going on unemployment payments.
The union had a generous scheme, and the figures for 1921 may reflect the
fact that out-of-work members were remaining in the union until they had
exhausted their benefit entitlement.	 In any event, 1922 was just as bad
a year, and membership of the union melted away thxoughout the Midlands.
The historian of the union estimated that membership declined by 	 in -
the early l920s.(8)
The ASE ended the war with about 5,000 members, while the AST claimed
about	 In mid-1920 when the ASE, AST, SEM and UMWA amalgamated
the Coventry membership of the new AEIJ was	 Thirther membership
figures for the united body were not given until March 1921, when they were
about l2,300.	 The March 1921 figures also showed. that of over 12,000
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members, nearly 4,000 were out of work that month, and this led to a
further loss of members in the period before the lock-out in 1922. By
the end of 1921, membership stood at 11,314, representing a fall of a
thousand in nine months. Over the period of the first half of the decade,
the AEU suffered almost as much as the WU, but in the case of the LEtJ the
bulk of the membership left as a result of the 1922 lock-out.
The WU's women members were iii a particularly difficult position
after the war. National agreements had been reached to ensure that women
would leave the factories and the AEE and other unions were active in
policing this agreement. Although some did stay on, most left the engin-
eering trades quickly. In January 1919 it was reported that there were
3,000 women drawing unemployment benefit in the city, and with engineering
closed to them, they had to fall back on a narrow range of female work,
which included domestic work. Alice Arnold was the women's organiser for
the lU and. was against any form of domestic service involving living in;
"The assurance of good wages, she said, good conditions
and liberty was essential before girls would re-enter service.
If they were indoor servants they could not have their liberty,
but were employed from early morning till late at night, and
their work was never finished. The only solution of the
servant problem was the eight hour shifts, and. a great improve-
ment in pay, food and. conditions of work, whilst the absolute
abolition of registry offices and control by tie Labour Exchange
were changes that had. got to be ma1e." (12)
This attempt to bring trade unionism and. factory conditions into
service was not surprisingly a failure, but Alice Arnold's remarks pro-
ducec3. a flood of letters on the issue of domestic servants and their
rights, and. revealed even in a working class city like Coventry strong
opinions from a number of people who felt that servants' rights were few
and. far between. 	 One letter from "Householder" complained
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"The majority of d.omestic helps have their homes outside
Coventry. Why should they want every evening off? Miss
Arnold must know that parading the streets is not conducive
to good morals." (13)
One woman, herself an ex—domestic servant declared
"There have never been such high wages nor better conditions
offered -to servants than today, but insolent letters from
lower class maids will not improve matters." (14)
Alice Arnold could not rely on support from most male trade unionists who
felt that a woman's place was in the home.
Sir Alfred Herbert employed women in his machine tool factories and.
was happy to carry on employing them after the war. "It is well to face
the -true facts," he wrote, "Owing to fundamental differences in mentality
it is perfectly certain that, save in the most exceptional instances,
women cannot become skilled mechanics." He accepted the popular view
that they were particularly equipped to do repetitive work:
"She is content to go on working on the same job so long
as the conditions are favourable, and. her earnings
reasonable, with the knowledge that her work is not her
life, and with the feeling that she is merely spending
her time usefully until marriage brings her the fulfilment
of her life." (15)
This attitude was the best that women could hope for from employers, and- it
fitted in neatly with their need for cheap and docile unskilled labour.
Even before the sudden slump in 1920, Coventry unions were concerned
about the effect of unemployment on union members. In 1919 unemployment
fluctuated, and although it never reached a high level for long it was the
first real unemployment seen in the city for five years.
	
Consequently,
restrictions on overtime and a reduction of the working week figured
prominently in the claims the unions put to the employers. These were
part of a package that the unions adopted -to meet post—war conditions.
The impetus for trying to negotiate a new local agreement came from -the ASE,
I 7L.
which submitted a claim to the CEJC, and. which were accepted by that body
with a few changes, in December 1918. They were then put to the employ-
er s.
The last local agreement covering working conditions had been in 1910,
and the unions particularly disliked the ainoun-t of overtime, fifteen hours
per week, which it allowed. The new proposed agreement stated that there
would be no overtime worked automatically on production work. It might
be acceptable on non—production work, provided that the CEJC had agreed
to it. On hours, the unions called for a reduction from 53 hours a week
to 40. They wanted improvements in piece work rates, and. also a move
away from individual negotiations. Iristeai a Pricing Committee of
employers and union representatives was proposed. The initiative for
this came from the ASE, which felt that skilled non—production workers
had. lost ground during the war, as Givens emplained; they wanted
"A method of avoiding the abnormal earnings of certain
individuals who are on goodpaying productive jobs as
against the skilled worker who during thewar has been on
tools, jigs, etc, at really a nominal wage.
	
Ou.r proposal
made an attempt to equalise the earnings of all individuals
by suggesting a collective system rather than ax' individual
system of piece_work."	 (16)
Also proposed were negotiations over the number and. wages of apprentices,
the controlling of new machines, a new holiday arrangement, and. a dismissal
and. disputes procedure.
In negotiating this ambitious claim with the CDEE, the CEJC was
hampered by three factors. The first was the national negotiations on
hours reductions; the second was the need for swift action in banning
overtime that some unionists wanted; the third was the refusal of some
unions to allow the CEJO to push negotiations to the extent that it would
call industrial action over them. The first meeting with the CDEEA made
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no progress as the national negotiations on hours were still in progress,
and the local employers would not therefore discuss the claim. At the
beginning of 1919, the national agreement was signed reducing hours to
47 a week. This provoked. strikes for the 40 hour week in Scotland and.
Belfast. There was no strike action taken in Coventry, but the unions
supported the strikers, and the Coventry District Committee of the AE
convened a 1 idlands Conference of the union 7 arid, put a number of militant
motions to it, including one that stated
"That we call upon the Government to negotiate directly
with the Committees now out, as we entirely repudiate the
E.C. as the responsible leaders of the Society." (17)
Another called. for a strike, but was not put to the Conference, which
anyway met after the strikes in the north were called off.
The national settlement on hours killed. off the local talks on the
issue, even though union officials attacked the way it was implemented.,
Givens complained. -that day workers got a reduction in hours without loss
of pay, but that
"The piece worker, however, had no such advantage, for
it he wanted to earn 53 hours wages in 47 hours he had. to
crowd. six hours extra work into the shortened week. As,
during the ware he had been working at top speed it was
difficult to see that the piece worker could possibly
reap any monetary advantage from the new system." (18)
Unions also claimed that employers were tightening up on discipline when
they reduced hours, and. cutting out tea breaks, stopping smoking, and
locking out late comers. At a local conference the employers made no
concessions, and the grievance was added to the CEJC's list.
Before the second meeting with the CDEE on working conditions, the
ASE got the CEJC to support a ban on overtime to deal with the unemployment
problem. Unemployment was not acute at the time, and it gave the employers
an opportunity to refuse to discuss the union claim in detail until the ban
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was called, off. The employers olaimed that the unions were unilaterally
ending the 1910 agreement. Thus a second and a third meeting between the
two sides made no progress. A mass meeting in February 1919 called by
the CEJO agreed to have a ballot for strike action, and this prompted the
employers to agree to another meeting.
At this fourth meeting, the employers made concessions concerning
the status of the CEJC. It was recognised as a local negotiating body,
and it was agreed to hold regular monthly meetings between the two sides.
As the WU had. been allowed to join the CEJO it appeared to have reestablished
itself as a leadership of a united trade union movent, but this was mere
appearance. The employers refused to negotiate on the working conditions
document; the CEJC responded by calling for a strike ballot, and ran into
trouble with some of its constituents.
The issues at stake were maxly and complicated, and this provoked
T.J. Harris to write to the local newspaper complaining that
"It is beyond contention that the vast mass of their
constituents are entirely ignorant of what has trans-
pired, or have been unable to express with any clarity
their views on the various items which figure in the
programme." (20)
The ballot "suffers from a multiplicity of details," and sought"to force
us to put up a fight locally for that which must be a matter for national
settlement." AST officials, chief of which was John Chater, the senior
E.C. delegate for the area, said that only its E.C. could call a strike
ballot, and. that it would not do so over a document that contained a 40
hour demand, as the union had signed the 47 hour agreement. Other pre-
ssure must have been put on the CEJC, for its two leaders, Givens of the
ASE and. Beswick of SEMS announced only a few days after the ballot decision
had been taken, that it was suspended and. that items of a national character
I i7
would not be pursued iocaiiy.(21) This climbdown showed that industrial
action was outside the scope of the CECJ. The claim was pursued to
Central Conference, which prevented any further action on it.
The formation of the AELT out of the largest craft unions in the city
struck a lasting blow at the CEJC, as it meant that one union dominated
the engineering industry, particularly with the decline of the U.
Although the CEJC carried on with regular meetings with the CDEEP, up to
the time of the lock-out, they were not fruitful and there was "Severe
criticism of the abortive nature of these conferences" by the AEU.(22)
The application of the ban on overtime soured the relations with the
employers and in the two yeaxs before the lock-out no less than 8 refer-
ences went from Coventry to Central Conference, and none of them were
settled. With no progress being masie on negotiations at local level,
the CEJC again declined in importance.
III	 The Overtime Ban
The ban on overtime in Coventry lasted from the beginning of 1919
to the lock-out in 1922. It had a varying effect on management, as trade
was slack for much of the period, but excessive overtime had been a tradi-
tion in the spring of each year, and for a few months the ban threatened
sales.	 Its prolonged application was a strong incentive to employers to
seize the opportunity of the lock-out to heavily defeat the unions. The
AEU and other unions did permit some overtime, as was reported to a meeting
of District Committees in the division;
"Written application from the firms were however considered
and if permission was granted the members were instructed
that before any overtime was worked the written permission
had to be posted. in the shops." (23)
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Most of this work involved, maintenance, but generally the unions took the
view that as long as they had. members out of work, there was a right to
take unilateral action to stop overtime.
The AEU was particularly determined, at least at the level of the
District Committee, to enforce the ban. 	 It encountered opposition,
however, not only from employers, but also from its own members and. those
of other unions. In a few cases it directly punished erring members.
Thus the AU DC minute book recorded in July 1920:
"That Brother Hopkins be fined 3 for working consistent
Overtime contrary to instructions, and. for using unpardon-
able language about our officials on receipt of his
summons to D.C." (24)
The ASE DC minutes also record. several criticisms of some of the union
officials who sat on the CEJO. These included a complaint at the chaos
that a lack of a central authority in the administration of the ban was
producing, another indication that the powers of the CEJC were waning.
In the autumn of 1920, when mass unemployment developed swiftly, the
unions began to consider further action against the loss of jobs. In
September the CEJC presented four proposals to the employers' associations:
"a. That a general temporary reduction of hours should
take place.
b. That where firms have sufficient volume of work, 2
short shifts shall be run.
c. That consideration be given by a Joint Committee to
special departments where this is not possible, and
ci. That no outside labour shall be brought into the
City without the consent of the Joint Sub—Committee." (25)
The employers rejected these as being impractical.
A month later, the AEtJ DC had a special meeting to discuss uriemploy-
ment, and. it was decided to try to reach a work—sharing arrangement with
the other unions, receive delegates from the unemployed committee, call
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on the City Council -to provide jobs, impose a levy for unemployed members,
and call for more trade with -the Soviet Union. The most important
decision was
"That this D.C. instructs the Secretary to inform the
ployers Association, that commencing Monday 1st
November 1920 our members will be instructed to work
only 5 days per week of seven hours each day until
such time as the Eiip1oyers can show that the volume of
work in the city is sufficient to warrant an extension
of these hours, without causing further unemployment."
(26)
However, the DC found that its proposal was not acceptable to the mem-
bership. At an aggregate meeting, it was agreed. to have a levy of 2/6d.
per member, but the proposal for a unilateral 35 hour week was referred
back by a small majority.(27) At a second aggregate meeting, the DC
again brought the proposal forward, but it was again defeated, this time
by a motion that the issue be put to a ballot. The ballot showed 549
members in favour of the proposal, and 2260 against, with less -than a
quarter of the membership voting.(28) Members clearly were not pre-
pared to lose over a quarter of their wages in order to create more
jobs. In fact, the DC found it more difficult to get members to ban
overtime when there were thousands out of work. Many of those in work
suffered periods of short time working, and wanted to get their wages back
once the opportunity appeared. As a result, in 1921 the number of
exhortations about sticking to the ban from the DC increased, but the
number of people being disciplined was reduced, despite complaints from
the unemployed committee and. others, that some factories were working
overtime.
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IV The Ehployers' Attack
Soon after the war, the CEJC began a campaign for higher piece work
prices, and for some rationalisation of the many piece work schemes in
operation in the city. Some increases were achieved in 1919, but an
application for the merging of all war bonuses into the district rate
and. a 15/— increase was rejected at a local conference. This went to
Central Conference, and. again nothing became of it. The .ASE DC corn—
plained that
"It appears that all questions of wages and. conditions
have been taken entirely out of the hands of Local
District Committees and that the SC will probably be
able to arrive at a settlement of the maxly questions
now in their hands in the dim and distant future." (29)
There were a couple of small wage increases in the first half of 1920,
and. this kept the heat out of the wages issue. In the end of the year,
however, movement began again, with this time the initiative coming from
the employers. The situation changed with startling rapidity. In
December 1920 the CDEEA. argued for a national wage reduction by producing
evidence of the slump in Coventry.
Enployers' Federation spelt it out:
A resolution sent to the Engineering
a. At the present time out of 46 members only 5 firms are
at present actually working full time with their full
complement of workpeople, whereas prior to' the 1st
August 1920 42 firms were working full time with their
full complement of workpeople in each instance.
b. In consequence of the altered. position of the engineering
trade 41 members have made reductions in the numbers of their
workpeople varying between 10% and. 75% as compared. with
their employees at the 1st November 1919.
c. 41 firms are now working short time in their works, that is
to say, 2/3 days per week with reduced numbers of employees
and. in certain instances the condition of affairs amounts
-to a complete shut down, only a nucleus being retained.
which is engaged either manufacturing to stock without
prospect of orders or on maintenance and repairs...
This was at a time when unemployment was under 7,000 - it kept rising to
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about 12,000 in the next few months. The association drew the obvious
conclusion from this picture.
"This Association is of opinion -that the engineering
industry in Coventry is unable to carry any further
increase in wages and that the question of a reduction
in wages should be earnestly considered by the Federa
tion."	 (30)
A month later, the association returned to this theme, though more
vigorously. Another resolution was sent to London:
"That -the Federation be strongly urged to take immediate
and definite action in the matter of reduction of piece-
work prices, or otherwise to allow the Coventry Associa-
tion to commence negotiations with the Unions in regard. to
the wages question.
It was pointed out -that the present was the most opportune
-time possible for an adjustment of wages and. that if the
Federation cannot or will not advise members as to -the
policy to be followed, members will be found to take matters
into -their own hands." (31)
In fact, by this time, Coventry employers had already taken matters into
their own hands. Although national agreements on a reduction did not
get signed until mid-1921, a blizzard of cuts struck the trade unions in
the city at the end of 1920, showing the weakness of workplace organisa-
tion and splitting the unions in the city once again.
One of the first factories to introduce reductions was English
Electric, and it was reported to the AEU that the shop stewards there
had agreed on a reduction. The Works Committee was summoned to the DC
meeting where they were accused of having "done the dirty work of tha
management, " by taking around the lists of reductions to the men and
persuading them to accept. The stewards claimed that the only alterna-
tive was dismissal, but this did not satisfy the DC and five stewards had
their credentials removed.(32)	 it was an inauspicious start to a defen-
sive campaign.
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It was at this point, when the trade unions were facing the first
serious attack from employers since before the war, that the AEU d.ecid.ed.
to leave the CEJC, a decision supported by a crowded aggregate meeting.
The minutes of the meeting do not make it clear what the reason was for
leaving, but it is likely that it was a combination of a feeling that the
CEJC was not prosecuting the struggle against unemployment or reductions
energe-tically enough with a feeling that now that there was one major
union for engineering workers there was no point in the CEJC which it
had. just left.
The AEU was particularly concerned by the lack of resistance given
in maxly factories, though where it was offered it was countered by threats
to close -the works down.	 It was also concerned with the way its members
co—operated in applying the reductions, particularly the foremen and.
chargehands. One of the chargehands from the Hillman machine shop,
called before the DC to give evidence reported
"The Foremen and chargehands had been called into the
office and told that a reduction of prices had got to
take place covering the whole town and they were re-
quested to find out what reductions could be obtained.
Some of -the foremen and chargehands had. gone round their
section with a list, but he did. not do -this but simply
told the men indivitually when they were wanted in -the
office. Some of -the men had accepted 10, 15 or 20%
reductions and in his opinion these men could afford these
reductions."	 (33)
Thus the size of the reductions to some extent depended on the vigour with
which they were pushed by chargehands, and the confidence individual
workers had in opposing some or all of them. As a result, the weaknesses
of "mutuality" were seen, with no wilted workplace opposition, but each
individual trying to do as well as he could..
Givens reported to the DC in December 1920 and.
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"Drew attention to the many attacks on the rates and. p.w.
prices being made by the nployers connected with the
Federation; Thiglish Electric Co., Coventry Chain Co.,
New Rover Co., Lea and. Francis, Selson Co., Morton and
Weaver, and. others having all made definite attacks and.
in some cases our members had. accepted. the reductions
without resistance." (34)
I-t was agreed. to hold an aggregate meeting "To point out to the members
the urgent need for Unity of Action on this matter and. to secure resistance
to the employers' moves." The meeting was well attended, and resolved
that no members should. accept any reductions. The first major attempt
to resist was in the unusual circumstances of the Triumph dispute.
The Triumph Cycle Co. had. not been a member of the EEF or the CDEFSA
during the war, and. as a result claimed that it had. made an error in 1916
when a l2% war bonus was merged. with another. The company claimed that
it had done this, but by mistake hail carried on paying an additional l2%
to some 300 skilled day rate workers. In January 1921, the company
noticed its error, and tried -to get the unions to accept a l2% cut.
4hen this was refused, the company dismissed all the men and offered. re-
engagement provided. they accepted. the red.uction. It was thus a lock-out,
though the employers' association unblushingly called it a strike. The
AETJ and the WU were the major unions involved., and they had. all of their
members out from February 8th. The AEIJ alone had some 1,600 men parti-
cipat.ng.
The AE(J DC promised the "Utmost resistance possible" as the company
had. broken procedure and locked men out while negotiations were going on.
It was also felt to be highly suspicious that the company had found the
error at that particular point in time. The EC of the union agreed to
support the dispute, and. an aggregate meeting in Coventry unanimously
decided to ask the EC to approve a strike ballot for the district "For a
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down tools policy to restore the Status Qjio at the Triumph Works and.
resist airy further reductions in wages." This was turned down,
and. the DC had to make do with a levy and. collections.
It was not a good time for a large dispute like this, and. a number
of members from the PLEtJ did. not come out.
	 There were picket lines and.
demonstrations, with the CIJWC and the newly re—formed Workers Committee
getting themselves involved, and in one incident, Bob Orrel, who had. been
an AT official and. had. recently been made the ODD for the new Coventry
and District Division of the A1U, was attacked on the picket iine.(36)
The biggest blow came when one of the skilled unions the National Society
of Brassworkers and. Metal Mechanics decided to accept the reduction and
return to work. Their representative told. the AEtJ DC
"The causes of their action was the economic position of
their members, the advert re. Ballot not taking place and
also the number of AEU members continuing at work." (37)
The DC met George Morris of the WCJ and the two bodies agreed to carry on
the dispute, but on the same day at a mass meeting of Triumph AEU members,
only a minority turned up, and. a vote of confidence in the DC was defeated,
(38)
with a majority of those present refusing to vote. 	 The strike had.
been on for three weeks at this point, and. the U and the AEU DCs met to
insist that the dispute was still on, and that members who went back would
be expelled. Nevertheless, the numbers returning increased. A report
in Solidarity summarised, the situation; "More than six unions are concerned,
arid, as a consequence, scabbing and confusion prevaiis.
The Brassworkers and. Metal Mechanics went back on 1st March, and a
large number of AEU members returned. as well. When the DC interviewed
them, they claimed it was because the response to the strike had been weak,
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and. that others had also gone back. On 6th Narch, the Chairman of the
DC complained of "various meetings of the men in certain public houses,"
presumably to agree to go back, and after discussion and a narrow vote of
11 to 8 it was resolved that
"Recognising the loyalty of the minority of members now
in dispute at the Triumph Co. and. that their position is
seriously jeopardised. by the action of the weakened
majority, we recommend. them to resume work..." (40)
1\n agreement was reached with the company that allowed for the reduction
of l2% for skilled day workers and. 3/- a week for unskilled day workers,
and the workers returned on 14th IVlarch. Prior to the settlement, the
employers were claiming that 1,426 men had already gone back.
This was not the end, for the AEU and. the WU felt that disciplinary
action was called for. 	 In the AEU a complaints sub-committee met and
began to interview large numbers of Triumph members. It was initially
decided that those members who could show hardship or that they had at
least stayed out for several weeks would be fined 3 and in some cases
lose six months benefit, while others who had. no excuse would be excluded
from the union. This would have meant excluding too many, however, and
the DC finally decided that those who had worked throughout the dispute
plus those whose actions were especially detrimenta], totalling about 50
people, were to be excluded, and the rest fined. One of the men singled
out for criticism for his role in the strike was John Chater, who was a
member of the	 It is not known how many WU members were disci-
plined. This union action was strongly objected. to by the Triumph manage-
ment, who claimed that it broke a term of settlement, that there would be
no victimisation by either side. 	 In fact, they claimed over 1,000 men
were "victimised" by the AETJ. The Company took the matter to Central
Conference, where the record shows
186
"Considerable correspondence took place between the
Coventry Association, the Federation and the General
Council of the AEIJ and certain interviews took place
in regard to the victimization of their members on
the part of the District Committee of the AEtJ." (42)
Eventually the Federation advised the local association that nothing could
be done as it was an internal union matter.
The dispute had clearly done the trade union movement in Coventry
no good at all, and. while it could be argued that the Brassworkers and
Metal Mechanics were chiefly to blame in leading the retreat, it was
the AEtJ that suffered the most by adopting a more militant attitude.
The comparative strength of the union should not be overlooked, f or it
appears that most members paid their fines, though a number must have
simply left the union. This dispute and others of a more minor nature
had its effect on the union membership. The AEtJ lost some 1,800 members
in the year after its formation.
Some members of the DC felt that its attitude of resisting all cuts
was unreasonable, and another incident only a month after the end of the
Triumph dispute made the same argument. The management at the Daimler
proposed reductions, and were opposed by the stewards there who adhered
to the DC line. But the management took a ballot of the members, and
found a majority in favour of accepting the reductions. The stewards
resigned, but other workers came forward to act as unofficial stewards
in arranging the reductions.	 Again, they argued that the alternative
was the closure of the factory. 	 It was also true that the cost of living
was falling, and some workers accepted that in the new post—war conditions
they could afford to forego part of the high wages that had been won during
the war. It was reported to the 4EU DC that men at the Humber were earning
up to £9 in a full week including war bonus, and. some felt this could be
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reduced. in the interests of saving jobs.
In April 1921, at national negotiations, the employers proposed
to reduce wages by a total of 16s a week. This would come on to p of
piece rate reductions already settled, and. made it clear to workers the
extent of the cuts being imposed. It was also clearer how to oppose
it, and although there was little evidence of a determined fight in
the city against rate cuts imposed shop by shop or man by man, there
was a determination to support a national action against the EEF. At
the end of April, 1,000 members of the AEU agreed at an aggregate meeting
to support their union's opposition to the proposed. reductions, and in
June, when the negotiations were at a crucial stage, a meeting of 3, 000
members called on the EC of the union to resist all attempts at wage
reductions.
The negotiations went right to the brink. Two days before the
reductions were due to take effect and. the men to be locked. out, the DC
decided. to call out all its apprentice members, foremen and staff members
in the event of a lock-out.	 It also decided to approach each firm
separately, and attempt to make arrangements to keep the rate up, in order
to break a united employers' opposition. 	 The stoppage was due to
start on the 16th June 1921 and. the DC ordered its members not to work
after the normal finishing time on the 15th. This was done, and shortly
after a telegram was received. calling off the action. The abortive
stoppage had been encouraging, for
"All delegates reported. that the members appeared to be
nearly unanimous in their cessation of work and in a large
portion of cases the members had. brought out their to)tt
A few days later some 5-6,000 members were present to hear the reasons
for the suspension of action - the unions had decided to call a ballot
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on the red.uctions.
The episode showed that members would respond to a national lead,
but it was fortunate for the Coventry unions that the dispute did not
take place, but preparation for a withdrawal of labour did not begin
until two days before the day fixed for the lock—out. The AEU made no
contact with the CEJC even though it would also have been involved with
the dispute, nor were there any meetings between the LEU DC and its shop
stewards. After the emergency, there was recognition of the lack of
preparation, the minutes recording
"The Secretary drew attention to the position we were
recently placed in owing to the nployers' Notices and
urged some plan of organisation. After discussion DC
resolved that a meeting of Organisation Sub—Committee
and Chief Stewards be called immediately to consider
what machinery is necessary in the event of a lockout."
(47)
This meeting decided on the need for a committee to co—operate with the
CECJ, particularly setting up joint propaganda committees and a sub-
committee -to arrange food supplies WitL the Co—op. This was put to a
meeting of the CEJC and agreed, together with the suggestion that a
central strike committee would run a dispute for all of the unions.(48)
This was a step forward, though had the AEU been in the CEJC organisation
would have been tighter. The consideration of using the Co—op shows
that the unions were anticipating a prolonged stoppage. However, no
further action was taken over the next eight months.
The ballot over reductions rejected the employers' offers, but the
unions accepted a phased reduction of 6s off -time rates. No sooner was
this carried out than the employers were back for more, and the l2-% war
bonus was removed without a struggle. Although the DC of the AEU was
prepared for a struggle, the membership refused to support it, and refused
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to support a local levy for the unemployed unless it was voluntary. The
response to this war poor, the DC regretting "the meagre response given
(49)
by our members in view of the enormous problem of destitution." 	 The
last A.EU DC meeting of the year ended with a pious minute:
"The Chairman in closing the last meeting of 1921 expressed.
the hope that 1922 would be of a much pleasanter and. pros-.
perous character for all our members than the past 12
months had proved to be." (50)
The year of mass unemployment had shaken the trade unions of the city and
discovered cracks and splits in its organisation. Far from being a
relief, 1922 was to see those cracks widen to almost bring the whole
movement crumbling down.
V	 Apprentices and Machines
Wages and overtime were the two main workshop problems between 1919
and 1922, but there were many others as well. These included the operation
of different sorts of piece work, relation to time rates, war bonus and
rates for new jobs such as setters up.
	
In all of these cases, the unions
wanted. to establish their right to negotiate, while employers wished. to
make unilateral decisions, or negotiate with individual workers.
Other issues which were not primarily wage or payment issues never-
theless had a money side to them, particularly restrictions on output.
There was also the position of apprentices, and the issue of who would
work what machines. These more directly raised the question of workplace
control.
Restrictions on output in order to ensure good piece work prices was
a natural development from a piece work system, though the unions had agreed
to drop the practice during the war. It revived after the war, though in
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the conditions of the time it was unlikely to be widespread, as when
faced with layoffs and short time workers wanted to make as much as they
could while they were still at work. The employers pretended ignorance
of this practice and complained when it was uncovered. In indignant
minute of the CDEEA. read
"It was reported that apparently in certain instances
workpeople were deliberately working 'to a limit' and that
where workers exceeded this self—imposed limit of earnings
they were being victimised by the other workers." (50)
Complaints to union officials achieved little, as the practice was con-
trolled either by stewards, or by the workers themselves. It remained
a management grievance -to be raised when the time was ripe.
There were a number of problems with young workers. The unions felt
that boys were being used in too great a number as cheap labour. They
wished to ensure that a sufficient number of boys were indentured as app-
rentices, anti they wanted to be able to negotiate wage rates for them.
The employers' policy was to often have large numbers of boys in the shop,
the majority of whom were not apprentices, even though there would not be
enough work for all of them when they were fully trained.
The indentures of apprenticeship were drawn up without consultation
with the trade unions, for employers held. that unions had no authority over
apprentices. Some of the rules in the indentures were very strict, as
well as being out of date. Thus one indenture drawn up in 1918 had a
nile fining a boy for washing his hands in oil or wasting candles. A
more restrictive rule was one that said that any apprentice who is absent
without leave from work "Will forfeit double his wages and. be  subject to
legal penalties.t(52) This put the boy at the mercy of the employer. The
AEU made it plain that i-b felt that indentures should. be
 signed by employers,
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unions and. guardian, and. that all should be responsible for training.
In mid-1919 a local conference with the ABE made no progress in
establishing a district rate for apprentices with regular paj increases,
but there was agreement limiting the number of apprentices to three for
every ten journeymen. However, there were complaints after this, as
employers used boys who were not apprentices.
	
Another local confer-
ence was held. in February 1920, but the employers claimed it was a national
question. Givens reported to the AEU DC that the issue had been around
for 14 months, and. -that the union would have to take unilateral action if
agreement was not reached.
The reference went to the Central Conference, and. before this met,
members of the DC discussed jobs advertised. by employers at the labour
exchange. They had found 15 jobs on offer for men aged 18-20, but none
for craftsmen. It was resolved that
"The Secretary write to EC for permission to instruct our
members to cease setting up for boys and youths on account
of the practice abnormally developed. by the Coventry
employers only requiring men of 16 to 20 years in total
disregard of promises made in Local Conference." (54)
There was no agreement at Central Conference, and again the DC suggested
the cessation of "setting up for, teaching, or assisting boys or Appren-
tices in the Shops until an agreement can be reached" about their propor-
tions, and. wages, this time to the CEJC. The CEJC agreed, and. a date
was fixed that no more assistance would be given from iiiitson.
However, when men began to refuse to set up, the employers took the
matter to Central Conference. Here it was decided that the question be
deferred pending a national agreement, and. the EC of the AETJ instructed
the Coventry DC to lift its action pending national agreements - which
were not forthcoming.(56) 	
This brought to an end. attempts to negotiate
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for apprentices, but did not end. objections to what the unions saw as
misuse of young workers, as they felt they were being left in the work-
places while adults were d.ischargecl.
The apprentice issue and the use of young workers generally was
closely related -to the question of dilution; who would. work with which
machines? In the period. up to the lock-out, the skilled. unions did what
they could. to get all of the unskilled. workers and. women out of the trade.
As in the war period., this meant that the skilled unions took up an
exclusive position on unskilled. workers. This is illustrated. by a minute
of the ASE DC discussing a letter from the Daimler management on using
unskilled workers. The company
"Claim they can upgrade any workman, as this was a pre-war
practice. Secretary to suitably reply that a Painter or
Cattle-.drbver, such as the men in question, cannot be
upgraded. in the Engineering Trade, and. to again demand their
removal." (47)
As the Coventry motor industry was new, the problems of unskilled
workers on new machines was acute. Bates, the AEtJ Divisional official
reported.
"This Division, which contains some of the most up-to-
date machine shops in the country, and is well organ-
ised. on the employer's side, shows every indication of
becoming the storm centre of this important question."(58)
The DC felt that there was scope for national agreements on machine manning,
for some time after Bates' report it passed the following motion:
"That we, the members of the Coventry DC deplore the
long delay in arriving at a satisfactory settlement of
the Female Labour question, and the question of the
large amount of Unskilled Male Labour being introduced
in the manning of machines etc.
We therefore call upon our Executive Council -to immed-
iately convene a National Conference, so that our
future policy on these vital questions may be framed,
and. thus allay the grave unrest now so prevalent among
our members." (59)
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In this as in other matters, the DC was disappointed by the EC. There
was a national conference, but not until 1921, which decided to resist
all attempts by employers to control their machines, but it had little
impact in the workplaces.
VI	 Shop Stewards in Decline
The shop stewards movement in Coventry was still strong at the end
of the war, although perhaps it was not as strong as it had been. Union
district committees were too busy to do much to bring stewards together,
cE c-	 k
or to try to help workplace organisation
	 # thooc tended to attract only
a small number.
Because of the neglect of the movement, officials lost touch with
workshop organisation.	 In September 1920 there was a strike of elec-
tricians at English Electric, and the LEU involvement was mainly to ensure
that electricians did not switch unions in order to avoid the strike. The
DC told the other union that it had no stewards at the factory, but later
found out that there had been more than 30 stewards there for over a year,
and at least 20 of them were in the AEU, although they had never been
recognised by the DC. 6° The CEJC scheme whereby that body recognised
all stewards more or less died in 1919/20, but this also had depended on
the stewards actually letting officials know they were there.
This lack of recognition was not just at DC level.
	 Cyril Taylor,
who later had a number of senior posts in the kEU first become a shop steward
in 1919 at Armstrong—Siddeley. The only people who were notified, other
than the men in the department, were the rate fixer and. the foreman. He
was a steward there for 18 months, and in that time he never met the convenor,
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nor did the latter know of his existence. Yet this was one of the best
organised. workplaces in Coventry at the time.(6
In mid. 1920 the establishment of the AEIJ led to attempts to improve
organisation. Shop stewards were asked. to meet to discuss what the new
body would be like, and. it was discovered. that there were several fac-
(62)tories without stewards, and attempts were made to find some. 	 A new
shop stewards' group was formed, monthly meetings held, and a stewards'
executive set up. This did act as an impetus, and a number of new stew-
ards were appointed. A report in September 1920 showed that the AEU DC
had 236 approved stewards. The list showed. very uneven organisation.
Daimler had. 46 stewards, Swift 28 and Humber 22. But large factories
like Dunlop, Hillman and. Singer were reported as having only one or t.(63)
Shortly after this, unemployment rose rapidly, and this put a strain on
organisa,tion. By November 1921 the Chaixman of the AEU stewards group was
talking about "The seriousness of the position of shop stewards, and their
'(64)probable extinction.	 The AEU stewards meetings themselves were not
very successful. In 1921 the numbers at the meetings were only about half
the previous year's, and there was difficulty in getting a stable executive
together. There was also a couple of occasions where the stewards felt
that Givens had acted. without consulting stewards, and that the District
(65)
Committee was not giving the stewards meeting full backing.
	 Eventually,
the DC decided to abolish the monthly stewards meetings, on the eve of the
(66)lock—out, presumably because it wanted. to feel in control of that dispute.
An attempt to improve the organisation was made in early 1921 when
from an initiative of the revolutionaries that were still in the process
of forming the CPGB, an attempt was made to re—establish the Coventry
Workers' Committee. The main originator was Tom Dingley, who was
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national organiser for the Shop Stewards and. Workers' Committee Movement.
After a lot of propaganda work had been done, Gallacher and Leckie were
brought in, and. invitations sent to various trade union bodies to attend
a conference. This was only moderately successful, with 41 delegates
present, representing the Trades Council, the AEU DC and Shop Stewards group,
the CEJC shop stewards, Shop Assistants, Building Workers, Miners, and.
Transport Workers, as well as the CTJWC.	 It agreed on a resolution,
"That this meeting, an organised body of workers
representing every class of industry, resolve to
get together and organise both insid.e and outside
the factories by propaganda, with, a view to obtain-
ing control of the means of production, believing
that this is the only solution of the present crisis
of unemployment." (67)
A Workers' Committee of 12 was set up with Bob Thompson from the Daimler
as Chairmaxi, and Harry Enery from the CUWC as secretary. About five of
the Committee were members of the C?, which shows that it was not ab rep-
resentative as it could be.
The sponsors of the Committee saw it as being a body whose job was
to organise the workers in a revolutionary way, in the same way as the
CUWC should organise the unemployed. Emery, while secretary of the
latter and shortly before becoming secretary of the former,wrote
"There is every hope of the movement becoming a great
power in Coventry. The workers of the tovms must be
prepared to take control of the factories, and thus
lead the way to a general proletarian seizure of the
means of production. The best way to prepare for
that is the formation of revolutionary Workers' Comm.-.
ittees inside the compound now." (68)
What this meant was that the Committee became a propaganda body rather
than one which was really involved. in organisation at work, and in this
it was not different from the rest of the post-war Workers' Committee
movement.( 69)
	It had fortnightly meetings and involved itself in strikes
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such as the one at Triumph, but it cannot be said. to have made a major
intervention in the industrial life of the city. 	 In the circumstances,
it would have been surprising if it had, for with the unions in retreat
the likelihood of workers seizing the factories was remote.
Despite this, there was some sympathy for the Russian Revolution
among engineers, and this was reflected at many of the aggregate meetings
and some of the DC meetings in the ABE. In July 1919, over a year before
the campaign to keep Britain out of war with the Soviet Union reached. a
crisis, a resolution was passed at an aggregate meeting to support a 24
hour stoppage against British intervention on 21st July. The proposers
claimed that this was supporting the initiative taken by the Labour Party,
but though a recent Labour Party Conference had discussed the situation and
hail threatened to use industrial action if need be, there is no record of
it having called a 24 hour stoppage, and it seems to have been peculiar to
Coventry. It is not known how many did actually stop work on 21st July,
but there were enough for the DC to record its deprecation of the strikes.
At Sterling Metals, some of the workers struck, and. were locked out, and
the rest of the factory came out in sympathy until they were taken back.'
In November 1919 the ABE DC affiliated to the Hands off Russia Committee
and sent a resolution to the EC supporting t?drastjc action. (71)
December 1921, on the instigation of a member of the SLP, an LEU aggregate
meeting passed a long resolution calling for ?tThe bringing into being of
the Shipbuilding and. Engineering Section of the Workers International
Industrial nion . t 2 ) This was carried unanimously, and probably shows
that most left wing motions stood a chance of going through provided they
involved no serious action. Shortly before the lock-out the DC allowed the
CP to leave its literature in the office where unemployed members signed
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the vacancy book, and. it was usually infonned. when CP engineering speakers
were in the city. '	By this time there were at least two, possibly
three, CP members on the DC as well as other left—wingers, though the left
was not in a majority.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PART II
The Managerial Functions Dispute
The managerial functions d.ispute was a result of the initiative of
the EEF in its dealings with the AEU and. other unions at national level,
but the necessity for the dispute could be seen by Coventry employers.
The EEF wished to establish its member's right to introduce changes
pending negotiations, and to determine the amount of overtime without
reference to the trade unions. After much negotiations, the AEU E.C.
recommended these terms to the membership, but they were decisively
rejected in a ballot. The other 46 unions were also put in the same
position, but were not faced with a lock-out at the same time as the kU,
which was informed that from 11th March its members would be barred from
work in Federated shops. As the dispute had been dragging on from Novem-
ber 1921 both sides had ample opportunity to organise and prepare for the
struggle, but a survey of local records of both sides shows that the
employers were much more prepared than the .AEU.
At the time of the lock-out the .A.EU had about 11,000 members, but
2,133 were unemployed, and a number of others were on short 	 In
February 1922 the AEtJ shop stewards met to consider the state of their
organisation and found. a varied situation. Reports showed that the
stewards at the Armstrong-Siddeley were "flourishing" and at the Humber
they "were in good condition." At the Daimler, the Chairman of the Works
Committee had just been laid off, and it was stated "That (the) Stewards
movement was rather dormant at present owing to discharges and indifferent
working." At Herberts the situation was poor and. it was difficult to find
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stewards, while at Standard Canley "Movement almost non-existent" was the
report. Perhaps the most significant statement about organisation was the
fact that only 16 stewards turned up for the meeting.
The AEU initially left the dispute to its Disputes sub-committee,
which was not particularly active prior to the lock-out. It did discuss
making arrangements with the Co-op for the supply of food and the use of its
banking facilities and decided that shop stewards in the different works
would be responsible for picketing when the dispute began.
	
It also met
the CEJC to get support in the event of a dispute. 6 ' The first sign
of disagreement on the union side occurred only three days before the lock-
out, when the AEU Unemployment Committee met the Organisation sub-committee
and threatened to break away from AEU leadership and. throw its lot in with
the	 This body had been quicker off the mark than the AEU, and
on March 4th had called a local conference to bring trade union and unem-
ployed groups together to form a joint organisation for any lock-out. This
was rejected by the AEU DC as "interference" but there was by no means com-
plete disapproval of what had happened, for a few days later Jack Leckie,
who was a member of the AEU, was allowed to speak for 20 minutes to the DC,
where it was reported he gave
"An excellent and interesting address dealing i'iith the
present position, and administered constructive criticism,
to the Society generally, he strictly adhered to the con-
di-tions as laid down by the Chairman re confining himself
to Industrial and non-controversial remarks." (78)
The same meeting heard reports on the members' morale, "The representatives'
opinion varying considerably."
Although the Disputes Committee remained in existence, once the lock-
out began, the DC took over responsibility. In a circular on the eve of
the lock-out the DC assumed responsibility and. gave intru.otions for
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picketing - a number of centres were set up. A few d.ars later, the
DC set itself up as a Lockout Committee, but two days later, after an
aggregate meeting attended by Brownlie, the union General Secretary,
nominations were taken for an elected Lockout Committee, and this was
quickly elected at a mass meeting.	 It did. not have its first
meeting until 23rd March, twelve days after the lock—out had, started.
In contrast, the CDEEA showed much greater foresight and preparation.
In January 1922 it had sent its views on the ieed to reduce labour costs
to the EEF, and wanted a reduction in wages, an increase in hours, full
acceptance of piece—work, uniform wage rates, and the acceptance by
unions of the employers' memorandum on managerial rights.(80) At a
meeting at the end. of January the minutes record support for the EEF:
"It was agreed by all present that a very strong line
should be adopted by Diiployers as a whole to insist
that they should retain the right to manage their own
factories." (81)
There were a number of factories in Coventry that were not in the CDEEA
and a number like Swift Motors that were in the CDEA but not in the EEF,
and. Johxi Varley, the full time secretary of the CDEEA contacted. these
firms that were not party to the dispute to ensure that they would not
take on workers who were locked out at Federation workshops, and in
February he was able to report a good response to his approaches.
At one point, there was the possibility of a split appearing in the
ranks of the employers. 	 Sir Alfred Herbert took the unusual step of
appearing at one of the Associated meetings in person and argued
"That he considered that the action that was being taken
by the Federation in forcing a lock—out on the question
of overtime at the present time was one that would prove
to be unpopular with public opinion, and. in his opinion
he considered that the adverse ballot vote of' the A,EU
should have been left for the time being..."
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However, it is clear these were differences of approach rather than
substance for he went on -to argue for a
"Lock—out forced. on the more concrete question of a
reduction in wages of the 26/6 per week war awards."
Col. J. Cole of Humber, the President of the CDEEA. disagreed;
"The main point at issue was not on the question of
overtime being worked., but whether ployers should
maintain their right to manage their own shops." (82)
Sir Alfred Herbert had raised two important points. One was the
need. to present a good case to defeat union propaganda on the lines of
the need. to cut out overtime while many were out of work, and. the other
was whether the managerial functions argunient should. be  linked. with a
demand for a further reduction. 	 'Jhi1e the lock—out was on, this second
issue was discussed., by the Executive Committee of the CDEEAS
"It was agreed by all present that so far as regards
the Members of the LEU are concerned., the questions of
wage reduction and. working conditions should be cleared
up before the men are taken back." (83)
The reason given for this was "To get over any breach of faith" by causing
another lock—out over a wage reduction, but it could also be interpreted
as getting as much out of a defeated trade union movement as possible.
However, this point of view was not taken up by the EEF. Sir Alfred.
Herbert's first point, of the need. for a good case was dealt with at the
same meeting, for a patphlet issued by the Federation was sent to the
Association and "It was agreed. that the Secretary should. arrange for
-	
(84)
prominance -to be given to this pamphlet in the local press."
The AEU did not feel that its links with the local press were strong
enough to make similar arrangements, and the main force of its propagand.a
was to send. circulars to its members, and. to help the circulation of a
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local leaflet called, the Labour Record, which gave its case, and. 20,000
of which were printed by the Trades ouicii.(85). But the CDEEA had.
greater resources and. concentrated on winning over foremen and. charge-
hands, although leaflets and. posters putting the employers case were
also distributed round all the factories.
The CDEEA went to great lengths to ensure that foremen were well
educated in the employers' case. 	 For many years the employers had
adopted a strategr of weaning the foremen from the unions, and treating
them as first line management, owing management their first loyalties.
Thus the Foremans Mutual Benefit Society had. been funded by employers,
and they had. received preferential treatment for some time. This paid
off in the lock-out. In a circular letter at the beginning of March
Varley pointed. out to employers
"The desirability of putting the ployers' point of
view clearly and definitely before the foremen in the
various establishments so that the foremen will be in
a position -to cearly indicate to the men under them
exactly what is in issue and at stake in this connec-
tion." (86)
Varley was well aware 'that some foremen were .AEtJ members, so although
- publicity material was sent out with the circular letter, he went on to
write
"Personally I do not think it desirable for this
document to be handed to the foremen in case some of
them might be members of the EU with the possibilities,
in conse1ence, of it being handed over by the foreman,
either deliberately or otherwise, 'to their union."
The accompanying notes also stressed the importance of the foremen, and.
tried to show how they would suffer if the unions were not defeated.:
"Foremen, are asked to consider exactly what their own
individual position is going to be if all their instruc-
tions are in the ordinary course of business to be
subject 'to review and veto by the men the Shop Stewards
and the Unions." (87)
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This, of course, was a considerable overstatement, but calculated to
encourage foremen to see unions as a threat to their authority.
This consistent policy to foremen contrasted with the confusion on
the union side. 	 Initially it appears that foremen were expected to come
as
out, but as employers did not lock them out, most did not do so, and/long
as they did not encourage blacklegs or apprentices to do the locked out
men's work, little pressure was put on them. Later in the dispute, when
some men had gone back, the AEU and other unions decided to bring all their
foremen out. Some foremen members of the AEU wrote to their EC and re-
ceived. replies telling them they did not have to come out. This prompted
the DC to write to the EC,
"Thiphatically protesting against EC replying to individual
members uon ally pretext thereby very seriously under-
minin	 bur members here." (88)
The EC then instructed the DC not to withdraw its foremen, and. the ODD
Orrell took this to mean that those few foremen who had come out were to
be sent back. However, it was pointed out at the DC that locally the AEU
was part of the Joint Committees running the dispute, and. that body had
agreed to pull out foremen and so it was decided to leave the foremen out.
Confusion reigned.
Foremen were seen by employers as important for two reasons. In the
first place they had the ear of the workers, and were in a position to
influence some of them, and therefore they had to be well primed with the
employers' point of view; secondly, they were likely to know who were
trade union members and who were not, and therefore could be used to ensure
that every AEU member at first and later every trade union member was shown
the door.
Varley was very concerned to see that AEJ members were not allowed to
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skulk in the works when they should have been locked out. lie suggested
to the employers before the lock—out started that
"Individual firms will, no doubt, have ways and means
of procuring the information but it is suggested that
the foremen would, in all probability, be able to
furnish such information if asked to do so but in this
connection it is suggested that the foremen should be
warned to be very discreet in their enquiries.
In case, however, difficulty is experienced it is
suggested that it might reasonably be assumed that all
skilled engineers are members of the AEU and if and
when the lock—out becomes operative the onus should be
then placed on any man... to prove...that he is a member
of some other Union or, in fact, a non—Unionist." (89)
Varley stressed this point on a number of occasions, for it was the
intention of the employers to inflict a heavy and decisive defeat on
trade unionism in the workplace. A second circular sent out on the eve
of the strike, and, heavily emphasised, said
trLjnless an thployer is satisfied beyond any question
-that a workman has in truth and in fact irrevocably
severed his connection with the AEtJ, such workman
ought not, without definite instructions from this
Association be retained in the employ of the firm
or be re—engaged after the expiry of the lock—out
notice."	 (90)
In the first week of the lock—out, even this very tough attitude hardened.
Dealing with workers who claimed they had left the AEU and therefore were
not looked out, Varley wrote to his members
"The only condition under which the service of such
men shall be continued is that the men must furnish
	 -
documentary evidence that they have been expelled
from the Union." (91)
This was also underlined. Thus from the start of the dispute it was
quite clear that as far as the employers were concerned this was not a
normal dispute but an attempt to pick out every AEU member in the city
covered by the Eployers Association and inflict a. personal defeat on
them. It was ax' attempt to deal with the union once and. for all.
hatever the state of preparation of the different parties, it is
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clear that virtually all AETJ members came out on March 11th, which in
view of the attitude of the employers, is not surprising. There were
a number of large non—federated works in the city, and. AEU members worked
as normal at these. The first reports from the employers show that 5,303
men were locked out, and 110 laid. off as a resuit.(92) This would be
about 60 of AEU members in work in the city. AETJ shop stewards' first
returns claimed that only about 78 members had failed to come out, and
about one third of these were at the Rover. 	 They also claimed that
a small number of lapsed members and non—Unionists ha4 come out, though
this may have been thanks to the employers rather than solidarity. Although
the organisation on the AEIJ side left something to be desired, it is clear
that union leaders saw this as a major struggle, for it was resolved
"Ou.r members are instructed that no arrangement can be
made for a restart Unless proof is given that they (ie
the firms) have seceded from the Federation and entered
into an agreement with this DC." (94)
Thus the AETJ were looking to the possibility of also inflicting a major
defeat. The dispute was fairly quiet for the first few weeks. Picketing
was at a low level, and. there was little enthusiasm shown. However, a
well—attended aggregate meeting agreed -to step it up, as there were a
number of workplaces, such as the Daimler, where there were siiall numbers
of union members at work. This led -to the Chief Constable complaining
about the use of mass pickets.	 However, much of the picketing was
done by the Joint Committee set up by the CUWC, n3 the DC for some time
refused to associate with it. This led to disagreements between the DC
and. the elected Lockout Committee.
The Lockout Committee saw itself as running the dispute, but was
told by the DC that it was subject to the DC which took the final decisions,
and which, unlike the Lockout Committee, was not prepared to co—operate
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with outsid.e bodies. This attitude angered the Lockout Committee,
which sent a letter to the EC
"To enquire specifically the functions of the L.O.C.
particularly with respect to co—operation with other
bodies, descriptions of delegations allowed, sub-
mitting of minutes to D.C., definite decision re
withdrawal of men." (96)
The reply came some 10 days later, and. was regarded by the Lockout
Committee as 'disappointing' for it declared the DC to be the authority
in the	 So upset were the members of the Lockout Comm-
ittee that they decided to refuse to continue submitting their minutes
to the DC, and. called for an aggregate meeting, at the end of which
they would resign en bloc. However, it was eventually agreed to meet
the DC, and both bodies called an aggregate meeting to discuss picketing
arrangements, and the Lockout Committee decided "In view of the more
amicable feelings now displayed." not to resign. It was agreed -to carry
on arrangements as before.(98)
The Lockout Committee objected to being responsible for picketing,
but having all their actions subject to DC approval. It was also unhappy
at the poor response to the calls for picketing, and. felt that it was
being deprived of information necessary -to run the dispute. 	 It deferred
making a decision on relations with other bodies, but some of the members
of the committee felt there should be an exchange of delegates between
their body and the unofficial committee, which had. the CUWC and the AEU
Unemployed. Committee working together. The DC would. not change its
attitude on other bodies, but resolved
"That where Pickets had been suirimonsed by Lockout Committee
to act and had not responded., the Secretary to notify their
branch secretaries to stop benefits for the period in
default as a fine for neglect of duty." (99)
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The lockout was carried, on as before for another week, but the
response of union members to picketing remained poor. Five weeks after
the lock—out began a few weaknesses were beginning to show. The pickets
at the Hotchkiss reported that blacklegs, non—union men and. other unions
were keeping production almost up to normal, and. there were reports of
other weak spots. The Lockout Committee decided that "The time had now
passed for conciliatory methods and. that we must adopt more stringent and.
severe tactics with these fixms.ft It called for the merger of the Lockout
Committee and the DC, joint demonstrations and pickets with the Lockout
Committee and the DC, with union officials trying to get more members
involved, and. "That we ask DC to co—operate with Central Unemployed. Workers
(100)Committee for demonstration purposes, owing to the critical position."
This produced. a speedy confrontation; the next day Leckie was allowed
to speak to the Lockout Committee, and. he called for united action:
"It was pointed. out to him that it was a coincidence
that his remarks were similar -to those as expressed. by
this committee the previous day." (ioi)
Encouraged by this reception, Leckie and others went to see the DC on the
same day. Alex Madd.ison from the AEU Unemployed Committee referred. -to an
ultimatum given earlier; "That if a move was not made within seven days
the rank and. file would take charge." That time was now up, as Leckie
told them:
"On March 4th an unofficial Conference was held when it
was decided. to pool all available forces, AEU, other
societies, and. the Central Unemployed. Committee, but we were
now faced with a split owing to the attitude of the AEtJ
District Committee and Lock Out Committee, and. they were
now determined. to fix up an unofficial committee to take
control of the Lockout. The Rank and. File were disgusted
with the position in Coventry and. he gave 24 hours
ultimatum to link up with (the) Centre]. Unemployed Committee.
They had between 12 and. 13 hundred. members and. would. know
what to do."	 (102)
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1rhen the DC decided, to defer a decision over the weekend, Leckie declared
that this was not good. enough, and. "they were not taking it."
On the Monday, a meeting of the DC, the Lockout Committee, and.
representatives from the AEU Unemployed Committee took place. It
re-organised the Lockout Committee, by incorporating most of the DC
into it.
	 It then set up an Executive Commitee of eleven, a Finance
Committee, a Picketing Committee and a Complaints and. Enquiries Committee.
It decided to co-opt a number of delegates from the AE[J Unemployed Comm-
ittee, but would not have anything to do with the CUWC. This decision
was given to representatives of the CUWC who "Showed extreme disapproval".
So extreme that the minutes of the meeting went on very shortly to record
"Our business was then suspended. for a time owing to the
proceedings being interrupted by the forceful entry of a
large number of out members."
After a further exchange of views the members left. They were replaced. by
a deputation from the Hotchkiss, who pointed out that despite their pleas
for help, more new men were being taken on every day. These two interrup-
tions appear to have had. an effect, for it was then decided that a Joint
Committee of the Lockout Committee, the AEU Unemployed, and the CtJWC be
set up with the purpose of rumling the pickets and the ãemonstrations.03)
At an aggregate meeting in the evening, speakers from all of the' bodies,
including Leckie, spoke, and. it appears that the Joint Committee was
accepted, though it was also agreed that a Joint Committee of unions would
be foimed. when the other unions were locked out.	 In the same evening, the
first results of this decision was seen for between 1 and. 2,000 workers
picketed the Hotchkiss. Bob Orrell spoke in the street, but some men
broke into the factory and only left after Leckie was allowed to address
some of the workers. There was some attacks on blacklegs, and. the breaking
•	 (104)of windows.
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This was one of the turning points in the lock—out, for it meant
the body that was now called the Joint Council of Trade Unions and Unem-
ployed was given at least partial recognition arid. allowed to get on with
the running of pickets at a time when they were clearly needed, and just
before the other unions joined the AEU and the workplaces were thrown open
to non—union labour.	 In effect, -this Joint Council ran the lock—out, al-
though a Joint Executive Committee was also set up which had the final say
in calling any decisions about returns to work. This Committee had two
delegates from each union, and. was attended by all the local full time
officers. However, the crucial job was to stop any return to work, arid
here the Joint Council was the body that mobilised. the workers and captured
all the publicity.	 In effect it put Leckie, Dingley, Naddison and other
leaders of the unemployed at the head of the lock—out. This was what the
DC had sought to avoid, but it became inevitable when it was clear that
the DC and the Lockout Committee were not able to mobilise the membership
in the way that the CTJWC could. This was a great victory for the
Communist leadership of the CIJWC, and for Leckie, who together with Dingley
seized the opportunity to get as much publicity as possible. Yet it was
a sad. comment on the state of the Coventry trade union movement that in an
industrial dispute of this kind it took the best part of seven weeks to
arrive at an uneasy compromise on how the lock—out should be run, arid even
to achieve this it had meant the most extreme actions such as the breaking
up of meetings and confrontation with DC officials. The attitude of the
officials of the AEU, who were reported to be very upset at the events, was
similar to that of the CEJC when faced by Dingley and his shop committee in
1917. They were prepared to weaken the union side rather than allow control
to pass to the militants. This victory for the militants was achieved at
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the expense of exacerbating the relations between the Labour Party and
the Communist Party, leading to Bob Williaiiis' attacks on the demonstra-
tions.	 It also completely identified the militants with the leadership
of the lock-out - if it were to be defeated it would be a defeat for them
more than for Orrell and Givens.
The lock-out of the other engineering unions took effect on 3rd. May,
about eight weeks after the AEU were locked out. These unions had. also
refused to accept the managerial functions document of the EEF, and. their
lock-out had been preceded by lengthy negotiations. Early on in these
negotiations, the Coventry Association had unanimously approved their
lock-out, but different opinions emerged when more detailed negotiations
took place. On the 18th April Varley wrote to John Milburn from the
Humber who was acting as the Coventry delegate to the EEF for the nego-
tiations, commenting on the proposals that had. been sent to him. The
shipbuilding and engineering unions had gone a long way to avoid a settle-
ment by giving up the status quo. Where there was a disagreement in the
workplace over conditions, the unions suggested that management should give
notice of any impending change, and. then
"The management shall be entitled on the expiration of
the notice to give a temporary decision upon which work
shall proceed pending the following procedure being
carried through." (105)
Varley wrote about this:
"Having gone carefully through the various offers arid.
counter-offers made at the conferences between the 10th
and. 14th April instant I cannot, for the life of me,
understand why the Ep1oyers could not fix up an agree-
ment on the document dated 11/4/22 and marked "D" in
the documents herewith.
It seemsto me, in the absence of any explanations,
that the only possible complaint we could have is in
regard to the expression 'temporary decision' and. I
am sure wit enough could have been found to get over
this verbal squabble.
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Apparently following on the rejection of this offer
by the Unions to the ployers things appear to have
d.rifted. until they got into an altogether impossible
position. On the face of it, however, one is bound
to ask why the proposal of the Unions as set forth
in document "D" was not accepted because that con-
tains about all we want.
On thinking over this question further I suggest
that the Executive Board ought to consider whether
they will get another mandate from the various ass-
ociations in view of the position which has now
cropped up, because I do feel that we require to
have unanimity in this matter if we are to go on
with the lock—out and carry it into operation as
regards the 51 Unions (other than the A.E.U.) -
would not a retrospect of the whole position be
useful at this stage?" (106)
Other records from the Coventry Association make it clear that Varley
was not one to give unnecessary concessions to unions, yet it is clear
from this letter that his own view was that the EEF were creating a lock-
out when one was not needed. Vthether Milburn pressed for a re—assessment
or not is not known, but the lock—out went on despite Varley's reservations
and as an employee of the Association he suppressed his own views. Six
dars after writing the above letter he sent out a circular to CDEE
members, which claimed,
"It will be observed that the Unions are still insisting
that in the event of their members in a shop considering
that any change made by an ployer in his works is a
material change, the p1oyers should suspend putting the
change into operation until a representative Of the Union
concerned has had an opportunity of discussing the matter
with the management. In other words the Union are en-
deavouring to secure that the Union concerned shall,instead
of the Ehiployer, be the deciding party as to what is a
material change." (107)
This statement was clearly at variance with his earlier assessment
of the way negotiations had gone, and amounted to putting a quite inacc-
urate interpretation on the events. The notes that Varley received
containing the unions' offers were not circulated to CDEEL members, they
only received the above circular.	 It is possible then, that in the
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interests of unity, Varley not 3nly suppressed his own views about the
dispute, but suppressed the notes sent to him, and produced a quite
different version that was bound to strengthen the resolve of local
employers.
On 3rd May members of the other engineering unions, including the
WU joined their colleagues out on the streets. Despite some signs of
weakness, and the poor organisation of the AEU the bulk of the membership
remained firm. The Midland Daily Telegraph commented
"It appears that very few have returned to their shops,
the Trade Union officials expressing satisfaction at
the loyalty and solidarity of the men." (108)
The factories were opened to all AEtJ members who wished to renounce their
union and return, but there were few takers. The only figures available
are for the two Herbert's factories: on 3rd May only 1 of the 280 locked
out AEU members went back. Nevertheless the Joint Council was very busy.
The Midland Daily Telegraph reported that pickets were active at all the
factories, and
"The lock-out men and the unemployed had their head-
quarters on the Pool Meadow from which there was
directed a stream of scouts on motor bicycles and
push bicycles, who reported periodically as to the
situation at the d.ifferent works." (109)
This must have been the most open and public labour dispute in the city
since 1860. In mid-morning news came through to Pool Meadow that Len 	 -
Jackson and Jack Preece, Communist leaders of the Joint Council, had been
arrested, and the whole crowd marched off "A mass of singing and marching
men and women."	 Jackson and Preece had led a group of pickets to a small
workshop, Monk Engineering, off the High Street where work was still going
on	 The pickets had broken down the main doors and got into the machine
shops and. the upstairs premises. Police had fought their way through the
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crowd. to get in, arrested some pickets, then had. to fight their way out,
leading a baton charge to clear the way. Four people, including Jackson
and. Preece, were arrested, but the crowd, estimated. at 3,000 surrounded
St. Mary's Hall and. the Police Station. A deputation of Leckie, Orrell,
Morris and other union officials went to see the Mayor, and. after promises
of good. behaviour the men were released.
	
Singing the Red. Flag, and. amid
scenes of enthusiasm, the crowd returned to Pool Meadow to continue picket-
jg (110) Soon after he had been released., Preece led a deputation to the
Guardians to protest about supposed. reductions in relief. Strong picketing
and. demonstrations continued for the next few days, with the Midland Daily
Telegraph commenting "The system of following men home is adopted. in many
(iii)	 .	 .	 .instances."	 In fact, this was what Leckie described. as "scientific
picketing" and. he told. the local paper on 6th May that it was entirely
successful except for one factory (probably Smiths Stamping Works). Leokie
was not one to miss drama, and he claimed. that police were looking for a
confrontation and would not allow more than two pickets per factory, and.
that the CID were seeking him as well as other Joint Council leaders.
Although that day was a Saturday, and. there were no demonstrations planned.,
a large crowd turned up in Pool Meadow almost out of habit. This series
of large meetings upset the police, and on the sam day reinforcements
arrived. from Birmingham.(2) On that day there was a meeting between
the Mayor and. representatives from the Joint Executive Lockout Committee
and. the Joint Council to try to ensure that picketing would. be  peaceful.
The Joint Council was not put off, for mass picketing continued for the
next week, though without any violence.
The CDEEA was greatly angered. by the picketing. The executive on
5th May commented.
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"It was generally agreed that a great amount of
intimidation was going on, arid but for this there
would be a ready response for a general return to
work."	 (112)
Complaints were made about "The apparent lack of protection that was
being given by the local police," and. a deputation went to the Mayor the
same day. They got a "very weak" response, for he admitted that
"The local police force was totally inadequate for
complete protection against intimidation to the
various workpeople who were willing to work." (114)
Nevertheless, following this deputation and a visit to the Home Secretary
by Sir ward Manville, Coventry's N.P., extra police were sent into the
city. The employers had been a little disappointed at the response of
the men on 3rd May for they had hoped for a better return. A circular
letter had. been sent round advising that men going in should arrive in a
body "rather than in drablets" in order to intimidate the pickets but
this had not worked.(]15) Well before the lock—out had reached this
stage, the CDEEA had been considering the possibility of public disorder
and. the role of the Association in dealing with it. A circular letter
sent out on March 11th, the date of the original lock—out,suggested mea-
sures "So that we may be ready if and when the emergency occurs." Varley
wrote
"I have to suggest the desirability of all members en-
deavouring to ascertain discreetly and in the strictest
confidence which members of their staff are prepared to
be sworn in as Special Constables for the City of
Coventry or the surrounding County areas as the case
may be, during the present crisis. 	 The Enployers will
no doubt find that in the majority of instances there
are certain members of their staff who have had police
experience (either as Special Constables or otherwise)
during the War, and. these men would of course be most
useful if. they would express their willingness to act
in the emergency which has arisen." (116)
It is not known whether this circular had the approval of the local police
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force, but in the event nothing seems to have come of it. 	 It is inter-
esting to note that imlike the letter dealing with foremen, there is no
hesitation about members of staff having split loyalties.
The introduction of police from Birmingham reduced the number of
violent incidents, and police began to try to reduce the number if pickets
outside each workplace.	 On May 16th the Midland Daily Telegraph reported
that "Mass picketing has been abolished," but this was premature. 	 The
police were keeping a closer eye on the pickets, but it was still going on.
It was not confined to Coventry - Leckie led 120 cycle pickets to Rugby
to demonstrate outside the magistrates' court where a locked out worker
(118)
was being charged with intimidation.	 On May 22nd a demonstration
accompanied some lawyers to the railway station in Coventry after they
had defended successfully an arrested picket, and then, taking the police
by surprise, went off to the Swift and Maudsley works, where they preven-
ted the workers from leaving for their lunch breaks until Orrell and
others had interviewed the management and got promises that overtime would
be kept to a	 Swift was not a member of the CDEEA and so was
not involved in the lock-out. The next day there were "lively"scenes
at the Coventry Chain and Rover works, with the following of blacklegs and
vigorous picketing.23) On May 26th Leckie saw the Chief Constable, and
agreed on plans for peaceful mass pickets, and in the evening appealed for
(121)
order.	 However, returning from Leamington on May 27th, Leckie had
an accident on his motor cycle which put him out of activity for some days.
A couple of days later Tom Dingley was charged with incitement and dis-
turbing the peace in speeches he had given in Birmingham and was put in
jail on remand. Coming at a time when the numbers on the picket line
were dwindling, and the numbers going back were increasing, this took a
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lot of steam out of the Joint Council plans for picketing. By this time
it was already clear that there was less enthusiasm for picketing duty and.
complaints that the union officers were not giving a lead and leading too
much for the unofficial Joint Committee.
Before the accident -to Leckie, a number of demonstrations had been
to the Boards of Guardians. The struggles over relief and unemployment
benefit played an important part in -the overall dispute. Workers were
not entitled to unemployment benefit for taking part in a trade dispute,
but some were claiming that they were not party to the dispute but had
been laid off as a result of it. 	 Others were claiming that they would
have been laid. off for lack of work anyway. 	 hen some AEU members got
judgements in their favour at the local Court of Referees, Varley became
very concerned, and circulated his members:
"Special attention should be given to all cases of this
kind. The fullest information should be given to the
Court which may tend to show, as a matter of fact and
not merely as a matter of the firm's opinion that -the
men have actually lost their employment by reason of
a stoppage of work due to a trade dispute at -the worksJ'
He emphasised the need to have representatives present for insurance cases,
for
"cie of the grounds on which benefit is sometimes
claimed is that the firm, by re—arranging their work,
have managed -to carry on without a s-toppage. In such
a case, even if no complete stoppage can be proved, it
is desirable -to show that -there has been an appreciable
stoppage or at least a substantial check to -the work." (122)
When he was unable -to reverse decisions made locally, Varley went down -to
London to see the Umpire on insurance cases; on behalf of Herberts, who
had about 100 workers laid off besides those locked out, he was able to
get the cases referred back as the true state of affairs had. not been
represented -to the Court of Referees. There may have been a few workers
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who were able to claim unemployment benefit, but for the most part it
appears that Varley's action was sufficient to block that approach.
The Boards of Guardians needed less special attention from the
employers, for politically they represented Conservative and Liberal
opinion in the city.
	 The Guardians had a duty to provide relief for
all who needed it, but did not relish supporting workers involved in a
dispute, so relief for most of the lockL_out was in kind, only. 	 lrjhen the
employers decided to open their works to all workers, the Fbleshill
Guardians, whose conduct has already been referred to, issued a notice
as follows:
"Various works have been thrown open to men previously
locked—out, any man not returning to work is, under the
law, on strike, and. the law forbids any form of relief
for men on strike. Effect will be given to this law
after this week." 	 (123)
Of course the men were able to return, but only if they repudiated their
unions, and accepted the position of management. This decision amounted
to the Guardians coming down on the side of the employers. They were
followed 'by the Coventry Board, which made a similar ruling but with
one important difference. No relief would be given to the locked—out
men, but wives and families would 'be allowed outdoor relief. This
differed from Foleshill, where the families of the men involved in the
dispute were given no form of' relief of any kind.
At the next meeting of the Foleshill Guardians, there was a large
crowd present, a deputation was turned away, and the Guardians were jeered
as they lefts24) The two Labour members of the Board managed to get
another meeting called, but the same decision was reached. Speaking in
Rugby, Alice Arnold threatened that the Guardians would need police support
from all over the country if they persisted in this attitude:
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"Unless these people get food. and. drink by fair means,
we are prepared. to use any and. every means to see that
they are got."	 (125)
The last meeting of the Guardians had led. to violence, for the Relieving
Officer Thomas was chased, but there were no incidents at other meetings,
for by then the lock-out was showing signs of crumbling.
	 In Stoke Heath,
an attempt was made to reply to the attitude of the Guardians by refusing
to pay rent while the lock-out was on. It is not knon how widespread.
this was.
The situation was not so bad in Coventry, though the unions were
very unhappy that relief was not to be paid to those involved. in the
dispute from May 11th. A number of demonstrations took place outside
the Board Room. At one of them, the Guardians refused to meet a depu-
tation, and. the ever militant Leckie took exception to this. Saying the
deputation should force its way in he declared to the demonstration. "If
(126)you say go, I will get inside, or be in prison this afternoon."
	 He
was spared. this sacrifice, for the Guardians saw a deputation later. After
another deputation from the Joint Executive Committee and the Joint Council
the Guardians appear to have modified their position, and decided. -to give
relief in kind. to workers in the dispute, and. a payment for the rent, pro-
(127)
vided they could show they had no other source of income. 	 This proviso
could be serious, for the Foleshill Guardians would also give relief, pro-
vided a family could show that it was destitute, and. it had a strict d.ef in-
ition of what destitution involved.. Although the situation in Coventry
was better, the general position about relief was a considerable incentive
to drive people back to work, for the best that was possible was the
humiliation of proving that the family was entitled. to a small bundle of
food. per week. Qrrell commented after the dispute that
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"The pressure brought to bear upon the Guardians by
the employing class did. much more than some people
imagine in breaking down the determination of our
members."	 (128)
In fact, although there may have been pressure brought to bear, the
general attitude shown by the Guardians, particularly the Foleshill
Guardians indicates that they did not require special treatment.
The attitude of the Guardians was important for the dispute exhaus-
ted the funds of the unions. 	 Initially the AEU paid its members for
picketing duty, but when the other unions were involved and did not pay
their men, the AEtJ gave up the practice.
	
It had a distress fund, and
paid needy cases out of this, including non—unionists who had. been locked
out as well, though the AEIJ felt that non—unionists should be taken over
by all the unions. Some fund raising schemes were put in hand, including
the use of the Foleshill Picture Palace for a concert (the manager was a
supporter of the unions), but the unions were in a financial mess by the
end of the dispute. The Joint Council had little funds, and appealed
without success to the unions for funds. The LEU DC did however, con-
tribute £5 to the repair of Leckie's motor_cycle.29)
The employers played their final card. a week after the lock—out of
all the unions. Having taken steps that would abolish strong picketing,
or so they thought, for in fact as mentioned the demonstrations carried on
for another two weeks,the Executive Committee of the Eployers' Association
decided to act in concert and throw open the factories with the threat
that if the workers did not return they would get non—union labour to
permanently replace them. Varley sent out a circular which first dealt
with police protection:
"I am gratified to be able to inform you that the Police
Authorities in this City have now definitely ind.ertaken
to take strong steps with anr demonstrators who may
appear outside the works, so as to ensure that only
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'Peaceful picketing' shall in fact take place in
accordance with. the terms of the Trad.es Disputes Act
of 1906.
Similarly as regards the formation of processions and.
the escorting of workmen home from wori by crowds of
communists etc., the local Police Authorities have, I
understand, intimated their determination to prevent
individual intimidation to workmen either at the shops
or in their houses."
He then went on to say that all of the federated finns should. apply to
the Labour change on 9th May,
'9he object of this application, of course, being
to let each firm's own individual workpeople know
that the firm is in earnest in its determination to
carry on."
However, no new workers should be taken on until 11th May,
"So that in the interim your own particular craftsmen
may be given n opportunity of asking to come back
into your employ on the terms Bet forth in the poster
of the 1st May instant.
it is essential for the success of this scheme that
each firm should act promptly in accordance with the
suggestion set forth above and. take its own means to
let it be known amongst its own workpeople that jobs
are waiting for them provided they offer themselves
before Thursday morning, 11th May instant."
Finally, the letter spelt out what should. be the attitude of the firms
to any new non-union workers that were taken on to replace the locked
out workers. Varley maie it clear to the employers that
"You are authorised. by this Association to give a
definite undertaking to each of these new workpeople
as follows:-
'That notwithstanding the fact that they were not
in the employ of the Company prior to the present
dispute, as from the date of their engagement with
-the Company their position will be safeguarded by
the Company if it is proved that they are capable
of doing the particular work for which they are
engaged and as far as the state of trade from time
to time permits.'
In other word.s,any new hands who are engaged under the
above scheme will be guaranteed employment by your firm
under the conditions mentioned above and. will not be
liable to be displaced by the men who are unwilling to
accept employment on the terms suggested by the Bnployers."
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However, he concluded
"A united effort should be made by all Members of
their Association to get their own workpeople back
into the various shops." (130)
This approach was too much for one employer, for when Sir Alfred Herbert
received his copy of the circular letter,he wrote on it "This promise
is not to be made" next to the section which offered a safeguard to new
(131)
workers.	 Sir Alfred prided himself on relations with unions, and
was prepared to take his original workforce back. It became clear that
the way the employers would let it be known that jobs were to be filled
between the 9th May and 11 was through the foremen. That they did their
jobs successfully can be deduced from a list of complaints drawn up by
the AEtJ Lockout Committee. 	 It wanted all foremen to join the lock-out
because they were
"1. Supervising blackleg labour. 	 2. Working at the
tools since March 11th. 3. Leaving the works and
appealing to members at their homes to restart at
their respective shops under the sane conditions as
rejected by ballot vote of our members. 4. Calling
works meetings outside the gates for the purpose of
intimidating our members to return to work." (132)
The unions' response to the employers' initiative was to call out
their foremen members, withdraw their volunteer firemen and call out
those few members who were full time firemen at work. This last decision
led to protests by Nanville in the House of Commons, 'but the first ran
into difficulties, for in an unusual act of partisanship, the Midland
Daily Telegraph refused to publish the AEU advertisement calling out
foremen.	 Moreover, as we have seen there was confusion with the
national office over calling out foremen, and anyway most of them did
not respond. The role of foremen in keeping the work going for manage-
ment as well as persuading many men back in was most important. One
foreman who bothered to attend the DC meeting when asked was from the
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Rudge Whitworth. He reported. that he
"At present had some 30 females under him, previously
some 18 -to 20 setters up were employed but he had. no
men left in. There were about 120 machines and as
one broke down he transferred the women -to another.
On being asked who changed the Tools he replied the
women changed their own Tools." (134)
Not surprisingly, he was censored by the DC.
The attempt to get the men back by the 11th May was not immediately
successful.	 On 12th May Givens admitted that there were men who had
gone into the factories, but claimed that these were bad workmen and.
that 99% of skilled workers were still out. Nevertheless, it would
appear that from this date there was a small stream of people going
back. There was also a decline of morale, and a decline in the number
of people prepared to picket. On 16th Nay the Lockout Committee of the
LEtJ complained that
"There seens to be no one in charge at some of the
shops and the picketing system generally is far from
satisfactory."	 (135)
About a week later, it was complaining
"This Committee views with a1ar the lack of co—opera-
tion of other Societies with AEU as regards picket
duty and deplores the action of polishers in going
to work at the Triumph after pledging themselves to
stand solid with other Societies at yesterday's
demonstrations."	 (136)
Although the situation was deteriorating, the dispute was far from
lost, and there was no general return to work in May, though the AEU
Lockout Commit-tee commented on 31st May "There seemed to be a slight
increase in numbers started at one or two shops."	 But a greater
danger was of the other engineering unions going back. In fact an agree-
ment had been reached in principle, and this was seized upon by the local
employers; Varley wrote to his members on 22nd May
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"1 have to suggest that the fact that a Memorandum has
been arrived at with the 51 Engineering Unions (other
than the AEU) will form a strong point in argument , to
secure a considerable increase in the number of men,
being members of the various Unions including the AEtJ,
to resume work under the terms offered by the Enploy-
ers." (138)
The unions were aware of this threat, arid met on 24th May , to try to
get a local agreement to stay together. On the 23r d May Leckie had
urged a decision
"To show whether, in spite of what the Executives
might say, the unions of Coventry intended to
maintain that solidarity which had. been evidenced
during the recent diispute." (139)
This was achieved, at least on paper. A meeting of the full District
Committees of the fifteen unions involved in the Coventry area decided
"That no settlement of the Dispute be accepted in
this District unless the terms are satil,factory to
all the Unions involved." (140)
Peeling the dispute slipping away from them, the AEU DC decided
that all-out aggression was the only resort. A motion was brought
before sri aggregate meeting to widen the dispute:
"That our delegates to National Conference be
instructed to press that all our members including
public services (except Hospitals) be withdrawn
from all shops in the United Kingdom." (141)
It also wanted the existing war bonus consolidated in the basic rates,
a very unrealistic demand at that time. Orrell was unhappy with the
motion, though at the aggregate meeting he refused to say he supported
it or opposed it. An amendment that the union abide br the decision
of the forthcoming conference was beaten by a two to one majority.
Another motion, to have the dispute closed as soon as possible, was
ruled out of order, but it showed that there were some people who were
all for getting back to work. Nevertheless, the aggregate meeting,
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which was held. on 31st May, claimed an attendance of 6,000 AEU members,
which suggests that the large majority of AJ[J members were still
The motion that the Coventry delegates took to the National Conference
stood no chance of getting accepted, for the union had virtually run out
of money and could not afford to widen the dispute. 	 On May 27th it
decided to end all payments of benefit except to sick and superannuated
members, and this must have been another factor in encouraging men to go
back.	 The Rugby .A.EU, in opposition to Coventry, instructed its delegates
at the National Conference to support the decisions of the other unions,
and. if they decided to call the dispute off, they felt that the AEU should
d.c the same. Their spokesman criticised the Coventry decision in the
(143)local press.
The day after the aggregate meeting, a more down to earth incident
showed the state of morale of the locked—out workers. The Lockout
Committee minutes recorded that "Bro. Newgreen is in a state of nervous
collapse and cannot carry on his work as Chief picket," while there was
a report of the "serious position" at the Deasy, and non—union labour being
('44)driven into the Huniber in lorries.	 The next day there was a report
of a meeting of I{otchkiss workers that had agreed to resume work, of more
AETJ men going back at the Standard Canley plant, while the DC was informed
that the B.T.H. management was sending out batches of letters signed by
AEtJ members to the workforce urging a return.(145) This was the last
report of attempts by the Committee to keep up meaningful pickets.
Even at this stage, while it could be said that there were serious
gaps in the ranks and defeat was virtually inevitable, the majority of
AETJ members were staying together and obeying the instructions of their
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local leaders, But then occurred two events that turned defeat into
disaster.	 On the 2nd of June most of the other unions decided to return
to work. The A.EU, -the Boilermakers, and the Foundry Workers were left
on their own.
	 On the day the other workers went back to work, the kEtJ
EC decided -to call a ballot of their members to find if they were willing
to carry on with the struggle, and Brownlie, the President of the union,
publicly urged members to vote for an end to the stoppage and an acceptance
of the employers' tens. 	 It could be argued that this was inevitable, at
least as seen from Head. Office, but it persuaded many workers, who needed
little persuasion, that the ballot would be a foregone conclusion, and
therefore they went back to work alongside the members of the other unions,
prior to the announcement of the result of the ballot.
Local AELT officers and activists were furious, but could do little.
The DC passed a motion to
"Strongly condemn the action of Brother Brownlie in
recommending acceptance as likely to demoralise our
members."	 (146)
while the Lockout Committee felt that the other unions had broken their
agreement that all Coventry unions would wait for a common settlement,
and so ended the Joint Executive Lockout Committee. From about 6th June,
men began to return in large numbers. An aggregate meeting was held on
the 7th and agreed to hold out - "The meeting closed in perfect order and
apparent harmony" - but on the same day the DC heard of branch secretaries
and branch officers taking their men back en mass 147) The Lockout Comm-
ittee was reduced to passing a motion hoping that no members of its
committee would go back prematurely. The ballot showed a large majority
in favour of acceptance of the management terms, and. the lock-out officially
ended on 14th June.
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Just as Coven-try appears to have been unusual in having had. such
lively pickets and demonstrations, and. in uniting strikers and unemployed,
so it was unusual in seeing such a scramble back to work on the part of
AEU members in the ten days before the official end. of the dispute.
According to the President of the Eployers'Association, the situation in
Covëntxy compared to other districts was "exceedingly good. ,,(l48)
The final mistake of -the union was the attempt to discipline those
members who went back before 14th June. The AEtJ DC drew up a scale of
penalties:
"Defaulters up to 3 June to be excluded
Members returning June 5,6,7,8, fined £.2
Members returning June 9,10, fined. £1
Members returning June 12 and. 13, fined 10/-
Apprentices to be censured only. " ( 149)
On top of this, members who encouraged others to go back were to be sus-
pended from various benefits, depending on the circumstances, while those
who refused to reply to summonses from -the DC were to be fined 5/- in
addition. But members who had borne thirteen weeks without wages and
had been decisively beaten were in no position or inclination to be fined,
and the action of the DC amounted to striking as hard a blow against the
union as the employers had done.
Nevertheless, the DC was intent on its policy of discipline. It
tried to have excluded all branch officers who went back early, but this
was outside its powers and a matter for the union BC, which refused to
support it. The DC protested
"As in the near future more bitter fights with the
employers are certain, the maintenance of discipline
until the end is absolutely necessary and cannot be
maintained. if the Officers of the Society cannot be
relief upon to maintain that discipline in a personal
sense."	 (150)
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A motion that unless the EC allow the DC to expel these officers the
DC should resign was defeated by 11 votes to 10; clearly there was a
strong school of thought on the DC which put discipline first and the
interests of the union as a whole second.
It appears that the discipline prograjme broke down under the apathy
of the membership.	 There was also active opposition; the DC had -to
consider a situation
"Of Branch secretaries failing to send any returns
of defaulting members and boasting that they did not
intend to do so."
	
(151)
It was clear that some branch secretaries had. left the union; in September
14 of them had failed to send any reports to the union General Office,
so presumably the DC did not have complete records of defaulters. The
minute books show that notwithstanding this, some 2,627 members were
dealt with for defaulting at one time or another during the lock_out.52
It is possible that the large majority of these had failed only to the
extent of goizg back a few days or a week early, but it is also possible,
and indeed likely under the circumstances, that the majority left the
union rather than pay the fines. At the end of the year membership was
down to 5,388 effective members plus 1,35 0 unemployed, sick and superaim-
uated.	 This compared with 11,314 a year earlier. Attempts to
discipline foremen met with very little success for nearly all of them
refused to attend DC meetings when called or to pay fines.
The end of the lock-out was the turning point in the fortunes for
the AE(J, for it began a prolonged loss of membership and importance. In
December 1922 the DC decided to invest some of its small funds in photo .-
graphs of the membership of the DC "As a memento of the past abnormal year
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in the history of Trade Unionism in this District.tV(154) The photograph
recorded the end of craft unionism on a mass basis in the city. 	 1922
saw the last attempt at effective trade union action for engineers in the
District for many years. Although trade improved from 1923 onwards a
combination of victimiation on the part of the employers and disenchant-.
ment on the part of many engineers combined to send membership figures
down to a small fraction of the 1920 membership. By August 1923 member-
ship was 4,233, and by the beginning of 1925 it was 3,035, and. it remained
below this figure for almost every month of the following nine years.
A major casualty of the lock-out was the shop stewards' movement.
There were widespread complaints from a number of different unions that
many firms vic-timised active trade unionists by refusing to taie them back
to work, and it is true that it took several months for the bulk of locked
out workers to get their jobs back, as employers told them that trade con-.
d.itions did not allow for -them to be taken back. A number of complaints
went to the Ehiployers' Association, but this body gave a classic example
of how -to shelter behind procedure. It claimed it could not take up and
investigate a claim of victimisation unless this was first made by the
worker concerned to his own employer. But as the worker had been dis-
missed by his employer, or not re-engaged, he was in no position to use
procedure for it did not cover ex-employees. 	 As a result, the Eiployers'
-	 (156)Association refused to recognise the existence of victimisation.
Once it was clear that employers had been able to keep many shop stewards
out of the factories there was very little likelihood of new stewards com-
ing forward. The shop stewards movement ceased to exist for just over a
decade. The Workers Union was in an even worse position, and. its stewards
disappeared as well. 	 Effective workshop organisation became limited to a
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handful of unions such as the Patternmakers, Sheet Metal Worker and
Vehicle Builders, whose membership was not greatly affected by the
lock—out.
The situation could have been worse, for shortly after the lock—out,
attempts were made, possibly by both workers and employers, to finish off
the AEU for good and to substitute a "non—political" body in its place.
It was reported to the DC that ex—members of the AEU were trying to set
up another union; the chairman of the DC stating "That it was common
knowledge in -the town that a new Society was being formed." The DC was
able to interview some of the people concerned, and one told them
"That the proposed Society was to be confined to the
Engineering Industry but he understood it -to be a
sick and dividend Society, the idea of a new trade
union having gone west." (157)
&i attempt to register a new union with the Registrar of Friendly Societies
failed, and the new sick and dividend society did not flourish. Eiployers
may well have been the instigators of this scheme, for just after the end
of the lock—out the Executive of the CDEEA discussed the situation;
"The Secretary suggested that the present was an
opportune time for considering a scheme for engin-
eering workers somewhat on the lines of the LBS
(Foreman's Mutual Benefit Society) so their inter-
ests might be safeguarded against (a) unemployment,
(b) incapacity, and (c) old age, or in other words
the provision of ordinary friendly society benefits
by a Union supported by the Ep1oyers without any
political interests whatever." (158)
The fact that an attempt was made to put such a society into existence
suggests that there were some employers concerned to see the complete
collapse of the kEU in the city and. its replacement by a benevolent Society.
However, there is no evidence that the CDEEA took airy definite action or
a common position on this, and it is unlikely that the employers would want
to make such attempts to completely eradicate the AEU when the lock—out
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had given them all they wanted and. established them in a strong and.
dominant position.	 In earlier discussions, the Executive of the CDEEPJ.
had consistently denied that it was trying to smash trade unionism, and.
it was aware of the benefits to employers of having trade union officers
to negotiate with in the event of a dispute, rather than have to deal with
local rank and file leaders. 	 Nevertheless, if it wanted. unions to
survive, it wanted them as weak as possible, and were extremely ratified
by the outcome of the lock—out.
The lock—out had dealt a severe blow to all engineering unions, and
to the A.EU in particular. However, it does appear that the defeat Was
disproportionately heavy in Coventry and. the consequences in terms Of
effective trade unionism particularly severe. This was partly due to
the good. organisation, attention to detail, and united front shown by the
local employers, and their unity contrasted with the divisions and disunity
on the side of the unions. Coventry employers stood to gain a lot from a
successful outcome, and may have prosecuted. the lock—out more vigorously
then employers in other areas.
The lack of unity and preparation shown bythe unions, particularly
the AETJ, must have contributed to the defeat, but this may not have been
vital, as the existence of separate bodies running the dispute, while it
exposed clearly a lack of unity, existed because forces like the unemployed
movement and the left were strong enough at the time to have a significant
impact, and the work of the Joint Council prevented the struggle from
crumbling earlier than it would have done.
iViore specific features of the struggle in Coventry were the very high
level of unemployment in Coventry coupled with fears for the future of the
motor industry. The city had seen short lived booms in industry, and had
also seen industries such as ribbon making and. cycle making lost to the
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city, so it was possible for employers and the local press to exploit
the fear that trade union militancy would drive out the motor industry
as well.
The newness of much of Coventry's industry, with the rapid expansion
of the industrial base in the war meant that the city also had a new and
inexperienced labour force and. labour movement. Workers had come from
all over the country to find work in Coventry, often from outside the
engineering industry, and some remained on after the war. But even for
skilled workers the city had no sort of tradition of collective militancy
that would. be able to sustain it in a prolonged. encounter with employers.
The only other major disputes in the city in engineering had been the
strike for shop steward. recognition in 1917 and. the embargo strike in
1918, in the peculiar circumstances of the war where it was clear to all
that whatever the outcome of the strikes they would not be allowed. to last
as long as the 13 weeks of the AEU lock-out. The traditions of struggle
in the city were mainly confined to craftsmen and concerned. almost exclu-
sively with local battles either for the district rate or for higher piece-
work prices. Because of the small scale nature of the industry up to
about 1910, and because of the multiplicity of shops and skills after 1910,
and the early acceptance of piece-work, the craft tradition produced. small
scale disputes, boycotts, works to rule, and local action at shop level.
There was no tradition of large numbers of workers, either as a class or
as a craft engaging in struggles that cut across the different factories.
Thus in 1922 the city's trade unionists had no experience of the sort of
struggle they needed to win in such difficult circumstances.
The years 1917 to 1922 had seen tremendous changes in the labour
movement in Coventry, the most significant of which was the development
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of a body of hundreds of activists, either as branch secretaries, DC
members or shop stewards. For the most part, stewards failed, to meet
the demands of the lock-out ., particularly when it caine to the organising
of pickets. This was a reflection on the immaturity of the shop steward
movement as a whole. Most stewards had. only a few years experience, and
that was confined. to their own shops. There were few active workshop
committees, and. no autonomous local organisation. As we have seen,
leadership of the shop stewards remained at first with the CEJC, and as
this lost influence, with the different DCs. The practice of holding
stewards meetings under the auspices of the CEJC seems to have died out
after the ware and meetings, if any were held, were under the auspices
of different unions. Even the most organised. union, the AE[J, neglected
its stewards movement after the war. By 1922 the stewards in many instan-
ces were unable to run effective pickets at their own workplaces.
Had. there been a strong trade union leadership at district level the
limitations of the shop steward. movement would not have been so important,
but the history of the CEJC was one of splits and. disagreements, and although
various federations continued. throughout the 1920s and 30s they were no
longer an important centre of power, any more than the Trades Council was
after the outbreak of war. No union body in Coventry could surmount the
problem of the AEU nationally following a different policy to that of other
engineering unions. The formation of the A.EU did. create a strong union
in the city, but in 1920 it was strong on paper only, and still hostile to
the THU. The AEU was a focus for militancy after the war, and the DC was
prepared. to give a lead on struggles against employers, but within an in-
creasingly unrealistic craft framework which could countenance the disas-
trous step of driving thousands of workers out of the union because they
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were regarded as having failed it. The lock—out brought out the worst
in the AEU for it resurrected the tradition of fighting a dispute by
forcing the membership to individually take a stand, by neglecting
organisation, by having distant relations with other parties in the
dispute, and by punishing its own members but not the employers. In
an engineering city like Coventry, the lock—out was virtually a division
of the city into opposing classes, but although some of the AEU DC were
well aware of this, only the revolutionaries argued for organisation on
broad class lines.
Thus the particular severity of the defeat in Coventry in 1922 had
much to do with the existence of a new, inexperienced trade union movement
in a centre of advanced engineering, and the failure of the movement -to
provide the organisation and. leadership needed to survive a difficult
economic situation. This situation was a reflection of the general
immaturity of the labour movement in the city, and not just an industrial
weakness. The city's labour traditions hail more or less started from
scratch with the engineering industry, and their development had been ham-
pered by the uneven and peculiar nature of that industry together with the
social composition of the city.
Even in the 1920s there were still a large number of small specialist
workshops in Coventry. They existed alongside big factories, which had
generated a need for small specialist producers, and stimulated the growth
of small workshops, and there was always the prospect of small workshops
developing rapidly into big ones. Thus there was an avenue out of wage
labour arid into independent production or servicing, although this escape
route became more hazardous as the years went by. Inside the factories,
particularly the medium sized ones, there was scope for a skilled man to
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become a foreman or technical worker, and. we have seen the importance
the employers attached to foremen as instruments of influence over
workers. There was thus a route into positions of influence away from
-the struggles over piece rates, and this plus the dream of independent
workshops were important factors in taking experience away from the
trade union movement, and, perhaps more importantly, creating expectations
that were at odds with the need for unity and solidarity.
(160)
At the same time Coventry was still close to rural life. 	 It
was not part of a major industrial conurbation, but an isolated industrial
centre which served as a magnet for workers from Warwickshire, Leicester-
shire, and Northamptonshire. 	 Many of the new jobs that had been created
before and. during the war were filled by new workers, new to engineering
and to trade unionism, and without the background in industrial work that
would serve to strengthen trade union traditions. The seasonal nature
of the engineering trades in the city prolonged the link between town and.
country, for workers could try to take jobs in rural areas during lay off s,
or return to their families.	 The period, of greatest inactivity in the
motor industry, and the time of extended holidays when work was short was
co—incidental with the harvest season in rural areas. This link with the
country meant that in 1922 there were some workers in the city still in the
process of adaptation to urban industrial life, people who were unlikely
to understand the importance of the managerial functions dispute. In 1921
the population of Coventry was 5 greater than it had been twenty years
-	 -	 -	 (1
earlier, while the population of Foleshill grew by over 44% in ten years.
Some of -this increase, though it is impossible to say how much, was due to
migration from the rural areas close at hand.
The city was full of young people. The average age of men and women
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in Coventry in 1921 was 29 years; it was even lower in Foleshill - 26.
There were twice as many men in the age bracket 15 -to 19 as were in the
bracket 50 to 54. The majority of men and women were unmarried.(162)
The large numbers of single young people present in the city may well have
been a source of strength to bodies like the CUWC, but it also meant that
the labour movement was lacking in experience and there was the danger that
unions and the Labour Party would be too dominated by older trade unionists,
out of touch with young people. The AEU and the WEJ seemed to have avoided
this danger, but the average age of the DC of the AEU was about 40, and
although this was probably lower than in most other AEU Dcs, it was still
significantly higher than the average age in the city. The existence of
such a large proportion of young people in Coventry was not unrelated to
-the emergence of a group of young revolutionaries and trade union militants,
but their lack of experience may well have been another factor in explaining
their tendency to over—estimate revolutionary potentials.
The lack of maturity of the labour movement was shown by the weakness
of the Labour Party in this period, as shown in the previous chapter.
With little working class political activity in the city, workers were
much more likely to be influenced by the local press and. local leaders,
as well as the national opinion formers. As the local press was hostile
to Labour and. suspicious of trade unionism, its influence worked against
the interests of the labour movement.
In some circumstances, a confrontation like the lock—out could lead
to a rapid change in outlook on -the part of working people, and a sudden
development of ideas of class struggle and. militancy. But in Coventry
the lock—out took place after several years of acute depression and. falling
prices, with employers having time to prepare the groundwork carefully,with
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an eye -to exploiting differences in the workforce, and following a year
of retreat by -the unions. In such circumstances it was not surprising
that the conflict brought the latent weaknesses in the labour movement out.
The lock—out and its aftennath of victimisation and loss of union
membership was a heavy defeat for labour in Coventry. Between 1917 and
1922 there was some tension within the trade union movement between what
were broadly two schools of thought; those that for the most part accepted
the trade unions as they found them and accepted the leading role of the
different District Committees and Executives, and those who were influenced
by the Soviet Union and wished to construct a new trade union movement based
on Workers' Committees, and. the shop stewards' movement.	 Although the
second school of thought was weak in Coventry, the tension could be con-
siderable, as the confrontation between Leckie and Givens at the A33 DC
meeting in the lock—out showed. Although both sides could be negative,
the general opposition of the two views was valuable in developing political
and trade union policies and practice. The lock—out, however, meant the
end of ideas of direct action, the end of the shop stewards and workers'
committees as viable bodies, and. the end of the claims of the revolutionaries
to represent a significant section of the labour movement. The collapse of
the revolutionary alternative can be seen in the collapse of the early
Communist Party in Coventry. Thery had already left the city, and had to -
flee the country, going to the Soviet Union. Leckie left soon after the
lock—out, to become a Party functionary in London. Dingley, one of the
oldest of the group, suffered a virtual physical and mental breakdown after
the extreme exertions of the previous six years, while Jackson had to leave
the area in an attempt to find work. Some drifted out of the Party
because of disagreements in policy, while others, such as Thompson and
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and. Cresswell, made names for themselves in the Labour Party. Not everyone
left, but the Party went into a decline that reflected the decline in the
fortunes of the left in the trade union movement.
Thus the unreformed. traditional trade union movement survived, and.
some of the features -that the revolutionaries had attacked were strength-
ened. With the collapse of workplace power, what influence there was
left in the unions became concentrated on the District Committees, and the
full time officials who serviced them. The focus of power in the unions
moved outside the factories, and unions became more remote and. less relevant
to shop floor workers. This development was encouraged by employers, who
would hold any number of local meetings, but would oppose attempts to
strengthen unionism at work.
Removed from the workshops, the AEXJ DC remained trapped with its
craft outlook in isolation. The new machine tools that went into the
workshops after 1922 were worked by men with few or no skills, but without
a workshop movement the ALU DC could avoid the implications of this. As
a result it was slow to shed exclusive attitudes in the revival of the
unions in the 1930s.
The relationship between the Labour Party and the unions changed. as
well. From being the minor partner, the Labour Party quickly established
itself as the major partner, in terms of winning new votes and members in
the late l920s while the unions were still losing members. The links
between the two sides of the movement became weaker, with the Party slowly
building up its own core of leadership that was separate from the leadership
in the unions. While there was always an overlapping of personnel between
the two sides, this became less strong as time went by, or rather trade
unionists who became active in the Labour Party found they were likely to
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have to curtail their tra4e union activity. As the trade unions hasi
stifled the growth of the Party there was obviously some benefit in
this change of relationship, but the change was from a relationship that
stifled. the Party to one that threatened to stifle the unions, or at
least made it possible for the Party to grow arid. foxulate a policy for
Coventry, without reference to the mass of trasle unionists, arid in the
absence of a dtnamio industrial movement. This separation of industrial
and political struggle meant that both sides saw limits to their actions
and. narrow views about their roles.
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CHAPT FIVE
The Unions in Defeat
This chapter covers the years after the lock—out and before the
revival of trade unionism. It shows what employers were able to achieve
once union strength had. been broken, and how changes in workplace produc-
tion methods served to push unions into isolation and minority represerita-
tion. It also deals with the General Strike and its afteimath in Coventry,
and. the self imposed isolation of the Communist Party from the official
trade union movement. This isolation of the left occurred while the
Labour Party was emerging as the dominant force in the labour movement.
Non—union Workshops
At the end of the Lock—out -the AEtJ District Committee had insisted.
on "the maintenance of discipline until the end,"	 and. had. thereby
hastened that end by encouraging thousands of its members to desert -the
union rather than pay the fines imposed. on them. In August 1922 the
District Committee came within one vote of resigning en mass(in protest at
-the alleged failure of the ecutive Council to deal firmly enough with d.e-
-	 -	 (2)	 -faulting strikers. 	 But in January 1924 the Committee agreed. to press
the EC to treat the fines -that had. been levied. on excluded members as
arrears in order that -they could. be
 paid off in instalments, as an incen-
tive for men to rejoin the union.	 This period marked the reluctant
acceptance of the DC of the new constraints that operated.
The end. of the lock—out was the signal for thousands to leave the
union, and. this desertion continued. in large numbers for several years
afterwards. Whole branches disappeared., and as a result estimates of
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union membership for 1922 are suspect. A number of figures were issued
in 1923 which showed. that the alaiming fall in membership was continuing.
In February of that year Givens reported that membership had. fallen from
nearly 14,000 in July 1920 to 5,900 and. that half of that loss had. occurred.
in the previous nine months.	 I'Iationally, the union had. lost 30 per cent
of its membership, but in Coventry the loss was 57 per cent. This seemed.
bad, but membership figures for the next few months were substantially
lower and. suggest that either there was another sudden outflow which was
unlikely as there was no serious dispute on at the time, or that the figures
were being reassessed. more realistically. In any case, by August 1923 the
figure given was	 Membership kept declining throughout that year
and the next, and. by the beginning of 1925 was down to 3,035 and went below
3,000 a few months later. It then stabilised. at or below this figure,
representing a loss of 80 per cent from the time of amalgamation in 1920. (6)
The implication of this collapse in membership was that trade union
activity was disappearing from most parts of' the factories. Union member-
ship was confined to a small minority, and effective organisation either
non—existent or in small pockets. 	 In 1925 the District Committee inter-
viewed a number of union members to find. out conditions in the workplaces,
itself an indication of the union's weakness. Organisation was shown to be
in a sorry state. At the Triumph Cycle Company less than 5 per cent of
the workers were union members. At Maudslay Motor Company membership was
8 out of 60 in the Fitting shop and 6 out of 60 in the Machine shop. At
Swift 85 per cent of the Toolroom was unionised., but organisation was very
weak in the rest of the factory. At Coventry Gauge and Tool, membership
was 10 out of 140. At the Rover, half of the Toolroom were members, but
there were only 3 in the Fitting shop.17) Other reports were similar but in
a number of small and. a few large factories there was virtually no membership,
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and. no one prepared. to report. The shop stewards movement, weak in 1922,
had all but disappeared. In October 1922 the DC put the best face on it
by resolving
"That we revert -to the old system of shop stewards and
appoint such from the membership in the various shops,
without in any way notifying the employers upon the
matter."	 (8)
This was setting the clock back to pre—war days, and as then, with a few
exceptions even this system did not work effectively.
Membership figures for the Workers Union in Coventry do not exist,
but it is likely that it was at least as hard hit. In the West Midlands
as a whole the union lost ninety per cent of its membership in the
By contrast, the smaller craft unions fared much better. The Amalgamated
Society of Woodworkers, which had only a few hundred members in the city,
did not lose members in the early 192Os, and. gained a few towards the end
of the decac1e. 	 The National Union of Vehicle Builders saw a slight
decline in 1922/3, but membership rose in the mid—l92Os. About five per
cent of total union membership was in Coventry, which always had the lar-
gest branch in the country. In April 1923 it was reported. that there had
been a "Large influx of new men" which 'has given the branch much anxiety"
which suggests that some defaulters from the AXJ were trying to switch to
the NVB.(11) The Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers Society which only had.
two large branches, one in Birmingham and one in Coventry, lost a few hundred
members in 1922 but made them up within a year. It was still able to main-
tain some small closed shop areas throughout the 192Os.2)
Because the AEU and. the WU aspired to organise across the city they
were more widely. stretched and more vulnerable to attack. They depended on
large numbers of members to be effective and the loss of a certain proportion
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of membership in a workplace, by making the unions ineffective, encouraged.
many others to drop out. The AEU was mainly craft-membership, and. could.
survive better than the 1d13, but in the mid 1920s its membership wa only a
few hundred. more than the NUVB. The employers' onslaught had led to mariy
people leaving the unions, but while coercion and victimisation undoubtedly
existed, it would be wrong to conclude that the weakness of the unions was
an indication that life in the factories had become much harder.
Despite the decline in the unions between the lock-out and the general
strike, there is no evidence to show that there was a widespread attack upon
wages. The national reductions were imposed, but may well have been made
up by increased piece-work production. There is also no evidence of a
widespread attack on working conditions, though this happened. at some places.
An AEU member giving evid.ence -to the DC in November 1923 said of the toolroom
"It was dangerous to talk in the shop and he knew very
few of our members there as it appeared to him that they
could. not trust one another and therefore they were very
secretive...
Qu.es-tioned as to the conditions in the production shops,
he replied that he understood that they were very bad.
The piece-work prices fixed. by the firm were such that
many men were badly in debt, and in some cases £10 to
£12 debt was shown on the tickets." (13)
A report from Sterling Metal in 1925 claimed. that "the foreman used the whip
all round." Most of the reports, however, were conspicuous for the absense
of complaints about bullying, harassment or bad working conditions.
The report from the production shops at Triumph Cycle stressed the "complete
absence of bullying by the foremen and the shop was much more go as you
please in character than most shops." 	 At Maud.slay conditions were "fairly
easy", at Rover conditions were "good", at Lea & Francis "fairly comfortable,"
while no complaints were made in a number of other reports.(15) What the
reports did. show was that moderately high wages were being earned. in a
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number of places. Despite poor or non—existent union organisation, the
large majority of skilled, workers were getting at least the District rate,
and. often through piece—work and. bonus substantially more. The extension
of piece—work meant that the district rate was often irrelevant. 	 In 1925
the district rate for a skilled man should have been 56s a week.6) In
some places the hourly rates paid to workers were well below this, but the
piece—work earnings were well above. The Triumph Cycle Co. seems to have
been particularly well paid, for the report from there stated
"The rates paid to Machinists were abnormally low, men
of 23 or 25 being rated. at Gd but their earnings under
the piece—work system were up to £5. Boys of 17 were
earning £3. Drillers were getting £6 to £7, while
frame filers were getting from £6 to £10 per week."
However, this may have been a little exceptional, for the reporter went on
to warn:
"He did not know what would. occur in the future because
the Head Rate—fixer had been discharged. There had
recently been a 20 per cent reduction in the fitting
shop but the men were still earning the same." (17)
S o&
The report/that the toolset-ters were on time rates, and although being
paid. above the district rate, and. getting a bonus, nevertheless were com-
plaining of being worse off -than production workers. Although wages
were a little lower in most of the other factories to give reports, they
were all well above the district rate, except at Sterling Metals. At
several factories, toolroorn workers got about £4 per week, while production
workers could get anything from one—third to over two—thirds on top of the
basic rate. The major complaints were not about the level of pay, but
about the inconsistencies in rating jobs, and. the consequent insecurity.'8
With the union powerless, wages were negotiated. either individually or in
groups or gangs with the ratefixers and the foremen.
While the degree of coercion and. anti—union suspicion should not be
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underestimated, it is clear that many employers were, while in a position
of strength, providing good. working cond.itions and good wages to their
workers, and that this was a big disincentive to become active in the unions.
The lock-out in 1922 had. had its aim at reducing labour costs, and union
interference. This did. not mean reducing earnings. The money was there
provided workers lifted restrictions on overtime in particular, accepted
boys on men's machines, removed output restrictions, allowed semi-skilled
men on more jobs, and skilled men to move from department to department.
The lock-out had been a defeat for union attempts to restrict management
initiatives, but did. not lead to a reduction in living standaxds for those
who remained in jobs. Moreover, for nearly all of the period unemploy-
ment was low, and at some times there was a shortage of skilled labour.
The AEU had a lot of unemployed members throughout 1922, but the number
fell quickly in the winter of that year. Orrell reported that January
1923 was the
"Best month for a considerable period, and many of our
members who had unfortunately been unemployed for the
past two years have secured jobs." (19)
Throughout the year there were several hundred ABU members signing the
vacancy book, but in February 1924 Orrell reported:
"\xrther improvement in trade in this division. Many
finns find it impossible to obtain the highest skilled
labour, and one hopes that this will be the time for
the skilled man to come into his own." (20)
itt the beginning of 1925 Orrell was commenting:
"l?he motor trade in Coventry is as busy as can possibly
be, but the worst feature of this business is that one
has got to work like a Trojan for seven or eight months
and then be idle for the remainder of the year." (21)
A year later he was saying:
"The motor industry has undoubtedly had a most succ-
essful year, and at the moment seems to be in a
happier position than for some long period. Our
unemployment figures appear to be lower than ever." (22)
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In these circumstances it might have been thought possible fox' the
unions to regain at least some of their lost members, but as already men-
tioned, they carried on losing members. The AEIT ran a number of special
cañpaigns, but all of -them were unsuccessful. The first was in July 1923
when a Back to the Unions week was held. Not a single member rejoined,
and Orrell admitted that "there was no real enthusiasm exhibited at the
meetings.tt(23)	 In June 1924 the National Organiser, Fit-ton, came to the
city and. took part in a propaganda fortnight, but reported that
'!Much apathy is d.isp1ayec1 by the workers towads the AEtJ,
and. there are many d.ifficulties in the way of thoroughly
organising Coventry District." (24)
The District Committee minutes recorded that "Meetings appeared to have
failed through lack of energy on the part of members in getting ex-members
to attend..1(25) The Executive Council of the LEU did grant concessions
for a limited period for returning ex-members, but these were not taken up.
Further campaigns took place in early 1926, and after the threateued lock-
out of engineering workers did not take place in March 1926 Orrell felt he
saw signs of change:
"The recent threatened lockout has given a shock to all
eligible members, with the result that there has been a
remarkable exhibition of common fellowship, an inrush of
new members and a revival of a fighting spirit." (26)
This was a considerable exaggeration; only a few dozen workers joined the
union. It is probable that the CDEEL assessment of the mood of Coventry
workers was more accurate at this date, for it complained against the EF
policy of threatening a lock-out. The representative from Herbert's
claimed that because wages in Coventry were higher than in most other
centres, workers were satisfied, and as they were not complaining, they
should not be faoed with a lock_out.(27)
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that employers had been
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successful, through the use of the lock—out, in breaking down what they
saw as restrictive labour practices that constituted. a barrier to the
efficient use of labour and. a reduction in costs. 	 ce these restrictive
practices had been done away with, wages could be allowed to rises provided
the rises reflected increases in productivity. 	 These ind.ividualised. and
piecemeal increases kept the work±rce relatively contented. Moreover,
once union restrictions became impossible, there was little incentive to
stay in the union, for the imposition of union policy, if possible, would
have meant a res-riction on wages. Also a developed piecework system
meant that workers supervised themselves to a considerable extent, and. no
bullying and. harsh discipline was required. In other words, after the
lock—out, some employers saw -that a system of high wages and high output
was the best way of keeping the unions outside the gates, and the economic
conditions of the motor industry meant that this policy took firmest root
in Coventry. Thus William Morris, when referring to the acquisition of
the Hotchkiss works, wrote "A low wage is the most expensive method of
producing. A moderately high wage is the cheapest," (28) while A.P.Young,
President of Coventry Liberals, and managing director of BTH at Rugby, also
wrote
"High wages, when rightly applied to ensure that value
is obtained for the money expenses, is a right and sound.
principle that is likely to lead to success." (29)
Morris, of courses combined his high wage policy with fierce opposition to
unions and the fostering instead of social clubs. The success of the
employers after 1922 showed how difficult it was to struggle for the defence
of union practices which were not firmly rooted, and. the speed with which
many workers adjusted to non—union work showed that their commitment to the
union had been very limited.
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Immediately after the war over-capitalisation and speculation in
the motor ind.ustry had exacerbated the slump of 1920, but by 1922 car
sales were picking up and. they grew every year throughout the decade.
By 1927 total production of vehicles was three times the 1922 figi.ire.'
The motor trade was still a risky business, but for the companies that
survived, prospects were good. Provided -that better use of resources
allowed the companies to sell at the new low prices, there was a good
market and a good profit. Increased production necessitated reorganisa-
tion in the factories. There was a move away from organising a factory
around the different sorts of machines, to organising it to fit in with
the different stages of production.	 ll mass production was a charac-
teristic of only the very large suppliers of cheap cars in the period
before the Second World War, but batch production and. the reorganisation
to accommodate production on an assembly line basis began in the 1920s,
particularly with engines and accessories.
	
In Coventry, a good
example of what could. be done by way of increasing production and reorg-
anising the method and system of work was seen when Norris took over the
Hotchkiss works. This had changed from armaments to motor engines after
the war, and Morris Motors had been its major customer. Morris explained
why it was purchased:
"I only buy a concern when they tell me they cannot
produce enough of the article in question for our pro-
gramme.	 The Hotchkiss Co., for instance, said they
could not produce more than 300 engines from their
Coventry factory. So I purchased the concern 12
months ago. Already, by replanning the shops, by
putting on an extra shift and by saving space every-
where, we have produced 600 engines a week out of the
identical cubic space. We are now extending this plant
to produce three times this number." (32)
Morris was successful, for by December 1924 -the plant was producing 1,200
engines a week, less than two years after the factory had been taken over.
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Frank Woollard. was the senior engineer responsible for reorganising the
works, and he explained, the reasons for his success. The major principle
was the establishment of continuous or flow production, withas much work
as possible being done on the engine within the one building, rather than
components being sent to one or more different factories for various pro-
cesses. This allowed, for the planned flow of production8
"The idea of continuous flow must be present from the
design and raw material stages up to and. even beyond the
sales stage." (33)
The layout of the works was arranged. round an assembly line for the
cylinder blocks which arrived from the foundry. The only time the blocks
were manually handled. was when they were taken off the lorries. For the
rest of their journey round the factory they were on elevators or track,
and did not touch the floor. The major new machinery in the factory,
which at the time was claimed to be imique, wa,s a cylinder block machine,
which was
An aggregation of simple machines attached to a continuous bed, a
continuous table, and a common control shaft to time the 53
different operations." (34)
The cylinder blocks were turned from the castings into completed blocks
by the men working the different parts of the machine complex at the rate
of one every four minutes. Several sub—assembly lines were geared to the
main line.	 Inspection after each operation was replaced by inspection of
the finished product, and this reduced the need for skilled men as did
the abolition of a machine shop. To maximise production, the factory
went over to a three shift system, and production went on for about 125
hours a week. Even the mens' 'Mess room" was reorgariised on a continuous
flow system, and a conveyor service of meals established.
Only maintenance and toolroom workers were unaffected by this
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reorganisation. Throughout the rest of the factory only semi-skilled
labour was required. Much of the work became routine repetition, as
Woollard. acknowledged:
"Repetitive work can be made more interesting, and. one
way of doing this is to give the men a change of scene.
By changing men round the machines they are not only given
a great interest, but they become more useful men, and. that
is one way in which this matter will probably be tackled,..
Machine minders with complicated machines develop a real
interest in their work, d that helps them." (35)
The factory waS free from unionism, and. from industrial disputes. Woollard.
felt that this was due to the way the work was organised;
"Payment by results and. honouring unwritten laws between
employer and employed, together with reasonably comfort-
able surroundings, would appear to be the solution of
the labour difficulty." (36)
Work satisfaction was likely by -the fact "That the hours are short, that
the men get plenty of time off and they have plenty of money to spend."
Discipline did not have to be strict; the men were allowed to smoke on
the job, which was an irinova-tion. Woollard saw the new system of work
and payment as creating its own discipline, as this lyrical passage shows:
'echanised movement of the work-piece are possibly
even more of moral than of physical value, notwith-
standing the fact that it is the physical help they give
that makes the moral value possible. The mechanised
movement is a metronome which beats out time for the
whole of the works. It does its work quietly, and effi-
ciently without argument or any of the old-time bluster
which was, erroneously, supposed to be necessary to activity
in the factory. If used wisely, it sets a pace which in
itself helps to maintain: it discovers weak spots in the
organisation and shows up inequalities in method which, once
visible, good. management quickly remedy. It is beneficial
in redressing injustices to the overworked by urging those
who do less than their share." (37)
Thus the workers become the instruments of the machines. 	 It is hard -to
imagine a description of a workplace that could be more at odds with the
tredi-tional craft union view of the skilled worker in his authority in the
workplace, and. the reorganisation at the Hotchkiss, renamed Morris Engines,
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shows why Coventry employers had. fought so vigorously to d.efeat union
practices. These practices were not particularly strong in the city,
but were still an obstacle to the extension of mass manufacture that was
urgently required in the vehicle industry at the time. The Hotchkiss
reorganisation is a fairly extreme exemple of the way things were moving;
at the time it was regarded. as being in adizance of the rest of the industry.
But in the next decade, many large scale producers went through a similar
reorganisation, in Coventry particularly Armstrong—Whitworth and Armstrong-
Sid.d.eley, Standard. and. Jaguar, while those companies that lacked. the
resources or the space to follow them (such as Singer and. Rover), found
themselves in crisis. A few specialist or quality companies, like Daimler,
avoided. major reorganisation, but even there there were a number of changes
in the work method.
For semi—skilled workers new to the industry, the work at companies
like Morris Engines had many attractions. Of course, the fact that manage-
ment arrogated all decisions to itself ensured that there would. always be
some form of conflict between the workers and the employer, but much of the
union concern to protect the rights of skilled workers was irrelevant, while
some of it was hostile to the interests of the semi— and unskilled worker.
The AETJ in particular was out of touch with workplace realities for most of
the inter—war period. Its appeal was almost exclusively limited. to the
shrinking section of industry that constituted skilled men. Thus throughout
the 1920s and. the early years of the 1930s there were very few semi—skilled.
members of the union in the city. Not until 1937 did. the number of semi-
skilled. men in the Coventry District overtake the number of skilled, despite
the fact that they had been a majority in the workshops for many years
before.(38) As a consequence, much of the work of the DC of the AEU was
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in the form of exhortation rather than organisation. Members were criti-
cised for accepting reductions in piece—work, the introduction of boys and.
girls, and in particular working in excess of the agreed. thirty hours a
month overtime. Such criticism was a sign that the DC was finding it
difficult to adjust to its new role. 	 One incident gives a good picture
of its weakened influence. At a local conference on an application for
a wage increase for blacksmiths and strikers in May 1924, the employers'
side was able to produce figures on their wages, which appeared. to have
undermined the union case. The DC, in considering the conference, felt
that the different unions involved should have met prior to the conference
to discuss the case, but Givens felt that this would not have made much
difference:
"Secretary pointed out that our delegates should. be
instructed by DC but owing to our weakness of organisa-
tion and discipline it was impossible to refute the
figures of ployers however much discussion took place
before the conference." (39)
With the weakness of workshop organisation, however, local conferences
took on more importance to the unions. The E1nployers' Association recog-
nised this, arid began a policy of refusing to call conferences where an
issue -t be discussed had not first been raised by an individual worker
with his foreman. This was felt to be important as
"There would in all probability be many local Conferences
which would prove to be a sheer waste of time." (40)
So although there were many issues that the unions wished to take up,
particularly the increasing use of boys at work, there was a decline in
the number of conferences. With less work to do, much time was spent on
the DC in internal argument and factionalising. Most of the trouble was
between -the district secretary and. Orrell and the Minority Movement group
on the DC. On a number of occasions in 1924 this group felt that Givens
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was suppressing motions from branches, and. on one occasion the minutes
record. "The Secretary was again told he was the servant of the Committee
and. they were not allowing him to decide. ,,(41) When Fitton came to
Coventry he "appealed. for less personalities and. more unity with concen-
tration on problems of the future in preference to disagreements about the
past." (42) He was not successful, for there were a number of discussions
on Minority Movement Conferences that caused dissension. Qi one occasion,
after Thomson and Stokes had been elected as delegates to a conference in
London, Givens flatly refused to pay out any travelling expenses as he
stated that the cecutive Council would. not support the use of funds for
this purpose.	 Later in the year the DC decided by the chairman's
casting vote not to send. delegates to the next Minority Movement Conference.
Although the left could sometes get motions through the DC and aggregate
meetings of the &EU, it did not feel strong enough to mount challenges to
Givens in his re—election as secretary, or to Metcalfe in his election as
District President, in 1924. In 1925 Stokes did. stand for the Presidency
but came last of three. This apparent weakness seems to have led to a
reduction in in—fighting, though this may have been due to the serious
political and industrial situation that was developing in the autumn 1925.
II
	
The General Strike
The events in the mining industry that led to "Red riday" had some
impact in Coventry, for the Trades Council set up a Council of Action.
After three meetings, and a temporary settlement of the dispute, it went
into abeyance, and Coventry trade unionists, like those throughout the rest
of the country, found that shortly before the strike was to begin they had.
to create an organisation from nothing. At least in Coventry some organisation
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-took place prior -to the strike. 	 On 15th April 1926 a joint meeting of
unions agreed -to call on the Trades Council to re—establish the Council
of Action, and. a meeting took place on 22nd. April which agreed that the
Trades Council Executive Committee, together with co—opted. union delegates
should be the Council of Action. This was immediately put into operation,
and a Council of some fifty persons was established. with an Executive of
about fifteen.	 The Labour Party was allowed to have its officials
co—opted onto the Council, and. Mabbs, Chaizan of the Trades Council and
of the Labour Party also chaired the Council jointly with Metcalfe of the
AEU, while the Trades Council Secretary, Jack Baird a printworker, was the
Secretary. Afterwards, the Minority Movement claimed that about 20 members
of the Council were MM members, but this may be overstating their influence,
for the majority of members of both the whole of the Council and the execu-
tive were the leaders of the local union commit-tees and full—time officials.
Trades Council activists such as Baird and Bill Buxton, a leading Communist
from the local bus service, also played an important part and the organisation
was based. on -the Trades Council, but by and large the strike locally was run
by the existing -trade union leadership.
The strike began at midnight on 3rd May, and whatever doubts the Council
may have had about the response were soon stilled, as virtually all of the
workers in the unions specified. by -the TUC stopped work. Railway workers,
-transport Workers, printers and building workers stopped in sufficient -
numbers -to ensure a complete halt in all these trades. In addition, the
JTJVB, Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers, National Union of Copperniths, and
the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers called. their members out from all
factories. The Council of Action was pleased. with the response, and the
first report to the TUG ended with Mabbs writing on Wednesday 5th May
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"Everything has moved. remarkably well, and the Coventry
Trade Unionists are delighted, at the action taken by the
General Council, and. tender its hearty congratulations.
Be assured. that the Local Disputes Committee will back
the General Council till victory is achieved. The
only trouble is keeping the men in work." (46)
But in the AEU, the strike began in confusion. On the Monday the
DC held an emergency meeting, to consider a telegram from the union's
Executive Council, which instructed AEU members to stop work in workplaces
where other trade unionists were called. out. As the DC did. not know
which other engineering workers were coming out this was not very helpful,
and. the only decision made was to call out members working in the Nurieaton
railway workshops. The DC felt there would be confusion over the defini-
tion of transport workers, which would. not normally be taken to include
workers engaged in the manufacture of vehicles. However, their members
inspected. and dispatched finished. vehicles in some cases, and a resolution
was passed. which pointed to another involvement:
"That the Secretary place before National Committee the
fact that every firm in Coventry are supplying fleets of
cars and. lorries to be used. for road. transport of passen-
gers and. good.s and -to ask -that the position be considered
and authority given for the closing of the shops." (47)
On the 4th May Givens noted. where other unions had. had large walkouts, and.
instructed. AEU members in those particular shops to come out. The union
members in Armstrong-Whitworth, where the union was a little stronger than
most, were also called. out, as the aircraft industry was in the first w3ve.
It was clear that engineering unions in the city were determined. to take a
wide view of the definition of transport workers and. turn the strike in the
city into a much more general stoppage than was taking place in most other
areas. The AEU was also ready for a stoppage, but the local officials
insisted. that official sanction had to be given.
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On Wednesd.ay 5th May, the second. day of the strike, about 1,500 AE(J
members attended an aggregate meeting, where Me-tcalfe reported on the
situation, which had. only changed slightly as the UPA had. also agreed. to
stop from that evening. He complained that the DC had "found themselves
considerably handicapped by postal delay" and. said. they had still received
no instructions from London. He went on:
"The position created by other unions was of grave
concern to the District Committee as we were already
being termed. a blackleg organisation in view of our
apparent lack of support to the Miners, but as approval
of the EC must be received. before we could. stretch the
instructions from the Trades Union Congress." (48)
Givens then read out to the meeting the instructions from the TUC, stressing
the fact that engineering workers had not been called. out, and he "Urged
upon the members the absolute necessity for discipline and. waiting for
approval before any drastic steps were taken." 	 This appeal fell on
deaf ears, for Stokes and. hitely proposed a motion that
"Having considered the position in all its bearings we
have come to the conclusion that the manufacture of
Motor Vehicles cannot be separated from the question
of Transport and. therefore we recommend our members to
cease work at a time to be fixed." (50)
This was put forward in the name of the DC, so Metcalfe and. Givens had
already lost the first round. of their attempt to put off the strike. An
amendment to the above motion was moved from the floor that no action be
taken until permission had besn given by the EC. In the discussion,
"considerable feeling was displayed," but the vote to cease work was passed
by 537 to 413, so maxiy members may have left by this point. It was agreed
to stop on the next dar, and. Stokes was sent down to London to explain the
position to the EC.
The next day there was a general stoppage of AEXJ members in Coventry,
and. a substantial number of non—unionists came out in support as well.
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The union vacancy book for that day showed. that 1,850 members were signing,
together with 332 non—members, By Wednesday 12th May the numbers had
risen to 2,307 members and 533 non_members.(51) This was slightly more
than three—qtxarters of the union membership, and it is likely that the
figures i.ind.erstate the response, for there was not a great deal of sig-
nificance in signing the vacant book. The figures must also underestimate
the number of non—members out as well, as there was even less logic in their
signing the book. The Council of Action was delighted. with the response,
as their report on the evening of Thursday 6th of May showed.:
"99% of ABU men are now out and. an astonishing number of
non—unionists have also come out. In view of the special
feeling locally this is considered. by the local Disputes
Committee to be specially satisfactory." (52)
This was a bit over—optimistic, as was a report by Kingsley Martin and
others that was sent to the TUC on May 10th, which spoke of 2,835 .&EIJ
members out of 3,000 on strike, for this failed to notice that the figure
included 495 non—union members.t53) The major source of weakness, how-
ever, was the fact that tens of thousands of the city's workers were not
in any union and. not prepared to stop. Thus there was no stoppage at
Dunlop, or Morris, nor at nearly all of the non—motor factories in the city
such as Peel—Connor, Courtaulds, and BTH., although it appears that AEU men
generally across the city were being encouraged. to stop. Moreover, the
stoppages were partial at most car factories, with only a small number
closing completely. The National Union of Foundry Workers, and possibly
one or two other unions stayed at work, but the majority of unions came
out. Given the weakness of the unions in the city, the response was much
better than could. have been reasonably expected..
The AEU DC had. a couple of serious problems. On May 6th a deputation
of members from the Morris toolroom came to see the committee and, pointed.
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out that there were only 12 out of 130 members there, and. that they had
been threatened with losing their jobs if they stopped. They asked if
there had been definite instructions from the union EC and. although there
had. not been any the DC instructed them to stay out. Nevertheless, the
men returned to work the next	 The union's members at Courtaulds
stopped work, but management there claimed that the Warwickshire Miners
Association had agreed -that women should be kept in work there, as many
came from miners' families, and so the DC agreed that a number of men could
go back -to keep the machines working. However, the central strike comm-
ittee that had been set up by the Council of Action to co—ordinate picketing
refused to permit them back. A few days later, on May 11th, an unofficial
meeting of strikers at the factory led to a vote to return to
Elsewhere things went smoothly for the Council of Action, and. up to
the time of -the calling off of -the strike there were few signs of weakness.
Only -the electricity undertaking gave some problems, and here again instruc-
tions from the TUG were unclear. Electricity was to be out off for industry,
but maintained for domestic purposes, but -this was not possible to arrange.
The first report from the ounci1 of Action to the TUG stated
"The Electrical Power position is weak. The E.T.U. will
come out if called upon. The key position, however, is in
the hands of the members of the Electrical Power Engineers,
and at the moment the information is that they are antagonic-
tic.	 Can you do anything with them nationally?" (56)
Not all ETU members were keen to stop. The leaders of the West Midlands
Joint Industrial Council for the industry, which included an ETU man circulated
all the workers, pointing out hopefully,
"That as the result of the Industrial Council's work
during the past six years much has been accomplished to
improve and regularise the relations between employer
and employed. Mutually satifaotory rates of pay and.
conditions of service, including seven days'notice of
termination of engagement on either side, have been
established.
265
In our opinion it would. be very regrettable if anything
should happen that would tend. to prejudice the Council's
continued. existence." (57)
On the evening that this circular appeared., union leaders met the er-
gency Sub—Committee of the Council's Z.Lectricity Committee. Most of the
labourers at the works were in the Workers Union, and. George Morris led
the union side. He admitted that "It was not quite clear what this defi-
nition was with reference to power stations," in dealing with the TUC
instructions, but went on to offer that "Labour will be supplied. on the
definite understanding that it is for lighting hospitals, heating and
sanitary purposes," but not for industrial production. The Town Clerk
delcared. that any agreement with the workers to restrict the supply of
(58)
electricity would be illegal, and. so
 no agreement was reached..
On May 10th, the unions called out all their members, and. a mass
meeting of the strikers on the 11th resolved that they were still prepared
to carry on supplying electricity for domestic consumers, but as this offer
had been rejected by the Committee they accepted no responsibility for the
dispute and would stay out until the strike was
	 The Sub—Committee
again rejected. this offer, which may not have been practical, and claimed
that "The men have struck at the whole principle of t1hit1eyism, by deliber-
ately violating the conditions of service.tt(60)	 This was accompanied by
a letter sent to all the strikers saying they would. be
 dismissed. if they
were not back at work by 13th May, so the principles of 'thitleyism had
suffered. a double blow. An indication of the spirit of the strikers was
given by the fact that the resolution to stay out was accepted unanimously,
and when Morris was challenged. by the Town Clerk on a statement he had. made
that all men at Bixingham Power Station had walked out whereas in fact some
were still at work, he replied.
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"It should be pointed. out that the statement is strictly
accurate inasmuch that all Trade Unionists were withdrawn,
hence ALL MEI\I ceased. work at the Birmingham Power Station."
(61)
As expected., the members of the EPEA did. not go out on strike, so axi
electricity service continued. Kingsley Martin reported that the power
station was only carrying half the normal load. due to the strike.(62)
For the rest, the strike in Coventry passed. off quietly and efficiently.
The Council of Action BC met daily, while the Council itself met on most
days. A number of Committees were set up; Tranport and. Transport Permits,
Publications and. Publicity, Distress, Social, Meetings, Disputes and
Pickets.	 Coventry was a centre for the distribution of the British
Worker for much of the south Warwickshire area, and. some of the reports
from these areas were sent to London by the Council of Action. The daily
ration of the British Worker for the whole of the area was delivered. by
a motor cyclist from London, and copies were in very short supply. A
Coventry Strike Bulletin was issued every day as a supplement, but this
was a poorly produced. affair on one sheet of paper, and was not produced
in great quantities. There was also little local news in it. George
I-Iod.gkinson was active on the Publications and. Publicity Committee, but it
was impossible to overcome all the handicaps associated with lack of prep-
aration at national level.
There was an almost complete stoppage on the railways, buses and trams
in the city. Martin noted 5 NIJR members and. 23 RCA members at work, while
pretty well all the bus workers were out. Buxton described how road. trans-
port was dealt with:
"Almost every day without fail pickets were posted on guard
on all main, roads to and. from the city. Motor transport
was stopped. for inspection of travel permits, stamped and.
endorsed., giving trade union clearance from' their depot with
that particular load. Without this the transport got no
further on its journey, banned. by the weight of the trade
union solidarity of the strikers to all black transport;
such was the mood of these times." (63)
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The City Council made no attempt to run the bus service; a few "black"
buses (Black Pirates) carried out some journeys, but had. no real effect.
Picketing went on without interference from the police. Martin reported
"good. relations with the police. 	 Informal agreement between TU Head.—
quarters and police to keep the peace. ,,(64) When a bus company in the
city offered to rim buses for the Corporation the Transport Permit Issues
Committee "informed the police authorities of the danger involved by
inflaming the workers so the police thought better of it and. dropped the
whole ideas(65) Throughout the strike there was only one arrest in the
city, of a man advertising the public meetings in the Pool Meadow, and when
members of the Council of Action went to the police station he was released
without charge.
This lack of violence or clashes with the police was in marked contrast
to the 1922 lock—out, particularly as during both disputes there were large
public meetings every da in Pool Meadow, with a number of touring speakers
and local officials reporting on the development of events, in so far as
they knew of any. Some picketing of factories also took place, and Buxton
claimed that plans were under way to do something about the Morris IIotors
factory at the time the strike was called off. Perhaps the Socials Comm-
ittee kept everyone happy with entertainments, which included cricket
matches. A number of concerts took place both in the city and at Rugby,
where the secretary of the Trades Council reported,
"We at .igby are solid.	 Concerts and massed meetings
have absolutely surprised Rugby. 	 I don't think that
Rugby will ever get over it." (66)
The strikers' show of strength continued. until the ninth day (Wednesday
12th May). The Picket Committee had been finally established on only
the previous day, and on the Wednesday the ALU DC reported; "Position
268
generally more SOlid.,,(67) Buxton reported on the calling off of the
strike. Ellen Wilkinson Was due to speak at a large meeting at Pool
Meadow:
"Just when she arrived, before she could address the
meeting, a telegram was handed to Bro. Matt Metcalfe the
chairman. After calling for silence he read out this
extremely important announcement. It just briefly
stated 'Strike called off. Return to work tomorrow.
Signed Walter Citrine (Acting) Secretary T.U.C.'
Immediately following this announcement pandemonium
broke out and a great cheer of joy echoed loud over
Coventry." (68)
There were three special features about the strike in Coventry. The
first was the role of the Co-operative Society and its relations with the
strike leaders. The LDR report stated
"No definite arrangements were made with the Co-op but
it played a prominent part in the stri.iggle. 	 It placed
a car at the disposal of the Council of Action and also
gave facilities in the way of duplicating Speakers Notes,
supplied copies of verbatim wireless reports, and gener-
ally intimated that it would do all possible to meet any
demands of the Council of Action." (69)
This is inaccurate as it gives the impression that the Society was whole-
heartedly throwing its weight behind the strike. 	 As Chapter Seven
shows, at this time there was a struggle going on for the soul of the
Society, and this was reflected in its actions during the dispute.
Although co-operating with the Council of Action, the officers of the
society were aggrieved to find that the strike affected their members as -
well. It was reluctant to see its employees join the strike, and sent
a delegation to Manchester to meet union leaders to get an tgreement to
keep their iiembers at work. This was not given, and the Society was
going to sena. a delegation to London when the strike ended.	 Halliwell,
as an employee of the Co-op, was chairman of the Permit Issuing Committee,
and this allowed the Society to carry on'the distribution of ±ood.. The
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Society played. a significant part in keeping prices in the city stable,
for at a meeting called, by the Food. Controller on 3rd. May for local trad.es-.
men 7
 it announced that there would. be no price increases in food. for a
fortnight. It also supplied. took of coal and. sold. them at the pre-
strike price, though in doing this it was merely complying with the
Government regulations. It allowed. Society members to use credit, and
there were no restrictions on the withdrawal of share capital, but members
were only allowed to buy a week's supply of food at a time. The Society
also allowed. the Trades Council to have collecting boxes in its stores
for the children of the striking miners.
This suggested a close link between the Society and. the Trades Council,
but this was resented by the officers of the Society. After the strike,
some Conservative and other co-operators, including George Jarrams, who had
been the Society's secretary for forty years, attacked what they saw as
the Society's generosity, particularly in taking l,OOO out of the reserves
and using it as credit for strikers and their fami1ies. 	 This provoked
Baird, Secrrtary of the Trades Council to criticise the contribution of
the Society:
"We had fought hard for the local Society to reorganise and
prepare for the industrial crisis of 1926 - had even inter-
viewed the Management Committee on the matter, but without
success. Nationally, a similar state of affairs obtained
between the General Council and. the wholesale Society.
The onus and. responsibility of unpreparedness rested
entirely upon the co-operative movement, nationally and
locally; and, viewed from the point of view of an indus-
trial struggle only, should have paid the price. But
locally, that was not our point of view. Faced with
the whole of your transport employees being called upon
to cease work (we had the authority to do it, both of the
General Council and of their National Executive), your
President and Secretary, with other officers of the Society,
were early waiting upon us in Much Park Street for permits
to be given.	 Without these permits, not only would. local
deliveries of bread, milk etc., have ceased, but supplies
could not have been secured from London. Your lorries
went to London, and our permits took them through the pickets.
Oir ideas of co-operation saijed the Society from a loss im-
possible to estimate, but undoubtedly considerable." (72)
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The conclusion would seem to be that in the event, the Society played
an important part in supporting the Council of Action and. helping strikers
in distress, but because of the disputes that existed within the body its
lack of preparation meant that it did not contribute to the struggle as
much as it could have done.
A second feature of the strike in the city was the relationship
between the City Council and. the Council of Action. Throughout the
strike Council officials were careful to make no move that would lead, to
public disorder or provoke those on strike. In practice this meant giving
de facto recognition to the Council of Action. As already mentioned, the
police had an informal arrangement with the Council, and pickets were not
molested in any way. There was no attempt launched to get food to the
city, other than through vehicles which were permitted to move by the
Council. The food position was kept under review, and halfway through
the strike The Town Clerk asked the Council to send three delegates to sit
on a "Goods stock review committee" of the City Council. According to
Buxton, who was one of the delegates, this committee met,
"To examine data which had been collated on goods avail-
able in the City and. which were being seriously depleted
by this time though it had not begun to show itself in
the shops. Fom facts ascertained it appeared that
within a short period of time, had the strike continued
beyond the ninth day (its duration) there would have been
a crisis of afood shortage in Coventry." (73)
Had the strike lasted longer the City Council might have felt moved to
set up a food supply system, but for the duration it was prepared to
co-operate with the strikers. Despite the fact that a bus compax wanted
to open a bus services the City Council made no attemp to run a service.
Nor did it respond to requests to make the police more public and. use them
to initiate a return to work. After the strike, the chief Civil Commiss-
ioner sent by the Government to run the emergency services, reported that
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while most local authorities co—operated with the emergency organisation
there were a number of notable cases of local authority "Dereliction of
duty," and. Coventry was included. on this 	 The Commissioner
complained that the police force in the city had not been increased., and
that the Council had declared. that it was impossible to run a bus service.
Most of the other local authorities that he judged. to have failed. in their
duty were Labour controlled..
The inactivity of the City Council contrasts strongly with the lock-
out of 1922 when pickets were harassed. and. police brought into the city.
In 1926 and 1922 the Enployers' Association tried. to put pressure on the
local authority, but met with much less success in 1926 than 1922. Thus
on 10th May Varley wrote to Alderman Snape, the Mayor;
"As you are aware, we met you six days ago and urged.
very strongly the desirability of some effort being
made by the local authority to maintain even a reduced.
Transport Service, with the main object of demonstrating
a determination on the part of the Corporation to carry
on, and. in order to set an example of moral courage to
the city generally and. especially those men desirous of
working.
It is with the keenest regret and. disappointment that we
have observed that the Corporation did. not see its way
to do this, either by its own transport service or by
the encouragement of the services of private enterprise."
He went on to quote Baldwin, and. to ask again for a transport service. He
also spoke of the walk—outs from the factories, and the need for a police -
force -to get men back:
"The Coventry Engineering p1oyers have accordingly
end.eavoured. to keep their works open, but when on
Thursday last the Engineers were withdrawn by the order
of the Union, the position became very much more diff i-
cult.
As is well known the number of non—Union in the Coventry
Engineering shops is overwhelming in proportion to the
number of Union men, and. it is our firm conviction that
because of the lack of determination on the part of the
Corporation that the non—Union men have joined. in the
strike due to intimidation by the strikers, affecting not
only the person of the workman but his wife and. family."
272
The establishment of a transport service would. encourage men to return.
Moreover,
"We fully realise that any move in this direction must
necessarily be preceded by a strong and. well—organised
force of Special Constabulary, and we consider that this
force when enrolled and. organised should be paraded.
openly in large numbers throughout the City in order to
demonstrate that those willing to work are assured of
adequate protection." (75)
On behalf of the ergency Committee of the City Council, Snape
replied on the same day. He agreed that public services should. be maifl-
tamed, and that "asserting the position that the Authorities and not the
strikers are in control of the situation" was important. However, he went
on to say that he had. access to facts that the employers could. not have.
After further consideration on the transport position, he stated,
"It has been decided., with full deliberation, not to
attempt for the present the commencement of a service.
This decision is not in any sense based. on weakness, but
has been taken in what are considered. to be the best
interests of the City as a whole, after a consideration
of all the relevant facts."
On police protection, Snape admitted that the police could not cover the
130 separate factories within the city boundaries.
If the regular and. emergency force can be supplemented
by an adequate enrolment of' special constables, more can,
of course, be done, but I regret to say that the response
to my appeal for specials has up to the present been dis-
appointing. This is a matter where, it seems to me, your
association ought to be able to help, and. I urge strongly
upon all your members the importance of bringing the matter
to the immediate notice of' their employees."
He reported that only five complaints of victimisation had been received
by the police, arid in none of these cases was there evidence to justify
prosecution. He felt that this showed that there was not widespread vic-
timisation. Finally, he felt that the public parading of special con-
stables would be "An ill—conceived. and provocative act."6
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A day later Varley replied., pointing out that the iiployers' Assoc-
iation represented. "Over twenty million pounds sterling of capital." He
claimed. that intimid.ation was going on and. that his members were in a
better position to see it than the police. He also seized. on the sugges
tion that more special constables were need.ed.:
"I m instracted., on behalf of all the firms of this
Association, to offer to the Chief Constable approxi-
mately 200 men who are willing to enrol immediately
as Special Constables for full time service, and. whilst
they are so enrolled. they will continue to receive their
full salaries or wages from the firms in whose respective
employ they are."
The men were members of works staff, and. would. be required. back when it
was possible to reopen the works. As this letter came only a day after
Snape had. mentioned. need. for more specials, it is likely that the Associa-
tion was volunteering men without having canvassed for volunteers. This
was similar to an offer made in 1922. Finally Varley ended. in a critical
vein:
"My Executive Committee desire me to say that from the
letter under reply there would appear to be circumstances
applicable to Coventry that evidently do not apply to
such cities as London, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Birmingham,
Nottingham, Plymouth, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield,
Portsmouth, etc.etc. y Committee are at a loss to en-
visage such circumstances. Such Cities, by their
action, have demonstrated their determination to govern
and have not considered. the rumiing of essential ser-
vices, such as omnibuses and. trains, as provocative in
the circumstances." (77)
There is no indication that the "volunteers" put forward by Varley were
accepted. by the Chief Constable. The significance of this exchange is
that it reveals the extent of the stoppage, and. the unwillingness of the
City Council to pursue the vigorous line called. by the employers. Unlike
the situation in 1922, the Council was in the role of mediator between the
employers and the workers, seeking to avoid confrontation with either body,
and prepared. to avoid making hasty decisions. This is qualified. by the
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action of the transport and electricity management behaviour after the
strike, and. must also be qualified, by the incomplete nature of the dispute;
had it lasted longer the authorities might have been forced to take control.
The fact remains however, that for the nine days, the City fathers were
prepared to let a large degree of authority concerning the transport of
people and. goods leave their hands and go to the strike organisation.
Part of the reason for this may have simply been due to the normal
state of organisation of the local authority. Coventry did not spend
money unless strictly necessary, and- did not have the police or other forces
needed to take firm possession of the streets and run a bus service against
the wishes of the strikers.	 Coalition leaders were not used to taking
decisive action and preferred to wait upon events. Another reason for inac-
tivity was the tremendous support given to the strike by workers. Had
some of the bus workers not obeyed the call the positions might have been
different. The response clearly impressed the City Council. It is
possible that there might have been some support for the miners on the
Council, but this seems unlikely. The coalition instead. appears to have
decided that this was a national issue, and that no local steps could be
taken to solve the crisis, hence there was no point in provoking the
strikers.	 In this policy they showed themselves to be distinctly out of
step with the employers; perhaps -this was the only occasion in this period.
when such a state of affairs existed..
The third special factor in the strike in Coventry has already been
ref erred to; the tremendous response from workers. Throughout the country
the response was heartening to the organisers, and. in many places it was
more complete than Coventry. Postgate, Wilkinson, and Horrabin put
Coventry in Class II of their evaluations, (Towns where the strike was
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wholly effective but with weaknesses in some sections) while Birmingham
Was in Class I (Towns where the response was near to 100 per cent).(78)
But in Coventry trade unionism was probably weaker in 1926 than in Birming-
ham, and. a great many engineering workers in Coventry came out while many
in Biimingham waited until called out the day before the strike ended.
The fact was that not only did. the great majority of engineering union
members come out without prior authorisation from the national executives,
but that they were joined by many thousands of non—trade union members.
Given the weakness of the unions, and. the fact that trade unionism was
restricted to small groups of mostly skilled men, this response needs some
explanation. What also needs to be explained is the fact that virtually
none of the non—unionists who came out joined the unions at least if the
membership figures of the AEU can be used as a reliable guide. 	 rel1 spoke
at a mass meeting during the strike and. congratulated the non—unionists,
reminding them that the BC of the union had. decided on an amnesty on the
fines imposed after the lock—out, and he hoped this would lead to a return
to the unions. On the day the strike was called off there were over five
hundred non—unionists signing the union vacancy book, but the district
records show that union membership only rose by 51 in the next month, and that
by August, membership figures were back below the May figure, and. a slow declin
continued for the next few years.	 Even most of the people who automa-
tically turned to the union when out of work did not rejoin the union when
back in work.
This suggests that the appeal of the general strike was very different
to the non—union members than the noimal language of trades unionism - craft
militancy and left—wing rhetoric. The strike was an opportunity to show
solidarity with the miners, a movement which appeared to bond together
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working people across the country regardless of craft or union. 	 It was
not seen as an aggressive action, as a first step in the conquest of
power. The workers' actions were limited to a defensive protection of
part of the working class. This defensive action, at least for many
workers, had little to do with the trade unions, though they were of
course prepared to accept union leadership in the strike. 	 It showed
trade union consciousness in a general sense, but not necessarily in a
specific sense. Coventry workers must have been influenced by their
war—time trade union experiences and reacted spontaneously in support of
the miners. But this show of solidarity did not change the realities of
their own workplace experiences, and the irrelevance of unions to many of
these experiences. The general strike therefore showed a curious glimpse
of the emotional identification with an oppressed part of the working
class by workers who refused to join their own unions. It showed a
strength and. feeling -that the Coventry trade unions 1 in their normal day-
to—day existence were not able to reach and contrasted -the potential
support that existed for unions with the miserable reality. It would be
wrong to say that this gulf between potential and reality was caused by a
purely voluntary rejection of the unions; clearly the employers discour-
aged union activity. But it is equally wrong to see the workers who so
readily walked—out without waiting to be called, as being completely
intimidated by their employers.	 -
The response from -the non—unionists boosted the morale of the union
leaders of the strike, who knew that elsewhere in -their area the strike
was all but solid. Accordingly, the end of the strike with no concessions
to the miners was a bitter blow, so bitter that -the Coventry Council of
Action sent Hodgkinson and Buxton down -to London to ask the General Council
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of the TUC to resume the disputeZ The delegates met a group of General
Council members, led. by Aif Purcell, who, as we saw, had. been for a short
time the first Labour M.P. for the city. To Hodgkinson, who had. not
always agreed with Purcell's left—wing rhetoric, this was an emotional
revelation of Purcell's feet of clay, but Buxton gives a more matter of
fact account of the meeting which makes it clear that not surprisingly,
-the General Council members were not swayed. by the Coventry delegates.(8)
Still Coventry refused. to give in. The two returned. on the Friday evening
14th May, before there had been a full return to work, and reported. to the
Council of Action. On the Saturday, the Council called a conference of all
the members of the District Committees, and a resolution was passed. calling
on the Executives of the various unions to again call their members out.
By this time it was much too late, and when the AEEJ District Committee met
the resolution was only noteci.(81) The AEU District Committee also noted
-the total cost of the strike to the union in -the city; 26 2s 2d, which
included a pemly levy of -the members which was the financial basis of -the
Council of Action, 2)
It was not until Monday 17th May that there was a general return to
work in the city. It would appear that the delayed start was due mainly
to the attitude of the employers. On Thursday 13th May many AJ1J members
tried to go back but a considerable number of factories refused to open 	 -
until the next week. In other cases a small number of men only were taken
back. The Rover toolroom took back only 3 out of about 70 employees.
Some firms were prepared to start most workers if they would accept that
others could be sacked;-thus Daimler and. Hurnber discharged. a good many workers.
The only report of a full return was at Herberts, where the "men returned
as if nothing had. happened." on -the Thursd.y.8 	 There was no immediate
return on the Railways, Buses and Trams. The local transport manager sent
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a circular to all employees deploring "the recent precipitate and. illegal
action," and telling the men that they had terminated their contracts and.
had. to apply individually for re-engagement. This meant that they would
lose their holiday entitiement.	 A mass meeting of those employed re-
fused to accept anything other than a reswnption without any strings, and
after a meeting between union representatives, the Mayor and Council
officials, the circular was withdrawn and a return took place on Saturday
15th May. 8	By Monday all the factories were open, and although the
union claimed there was some victimisation, particularly at Danlops, there
was no strong union opposition. The newly-found militancy of the strikers
disappeared with the end of the dispute. For a few months, the strike
had. an effect on production in Coventry. Before the strike in April 1926
there had been 1,300 out of work but this rose to 5,436 by mid-July, before
gradually declining. (86) This enabled employers to hit back at trade
union militants, and. also took the steam out of the engineering unions'
pay claim.
The strike had put the Trades Council back into the centre of action
in the labour movement. It was the only body capable of uniting the move-
ment and providing the sort of organisation and. leadership that was needed.
Bit without exceptional events it was like the spirit of the non-union
workers - great in potential but small in practice. Ii showed the labour.
and political movement united under the leadership of the Trades Council.
Right-wing and left-wing labour, and the Communist Party, worked together.
But there was no sign of Labour capitalising on the militancy shown in the
strike, and. while the Communist Party and Minority Movement probably
picked up members, not enough joined to lead to a substantial change in the
fortunes of either body. Thus though in one way the strike was a 'oment
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of truth" in -that a comparatively united. working class showed. its power
and. potential, it was also an aberration, in that political and. trade
union life soon returned. to pre.-strike patterns.
III	 The Unions in Isolation
Trade union membership continued to decline in the city for the rest
of the decade and the early years of the l930s. Figures available for
two of the major unions in the city, the AEU and. the N1JVB, show that the
decline followed. a different pattern in each case. NtJVB membership held.
up reasonably well in the late 1920s, indeed its membership was slightly
higher in the years after the general strike than in the years before the
strike. But in 1931 membership began to fall, and by the end of 1933 it
was about a thousand strong, less than half of the January 1931 figure.
Moreover, although membership later picked. up in the late l930s, it never
reached. the figures of the early 1920s. This suggests that the union
was particularly affected by the shift to mass production in vehicles,
and unable to pick up members in the new munitions factories of the late
(8)
l930s.	 The AE[J continued to decline immediately after the general
strike, and membership figures remained. depressed uiti1 beginning to recover
at the end of 1934. The lowest point reached. was at the end of 1933 when
membership was down to 2,415, only a few hundred. more than I1JVB membership
and. about 600 less than at the time of the general strike.(88) Moreover,
effective membership was about three—quarters of this figure. In October
1928, when membership was 2,771, Givens reported that only 2,100 of these
(76%) were paying members. 	 However, when there was a recovery, unlike
the NTJVB the AEXJ was able to increase its membership above its mid. 1920s
figures.
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The general dec1inein union membership meant a reduction iiq
 activity
at the workplace, the isolation of the leadership from the rank and. file,
and, a changing relationship with employers. The virtual disappearance
of shop stewards meant that District Committees were denied the information
needed to present cases to the employers. Thus when there was a series
of reductions in piece—work prices at Armetrong—Siddeley, the ABU DC was
unable to organise opposition because it could not find, out what was going
on in the factory, despite the fact that eight branch secretaries worked.
there. DC minutes recorded;
"There was a delay of 18 days with D.C. still in the dark
as 'to what had actually happened. As this firm was now
the biggest and most prosperous in the town, members could
rest assured that such actions, unless checked, would. be
rapidly copied by others...
...We were more entitled to co—operation than the Eployers,
from our own members and Officials, and unless we were going
to be acknowledged as the responsible body we should. have
to consider some action to overcome the present state of
affairs." (90)
In this case, as in a number of others, discussions about the reductions
-took place in the factory between the management and the men, and even
the union members there did, not organise a union intervention.
Another incident involved. reductions at Rover in 1929, and. again
information was hard to come by:
"Secretary pointed out that the Coventry D.C. were in a
very silly position when they were informed. by Birmingham
of events in Coventry which should be known to us, and.
that our position would be more untenable still if we took
a case to the ]p1oyers without any information from our
own members, whose duty it was to give us the facts of the
case."
In this instance, the DC was eventually able to get some information from
a Brother James, who made it clear that the company did not encourage its
supply:
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"Bro. James again emphasised. their position as a minority
and. asked. the Committee not to jeopardise their jobs by
giving away the information they had been able to supply
to us.
Chairman assured the witness that D.C. were always most
careful in this respect and. would not take any action
which would. necessitate bringing any individual into the
limelight apart from our Officials." (91)
This shows the return of trade unionism to semi—clandestine activity.
Various propaganda campaigns were held. by the AEtJ and. other unions1
to win men back to the union, but they made little or no progress for many
years. In some instances they seemed to have set back the already low
morale of the remaining union activists. 	 n AEU National Officer, Lamb,
cazie to Coventry and. spoke at a number of meetings, but without success.
So badly did. the campaign go in his first week in the city that he roundly
denounced. the DC:
"Bro. Lamb then stated. his great disappointment at the utter
lack of support given by D.C. and branch officers, and stated
that he had no intention of allowing his two weeks stay in
Coventry being rendered useless. D.C. were responsible for
arrangements, but to decide upon a meeting at such a place and.
time, without giving support at such meetings was not his con-
ception of Propaganda work. Up to the present, three members
with no non—unionists had been the maximum attendance. No
Organiser could. give his message to empty seats with any benefit
to the Society, and the members in the district were required
to provide at least a nucleus at all meetings." (92)
Lamb returned. in 1929 and 1930, and. again complained. 'at the lack of support
from branch officers. The DC at one time considered. amalgamating a number -
of branches, as they were not active.
Given the decline of workplace activity, the importance of works and.
local conferences as an opportunity to negotiate with the employers increase
for the unions, particularly the .AEU. But the CDEEA realised this, and.
sought to downgrade such meetings. In the first place they made sure that
the procedure was adhered. to and that conferences could not be held if
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workers had not raised the issue with their own superiors. J. Francis,
the NUVB regional official noted a new attitude;
"Where previously there was a willingness to receive Trade
Union Officials at the onset of any question, there is now
a definite insistence that -the procedure shall be carried
out by the workers before the question can be discussed. in
the office."	 (93)
When conferences did occur it seems to have been the policy of -the CDEEA
to try to personalise the argument, so that it was seen as a dispute
between Givens and the Association, rather than a negotiation between two
representative bodies. Thus at the end. of 1928 Givens reported on a
local conference on excessive overtime;
"The Chairman as usual attempted to make it a personal
matter to Mr. Givens and not the $ocjetys Agreements
with the Eiiployers." (94)
(It is interesting to note that the union was still sometimes referred to
as the Society, as old habits died hard).
Givens was selected as the target by the employers because, although
himself a target for attack from the left, he usually adopted. a 'tough
attitude to the employers. In this he differed from the ODDs for the
district. Orrell had such friendly relations with CDEEA that when he
was retired from his post with -the union, he informed. -the employers, and
the Executive of their body offered to find him a "suitable post." Within
a few weeks he was found a public house, and he asked the CDEEA Executive
to recommend him to brewers.	 His successors Dempster, covered Birmingham
as well as the Coventry district, so was not so available, but at his first
local conference Givens complained to the DC about him;
"The Secretary stated his opinion that ODD helped. the
Diiployers as against Bro. Stokes, arid appeared to
immediately accept any and. every claim by the ployers
when they mentioned Managerial nctions." (96)
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This sort of charge could. not be made against Givens; indeed a.
number of his meetings with the employers ended with disorder. The
Assocjatjon's Secretary, Varley, was not one to mince his words, and. on
one occasion at least threw Givens out of a meeting;
"Mr. Varley objected to Sec. interrupting his statements
and during a heated passage told Secy. that if he could
not observe the decencies of ordinary business intercourse
he had better leave his office as he was stating their
case and. would. not have interruptions." (97)
The problem with these sort of encounters was that the union got nowhere.
Even when there were not violent disagreements the Enployers' Association
could. usually make a close assessment of the support behind the union
officials. Thus w1en the AEU pursued a claim for an increase for skilled.
workers in 1929 up to Central Conference Varley reported to the local
employers.
"The application in question was not a genuine applica-
tion backed by the Toolroom workers and. Millwrights
working in the local engineering shops, but was more in
the nature of a 'stunt' effort on the part of the local
officials of the Union." (98)
On another occasion, an application for time workers had been pursued to
Central Conference, and no agreement was reached.. Although there was no
further procedure, "in view of the state of organisation, D.C. were unable
to recommend any course of action," and the matter ws dropped.
By the early l930s, the CDEEA had. succeeded. in stifling not onI.y trade
union activity at the workplace, but also activity at district level. Only
a small number of works and local conferences took place, as Varley sought
-to discourage them and rule them out of order wherever possible. 	 This
forced. the AEtJ to accept discussions with the employers that were outside
procedure. In April 1933 Varley had his first unofficial meeting with
Givens, and. reported,
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"This was the first occasion that Mr. Givens had. made
it his business to come in an informal way to discuss
matters on a friendly basis and. it was generally agreed
that the change of attitude taken by the Union in question
was very gratifying." (100)
Informal discussions confirmed the subordinate role of the union; the
two sides were no longer in formal equalily. Improvements achieved. by
the union were concessions rather than negotiated. agreements.
The CDEEA had earlier set out its views on the framework within
which unions should be allowed. to operate, in its contribution to the
discussion amongst employers that preceded the passing of the Trades
Dispute Act of 1927.
	
In a detailed. letter of september 1926 Varley
informed. the EEF that the Thiployers' Association supported. the restric-
tions on union activity that the national body had proposed, but sought
to go further by asking for -the repeal of the 1906 Trade Disputes Act aM
for picketing of all and every description to be made illegal. The other
proposals that they supported sought to make unions liable for damages for
their actions, that strikes in essential services should be prohibited, and.
that in other industries they would. be
 legal if the majority of union and.
non—union members in the workplace supported it in a secret ba1lot.(303
With the employers so clearly on the offensive, and. the unions in the
engineering industry in the city reduced to virtual impotence, there was
further dissension and. disruption in the AEtJ, due to -the activities of -the
Minority Movement and -the Communist Party.
The Minority Movement
Although the Minority Movement was set up nationally in 1924 by the
Communist Party -to -take over work in -the -trade unions -that had previously
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been carried out by RIL,U the movement was slow to develop in Coventry.
The group became active in 1925. At the first meeting of the Coventry
District Committee of the MI.I after the 1925 conference, the Chairman,
Vice—Chairman and- Secretary that were appointed were all members of the
Communist Party, and although a number of prominent members of the Labour
Party supported the movement, it was always influenced primarily by the
Communist party. 02) Its two most dedicated leaders were W.H.Stokes
and- Bill Buxton, while George Kingston, the Communist President of the
Trades Council, Was Chairman of the MN for a time. The organisation was
able to attract a number of local Labour Party supporters, including
Cresswell, who chaired- the MM for a time, Halliwell, and J.H.Ward who was
Chairman from 1 927 to 1929 and- Vice Chaixman before then. A.E. Mabbs and
Alice Arnold spoke at its meetings, and- Alice Arnold claimed that she was
(1 o:
a supporter who would have joined had she not been a full time union official.
There may have been other Labour supporters who were not active.
The MM had a functioning District Committee for several years, and
aimed- to have flourishing groups in the different industries and the Co—op.
In practise it was difficult to sustain active groups. The MM was probably
more successful with its Eo—op group than with any other. Halliwell and
Kingston were elected to the Management Committee Of the Co—op, and one of
two Co—op groups affiliated- to the MM, including the Lockhurst Lane Co—op
Womens' Guild. ki attempt to get the Stoke Heath Womens' Co—op Guild
(104)
affiliated- had led. to threats by the national Co—op body to close it down.
A list of members of the NM Co—op group in 1929 shows 20 names, but by
then this consisted of most of the active MM members.
Consistent support for the MN came from the District Committee of the
Workers' Union. In 1926 Bill Buxton, Jim ith and A.Shaw were all active
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in the MM and on the District Committee of the WtJ. This body sent
delegates -to the National Conferences for a number of years, while
several branches of the union affiliated -to the MM. In general the
number of union bodies affiliated was very small. A sign of the decline
of the MM was in July 1929 when the WU DC decided by 5 votes to 4 not to
(105)
send a delegate to the National Conference. 	 In previous years,
there had been only limited success in getting unions to send. delegates;
besides the WU DC the Trades Council also sent a delegate, as did a
couple of WtJ branches, and perhaps one AEU branch. There were four
MM supporters on the District Committee of the .AEU - Stokes, Bates,
Harbourne and. Latham. However, Latham could not be relied on by any
group. He often seemed. motivated mainly by personal dislike of Givens,
and. on issues that were not to do with criticising the district secretary,
he would regularly vote against the MM members. He may have dropped out
of the MM at some point. The other area where the MM had influence was
the Trades Council. Kingston was Chairman both of the Trades Council and.
the I'IM, while Buxton, Halliwell and Wellings, amongst others, were all
leading lights.
In all the union and co—op areas where the MM had influence, it
depended on small groups of militants acting together in an informal way.
It proved impossible for the movement to set up and. rim for any period. of
time functioning sections in different industries or unions, even though
there were a number of members in such industries or unions. The main
reason was that members had not been convinced of the need for a formal
organis3-tion. With only a handful of supporters in each union, the MM
acted as a federation of loose groupings of the left rather than as a
distinctive organisation challenging the existing leadership. It was
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also very small, never having more than a couple of dozen paid. up
supporters. When a voluntary levy of lcl a month was agreed on to raise
local funds, only 16 members took part in t.06) In June 1928 W.R. Read,
the Midlands Organiser, attended a group meeting and. criticised the group;
too much was left to Stokes, as secretary, and. the sectional groups were
not functioning properly. Nor were there any union branch or workplace
groups, though a women's group had been set up,(107)
The Coventry MM was therefore a forum for discussion and. a vehicle
for a number of successful meetings and local conferences. It brought
together a number of trade union militants from the Communist Party and
the Labour Party, but only built a very rudimentary form of organisation.
The disciplined machine poised. to take over from the corrupt leadership,
which was how the national office of the MM increasingly saw itself, was
a vision that made little sense in a city with a weak militant movement
and. a disorganised. and demoralised. trade union movement. It was another
pressure group on the left, and. one of its most important tasks was to
send a delegate to an Allocation Committee that had. been set up to ensure
that all groups on the left had equal access to the few public halls in
the city, to ensure that their public meetings did not clash with one
another's. The MM was added to the list that already included the Labour
Party, ILP, OF, Trades Council, Co—op, Free Speech Defence Committee, and.
the various other ad hoc and. campaigning bodies that existed. This
emphasis on public meetings that all of the bodies displayed served to hide
the lack of real organisation in this period.
The MM appears to have been most active in 1926/27, and was already
in decline in 1928. The first blow had fallen in April 1927 when orders
from the MM Head Office had. led. to the acceptance of the Coventry Trades
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Council d.isaffiliating from the MM. Without such orders, it may well
have refused to disaffiliate, in which case it would. have lost TUC
recognition, but in practice disaffiliation made no difference. It
showed, however, that the official union movement was wherever possible
clamping down on the activity of the Mlvi. In Coventry official disapproval
had. little effect on the Labour Party activists in the MM, though active
membership seems to have been reduced by early 1928. A more potent threat
to the Movement came from its sponsors, the Communist Party.
In June 1928 Reed, the Midland Organiser, when criticising Coventry
Mlvi for its lack of activity, denounced "pseudo—lefts," that is, left—
(108)
wingers who were not members of the Communist Party. At the next monthly
meeting, for the first time there was a split as to who should be the
group's delegate to the National MM Conference, and the President, J.H.Ward,
a Labour Party member, was elected by one vote against Reynolds, Communist
Party member . ( 109) On the Trades Council the MM group found itself in
disagreement with the majority on a number of issues, and pushed its dis-
agreement to the extent that it became to be regarded as a troublesome
unit. One of the disagreements was the decision of the Trades Council
not to hold a rally on May 1st but to celebrate May Day with a public
meeting in the Drill Hall called "Labour and the Nation." This was
clearly seen as an affront to the MM and CP who wanted a rally on May
Day itself and felt that if the Trades Council could not be affiliated
to the MM it should not be allowed to act as a mouthpiece for the Labour
party.--° )
 Events in Coventry at this time were influenced by the
changing policy of the Communist Party and its attempts to differentiate
clearly between itself and. left—wingers in the Labour Party. A change in
policy on the part of the Communist International eventually led to a new
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line. This saw the established, labour lead.ership and trade union leader-
ship as class traitors, and attacked as even more d.angerous anyone who
would not split with this leadership. Groups like the Minority Movement
and. the Left-Wing Movement were put in a difficult position.
There is no record of a Left-Wing group in the Labour Party in
Coventry, and it is clear that the Coventry Labour Party as a whole did.
not support -the National Left-Wing Movement, which was a Communist attempt
to build on left sipathy and establish influence inside the Labour Party.
However, it is likely, indeed Ward pointed, to it, that there was a left-
wing group in the local Labour Party, probably consisting of the Labour
MM members. Much of the activity of this movement nationally centred
around the paper Sunday Worker and a Sunday Worker Committee was in
existence, working closely with the MM which made frequent though not very
successful attempls to sell its paper, The Worker. With -the CP change of
line, the MM was to carry on, but with more emphasis on attacking the left
outside the CP, while the left-wing movement and its newspaper were wound
up.
All of this internal struggle within the CF and. its cavalier decisions
respecting what in theory were independent movements contributed to the
collapse of the MM. In February 1929 Bert Cresewell resigned as Chairman
of the group, only a month after he had, been elected, and two months later,
Jiard, an ex-Chairman, also resigned. It is worth quoting from Ward's
letter of resignation, for he gave a number of reasons for leaving, and
-they probably covered the views of the rest of the Labour Party member-
ship who were drifting out. He began by referring to the Left-Wing move-
ment, and it is clear that he saw this as being very close to the VIM:
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"I have also come to the conclusion now that the National
Left Wing Movement has been d.ropped in favour of the C.P.
that the M.M. will be ruled too strictly also by the C.P.
I find it a very difficult obstacle to do any useful work
inside the Labour Party if my actions are to be governed.
by OP's."
He also criticised the behaviour of the MN group at Trades Council
meetings. He had. "left several meetings of the Council very disgusted
at the behaviour and. criticisms of the MM group." Finally, he felt that
the movement was changing, "taking on an atmosphere that was not acceptable
to me," no doubt a feeling shared. by the others who left at -this -time,
-that -they were -the 'Pseudo—lefts" now under attack. 11) In the next
few months the WIJ DC decided not to send delegates to National Conference
of the MM, and the Chairman's ruling prevented the Trades Council from
being represented.. Attendance at MM meetings fell, and they began to
be held less frequently. The Chairmanship went to A.E. Lyrrell, a
Communist who had been active in the Unemployed Workers Commit-tee in the
early 1920s and who had recently formed a Coventry branch of the National
Unemployed Workers' Committee Movement.(fl2) The organisation may have
carried. on for some years, though there are no records of its meetings
after July 1930.	 Stokes was on the National Committee of the Metal Workers
section, which apparently lasted beyond this.
Although it had not amounted to a major force, the MM and the reader-
ship of the Sunday Worker had constituted some form of a bridge between
the CF and the Labour Party, and had clearly been acceptable to at least
some people in positions of influence in the Labour Party. The breaking
of this link, whatever the provocation, and there appears to have been
little at local level, pushed the CF more firmly into the political wilder-
ness though it was clear that it was heading in that direction anyway.
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It also weakened. the left—wing influence on the Labour Party at a
crucial time in its development in Coventry, when it was re—establish-
ing itself on the City Council and laying the basis for its municipal
politics. The link with the CP had. also been a small link with mili-
tant trade unionism 1 and this was another element that had been in the
Labour leadership experience that disappeared in the 1930s.
In some parts of the country, notably mining areas, the traumas
of the General Strike, the miners' lock—out, and. persistent unemploy-
ment pushed many into opposition to capitalism and, the policies of the
Labour Party leadership. In Coventry this did not happen. The strike
caught the sympathy and support of many workers, union and. non—union1
and. gave a boost to the left in the year after. But for the rest, the
labour movement in Coventry remained quiescent, the unions disorganised.
and the left isolated and irrelevant. Without the stimulus of hunger
or craft pride, the mass of workers were not prepared to accept the leader--
ship of the unions or the Labour Party, while the left could offer them no
alternative. The Labour Party could. come to terms with the situation by
basing its activities on electoral support, but the left was condemned to
fnistration and factional behaviour.
After the decline of the minority movement,the .CP continued. to remain
-
in isolation, and lost further ground in the trade union movement. The
years 1929/31 saw a series of clashes between the left and right on the
AEU DC, and no doubt on the WU DC as well. Neither side emerged with much
credit. In June 1929 the Workers' Weekly carried a report on the strike
at Armstrong—Whitworth, the only serious stoppage in engineering in the
city for several years, criticising union officials. Givens brought the
offending copy to a DC meeting, and denounced it as "Part of a deliberate
292
policy to vilify the Trade Union Officials generally."	 The minutes
report that Stokes agreed that the statements in the paper were wrong
and that he would take it up with the editors.l3) At the next meeting
there was a long disagreement caused. by Stokes objecting to the minutes,
and. moving their reference back. They were eventually agreed by the
casting vote of the Chairman, but after further challenge at the next
meeting, the offending paragraph in the minutes was dropped.
	 (Though
not taken out of the minutesL)(h14) Later in the year there was a
dispute caused by a ban on overtime at.Humber. It was clear that a
significant number of workers there did not support it, and objected to
being in the front line of a general campaign for a district increase.
Some workers continued to work overtime, including Latham, who was a
member of the DC. He denied that the DC had the authority to sanction
an overtime ban, and. Stokes successfully moved a motion of censure on
him. La-bham took this to the EC which upheld his appeal, and denied the
right of the DC to ban overtime on a general wage increase demand.
This was followed by Stokes and Bates moving a motion claiming the action
of the EC was "Against the principles of trade unionism." This was
defeated by the Chairman's casting vote.6) Later in the year, Tootill,
the District President, decided to resign from office due to the continued
troubles in the union. L17)
This continued dissension seems to have been blamed more on the left
than on the right in the union. Stokes usually stood for office at
district level every year without much success; in 1931 he managed for
the first time to come top of the poll for District President on the first
ballot, but there was clearly a strong feeling against him, for he was
decisively beaten in the second ballot (ll8 /
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Stokes and others on the left were particularly dismayed. by what
they saw as weakness on the part of the SC of the union over wage nego.-
tiations in 1931. Once again a motion of condemnation was proposed by
Stokes and defeated at the DC by a casting vote.19) This time, however,
union officials were determined. to deal with critics, and. when Stokes
signed a circular attacking the EC he was promptly suspended from all
office in the union. The Coventry DC was reluctant to come to his support.
After temporising over the matter for a month, while replacing Stokes with
Sidney Stringer, it eventually passed a motion regretting his action, and.
took no further steps to support his appeal. However, a poorly attended.
(120)
aggregate meeting passed a resolution protesting at his treatment.
DC lack of support for Stokes faded. as time went by, and he was
backed by a number of local union figures in his campaign to get back
into office in 1932 and. 1933. He was ruled to be ineligible -to contest
the District Presidency elections in 1933, and. was defeated in an election
as a DC member. However, in 1934 he was allowed to stand, and. won the
post of District President.2	 The poll was low, and the result was
more a reflection of Stokes' personality and. perseverence than a marked
swing to the left. With Stokes off the DC for over two years, dissension
died. down but did not vanish. There was a row over the ballot on whether
to consider employing a full time official, and Lathain's criticisms of
Givens eventually led to him being suspended from the DC at the end of
1933.]22)
Despite his eventual comeback, the behaviour of Stokes in the late
l920s and early 1930s was that of an intransigent opponent of the EQ of
the union and the District officials and officers. He became more
isolated and under attack as time went by, and -the overall effect of this
2 9.
situation was to weaken the DC at a time when it was already extremely
weak. Similar dissensions occurred on the Trades Council. The kinual
Report for 1928 shows a considerable Communist influence; Kingston was
President, and of the three public meetings held by the Council, two were
addressed by Communists (Leckie and. Buxton). Buxton and Chalmers also
reported on a visit -to Russia.(123)
The 1930 Report shows a different picture. Kingston had. been re-
placed, and the Report commented
"The policy of disruption pursued by a nall group of
delegates was intensified during the year, and scenes
occurred which raised the indignation of the overwhelming
number of delegates. As a consecpience, four delegates
were expelled. It is with real regret that the Council
has to record these happenings. The refusal to accept
the most elementary principles of democracy is a serious
reflection on those concerned.. The failure to appreciate
the necessity for united action, based on decisions taken
after fu.11 and free discussion, is not calculated. to help
the worker but to destroy him." (124)
Whatever the provocations, the Communist group had clearly made it easy
for its opponents to deal with it, and there is no evidence to suggest
that this "exposure" of social democracy led. to any gains on the part of
the Communists.
While dealing with part of the left on the Council, its officers
continued their scarcely veiled criticisms of the Labour Party in their
report. In 1928 the report had stated
"Whilst the Council emphatically believes that the right
use of political power is essential to Working—class
emancipation, it is regretted. that there is a tendency
to persuade the workers that it is only necessary to
put an X in the right place on the ballot form and
everything will be all right. It is not sufficiently
understood that it is only through the actual control
of economic power that emancipation can be achieved;
and that the whole enerr of the Trade Union Movement
should. be bent towards securing this control from the
exploiting class, using the political machine as one of
the instruments to that end." (l25
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In 1930 the Annual Report continued this theme:
"Those who expected. a Labour Government to bring into
being a new heaven and. a new earth have been disappointed..
In past reports we have, however, warned delegates against
taking this point of view.	 It cannot be too clearly
understood that economic power is the real power which
exercises control - political power must ±iake a second.
place...A Labour Government in office - not power - has
been a bulwark against the full consequences of present-
day capitali failing -to deliver the goods." (126)
This theme was no doubt partly pushed to establish the important role
of the Trades Council, but also as a form of criticism of Labour elec-
toralism at both local and national level. In the 1930 report it
existed alongside several attacks on Communists. Besides reporting
the expulsion of four delegates, it criticised the Colony Cottages
Tenants Defence Committee for allowing themselves "to be used for
political ends with the result that their cause was severely prejudiced."
There were also unfavourable comments on one of the hunger marches; the
marchers were "ill-advised" and the very poor response to an appeal for
help which came from union branches with "many expressing their emphatic
(127'disapproval" shows that Communists were isolated in most of these branches.
Inevitably, by proclaiming themselves to be in opposition, Communists
on the Trades Council contributed to a drift to the righ-t on that body,
and a lessening of criticisms of the Labour Party. Communists had criti-
cised the Council for being too close to the Labour Party,. and. concentrated
on trying to wean it away. In this they were unsuccessful, and also made
it very difficult to use the other tactic of using Trades Council influence
as a counter-weight to the electoralism of the Labour Party. The 1933
Annual Report again stresses the important role of the Trades Councils
and Unions in 'the labour movement, but it cannot be said to contain either
openly or by implication, criticisms of Labour for neglecting union and
industrial affairs.2	 Thus at the time when electoral success was
296
beginning to emerge as a real possibility for the Coventry Labour Party,
union bodies and. -the Trades Council were not in a position to preserve
a labour movement balanced between industrial organisation and. electoral
politics. Clearly the main reason was the reduced strength of the
unions, but a contributory factor was the policy of the Communist Party
to engage in systematic struggle with Labour and Labour supporters in
the unions.
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CH.APTER SIX
Civic Leaders
The Coalition
The engineering industry, and motor vehicles in particular,dominated.
the economic life of Coventry, but exerted a less direct influence on
the political life of -the city. Here lead.ership came from a group of
people for the most part unconnected with the big factories. Civic
affairs arid, municipal politics had. a separate existence, from industrial
life, though greatly influenced by it.
Until 1937 the City Council was controlled by a coalition of Liberals
and Conservatives that had been in undisputed power of the city for many
decades, and. which had. not significantly changed its social base from the
era before to the arrival of the big industries. 	 It is possible to
identify the occupations of most of the Councillors and. Aldermen who served.
under any of the Liberal, Conservative, Coalition or Progressive labels in
between 1918 and 1938, and although some of the descriptions of these
occupations are very vague, an interesting analysis can be made.(1)
Of the 98 Coui'icillors and Aldermen who were members of the coalition
in 'this period, and whose occupations can be identified, some 31, or nearly
one third, can be described as dealers or retailers, most of them being
• shopkeepers.	 hen publicans, builders, and commercial agents are added,
the number reaches 44, nearly half of the total. The second largest
category was those engaged in manufacture, for the most part small scale,
18 in all. Most of these manufacturers were associated with the old,
established trades in the city, such as W.H. Grant and his family silk
works, and. ed Lee with his watch and. electrical jewellery company. In
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some trades, such as watches, boots, and clothing, the distinction between
manufacturing and. retailing was blurred. The third largest category was
that of professional workers, with slightly more lawyers and. doctors than
teachers and. dentists. There were 16 in this group, and taking the first
three categories together, as representing essential parts of the commercial
life of the city, they provided 78 out of the 98 occupations - the over-
whelming majority.
The fourth largest category, with 12, was those people who were assoc-
iated with large scale industry rather than small scale manufacturing.
Most of these were managers, but a couple, such as Betteman of Triumph and.
J.D. Siddeley of Armstrong—Siddeley, were managing directors. Considering
the importance of industry in the city, this group was underrepresented.
among the ruling coalition, particularly as those who did come into this
category did. not provide leadership within the group, which caine from
retailers, dealers and small scale manufaturers.
The 98 did not include any women, nor any manual workers of any kind.
It was dominated by the ?Ishopocracye and the social composition of the
group as a whole could not have changed. much since the mid nineteenth
century.(2) This meant that by the l920s and 1930s the coalition had
only a very small social base; a few thousand retailers, manufacturers
and. professionals were represented by many, while the tens of thousands of -
engineering workers had no representatives.
Commercial interests did not restrict themselves to the City Council,
but dominated all the public institutions in the city, and. because of the
small numbers of the ruling group, many people took on a number of roles.
Thus, it was to be expected that many of the officers of the Chamber of
Commerce would be Councillors, and this was the case.
	
Although this
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body was also dominated by retailers, merchants and small manufacturers,
it brought this Commerce group into contact with the employers, through
meetings and. through encouraging industrialists to take up honorary posts.
As its Vice—President also included local gentry such as Colonel Wyley,
who ran a chemists' business and on his death donated land to the city,
county figures, and M.Ps., together with Sir Edward Iliffe, owner of the
Midland Daily Telegraph, the Chamber played. an important role in cementing
relationships and alliances. Bodies affiliated to it included trade
organisations such as the Master Butchers' Association, the Licensed.
Victuallers Association and the Master Builders' Association. These three
bodies have been cited. because during this period at least some of their
leaders served. on the City Council.
Membership of the City Council gave access to a certain amount of
patronage when dealing with Council contracts, and there was a strong
feeling on the part of the Labour opposition that many of the goods and
services supplied to the Council came from the commercial element that ran
it. These suspicions could not for the most part be proven, though the
relationship between certain builders who were councillors and also involved
in the construction of the Stoke Heath estate during the war was an illum-
inating case.	 But patronage was not confined to the Council. Sir
Thomas White's Charity had. extensive funds, and while most of the money was
used for education, loans could be made to people setting up in business.
The fund was controlled by a board of trustees responsible to the Councili6)
Commercial leaders also exercised influence by being Freemen's
trustees, for lists of trustees in the 1920s and l930s reveal that many
councillors and ex—councillors were included. Freemen - trained craftsmen -
had. played an important part in shaping the social and economic life of the
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city in the 19th century, and. the existence of an institution that gave
legal rights and. some financial protection to skilled, workers had. been
important in preventing Coventry workers from embracing Chartism and.
trade unionism. Moreover, by encouraging craft trades it slowed down the
development of large scale industry in the city. 	 Once 'big business'
had arrived the institution of the Freemen no longer had. the same importance.
But the office of Trustee gave status, while the Trustees still had. to ad-
minister funds, both for pensions and. loans and gifts for people wishing
to start new businesses.
These charities helped to bring the commercial leaders in the city
into a paternalist relationship with some working people. This was
strengthened. by the work of two other institutions, the Coventry Savings
Bank and. the Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society, both of which
were aimed. at working people. The Bank had among its trustees Thomas
Burbid.ge who was Chairman or Vice—Chairman for many years, and. who served.
on many other charities and was a Governor of the Grammar School. He and.
his family controlled the Coventry Standard,a weekly newspaper that sup-
ported. the Conservatives, throughout this period. Another trustee was
Alderman Goate, a Conservative solicitor. 	 In 1921 the list of managers
of the bank included. no less than 24 ministers of religion, as well as a
large number of councillors and. aldermen, and. representatives of local
industry.
The success of the bank is not knoi, as there are few surviving
records, but the rapid extension of the influence of the Coventry Permanent
Economic Build.ing Society was an important feature of the l920s and l930s.
The Society had been established. in 1884, "to promote habits of thrift and.
independence amongst the Industrial classes, and especially to encourage
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and assist every man to become his own landlord." (8) The "industrial
classes" were not expected to control it, however, for an investor had. to
have at least 500 in shares before he was eligible to stand. as a director.
The Society made rapid progress throughout the inter—war period.. Although
a couple of hard. years, such as 1920 and 1928/29 saw only low growth, the
number of investors and. borrowers went up consistently.	 In 1918 there
were only 2,789 investors in the Society, but by 1939 there were 2l,3l4.
This last figure represented about 44 of the families in the city. The
Society must have had investors from outside Coventry, but also some
Coventry people must have invested in other societies.
The increase in the number of people who took out mortgages from the
Society was even greater, though the total was smaller. In 1928 there
were 2,776 borrowers, about one for every four investors. In 1939 there
were 10,839 borrowers, one for just under every two investors.° There
is no automatic conclusion -to be drawn from the discovery that at least
some working people were buying their own houses while many more were saving
to do so, but the circumstances in which this activity took place is signi-
ficant, The building society was part of a network of philanthropic and.
charitable institutions under the influence of the commercial leadership
of the city -that had. developed. the art of encouraging working people to
imitate them and accept their values.
Despite the breakdown of the craft industries and. the emergence of a
massive working class, -this moral and. political leadership was carried. on
for most of this period..
Sir Thomas White's Charity was the largest in the city, and. it is
worth considering the composition of the board. of Trustees in 1931. There
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were five people tho controlled its considerable funds, all of them pillars
of the community. One was Sir Edward Iliffe, owner of the Midland Daily
Telegraph, and later of a range of newspapers including the Birmingham Post.
11±1 fe had been Controller of the Machine Tools Department of the Ministry
of Munitions for part of the war, was active in the local Chamber of Commerce,
and became President of the (ssocia-tion of British Chambers of Commerce in
1932, was President of the Periodical Proprietors Associations from 1935
to 1938, and. Conservative M.P. for Tamworth from 1923 to 1929. The second
Trustee was Hugh Rotherham, one of the family that controlled the largest
watch-making company in the city, and also active 4n the Chamber of CorrPrce.
Third. was Edward French, head of a company that produced textiles and tex-
tile machinery.	 He was a councillor or alderman throughout this period,
a leader of the Coalition, and was President of the Coventry Liberal Party
from 1921 to 1928. The fourth Trustee was William Wyley, head of a family
chemist business, Chairman of the Governors at the Grammar School, Vice-
President of the Chamber of Commerce, and founder and Chairman of the City
Guild Society, a religious body. He first joined the City Council in 1876
as an independent, and was made Mayor in 1911 despite not being a member of
the Council at the time. He was the last person to be elected. to be an
alderman without being a councillor, and remained an alderman till he died
in 1940 without being a member of any of the political parties. The final
Trustee was Alec Turner who controlled. a watch-making business. 	 He was
a Freeman's Trustee, a Governor of Bablake School, a trustee of the General
Municipal Charities, (which brought together a number of smaller charities)
Chairman of the Coventry Provident Building Society ( a smaller one than
the Permanent Economic) and one of the leaders of the Conservative Party
on the Council, where he served for 34 years. This group embodied. the
close relationships that existed between the political, business and
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charitable organisations in Coventry.
Other political leaders such as red Lee and Vincent Wyles held a
number of posts in the community, but a number of people active in charities
and education did not contest Council elections. The existence of these
other bodies brought councillors and. aldermen into close contact with their
peers, and encouraged the development of a coherent commercial voice in
the running of the city, and a strong social base for it. With the excep-
tion of a couple of councillors who became 'eemen's Trustees, the Labour
group had no say in any of the bodies mentioned, and this must mean that
there was a definite policy of exclusion working.
The existence of a cohesive commercial leadership, dominating all
aspects of public life in the city, and without a serious challenge to its
control since the weavers' movement ended in the 1860s did not prevent the
formation of the two main political parties in Coven-try, both based on the
commercial group. Liberal and Conservative or Tory parties had existed
throughout the nineteenth century: originally the Liberal Party had had.
a strong radical influence and had captured the votes of many working people.
However, it usually managed to return its candidate as M.P. By the time
of the First World War, the M.P. was still a Liberal, though he was soon
rejected by -the Party for his pacifist views, but locally it was not poss-
ible to make anything other -than a fine dictinotion in the policies of the
two parties, and in the social composition of the leadership, though the
Liberal Party still had a nonconformist tinge. Both parties, however, had
their share of manufacturers, retailers and professionals.
Although the Liberals had the M.P., locally the largest party before
and. after -the war was the Conservative Party. Lack of differences of
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principle did not prevent fierce contests in the municipal elections, and.
these often led to a. great deal of public interest.	 In the 1912 elections,
before all workers had. the local franchise, the percentage of votes cast in
those wards where there was a contest came to 71.9%.1	 However, only
seven out of twelve wards had. such contests. The extent of party influence
can be judged by the fact that only one independent candidate Was elected
in the three years before the war. In 1911, the Coventry Standard reported
on the municipal elections that
"All of them (the candidates) came forward under the Party
aegis, and. fought under the Party colours, and the result
can fairly be claimed as a Party victory for the Conservatives."
(12)
The paper went on to say that this result was what it had wanted, 'out
clearly made the point that was disputed later, that Party politics existed
in the City many years before the main challenge came from the Labour Party.
Before 1914 the Conservatives had twice as many councillors and. aldermen as
did the Liberals, and. as there were not major policy differences relations
between the two parties were mostly informal. However, in 1913 a cloud no
bigger than a man's hand appeared on the horizon, for Labour won three seats
on the Council.	 Interestingly, one of them was not contested, that of
Harry Wale, but in All Saint's Ward., Bannington, the Marxist, defeated
Councillor Snape, a Liberal who had been on the Council for fifteen years,
with the Conservative in third place. The combined votes of the Liberal
and Conservative was greater than Banninon?s.(13)	 The lesson was clear,
and. led to discussion between the two parties. 	 Prior to this time, the
only agreements that appear to have existed was over alciermanic vacancies.
Before any more formal arrangements could be reached, war broke out,
and although the Labour Party carried on having some meetings, the other two
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parties ceased to function altogether. The Liberal Party Annual Report
in 1914 stated:
"'om the moment war was declared the active propaganda
of the Association was suspended, and. is at the present
moment still in abeyance. While war is being waged the
voice of the Party should be silent." (14)
This was no doubt meant to be a moral rebuke to Labour, but it meant that
both Liberals and. Conservatives were slow at organising for the local elec-
tions after the war, despite the fact that they came eleven months after
the national election which in Coventry hed seen a Conservative victory,
the relegation of the official Liberal candidate to a poor third place,
and. the emergence of a powerful Labour vote.
It was only at the end of September 1919 that the Liberal Municipal
Committee agreed that "It was desirable to effect a Party agreement with
other Political Organisations with a view of engaging not to nominate
opposing cand.idates," and in October a sub-committee was set up with full
powers to meet the Conservatives and "Enter into an agreement upon a basis
of equal	 In fact agreement was reached. that the
Conservatives would have a free hand with the seven seats they were def end-
ing, and. the Liberals would. be given the other five. The parties also
agreed that where they were not contesting seats they would. give 'aterial
official support" to each other.
Whatever the reason, the 1919 municipal elections were an unpleasant
shock for the two established parties. For the first time Labour contested
most seats, and although- there was some confusion on the Labour side, there
was also confusion in the opposition. 	 One seat was not contested and.
therefore given.to Labour. Despite the agreement the vote was split in
Stoke, and. a number of people stood as either Ind.epenclents or Business. At
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the same time, the Labour vote grew considerably, and totalled more than
the two other parties put together. Labour won six seats plus Swanswell,
where Alice Arnold stood as an Independent against the official Co—op can-
diclate.	 The two major parties collected only two seats.
In 1920 a similar agreement between the two parties was arranged, and
this gave the Liberals more seats than the Conservatives. The two parties
were able to re—establish dominance at the polls, but the three Labour gains
were at the expense of the Conservatives, so in 1921 it was agreed -to give
more seats to -that party. The aim therefore was to have equal numbers on
the Council, and agreements took place over aldermanic vacancies. From
1922 at the latest, the two parties were acting together as one ruling
party, though still keeping separate orgaxiisations on the Council.
In 1923 closer formal relations developed which were to merge the two
parties on the Council. A draft "compact" was drawn up between the two
bodies, and a number of meetings took plac4 around it. In April 1923
agreement was reached on a number of important points. One was that both
parties would refuse to recognise Independent candidates, and that they
would not be let into any caucus meeting until they had renounced every
other affiliation. (This was designed -to deal with the intervention of a
small number of candidates who refused to accept the agreements.) It was
also agreed that future elections of aldermen should be based on seniority
between the members of the two parties only, and that any vacancy thus
created on the Council should go to the party which had the minority of
Councillors.	 Dealing with Labour, the agreement said
"That in the event of the Executives of the Liberal and
Conservative Parties being of the opinion that any Labour
representative has strong claims to an Aldermanic seat
then a Conference shall be held to consider -the position."
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The other items in the agreement dealt with which wards the different
parties would contest in 1923 arid 1924, but these turned out to be con-
tentious, as several candidates were reluctant to withdraw on instructions.
Not until October 1st 1923 was a slightly amended. version of the "compact't
signed, by Lee, Wyles and Halpin for the Conservatives and French and
Snape for the Libera1s.6)
The compact was strengthened in 1924. It was agreed that where a
party secured an extra alderman, it should have the right to fill the
vacancies left on any committees. 17) In mid July 1924 it was put to
the test for the first time, arid only just survived. A vacancy arose
for an aldermanic post, arid it was discovered that the longest serving
Councillor was a Labour member, Harry Wale. Nevertheless, the Conser-
vatives put up Councillor Bates, who had. one year's less service. This
put the Liberals in a difficult position, for they had no animosity to
Wale. After his election to the Council in 1910, Wale was not opposed
in any other election by the main parties. He was elected unopposed in
1 913 and in 1920 and 1923 opposed only by the SLP. In 1923 after his easy
re—election the Midland Daily Telegraph commented
"It is a fact that speaks volumes of the way in which they are
regarded that in their contests both Mr. Wale and. Mr. Moseley
had the good wishes of a very large nunther of people who in
political matters are of decidedly different schools of thought."
(18)
Moseley arid Arnold were the only other Labour Councillors left at that
stage, and the only ones opposed by the other parties. Faced with the
prospect of refusing Wale an aldermanship, the Liberal Municipal Committee
called a special meeting. French,the Chairman of the Party, stated the
position:
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"The existing compact between ourselves and the Unionists
would be endangered and probably regarded as broken if we
did not support Counc. Bates.
The weight of opinion however was that Councillor Wale's
claims were the stronger, that public opinion would be
against us if we failed to recognise his claims and that
it was doubtful whether the Unionist Party would regard
our support of Councillor Wale as a breach of the existing
Compact." (19)
In the event, although the Joint Committee of the two party leaders
recommended Bates, at least some of the Liberals broke ranks, for Wale
was elected as the first Labour alderman. However, the compact survived,
and a month later was again strengthened.
In September 1924 a new clause to the compact was added, stating
-that when vacancies arose for "Governorships of Schools and Institutions,
Charity Trusteeships etc," the Joint Negotiating Committee (of party
leaders) would be empowered to choose a new candidate, and Liberal and
Conservative mbers of the Council would then support him. This was
significant in that it gave more power to the half dozen members of the
Joint Negotiating Committee, and more important showed that far from the
Council being run by non-political groups, the various charitable insti-
tutions in the city were seen by the political parties as a legitimate
(20)
area for party organisation.	 At the same time an attempt was made
to ensure that all party members stuck to the compact, for another clause
stated:-
"That the assent of new councillors should be obtained
to the various clauses of the pact and that the support
of -the Liberal and Conservative organisations at elections
shall be dependent on such agreement." (21)
The next stage was to try to reach an accommodation with Labour.
Initially Wale turned down an agreement on elections, but after he had
become an alderman, further discussions took piaces(22) At a meeting
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with Wale and Moseley, it was agreed. that the election of aldermen should
be by seniority and not by party, and that when a Councillor retired or
died, his party should have the first choice in filling the vacancies
created on Commit-tees.	 However, no agreement was reached on the election
of Mayors, nor on any arrangements about the election of councillors.
The result of the agreements between the Liberals and. Conservatives
was to finally ensure that a united front was put forward in Municipal
elections against Labour, and that the two parties achieved. a balance on
the Council. This had happened by November 1924. After the elections,
there were 12 Liberal Councillors, 15 Conservative Councillors, 2 inde-
pendent, and 3 Labour Councillors. The most important result of the
agreement however was that it paved -the way to a more public coalition
of the -two ruling parties. This came in November 1928, when after
boundary changes, all seats on the Council were elected simultaneously.
For the first time, -the candidates of the two ruling parties stood not
in their party colours, but as members of the Coalition, and this title
was used. until 1937, when the Progressive Party was formed.
This formal Coalition was a natural development, though still unusual
as the two parties had separate existences and fought against each other
in -the General Elections. Although -there are only a few records of -the
two parties for this period, it seems likely that the Coalition was formed.
largely because of the decline of the Liberal Party. The election after
the war had been a disaster for -the Liberals, with the official Liberal
candidate getting less than half of the Labour vote, and less than a quarter
of the Conservative vote. Although Liberal Council members met regularly,
there was virtually no activity in the local party for several years. Only
after French accepted -the post of President did. 'the Party begin to recover.
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In December 1921 there was the first election of officers since before
the war, and. attempts began to reorganise ward. branches. A full time
agent was appointed. in 1922, but he had -to go part—time in 1923 due to
the shortage of funds.(23) Financial problems dogged the Liberals through-
out the l920s.	 For the 1924 General Election, the Party spent £1,233
which was £76 less than the Conservatives, but substantially more than
Labour, which could. only afford £844.124)	 A few years later the Party
again compared its finances urifavourably with the Conservatives. The
Balance Sheet for 1926 showed a Liberal Income of £203 and an expenditure
of £290. The Conservatives clearly had richer patrons, for 40 subscribers
gave them £800, and other subscribers gave £376, and £200 was drawn from
the reserves to give total expenditure of £1,376. The Liberals were so
distressed at their own relative weakness that it was resolved. "It would
scarcely be in the interests of Liberalism in Coventry, to publish typed.
or printed copies of the Balance Sheet.(25)
The Party also did. not have the best of luck with Parliamentary can-
didates. J.E. Dainton was selected as candidate in 1922, but only against
strong opposition, as many felt that this would. be  delivering the seat up
to Labour.	 In fact in the 1922 election -the Liberals vote recovered., but
Dainton still finished bottom of the poll. A new candidate, this time
H.P. Gisborne, was not selected in 1923 until a month before the election.
Under these circums-tances he did well, coming within 6 votes of the Con-
Servative candidate, but both of them were over 600 votes behind A.A.Purcell,
thefirst Labour M.P. for -the city. Unfortunately Gisborne did. not keep
up his early promise for in 1926 the Liberal Advisory Committee agreed. to
the blunt sentiment that "Mr. Gisborne is a hopeless candidate for Coventry
arid. -that it is impossible, with so little interest shown by the candidate,
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to work up any enthusiasm in the Party," and. French was given the job
of getting rid, of him.(26) Gisborne was eventually prevailed. upon to
write a letter of resignation, which stated.,
"That in view of the political situation, especially in
Coventry - namely, the strong Conservative organisation
and. the equally strong, if not stronger, Labour organisa-
tion, the prospects of a Liberal being returned. for
Coventry for some years to come are absolutely hopeless."
(27)
His resignation was accepted and an attempt was made to find. a successor,
but in September 1927 a further meeting was held. where:
"The opinion of all present was that it was practically
a hopeless task and. waste of money to endeavour to fight
the next election in Coventry, unless we were provided
with a well—known outstand.ing politician." (28)
In fact, finance was more important than getting someone outstanding, and
French nearly secured. a candidate who would. have been prepared to pay the
local Party 25O per annuni. This was his last act as President, for he
decided to resign, and this brought the Party to a further crisis. In
May 1928 a meeting was called. of all alderman and. councillors, as "It
appears to be a question of the continuance or the collapse of the Coventry
Liberal Association. (29)	 entual1y the Party was able to persuade
Arthur Young, manager of the BTH and. a firm believer in dynamic management
to accept the Presidency. However, no more candid.ä,tes were put up in the
General Elections in this period., and. it may not 'be a coincidence that this'
crisis in the Liberal Party was followed by the formation of the Coalition.
The continuing weaknesses of the Liberals meant that the original
agreement with the Conservatives was signed. by the Liberal Council members
without reference to the rest of the Association. When it came up for a
renewal in 1925 some members of the Association attacked the Council members
for not taking enough interest in 'the ward.s or work of the Association.
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Alderman Makepeace replied
"If the Pact were broken, it would be goodbye to the
Liberal Party on the Council. The members of the
Council are not found. or assisted when necessary by the
Executive. Candidates for the Council had been found
by personal help and. influence of individuals." (30)
Thus the Liberal Party got more out of the Pact than did the Conservatives,
but when the two formed the Coalition, the Conservatives were the major
part of that alliance. By the l930s the Liberal tradition in the city
had shrunk to near insignificance. The mass of its voters had deserted
to the Labour candidates, while those who were left in the Party were
tailing behind the Conservatives.
The challenge from Labour had succeeded in all but welding together
the two older parties, but it was found to be more difficult to get a
wedding between commerce and. industry, that is, in getting the engineering
employers to throw their full weight behind the Coalition. The CDEEA,
although sympathetic to the Coalition candidates, refused to support any
action directly emanating from a political party. In 1923 when the
Executive Committee of the Association was informed -that two employers,
F.J. Shoton of Albion Drop Forges, and J.D. Sidd.eley were standing in the
local elections, it was agreed to help them as much as possible, although
one was a Liberal and the other a Conservative.(31) Nevertheless the
Association refused to give Strickland, the Conservative candidate, an
opportunity to speak in factories prior to the 1931 General Election, nor
would it be in any way associated with his	 The only con-
cession given was that Varley was given permission to act in his personal
capacity to campaign for the National Government for
"It was desirable that everyone who could do so should
lend. their support to the organisation which stood for
Law and Order in the country." (33)
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Despite its reluctance to become involved with party politics, the
Association was always prepared to consider how best it could increase
the number of industrial representatives on the City Council, and a number
of discussions were held in this period on the problem, usually after rep-
resentations had been made by existing members of the City Council. Thus
in 1922 the Association secretary reported that,
"He had recently been approached by Councillor Victor Dodd.
with a view to the Engineering Manufacturers of Coventry
submitting themselves as candidates for election on the
Coventry City Council in November next.
A very full discussion followed on this matter, and it
was agreed that it might be beneficial if a mass meeting
of all classes of local manufacturers (not limited to the
Engineering Industry) could be held so that full consid-
eration could be given to this matter." (34)
The Board Room of the Association was made available for such a meeting,
but nothing caine of it. 	 In the mid-l920s the decline of the Labour Party
at the local polls seemed to satisfy local industry, but in 1930 a more
serious attempt was made to deal with the situation. In October the
Chairman of the CDEEA, Mr.G.A. Lister from M.L.Magneto, at an executive
meeting,
"Stated that the Manufacturers had little voice in dis-
cussion on matters of interest to Thployers in the City
Council meetings, and suggested that the time had come
for Manufacturers to consider offering themselves for
election to the City Council."
It was eventually resolved
"That a communication be sent by the President to the
Chairman and/or Managing Directors of firms, requesting
that they do all they can to interest some official
connected with them in the affairs of the City." (36)
At the next meeting, the executive of the Association considered a
letter from W.H. IIalcolm, who was one of the few who had been prepared
to be a Councillor while working for a major concern - GEC - who pointed
out that Labour representation on the Council had risen from 3 to 16 in
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the last few years and Varley was urged to take action on behalf of the
CDEEA. The fact that action was taken in 1930, after some good results
for Labour make it clear, as does the letter from Malcolm, that this was
an attempt to stop Labour rather than to get more industrial representa-
tion on the Council. In March a meeting of Managing Directors was held,
arid, according to Lister "It had been agreed by all present that the time
had arrived for definite steps to be taken in this matter." Three possible
steps had been put forward: the Managing Directors themselves could stand
as candidates; they could nominate members of their staff to stand as
representatives of industry, or the third alternative was -to find "pro-
fessional gentlemen" who worked for industrial concerns to agree to stand.)
A few months later "certain members" of the Council again approached
the Association. Varley reported that
"Whilst some steps had been made with regard to professional
gentlemen in the town seeking representation on the City
Council, no steps had been taken to meet the position by
securing Manufacturers who are willing to submit themselves
for election."
It was finally agreed that the best approach was "for firms to arrange
for some responsible official of their staff to take on this work."8
The series of meetings gave ample proof of the fact that the CDEEA looked
with interest on the work of the City Council, and was alarmed by Labour
progress, but they also show that Managing Directors were not prepared to
come forward to intervene, nor could they find members of their management
who could be prevailed upon, for the good. of the company, to seek election.
The discussions in 1930 had no noticeable effect on the type of the candi-
dates standing for the Coalition in the years to come.
Without more active support from the engineering employers, the
Coalition group was finding the going increasingly tough. Throughout
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the l930s the Labour Party made stea&y but unspectacular progress, and
this led. to some demoralisation in the Coalition ranks. It may have been
that -the lack of competition between the two traditional parties led to
a general reduction in interest and political activity, or it may have
been that the ruling Coalition group did. not choose to work in conjunc-
tion with -the ward associations of the political parties, but in any event,
the Coalition group found it difficult to get sufficient candidates to put
up against Labour. In 1934 they had to make another approach to the CDEEA,
and Varley reported, to -the Eecutive that he ha4 found two people to stand.
for the Coalition and. negotiations were in hand for two more that were
(38)	 - -
needed.	 In the event, neither Varley nor the Coalition leaders were
able to find. candidates, and. one of the na1es that Varley had. produced
dropped out, giving Labour three uncontested seats in -the elections that
year. The next year, when a further approach was made, Varley referred.
to "The difficulty in persuading suitable candidates to come forward who
could. devote the necessary time for this work." G.E. Roberts, who was a.
Councillor and worked for Coventry Malleable, stressed the need to oppose
Labour, for if it came to office it was expected "To grant concessions to
the domestic consumers of Gas, Electricity etc. at the expense of the
industrial consumers." Again it was agreed to try to find suitable can-
didates, to stand as Coalition members, not as members of the ODE 	 -
The reference to gas and electricity utilities gives an illustration
of the way the CDEEA was able to influence the City Council, even though
it could not provide Councillors. At a Council meeting at the end. of 1935,
fl.M. Malcolm, who was the Chairman of the Electricity Committee reported.
that as the coicern had showed a profit of about £15,000 there ought to be
a cut in the charges for bulk users, which would. amount to about half the
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profit. This suggestion was strongly attacked. by Labour, and T.J. Harris
successfully moved a reference back, when he claimed
"There is a very important principle involved., and this
is whether (company) shareholders are to have precedence
over the general welfare of the citizens and of sound
finance."
He claimed. that bulk users were already only paying 75% of the rate charged.
to domestic users and. said. that the proposal was a result of an appeal
from the CDEEA. Malcolm denied this, and said. there had been no dis-
cussion with the CDEEA but that cheap electricity would attract firms
and. jobs to the ±t . ( 40) Although the reference back was carried,
the proposal was accepted. at a later meeting. At the February 1936
meeting of the executive of the CDEEA, the reduction of charges was
mentioned., and a resolution of thanks to Malcolm was passed., as the meeting
acknowledged that it was mainly his actions that had. led. to the proposal.
G.E. Roberts was also thanked by the executive for his part in getting the
proposal through the City Counci1. 	 Roberts was a member of the
executive for most of the period, and. on another matter a couple of months
earlier had. intervened in a discussion to say
"That as a member of the City Council, he felt confident
that the manufacturers would. appreciate that the Council
had. never displayed. any action which was likely to impede
industry in any form." (42)
With such protectors on the Council, it was not necessary for the Assoc-
iation to make special appeals to protect its interests, except in unusual
circumstances such as the passing of the Coventry Corporation Act of 1936.
The Association objected. to the discovery that under the Bill it would.
need. only 3 "disgri.intlecl" householders to sign a complaint against a finn
to take it to a magistrate's court to prove that it could. not reduce its
noise levels. A special sub—committee Was able to report that it had. got
the Town Clerk to make amendments to the offending clause.
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There was a possibility that the Labour Party would win enough
seats in 1936 to take control of the Council.	 When it failed to do
so it was clear that unless the Coalition made unexpected progress it
would lose power in 1937. This led to a hasty reassessment. The
Coalition had campaigned on the policy that it was free of what it called
national politics, or as the Midland Daily Telegraph explained; the
existence of Liberal and Conservative parties in the Coalition had 'o
real political significance." It went on,
"The main value of the respective labels was the exist-
ence of two political organisations which could be
drawn upon, even if surreptitiously, for municipal
election purposes." 	 (44)
But the use of these organisations got more surreptitious as time went by.
Looking at the election results in 1936 the Telegraph complained that
Labour had an advantage because it had central organisation, and. a planned
and. worked out policy, something the Coalition obviously lacked:
"In recent years the Coalition has attempted to meet
this Socialist organisation by placing in the field
candidates whose names have been unknown to their con-
stituents until a few days prior to nomination day.
Elections have been fought on hastily-recruited ward
committees, their organisation dependent upon the
verying enthusiasm of individual candidates, and the
degree of support they have been able to command among
their personal friends." (45)
The Coalition itself, in its election address had bitterly attacked the 	 -
existence of an efficient Labour Party, claiming for themselves, that
"The majority of the members of the City Council, and
also these candidates, do not represent the political
interests of a party: nor have such interests
entered into the conduct of city affairs with their
consent."
How -this statement was reconciled with the habit of the Coalition of still
sharing out Council and Charitable posts on a party basis is not known.
The address then went on to ask,
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"Can you afford. to elect a Councillor who is subor-
dinate to and. who takes his instructions from, an
outside body of persons - from a party responsible to
itself alone and not to the voters." (46)
The Coalition was suffering from acute jealousy. As the Midland Daily
Telegraph had. intimated, the Coalition would have used party organisation
had it survived. As it was, the final attempt to resist Labour s to
create a new party called the Progressive Party.
II
	
Education in Coventry
Before pursuing the fortunes of the Progressive Party, an illustration
of the nature of Coalition rule can be given by a study of the development
of the educational system of the city. This gives an indication of the
power the Coalition had to depress the quality of life for working people
and to pursue elitist aims that benefited the narrow social groups that
supported the Coalition.
With the exception of technical education, the City Council was
reluctant to spend more -than was strictly necessary on the educational
system, particularly on the elementary schools. They had serious conse-
quences as the rapid growth in the population put tremendous pressure on
the schools.	 Table shows the number of elementary school places in
the city, and the number of school children.
Table Three	 Number of elementary school children on the books, and the
number of elementary school places available.
Year
	 No. on books	 Accommodati on
1914
	
18,105
	
17,331
1915
	
18,600
	
17,381
1916
	
19,221
	
17,581
1917
	
19,536
	
17,631
1918
	
20,038
	
17,841
1919
	
20. 175
	
17,841
1920
	
20,464
	
17,841
1921
	
20,825
	
18,225
1922
	
21,427
	
21,271
Source: Coventry Education Department Annual Reports, 1921 and 1928.
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The accommodation was based. on the assumption that there would be no more
than 60 children in a class, and some of the room was provided by tempor-
ary army huts.	 In practice, the figures understated the problem, for
children were kept off the books until they were older. Not until 1928
were there more places than children, and the situation deteriorated
again in the years just before the war.
The result was overcrowding. This meant accommodating children in
unpleasant and. unsuitable schools that should have been closed down. One
such school was St. Peter's Church of England School near the centre of
the city.	 It was in the parish of the Rev. Paul Stacy a prominant
Christian Socialist, who when he first saw it described it as "a most
unwelcome and unexpected surprise." A Board of Education architect
reported. in 1919 that "the school possesses so many fundamental defects
that it would. be
 bad. policy to attempt to remedy them. (48) During the
war the "Late Head Master refrained from requisitioning books partly on
patriotic grounds and. partly to leave his successor a free
The Board of Education askeft for the school to be closed down in 1915,
but it stayed open until 1930 as there was no alternative accommodation.
At the time of its closure seven out of the fifteen Church oC England
schools in the city were on the Board of Education black list, that is,
the Board did not approve of their continued. existence and would not support
them in any way.°	 Not all of Coventry's schools were this bad but
many children suffered until the l930s due to inadequate accommodation.
	
Overcrowding also mean-b large classes.	 In 1924 41 classes in
elementary schools had more than 60 children, while there was a total of
	
254 classes with more than 50 child.ren.-	 It was not until the late
1920s that numbers were substantially reduced. They went up again in 1938,
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due to the next wave of migration. while an increasing population put
extra claims on the resources of the city, it is clear that the main
reason for the failure to deal with overcrowding in Coventry was the
refusal of the Council to spend. There were fewer teachers per child
in Coventry compared with the average for the County Boroughs in England
and Wales, and less was spent on them, as Table
	 shows.
Table Four	 Comparison of Teachers and Salary Costs.
192611
Teachers per 100 pupil	 Salary cost
in average attendance	 per pupil
Coventry	 26.6	 141s 4d
County Boroughs 	 30.1	 161e Sd.
930Ii.
Coventry
	 30.2	 155s id
County Boroughs	 32.1
	 168s 7d
Source: Board of fliucation Public Elementary Schools in England. and
Wales 1927 and. 1931.
The gap between average expenditure and. Coventry's expenditure widened.
dramatically when it came to secondary education. A comparison of expend.-
iture on free places and. grant between Coventry and the County Boroughs as
a whole is given below:
Table Five: Expenditure on free places and grants.
Per 1000 of the
population
1923/4
Coventry	 £3 14s 01
County Boroughs	 £14 14s Ccl
Per unit of average
attendance
1a 2d.
2s 2d.
1926/7
Coventry	 £4 6s Cd.	 7d.
County Boroughs	 £14 15s 03.	 2s 2c1
Sources Coventry Higher Education Sub—Committee Minutes, June 1925 and.
May 1928.
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The main reason for the verymarked difference in the above figures
was the use of charitable funds.	 Fred. Lee, for many years Chairman of
the Education Committee spelt this out:
"A further aspect of the situation was that the cost of
secondary education of boys in the City to the ratepayers
was nil. They had never had to bear the cost of a Council
secondary school for boys. The secondary education of
boys had been defrayed. by past benefactors. They were
unique in any City of their size and importance...Supple-
mentary to that, in fifty years of technical education in
the City the only capital expenditure on technical educa-.
tion had been £6,000. They sent annually to the univer-
sities 12 -to 15 boys and girls from monies left by bene-
factors. Then there was the large estate belonging to
the Freemen, valued at £100,000 administered for educa-
tional and pensional purposes, together with the estate of
Sir Thomas White...." (52)
This favourable position was seized on to sustain a tradition of
paying less for education than most other cities. Ratepayers benefited,
but their children did not. The existence of the charities also created
an imbalance between the poorly supported primary, elementary and publicly
owned secondary schools, and. the two privately owned boys secondary schools.
From 1919 the city had two girls secondary schools, both converted with
additional facilities built on, and both very quickly became overcrowded.
An Inspector's report on Stoke Park girls school in 1922 stated
"The accommodation is overcrowded and the School has
already reached its utmost limit of expansion in the
premises as they are...the accommodation is severely
strained and there is a sixth form with no other home
for its work than a passage." (53)
In 1936 Stoke Parish rooms were let for the school, and a year later
-temporary huts were put up. The position at Barrs Hill girls school
was little better.	 The school had originally been the home of J.K Starley,
but was expected to house 436 girls by the l930s in cramped conditions and
lacking many facilities. It appears that the charities existed to support
boys' education, and the girls had to make do with the Education Committee.
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While this meant that the boys schools were better off for land.
and. facilities, it also meant that it was easier for a girl to get
secondary education in Coventry than it was for a boy. King Henry VIII
Grammar School was independent, charged. high fees, yet was not able for
most of this period. to achieve the stand.ard.s expected. of it, or at least
to acquire a reputation that mad.e parents seek it out. While the rest
of the ed.ucation system in Coventry was bursting at the seams in the years
after the war, the Grammar school had. less than 200 boys, and. this figure
included. a preparatory section. Reporting on the unsatisfactory results
from the Grammar School, an Inspector commented. on
"The failure of King Henry VIII to appeal to the wealthiest
of the inhabitants and. no marked. superiority in standard.
of attainment."
He went on to link its problems with those of the other independent boys
second.ary school, Bablake School:
"It seems very unlikely that King Henry VIII on its
present course will supply Coventry with a First Grade
School, and. Bablake with its present Assistant Staff
and. its large classes have a very long way to travel
in the Humanities before it gets in sight of a
position of this kind.." (54)
Ba'olake School appealed to the social forces that made up the
Coalition in Coventry - it was their school. As it was the Coalition
that ran the Education Committee, this meant effectively that Bablake
was financed. and. administered. by the city, but was still formally an
independent school and. could. therefore reserve places for the sons of
the Coalition. After the war the school faced financial difficulties
although its capital expenditure programme was covered. by the charities.
The Education Committee gave it substantial grants in the early l920s
with no strings attached. Most of the Governors of Bablake came from
either the trustees of the General Municipal Charities or were elected.
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by the City Council. 	 As some of the Coalition Councillors were also
tnistees about half of the Governors were councillors or aldermen. The
city's Director of Education, Harrod, was also a Governor.
There were similar links between the Coalition and the Grammar School.
Jhen the school asked for a grant to meet its deficit in 1919 12 of the 17
Governors were either aldermen or councillors or were appointed by the City
Council.	 In the 1920s, when money was made available to the Grammar
School, there were normally conditions attached, unlike the grants made
to Bablake. The Grammar School was seen as an ancient foundation that
catered for the county, while the more humble Bablake School was good
enough for the sons of the Coalition.
This fiction of independence allowed the Coalition to run the schools
without too close regard for the educational needs of the city. 	 As
Councillors the Coalition would arrange examinations to determine who
could go to secondzry school and provide free places or maintenance allow-
ances. As Governors, the Coalition would ensure that many of the children
who passed the examinations were not given places, and that places would be
provided for children purely on the basis of their parents' ability to
pay.	 In 1937 there were 172 special places made available to girls at
the two maintained secondary schools. (Special places meant that they were
either free or reduced in fee). There were only 40 special places avail-
able at the two independent boys Schools. (56)
Lack of places for children from working class homes created a peculiar
form of selection. Up until 1932 headmasters made all of their pupils
take tests in English and Arithmetic. The top ten per cent would then be
put into a second examination which was to see who would get the limited
number of places available.	 The system suffered due to the lack of
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external examiners and therefore a lack of stidardisation in the marking,
but a more serious defect was that it had built into it the assumption
that 90 per cent of the children were not up to the standard of secondary
education, and that only half of those that were judged to be of this
standard actually got places. 	 The need. -to preserve an elite and protect
the privileges of the Coalition was the basis of the system of selection,
instead of educational policy. The examination system was changed. in
1932, when it was necessary for children to take only one paper, but
entrance into the examination was no longer compulsory.
In the 1920s, only a very small number of free places were made
available in the boys' secondary schools - sometimes as few as 12 or 15.
In the l930s it rose a little, but was never more than 40. This was an
extreme form of streaming, and it paid off insofar as examination results
were concerned - a very high proportion of boys with free places did well
in the school certificatese(58) But in 1936/7 about 60 per cent of all
secondary school places for boys in the County Boroughs were assisted,
while the figure for Coventry was only 40 per
	 It was more
difficult for a working class boy to get a secondary education in Coventry
than almost anywhere else in the country.
Most of the money that was needed to pay for free places, or make an
allowance against the cost of secondary education came from the charities.
However, the low amount of expenditure needed served to encourage the
authority to preserve a parsimonious attitude to the small sums that it
did give out. An example of the way Coventry was lagging behind. many
other authorities was the outcry over the implementation of Circular 1421,
which did. away with free places and replaced them with means tested allow-
ances. Its object was to reduce public expenditure, and it provoked. much
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hostility from many councils where this happened. In Coventry the
limits for the new means test were more generous than the limits for
the free places had been, and expenditure on allowances rose as soon as
(60)the new scheme was introduced.
	 Coventry's payments prior to this
circular h1 been as low as had been legally possible, and after the
circular it continued to base itself on the lowest possible figures.
Several years after the circular had been introduced, Harrod reported
that the allowance system in the city was inferior to others:
"Investigation has proved that the scales of neighbouring
areas, including rural areas, where living conditions are
less expensive,are more generous in their assistance -to
parents than those obtaining in Coventry."
He concluded that Coventry's scales "Appear to work inequitably on the
parents of children residing in Coventry. ,,(61) The changes that were
made as a result only brought the Coventry payments closer to those of
nearby authorities, and certainly did not surpass them.
Capital expenditure on schools was also low for almost the whole of
this period. Coventry tried to carry through the reorganisation of ele-
mentary schools in 1926 without building any new premises, and this pro-
yoked, the Board of Education to summon Harrod. up to London to explain the
position. A memorandum of the meeting commented,
"One gathered from Mr. Harrod's general remarks that
industrially the position at Coventry was far from
unsatisfactory.	 There was, however, an 'economist'
element on the Council headed by the Deputy Mayor."
(62)
Harrod summed up the city's reorganisation scheme as "an attempt to make
the best of a bad job," and. said that no new elementary schools were to be
built until a boys' secondary school had been built. Although the Ed.uca-
tion Committee had resolved that there was an urgent need for a boys
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secondary school in 1927 no such school was commenced before the war.
In contrast to a weak elementary system and. a small and elitist
secondary system, the city had. a long tradition of providing technical
education for children. By the mid. 1930s Coventry had one of the best
schemes of technical education in the country, and the contrast between
this and. the secondary system was marked. Technical education provided
an outlet for those boys who had done well in elementary schools but could
not be found. a secondary school place. 	 It preserved the social distinc-
tions between secondary school pupils arid the rest, and it provided the
motor and engineering industry with a constant supply of trained youngsters,
some of whom would be selected to become apprentices.
Even in depressed trading conditions, there were many vacancies for
young workers in the engineering factories; the problems tended to arise
when the young reached the age of 21 and. expected an adult wage. One of
the results of this encouragement of young engineering workers was the
specialising in technical education at an early age. 	 In 1919 the Tech-
nical College set up a Junior Technical School which took boys from the
age of 13 to 15.	 IIany of them then went on to evening classes or day
release courses at the Technical College. The classes were very voca-
tional, and. it was no surprise -to discover that 90 per cent of the pupils
went into the engineering industry.(63) In addition, some of the elemen-
tary schools had advanced courses for boys and. girls who wished to stay on
an extra year to the age of fifteen. Again, these courses were very
vocational.	 An inspector who visited. the John Gulson School in 1921
found. that there was a poor supply of books and that the school was weak
on literary subjects, but had"done valuable pioneer work in the development
of experimental practical eãucation.t(64) These classes, and the classes
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at the Junior Technical School were clearly part of the elementary system,
and were not allowed to give certificates in case they were seen to be
challenging the secondary schools.
After the reorganisation of the elementary schools in the late 1920s,
a break was made between junior and. senior elementary schools. The Junior
Technical School began to take in children from the age of 11 onwards.
Because of the existence of this school and the importance given to it,
Coventry did not create a selective centrai school, which was supposed to
be an elementary school of an advanced kind, with the children taking
examinations.	 Such a school would cover a range of subjects, but the
only advanced elementary education in Coventry was technical education.
A small Technical Institute had been set up in Coventry in 1887, and
had expanded after the war. In 1926 it had been upgraded to a Technical
College which meant that it could offer Higher National Certificates.
It catered almost exclusively for boys who had finished their schooling
and who were on either day release courses or evening classes.
	 In 1927
there were 292 day students and 1,117 evening students.(65) Most of the
courses were to do with engineering, and the college was well supported by
local employers. In 1928 a Board of Education report commented on the
well—established and comparatively widespread system of day release which
(66)
obviously depended on good relations with the employers. 	 A further
report in 1931 again commented favourably on technical education in the
city, and set out as a model the apprentice training scheme run by the
College, and. which had the support of the CDEEA. 6	Boys were encouraged
to aim for responsible positions at either technical or executive level in
local firms, though the majority of courbe were concerned with craft skills.
The report also pointed out that nationally 90 per cent of engineering
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workers came from elementary schools, and that most secondary bchoo].
children, Technical College students or University students did not end.
up in the engineering industry. In Coventry it appears that most of
the boys and. girls at secondary school did avoid the engineering industry,
but most of the students at the Technical College, whether full or part
time, entered. the industry. There were thus three quite separate types
of education within the city. The mass of boys and girls got a rudimentary
education to the age of 14, and then left to get unskilled jobs; a small
minority went into technical training, some of them becoming craft appren-
tices, some rising to the heights of technical management; finally a
very small minority went through the secondary schools to careers mostly
outside the engineering industry. This arrangement suited both the employ-
ers and the Coalition, notwithstanding the fact that their aims were quite
different. Eployers were provided with both unskilled labour and young-
sters partly trained to be craft, technical or professional workers; the
Coalition reinforced its social superiority. Besides to a great extent
determining the careers of children the types of education reinforced the
existing social structure. There was flexibility between the elementary
and the technical - a boy who was prepared to make sacrifices and give up
his evenings stood a good chance of getting some sort of technical educa-
tion - but there was very little flexibility between technical and second-
ary education, which marked out people with school certificates as likely
to have a life in management in a different career to engineering, or in
a profession. Most of the engineering employers had come through technical
education, and they were not particularly concerned to acquire Grammar
school or Univeçsity students, for their enterprises.
The contrast between thegrandiose facade of.the new Technical College
built in this period and. the continued. difficulties facing old. and over-
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crowded elementary schools summarises the priorities of the Education
Committee, but it should also be pointed out that the Committee's habit
of parsimony was catching, and it took some effort to get the new College.
The College was originally to have been built in 1920, but had been the
subject of a number of postponements. The capital expenditure plans of
1929 proposed a new College at the cost of £140,000; a Board of Educa-
tion Official noted that while members of the Education Committee "are
the reverse of spendthrift," they were very keen on the College, which was
"strongly backed by the industrial interests in the Borough.It(68) Due to
the enforced cutback in education spending, the start on the College was
put back to 1932.	 In that year it was again postponed for a time, but
a decision was finally taken to go ahead in early 1933. Although the
majority of the Coalition group was in favour of going ahead, a strong
minority, the "economy group" felt that such large expenditure could not
be countenanced during an economic siump. It took all of the Labour
votes in the City Council, backing up the leadership of the Education
Committee, to get the scheme through. Once the decision had been made,
the new College was proceeded with apace, and was in operation by the
autumn of 1935. This provoked a comment at the Board of Education;
"Coventry, otherwise quite a good Authority, are so taken
up with the project of the erection of a large new Technical
College that they are apt to give rather too little atten-
tion to the needs of the new housing estates in the way of
P.E.S. accommodation; as you know, they have not a parti-
cularly good record in the matter of over—large classes."
(69)
Much of the cost of equipping the College was met by local employers, who
donated machinery for the workshops. Although the final appearance of the
building was somewhat grand, and outdid the appearance of the municipal
offices, -the prudent leaders of the City Council only allowed the new
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building to go ahead, because they had, not found a suitable empty factory.
In all of their dealings, the Coalition majority on the Education
Committee denied that they were engaged in politics. 	 On one occasion,
when Labour challenged, the appointment of one of the non-council members
to the Committee, complaining of a bias against Labour educa'tionalists,
Fred Lee, Chairman of the Committee, claimed, that party politics was irre-
levant, for
"Pl1 the years he had been on the Council and. the Education
Committee politics had not counted in education." (70)
For Labour, Stringer replied, that the Coalition were secretly political.
"The only difference as that the Labour Party admitted they were there
for a specific purpose."	 While it is true that there was hypocrisy in
the Coalition claim that they were above party politics, it is clear that
Lee believed what he said to be true. While presiding over an Education
Committee that sought, with some success, to preserve an elitist education
system based. on the segregation of children into winners and losers, Lee
did. not consciously pursue party political ends. The fact that so much
could 'be done unconsciously gives ax' insight into the strength of the
Coalition. There was a fixed assumption that such an elitist system
was natural. This view was strongly held by national politicians, most
educationalists, and, probably most people.	 It influenced. the Labour
Party, which concerned itself with attacks on 'the penny-pinching nature
of the Educational Committee's expenditure, and did not appear to appreciate
that the system of education as a whole served 'to boost the interests of
the Coalition and the employers.
The existence of large scale engineering encouraged the city to
develop technical education. The way it was done was left to the Coalition.
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which was not intimately concerned, with technical ed.ucation,but more
concerned with preserving the status of the boys secondary schools.
Technical education got low priority after the war, and. only blossomed
in the 1930s, after the post—war problems of the secondary schools had.
been overcome.
The division between employer and Coalition was responsible for the
strong economy attitude on the City Council. The commercial viewpoint
could at times triumph over the industrial needs of the city, as in the
postponement of the Technical College. In the long run the educational
system gave both groups what they desired, but all sections of Coventry
education were affected. by a penny—pinching narrowness of outlook that
came from some councillors and aldermen with commercial interests.
III Social Neglect
A reluctance to spend money has been noted as a strong feature of
Coalition policy in housing and education. However, this reluctance
covered all areas of municipal life.
The Coalition's policy was -to intervene as little as possible in the
industrial and commercial life of the city, and to provide social services
-that were in keeping with a hierarchical view. This meant considerable
reluctance to extend public services or to plan ahead. However, with
a rapidly growing city some innovations had to come, and the Coalition
was prepared. to build and plan when convinced it was strictly necessary.
On some occasions it was divided between those who saw the need to grad-
ually update municipal institutions and. strengthen public services, and.
'the "economy" group, mostly shopkeepers and led by Councillors Holbrook
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and Pazyne, whose alqmost -total view of municipal affairs was to keep
clown the rates. A typical Payne speech took place during a debate in
the Council over industrial pollution in Foleshill. 	 Labour speakers
had claimed that Courtaulds aM Stirling Metal in particular were a nui-
sance and a public health danger. Payne claimed that the Council already
did more than enough to protect its citizens:
"It seems to mee that this Council has to be the foster—
mother of -the child before it is born and until it dies,
l'that are its parents for? You want us to look after its
milk, its teeth, education, college grants, and then if it
happens -to be a bit mental provide it with a grand home.
The responsibility is the parents ! .	 So long as the Cor-
poration will relieve them of their obligations, so long
will they apply for grants." (71)
Payne's outbursts could be an embarrassment to his own side, but he enjoyed
some support, and was successful on a number of occasions in holding up
the spending of money.
The majority of the Coalition though reluctant to spend, recognised
the inadequacies of the city. 	 In an account of his travels in 1933,
J.B. Priestley found Coventry a surprisingly picturesque place:
"YOU peep round a corner and see half—timbered. and. gabled.
houses that would do for the second. act of the 'eister-
singer.'	 In fact you could stage the 'eistersinger 1 -
or film it - in Coventry.	 I Xiew it as an old place -
for wasn't there Lady Godiva? - but I was surprised., to
find, how much of the pas, in soaring stone and carved
wood, still remained in the city." (72)
An editorial in the MDT gave a less romantic view, and passed judgement on
the mismanagement of the commercial group:
"Coventry is now emerging from the shackles of a purely
utilitarian era, stretching back for a hundred years or
more.	 It has been an era of commercial revolution allied
with civic stagnation during which the city has been so
intent upon serving the machine that it has given little
thought to the service of its people. There are vast
arrears to be overtaken, for succeeding generations have
contented themselves in seeking solutions to the pro'1ems
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of the moment, and have given little thought to the
future in any other sphere than those of mechanics
and. invention. Generations of bad. planning - or a
complete absence of planning - slums, narrow streets,
overcrowding, sewers, all the trouble saved up for
the present from an unimaginative past, must be
tackled.."	 (73)
Perhaps this indictment was so strong because the newspapers contrived to
make it an attack on the Rev. Richard. Lee, a Labour Councillor, who was
complaining of the large sums of money spent on buying land to lay out
Hertford Street, one of the few central improvements that took place.
But Lee was complaining of the high prices paid. for the land. rather than
at the reform itself. Labour usually felt that when the Council went in
for this sort of operation, the people who dealt with it made excessive
profits.
xiother area of comparative neglect was the public libraries. When
an opportunity to build a new library arose in 1936 with the sale of the
County Hall, Frederick Smith wrote to the Ministry of Housing and Local
Government:
"The Public Library was presented to the City by a citizen
named Mr. John Gulson as long ago as 1890 when the popula-
tion of Coventry was only about 50,000. Except for corn-
paratively minor internal aclaptions, it has not been possible
to improve the Library since, though in the meantime the
population of the City has grown until it is now very nearly
200,000."	 (74)
At this time the city had. only four branch libraries, and three had been
provided by the Carnegie Institute. There was no art gallery, but the
usual practice existed - the Council was relying on donations for one.
Joseph limes Bates had. bequeathed. 20,000 for a gal lery, and. Alfred Herbert
had. promised a similar sum. But nothing could. be built until he died.
Coventry's citizens used their libraries with average frequency, but the
city spent less than average on the service. -
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This policy of economy meant that Coventry's ratepayers benefited..
In January 1925, Larkin, the City Treasurer said. at a Rotary Club meeting
-that "Coventry, at the present moment, may be described. as a ratepayers'
paradise."	 In that year, out of the 82 County Boroughs, it was
72nd. as regards the payment of rates per head. This happy position changed.
gradually, but for only one year in -the inter-war period, (1936/37) was
Coventry in -the top half of -the County Borough "leagie -table," and then it
was 41st. In most years the payment of rates was below that in most other
boroughs. The rates fixed. by the Council actually fell for much of the
1920s, and fluctuated. only slightly in the 1930s, but the increased payment
per head came from the gradual rise in rateable values. New houses and.
new industrial property meant that not only did the amount of property with
ra-teable value increase, but -the valuation as well. Thus in 1922 the
average amount of assessable value per head. of the city's population was
4 7s, a low figire, which put Coventry in 70th place in -the list of County
Boroughs. By 1938 the figure was £7 4s, and. Coven-try was 34th in -the list.
Between April 1930 and. April 1938 the total rateable value of the City rose
by £530,000, an increase of 57 per cent. 	 The total increase for all County
Boroughs was 15 per cent for -the same periode(76)
This meant that the amount brought in by a penny rate increased.
steadily, particularly in the l930s. The city was comparatively well off,
and could have afforded to pay more for its services. However, it should
be pointed out -that despite -the increase and. extension in the city, the pro-
portion of the rateable value of the city covered by the industrial section
dropped from 4.9 per cent to 4.0 per cent between 1930 and. 	 Thus
any rate increase fell overwhelmingly on householders, and for political
reasons the ruling group sought to keep the rates down. The other com-
parisons with other county boroughs are of interest. In the mid l930s
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poor relief expenditure in Coventry was only about one third of the
average for the County Boroughs as a whole, while expenditure on sewage
and sewage disposal was nearly double the average for the County Boroughs.
The first ccnparison reflected the relative prosperity of the city and
played a significant part in keeping the rates down, while the second was
probably one of the less attractive results of extending the city boundary,
for the rural authorities had been unable to cope with the flood of people
moving into their areas (between 1921 and. 1931 the population of Foleshill
Rural District increased by more than double - from 8,595 to 18,103).	 x1
editorial in the M]YP in 1936 stated:
"Coventry's suburbs are in revolt. From North, south,
east and west of the city complaints are pouring in con-
cerning quagmire roads, non-existent footpaths and a
score of other....pernicious nuisances."
	
(78)
On the fixing of the level of expenditure the ruling group leant
heavily on the officials of the Corporation, and in particular in the City
Treasurer, Sydney Larkin. In general he seems to have encouraged those
who were opposed to increased public expenditure on social services. In
1932, at a time when teachers, bus workers and. school caretakers amongst
others were having pay decreases imposed on them he wrote in his Annual
Report:
"It cannot, of course, be claimed that public economy is
a remedy for the whole of the troubles of the present day.
It can only be said that it enables the poorer citizen
bettor to meet their individual difficulties, while it
encourages the distribution of money in healthy channels
of trade to the benefit of the whole population." (79)
Only a few months after this new scheme for the salaries of the top offi-
cials, which gave them pay increases, was discussed in the City Council.
when Labour members pointed out that other Council employees had taken pay
outs, the officials were defended by Payne who asked:
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"How many people on the right (meaning the Socialists)
have the ability to judge the ability of the City
Treasurer? How many of them understand the consolidated
funds?....How many of us here know the value of the heads
of our department: We are only laymen. We don't under-
stand finance to any extent." (80)
It was the view of the ruling groups as a whole that whereas they did. not
understand finance, they understood it more than Labour, and so no Labour
members were allowed to sit on the Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee.
Labour was felt to be lacking in experience and balance when it came to money.
As Payne pointed out, a pay increase was
"A matter of mental balance. Five pounds a week to me
would be bankruptcy - to Stringer it would be living on
the Riviera."	 (81)
The heads of departments exerted influence not only over Councillors
and Aldermen, but over local goverriinent staff. Throughout the period there
was a large branch of the National and Local Government Officers Association
in existence, with negotiating rights, covering the salaried staff of the
Council. By 1938 it had nearly 800 members, and although a Joint Committee
existed for resolution of matters together with the Council and manual
workers, it seldom met, for Nalgo preferred to deal directly with the Council.
The General Committee of the branch ran the association, and branch meetings
were called infrequently.	 It was accepted practice to elect a head of
department to the position of Branch President, and other members of the
branch were usually senior officials. This may account for the very wide
differentials in salaries that existed. Under the new salary scheme of 1924,
heads of department received a minimum of 11,000 per annum with annual incre-
ments of £59 to a maximum of £1,500. But junior entrants at the age of 16
started on only £39 per annum, less than the annual increment of the top
(82)
grades.
The service also discriminated against women. Long salary scales
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meant that a male could start work at 16 and receive increments up to the
age of 31. Women reached their maximum at the age of 24. After that
they were expected to marry and leave.
Although differentials between senior officers and staff narrowed
slightly during the inter-war years, the union remained firmly controlled
by a small group of senior officers who endeavoured to ensure that rela-
tions with the Council were good. As a result, the union kept well away
from the organised labour movement in Coventry, and. devoted as much energy
to social activities as to union matters.	 In this respect it was similar
to the city's National Union of Teachers branch.
IV The Progressive Party
Given the tradition of municipal stagnation that had gone on through-.
out the century, the Coalition was faced with a tremendous task when it
tried to stem the tide of Labour advance in the mid 1930s. The Coalition
election machine was quite inferior to that of Labour's, it had a sorry
record to defend, and Labour could attack all along the line of social and
environmental services. Nevertheless, an effort was made to change the
Coalition's image and revitalise the anti-Labour activists. Shortly after
the Coalition had lost more seats in the 1936 Council elections, the
Midland Daily Telegraph announced the formation of' the Progressive Party.
The paper reported that the Coalition
"Felt that the time had come to replace the ill-defined
and loosely-knit relationship in which the anti-Labour
supporters stood, with a body that represented more
accurately their approach to the electorate and which would
remove any suggestion of political interest." (83)
This final relinquishment of Liberal and Conservative labels was an attempt
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to unite all possible shades of opposition to Labour without being linked
to "political activities of a national character." It was hoped that a
more d.ynamic organisation could be created, that the CDEEIA. could be more
closely linked. to the anti-Labour group without falling into conventional
party politics. The importance attached. by the new Party to wooing the
Association can be seen by the fact that the Treasurer of the new Party was
G.E. Roberts, a member of the CDEEA Executive. This role also gives a clue
as to the sort of support the Progressive Party hoped. to get from the employ-
ers. Rowever, old habits died. hard., and the Chairman of the new Party was
one of the leading Conservatives on the City Council, and. the Vice-Chairman
was a leading Liberal Alderman.
It is clear that the formation of the Progressive Party did. bring the
Coalition much closer to industrial leaders than they had. ever been before,
but the irony was that it came too late. Defeat achieved. a unity that
could not be built during the palmy days when Labour's challenge was small.
In 1937 the CDEEA was too concerned. with the rising tide of industrial
unrest to devote much time -to the new Party, but it would appear that sums
of money were paid to it. 	 Certainly the Party had a full time secretary,
and an election agent was established. well before the date of the municipal
elections. Its slogan "Elect a Business Government for a Business City"
suggests that it was trying to be more publicly identified. with industry
-than it had. been in the past.i'84) Unfortunately for the Progressive Party,
Labour only needed -to hold. their seats to win control of the Council, and.
this happened in November 1937.
The Progressives were able to put up candidates in every ward., something
they had not done since 1931, and they achieved their highest ever total
vote. But Labour did. also, and. a resigned. but bitter Midland Daily Telegraj
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commented.
"This result was in accordance with general expectations,
following on the large influx of labour from Socialist
areas during the past year." (85)
However, a later edition went on to attack the failures of the new anti-
socialist Party. It had., it claimed.
"A dearth of that type of candidate for municipal honours
which is truly representative of the commercial and. indus-
trial life of the city.
	 It has not been necessary to
penetrate far 'behind the scenes' to become aware of the
almost frenzied search for candidates that has taken place
during the months of September and October.....
....The work of the City Council has been carefully shunned
by many of our outstanding business men." (86)
The CDEE had. been able to provide material support but not a political
orgaaiisation nor the sort of industrial leaders that could win seats. 	 It
had. been obvious for several years that the Coalition was in disarray and
that there was a basic lack of will to mount an energetic resistance to
Labour. The Progressive Party had. been too late and too like its prede-
cessor to make a difference.
Evidence of the fact that there had. been a closer link between the
Progressive Party and the engineering employers from the minutes of a most
unusual meeting of the Executive of the CDEEA. Normally the Association
was most careful in any reference to political affairs, but here there was
considerable openness. The meeting was first addressed by G.E. Roberts,
who admitted that a number of voters in the recent elections had not known who
the Progressive Party was, and. he wished to initiate a discussion as to
whether a new name was needed. The minutes record that
"Mr. Roberts stated that he was bringing the matter before
this Committee as the Party appreciated. very much the con-
tributions which had. been given by the Manufacturers to
assist the Fighting Fund and it was felt -that they ought to
have some voice in the future policy of the party."
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Roberts stated that he had received £50 from non—engineering manufacturers,
but did not say how much had been received from the engineering companies.
Later in the discussion, Varley stated. that he could. use a trust fund to
donate £50 a year to the Party, but this again was over and above donations
from the companies themselves. It was stated by Roberts that about MOO
would be needed to maintain an office and. secretary each year, and. that can-
didates would. be expected to meet their own expenses ( this might explain
why it was always difficult to find candidates). The rest of the meeting
was taken up with a discussion as to what should be the name of the party;
the Anti—Socialist Party and. the National Party were names that were put
forward, but finally a resolution was passed. unanimously
"That in the opinion of the subscribing Manufacturers,
it is desirable to continue, under the title of
	 -
gressive Party, opposition to the Socialist Party in
power in the City Council." (87)
Minutes of the meeting were headed. "Strictly Private and Confidential" and.
it is easy to see why: the meeting represented a major breach in the claim
of the CDEEA. to steer clear of party politics. Not only d±d. they discuss
all aspects of the work of the anti—socialist alliance, but they made recom-
mendations to it and were its major source of funds. Nevertheless, a few
months later, the CDEEP showed that its general policy had. not changed for
it refused to comply with a request from the Conservative Party, saying that
it did not interfere in party politics. This embargo clearly did not cover
the Progressive Party. The support that was forthcoming from 1937 onwards
should not obscure the fact, however, that for most of the period there was
a major gulf between the commercial group running the city and the industrial
group who ran its economic life. while the commercial group showed absolute
loyalty to the ind.ustrial leaders, for the most part the support they received.
was sympathy rather than something more tangible. Many of the big concerns
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were just too big to bother with municipal politics, and all of the corn-
panies were aware of the dangers which too close a link with the ruling
group on the council would have on relations with their trade unions.
Both the Coventry Standard, the weekly paper, and the Midland Daily
Telegraph portrayed the Coalition and its successor in the most favourable
light possible, and sought to criticise Labour's programme. Like the CDEEA,
the papers made a distinction between local and. national political stances.
Although it would give prominence to the sayings and. doings of the Coalition
spokesmen, the Telegraph never actually called on its readers to reject
Labour and. vote for the anti-socialist group, though that was the obvious
inference of much of what was written. In the General Election, however,
it was not afraid to tell its readers to vote Conservative.
	 It became more
openly Conservative in general elections after the Liberals stopped standing
a candidate, and. after the formation of a National Government.	 On the eve
of the poll in 1935 and on the day of the election itself, the Telegraph
appeared looking like a Conservative propaganda sheet. It contained promi-
nent Conservative advertisements, a picture of Strickland. the Conservative
candidate, long quotations from his speeches, messages of endorsement from
prominent local industrialists, all over the front page, and. with a headline
"Maintenance of National Government Policy Essential to City's Welfare."
There was no reference at all to Labour or the Labour candidate on the front
page, and inside, the space devoted to Noel-Baker's speeches as Labour can-
didate was about a third of that given to Strickland.. There was also a
prominent report of a speech by Lord. luff a, the owner of the paperm endors-
ing Striokland . ( 88 ) The day after the election the editorial declared
"This is a great clay for gland.tt(89) Presumably Iliffe took more direction
of the newspaper's line when gener elections occurred, for until 1929 he
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was a Conservative M.P. and. from 1933 he sat in the Lord.s as a Conservative
Peer. At other times, the existence of a mass of Labour supporters who
also read. the paper may have been a constraint.
Relations between -the press and. the engineering employers appear to
have been cordial. There was little direct contact between the CDEEA and.
the press, at least on a formal level, though obviously the Association kept
the newspapers well informed. about its policies. One indiscreet minute of
the CDEEA, however, reveals a picture of great influence. The AEU had.
published. a statement complaining of low rates of paj in the city, and. had.
sent a copy to the Coventry Standard. Before publishing this, the editor
had. contacted Varley, who later reported.
"The Secretary stated. that he had. been successful in per-
suading the Editor of the Coventry Standard, firstly, to
delete the article dealing with the Union's statements
and secondly to consult him in future before publishing
any material dealing with labour conditions in the Eagin-
eering industry in Coventry." (90)
It is unlikely that the Telegraph would have suppressed. union statements,
but it certainly had a procedure of allowing employers' spokesmen to comment
on union claims, and the paper proudly gave much space to the achievements of
Coven-try companies and industrialists.
The well established. civic leadership had got into the habit of ruling
the city, and. as time went by, got into the habit of ruling badly. The
fact that a small social group could. dominate political affairs for so long
was a testament to the way power and. influence had been concentrated.. The
advent of power of the Coalition predated. by a long time the arrival of big
industry to Coventry. 1rhile accepting that there was common interest betweer
employers and. civic leaders the Coalition -tried to run -the city as far as
possible as if big industry did. not exist.	 ployers' needs were seen to,
but the Coalition was reluctant to face up to the social and environmental
14.9
consequences of the growth of large—scale engineering. The commercial
group could appreciate the importance of industrial development, but could
not come to grips with it.
	
It did. not have the ability or the will—power
to reconstruct Coventry as a modern engineering city. This was to be the
task of the Labour Party. What the Coalition had. done was to divert
municipal politics into a narrow range of financial preoccupations, and. so
ensure that a new administration would be needed to deal with immediate and.
pressing reforms. This diversion of municipal politics made it very diffi-
cult for the new Labour administration to use municipal power as a spring-
board for socialist advance across the city. A policy of holding back the
growth of municipal authority meant that the Labour Party found that political
control was less important than had been realised.
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CRAPTER SEVEN
The Labour Challenge
The Labour Party saw itself as the party of socialism, and was
battling for a socialist Coventry. 	 It represented. the outsiders, the
working class that had. been denied access to power and influence by the
Coalition. The Labour Party seeking power, therefore, was more than an
attempt to change leadership, it was an attempt to upset the balance of
class forces, and to dispossess the ruling group. Hodgkinson recalled
the emotional impact when Labour finally got a majority in November 1937.
"To us the clouds had lifted, the people had responded to the
appeal 'England arise, the long, long night is over.' O.r
dreams had become a reality, we had escaped from history and
saw the dawn of a new lay." (1)
Labour identified both employers and Coalition as part of the ruling
class. But it had difficulty in elaborating a strategr that would attack
both sections. It overestimated the strength of the links between these
two sections, and assumed that once in power it could dominate both. In
practice, it concentrated its aim on the Coalition. 	 Its gradual success
at a time of stagnation in the unions strengthened it in its belief that
it was the leadership of the Labour movement. This in turn encouraged the
view that winning political power was the way to deal with the ruling class.
Coventry Labour Party had few intellectuals in it; it contained
practical men and women who had socialist ideals but lacked a programme
of socialist action, and who developed a. habit of looking to their social
betters for leadership on national issues. 	 (Witness the selection of
Noel—Baker. Crossman, Edelman as parliamentary candidates). Its gradual
movement away from the trade unions encouraged it to concentrate on the
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need. -to create a modern infrastructure for an expanding industrial city.
In Hodgkinson's words, it was "A Party which claimed 'we will get things
(2)
done'."	 It was not a party that had analysed how power was divided.
between the -two ruling sections, nor had. it a stra-ter for putting power
into the hands of working people.
This chapter considers the slow and. gradual rise to power of the
Labour Party, and its actions once in office. 	 It does not give a full
assessment of Labour in control, for its plans had. barely been thought out
before war intervened.	 It also deals with the powerful Co-operative move-
ment in Coventry, and considers its contribution to the formation of a
working class consciousness.
The Labour Party
Despite the split in its ranks between pacifists and war supporters,
the Labour Party emerged from the war stronger than before, as its showing
in the December 1918 election proved. Although a long way behind the
Conservative, -this was a creditable performance for a first attempt. It
was followed up by a strong challenge in the local elections. However,
the Labour Party had to discover in the early l920s that enthusiasii was
not enough. Attention has already been drawn to the slowness with which
the Party established. an effective organisation with a full time organiser
and individual membership. There was also some confusion when it came to
standing candidates in November 1919. A lot of work had. been done to get
the Co-op to put up candidates, but, in the election Alice Arnold stood. as
an Independent in Swanswell and beat the Co-op candidate into second place.
Alice Arnold. presumably had not been chosen as a fit Labour candidate, but
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after she was elected she became a Labour Councillor. Arnold was the only
Councillor who was a socialist, and she did not appear to work well with
Wale and. Noseley; the Coalition singled her out for attack whilst comment-
ing favourably on the other two Labour Councillors.
Excluding Alice Arnold, Labour won five seats on the City Council in
1 919
. 
The next year the Labour vote was erratic, reduced in some wards,
but increased in others, but the opposition was much more united and Labour
won only three seats. In 1921 Labour could only put six candidates forward,
though two Communists stood as unofficial Labour candidates, and, although
the vote held up in the wards contested, no seats at all were won. Labour
did not even contest Stoke, which had. been won in 1919 and 1920. In 1922
Labour was defending the six (including Alice Arnold's seat) that had been
won in 1919. Eleven candidates in all were put up, and the total Labour
vote was greater than it had been in 1919. But the Coalition vote had
recovered, and. the two raling parties totalled. 8,000 more votes than Labour,
who retained only one seat, that of Alice Arnold. In the next few years
the total vote declined, with Labour winning two seats in 1923, none in 1924
and. one in 1925. Not until after the boundary changes in 1928 and a muni-
cipal election which saw every one of the 45 seats on the Council contested
at the same time, did the Party's fortunes pick up. In that year it won
11 of the 45 seats, even though the Coalition picked up most of the seats
in the new areas.
The best result was in 1929 when for the first time since 1919 Labour
won more than half of the seats - 9 out of 15. In 1930 and 1931 results
were disappointing, but from 1933 Labour began to achieve the sort of results
that led to the takeover of the Council in 1937. The period from 1920 to
1933, with the exception of 1928 and 1929, were years of defeat for Labour,
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and. saw the Party make no progress in getting local control, despite the
large majority of working people in the city. This failure contrasted
with the results in the general elections in Coventry. Although Labour
only held. the seat briefly, between 1922 and 1923, it was won again in 1929.
Only in 1931 with the formation of the National Government did the Labour
vote in the city recede. Lack of success in the local elections may have
been linked to the defeats suffered by the trade unions in this period, and
to the decline in trade union militancy. T.J. Harris claimed. that the poor
results were because the Party was so closely identified with the unions who
were "making trouble" in that they sought to protect their members. 	 The
Midland. Daily Telegraph thought that Labour had been branded with extremism:
"We know what extremist advocacy has been poured out in
Coventry since the days when the City was over—run by
Clyde deportees and. others; we know how certain leaders
of the revolutionary type have from time to time tried to
exploit the unfortunate unemployed or to interfere in
trade disputes....
•...1hat Coventry, like other places, wants is a clean cut
from extreme doctrines in respect of Labour candidates."(5)
The link with the unions however, was most likely the key to the poor showing.
The defeats suffered by unions in the early 1920s not only led to poor morale,
but to a great many people leaving unions and the number of activists falling
off. This must have affected support for Labour.
Although Party membership rose in the 1920s while trade union member-
ship went down, the Labour Party on the Council appeared to be closer to
the unions in the l920s than it was in the l930s. Of the nine Labour
Councillors who served between 1919 and 1925 2 were trade union officials,
3 were railway workers, and 2 were engineering workers. 	 Seven had close
links with, or were, manual workers, while 4 had close links with engineering
workers. Of the 31 Labour Councillors and Aldermen whose occupations can be
identified in the period 1936-38 only 7 had close links with, or were manual
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workers, and only 4 had close links with engineering workers. Up to 11
of the 31 were employees of the Co-op, 5 were classed as 'housewives", 3
were retired and 2 were clergymen. I6) These figares would appear to show
a move away from closeness with manual workers and unions, and perhaps
they do, but they need explaining. It soon became clear to the Labour
Party activists that they would be very lucky if they could keep their
jobs while representing Labour. Thus Hodgkinson was faced with a choice
between political activity and an engineering 	 Sidney Stringer
was also an engineering worker, but had to take a job with the Co-op. Alice
Arnold had to be found a Co-op job after she left the Workers Union. Bill
Halliwell, who with Hodkinson and Stringer could be called the leaders of
the Party in the 1930s, ended up with the Co-op, while Wale not only worked
for the Co-op for many years but eventually became its President. Thus
the Co-op became a refuge for Labour activists; it was the only source of
patronage to be set against the many businesses and charities to which the
Coalition had access.
It would be unwise to attach too much significance to the decline in
the number of manual workers who were standing for the City Council for
the Labour Party in the 1930s, yet the facts are of some interest. They
show that at last the Labour Party had developed the sort of group that
would be necessary for the administering of the city should it come to power.
The leadership was composed of pretty well full time Party activists, with
few or no direct links with other Labour movement organisations such as the
Trades Council or the unions. This allowed a more consistent attack on the
ruling parties to be organised, and an alternative programme worked out.
But it did mean that there was a division, not of sympathies, but of work
and personnel between the industrial organisations of labour and the political.
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It was more difficult for trade union delegates to play a leading role
in the party, as it had acquired a hierarchy of its own.
	 It is inter-
esting to note that this hierarchy, and. indeed the whole Labour structure,
was on a narrow base. Although Labour Party membership had. reached 1,000
in 1925, it failed to grow, and indeed fell off significantly in the late
1920s. In 1929 only 489 members were paid up for voting at Annual Con-
ference.(8) Membership fluctuated around the 500-600 mark for several
years after, and went up in 1933. By 1937 it was back over the 1,000
mark but then fell to below 800 for the next two years. For all but two
years in the 1930s Party membership was higher in Nuneaton than it was in
Coventry, and after 1937 membership was higher in Rugby than in the city.
It could. be
 that an exclusive concentration on municipal politics led
to the establishment of effective ward organisation as an alternative to
reliance on union organisation and this influenced membership. No doubt
the Party could look to the unions to provide helpers at elections, but
there was no sign of the Party running big events or attracting publicity
in the l930s at times other than election periods. The habit of organising
the big May Day rallies that once impressed the city collapsed with the
decline of the Trades Council and the defeats of the l920s and was never
revived. In Coventry, the gaining of a majority on the City Council had
become a real prospect after the 1930 election, but did not occur until
1937 and this protracted struggle for power may well have led to a concer-
tra-tion on the struggle in the Council Chamber and a neglect of the Party
membership. Moreover, the weakness of the Coalition made it easy to organise
election successes. With an established leadership in the Party that was
effective in putting the Coalition on the Council on the defensive, there
was no pressure on the leadership to expand.. No doubt Hodgkinson, as the
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only full—time worker for the Party, switched. the emphasis of his work
after he was elected. as Counoillor in 1928.
By the mid. 1930s the Labour Party in the city had. become a professional
body capable of, and expecting to, take power. 	 It was no longer dependent
on the unions, at least for personnel, arid, it survived the breakaway of the
ILP, as the prominent ILP members on the Council refused. to leave the Party.
But it was a small number of leaders backed up by a relatively small group
of members that relied on and expected only passive support from the mass
of its supporters. It did not involve workers in the way that trade unions
did, and. while it played an important part as the political expression for
many working people, it remained separate and. detached. from the experience
of struggle in the workplaces.
It should be made clear that there were no real political differences
between the Labour Party and. the unions, and that nearly all the unions were
affiliated to it. But failure to provide a leadership that presented a
social and economic face as well as a political one made the task of breaking
down the control of the ruling groups more difficult.
One side of the Labour Party that did. combine social work with political
activity was the Women's Section. The Party had a Central Committee for
women and ward groups. Some of its activity involved. raising money and.
organising socials and dances, while some was helping in the general work
of the Party. The women claimed that they played a large part in helping
Labour to victory.
II Labour Politics
During this period. Coventry changed. from being a provincial town to
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being an engineering city. The city extended. its boundaries taking in
new suburbs. The growth of population put pressure on the municipal
administration to provide the services and amenities considered necessary.
Members of the Coalition, coming from a commercial background., had. no
incentive to intervene in municipal life to improve these services. Con-
sequently theirrecordof adminis-tration was open to attack, and Labour
concentrated. on the maxly abuses and. the failure of the Coalition -to keep
up with national legislation.
Throughout the period. the battles between the Labour group and the
Coalition/Progrssives, and the issues over which the elections were fought
were the obvious ones of housing, education, the level of rates, the
environment and the need. to attract and. keep industry in the city. Many
of the bitter differences between the two groups were fairly technical,
based. on reports of sub-committees that seldom attracted attention. But
differences were not confined to policies. Labour brought emotion and.
sometimes fury into the Council Chamber, and. provoked scenes at many Council
meetings. The suspicion that Council members or friends were making money
out of contracts caused rows on a number of occasions in this period, par-
ticularly in housing, and the treatment of Council employees and contract
workers was seen by Labour as an emotional subject. Thus they attacked
the high wages of some senior employees, and. criticised the low wages of
many others, and. fought for many years for a minimum wage. The application
of national policies such as means tests led to some angry outbursts, as
did Coalition attempts -to cut the rates at the expense of social services.
Although Labour sought for an expansion of expenditure on social
services 1
 its financial policy was extremely cautious. Indeed, T.J.Harris,
who was its financial spokesman, had. a positive horror of borrowing, and.
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this communicated itself to others, particularly Hod.gkinson. Harris
felt that money for expenditure should be raised before the expenditure
went ahead, and devoted much time to considering how the municipal debt,
which was qiite modest, could be abolished. 	 On one occasion he argued
"That a debt—free city can be achieved without initial
sacrifice is not possible. But I do submit that a
debt—free City would so gain in administrative freedom,
in social well—being, in trading power, and prestige in
the councils of the nation, as to make any sacrifice
light in comparison." (10)
At the opening ceremony of the Hen Lane Housing Estate in 1932, at a time
when he was Chairman of the Housing Committee, he said
"It was a matter of concern to him that the houses
were put up on borrowed money, because it threw the
burden on the rates....every estate built became a
barrier to further development." (11)
This approach could have been a serious limitation on local spending,
but appears to have been channeled along more orthodox lines into attacks
on the Coalition for giving such a high proportion of the rates to money-
lenders, and suggestions for municipal enterprises. An election leaflet
in 1925 headlined the debt burden of the city, and. only a secondary item
referred to the rise in infant mortaiity.2) By the 1930s, however, a
more sustained and coherent attack was elaborated against Coalition rule.
The Party's manifesto of 1936 rounded on the claim that Labour would force
up the rates, and that the Coalition was the party of sound economic man-
agement. It pointed out that interest charges had reached the figure of
l/5d in the pound, and blamed Coalition politics:
"They say they are out for a 'stabilised. rate', to
secure which they cut necessary services, and borrow
again.... The whole trend of Coalition policy is
against falling rates, or even stabilisation at the
present figure.
They part with land cheaply which should be retained.
They have entered into commitments that must force up
expenditure, and then borrow, the full weight of which
is reserved for tomorrow. They do not plan, they wait
upon events." (13)
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This last criticism was about the strongest that the Labour Party could make,
for i-b was aware of the fact that Coventry was still physically incapable
both
of meeting the demands put upon it b/ industry and an expanding population.
The centre of the city was medieval in layout, though most of the buildings
lacked any appropriate charm. The only major attempt to reorganise the
city centre had been the building of Corporation Street and this had been
held up by shopkeepers, and attacked by Labour Councillors for some of the
contracts that were awarded.
On a more positive note, the same manifesto claimed.
"There are means of saving, open to the Labour Party that
is (sic) a closed book -to the Coalition.
New estates are being opened up all round the City at
the moment. The profit goes to private individuals,
the expenses to the ratepayers.
Bulk buying, a municipal printing department, a mimi-
cipal bank, a levelling—up of the assessment of licensed
houses - these, -to quote a few of the many methods, would
save the city thousands of pounds annually." (14)
Labour reacted against the traditional Coalition position that
local government should be as restricted as possible and that private
enterprise should be the only type of business in the city by imagining
Coventry as a large multi—faceted co—operative. The Party opposed the
selling off of land in the city centre, though it did not always support
the use the Coalition put to the land it acquired. Elaborate plans for
a new city centre were considered. even before Labour came to power.
Hodgkin son
"urged that members of the Council should look forward
to the day when central property would be required by
the Corporation for laying out the centre of the city
on the lines followed by Continental cities." (15)
The Party was thus ready -to see the opportunities created by the devastation
of the Second World War, but in the l930s all this was too much for a
361.
Coalition that objected -to spending money on paving footpaths unless this
was felt to be essential.
The Party was by no means satisfied that existing municipal institu-
tions were properly run, and. the party line Was well expressed by Harris
in 1933, discussing the annual report of the Electricity Department
"He was rather proud of the establishment, because it
showed how very efficient a municipally—owned concern
could be, yet when they wanted to judge its working
results it was only fair they should take in comparison
other concerns. What he felt about not only that
department but all their departments was that instead
of the common people for whom the Council were the
trustees getting the real advantages of the concerns
they were passed over to a very small and select class.
Mr. Harris discussed the balance sheet of a private
company, and. stressed what a board of directors could
do for a comparatively small number of people that
Council ought to be doing for the whole of the citizens,
and the reason it was not doing so was that small and
select groups of people, while not having the advantage
of investment in the concerns managed to milk it, so
they got the advantage of an industry developed in the
city." (16)
A Labour administration would charge the industrial concerns the full rate,
he promised. Other points in Labour's programme of municipal reform were
the full implementation of statutes dealing with housing, welfare, slum
clearance, and. health, better and. more available education, better houses,
and. more of them, and. cheap transport as a public service.
Labour's policies in the years prior to winning power were attacked
by the editorials in the Midland Daily Telegraph, surprisingly, for not
being radical enough. Of the 1936 manifesto the paper commented,
"It is one of the most moderate - even modest - docuients
of its kind ever placed before the electors by the Socialist
organisers." (18)
It went on to claim that it was a long way removed from the extravagant
policies argued by the Party in earlier years, but there is little to
support this claim. Throughout the period the goals were the same, better
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housing, social services, public transport, municipal enterprises, ed.uca-
tion. A year later the Midland. Daily Telegraph returned. to the same
theme. Although the Labour policy was unchanged. it was then described as
"terribly unsocialistic - and. how extremely unoriginal." The paper ingen-
uously felt -that
"The Socialist Party finds itself in that inevitable
difficulty created. by the fact that Coventry, which owns
the whole of the public services, is already as highly
socialised. a community as any sane local legislator
could. hope to make it." (19)
Although this argument was rejected. by the Labour Party, it ecioed. some
of its statements, as it sought to persuade the electors that Socialism
was not an alien creed. In 1937 the Party began to produce a four page
newspaper printed in London, containing mostly nationally produced material,
but with some local items as well. It was distributed free about four
times a year. The election issue in 1937 pointed. out to its readers:
"The safeguards of municipal health and sanitation, the
facilities of municipal recreation, the opportunities of
municipal education - all these are so much a part of
our lives that we rarely stop to think: 'Why, this is
pure socialismi'....
....Municipal Socialism is, in fact, characteristically
and typically British." (20)
'Pure Socialism" or not, the Labour approach was essentially one of
quantity rather than of quality. Socialism meant more social services
and muriicipalisation. But the role of a local authority in relation to
the mode of production and political institutions was not considered. A
small example was the claim of the Party that it had. been instrumental in
getting the Technical College for the city. This directly contradicted.
the Coalition claim, as it was the ruling group at the time the decision
was taken. Labour pointed out, however, that at the decisive Council
meeting in 1933, the Coalition group had been split,anô. that 17 had. voted.
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for a further postponement of the scheme, while 15 had voted for an
immediate start. All of the Labour members had voted for the College,
and so it had. been accepted. But there is no record of Labour spokesmen
seeing the Technical College as part of a system of education designed to
rigidify the social system and serve the interests of the large industrial
formations. While criticising the Coalition for being lukewarm to the
College, another issue of the Labour Party paper attacked the shortage of
secondary school places in the city, claiming "It is as hard for a boy to
get into a secondary school as it is for a rich man to get into the Kingdom
of Heaven."	 There was no comment that the creation of the College was
(21)designed -to continue this state of affairs.
The two main influences on the Labour Party were non—conformism and.
the ILP. Besides having two cler&ymen on the Council in the 1930s, the
Rev Richard Lee and the Rev A.R. Bromage, men like 1ioseley, John Fennell,
Harris and Briggs were lay preachers. Lee was also a member of the ILP
as were Hod.gkinson, Stringer, Ellen Hughes and a number of others.
	 Indeed,
for all of' the period the local Party relied on the IL? to provide the
intellectual leadership. But the ILP itself d±d. not have much of an inde-
pendent life, and. its weaknesses were clearly seen when it decided in 1932
to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. In Coventry, all the Leaders of
the Labour Party who were in the IL?, except Richard Lee, refused to leave
the Party, and. left the ILP instead.(22) Lee himself soon returned to the
fold. The ILP contested. a number of seats in the municipal elections in
the years 1932 to 1936, but only secured more than a handful of votes when
they fought in wards not contested by the Labour Party. Their intervention
in Cheylesmore prevented Labour from winning the seat in 1933, and according
to Hodgkinson the intellectual level of the Labour Party declined, but the
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overall effect was minor.
A smaller group in the Labour Party came from either the Communist
Party or the Minority Movement. Bert Cresswell, who became the first
Lord. Mayor of the city, and. Robert Thompson, who became Chairman of the
Labour Party for a time in the late 1920s, had. both been active Communists,
and. Halliwell and W.I. Thompson had been in the Minority Movement. But
Marxist ideas did not have a big hold on the local party, nor did the Left
Book Club. According to Hodgkinson, who was its secretary, it only had
20 subscribers in the ±t.(23) The Party was not then strong on theory,
but prided itself in the practical values of craft engineering that men
like Stringer and. Hodgkinson had. acquired. Their remit was to win power
on the City Council, and. use that power to reshape and extend the social
services. This meant that the Party would change the political rules,
but not challenge the political system.
III	 The Co-operative Movement
The Labour councillors were aware that they were excluded from
charities and. institutions such as boards of governors, but in the co-op-
erative movement they had a charity of their own. As already mentioned,
a large number of Labour counillors ended up as employees of the Co-op.
Not only was it prepared to employ them in the first place, but it was
accommodating in allowing them time off to do their duties. The Co-op-
erative movement is the most neglected wing of the labour movement, and
though there are many good reasons for its neglect, it had a unique and
peculiar relationship with trade unions and the Labour Party.
Throughout the l920s there were bitter controversies in the Coventry
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Co—operative movement about its role in political affairs. The war had
seen the imposition of Excess Profits Tax and a restriction in the supply
of food. -to the Society, and this had convinced many leading members that
its place lay firmly within the ranks of the Labour movement. At the same
time the Society was growing, and needed to be put on a more businesslike
footing, and. some of the ideals that had. survived from the nineteenth
century were being ciuestionedL. The Society was no longer a self—help
club but a business with shops, coal depots, bakeries, a dairy, a warehouse,
and committees and assembly rooms. In 1920, as a symbol of the change,
the word "perseverance" was dropped. from its title.
A number of different positions were taken up within the Society in
the early 1920s and. fought out over the next half dozen years. One position
was put forward by the Rev W.H. Oliver, the Society's education secretary,
editor of its monthly journal The Wheatsheaf until he left the city in 1934,
and author of a short history of the ociety.(24) Oliver was upset by the
decline in the ideals of the Society, and wished for a return to the values
of the first religiously inclined. pioneers.
	 In 1926 he wrote
"Today, self—help, which formed a place in the designation
or title of many of the older co—operative societies, like
other such words as 'Ecpiitable,' 'Provident,' or 'Persev-
erance' is assigned to the dustbin, simply because of our
coming too respectable in putting co—operatidn into practice."
(25)
He hoped to see a time when the society's shops
"Will exist for something more -than the purchase of
commodities - they will be the rendezvous for social,
physical, mental as well as economic pursuits." (26)
He encouraged discussion about the aims of co—operation in the journal,
and also wrote about his own dislikes - smoking, drinking, greyhound racing
and credit. He was particularly upset at the decision of the society in
1927 -to set up mutuality clubs, which allowed members to purchase goods on
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credit. In a debate on the subject at a conference in Rugby he said
that this practice was "undermining the moral fibre of its members" and.
a reversal to "the despised tailyman" system.(27) He received no support.
He was responsible for the survival of educational classes, many of them
vocational for co—op employees, but he showed no interest in trade unions
and the Labour Party and consequently was listened, to but not regarded as
very influential. His views that the co—operative movement was quite
different from other retailers was generally accepted by the movement, and
he was able to write in his history that after the war
"It became the SOciety's policy to apply the truth that
capitalism is the very negation of all that life stands
for." (28)
He was not prepared to go beyond this into practice and advocate that the
society should join the Labour Party, as he felt it would become an adjunct
to that body.
A second position was put forward by those who objected to the
growing tendency of the society to support the Labour Party. This group
saw the co—operative movement as a peculiar sort of trading body that should
have no political strings attached. Perhaps the leading exponent of this
position,until he died in 1927, was George Jarrams. He was secretary of
the society for nearly 40 years. Only a few months before he died, he
attacked the Management Committee for giving relief to striking miners in
1926. He said that the affiliation with Labour had caused the co—op's own
employees to strike at that time, and that it was an outrage that credit had
been given to miners families. The Management Committee, he wrote,has a
duty to "supply coal to their members, and not support strikers, and as a
(29)result throw a lot of members out of work."
	 He was supported by a
number of other active co—operators, in particular Mrs. Varney, who corn-
plained to The Wheatsheaf:
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"By allowing ourselves to become submerged by politics we
are throwing away the substance for the shadow. The co-
operative society is a trading body pure and. simple, in
which the forces operative in the trade unions can have
no place." (30)
Another allegation which received some support was that affiliation to
the Co—operative Party and the Labour Party, and the granting of relief
to the miners had cost the society a lot of money. Although this group
claimed they wanted the co—op to be politically involved, it is possible
that some of them were linked to other political parties.
	 One of the
candidates in the elections for the Management Committee was Mrs. Ivens,
wife of a Liberal Councillor, and proposed by a Conservative CouriQillor.
Earlier Councillor William Jones had been President of the Society for 29
years, and when he was replaced in 1918 it was by another Liberal, James
Clay, who refused to accept that the movement was a working class one. He
wrote,
"Our real social enemies are within the gates, not
outside.	 There are influences at work within the
movement which are endeavouring -to close the 'open
door' of co—operation, and confine its energies and
benefits to the section of society sometimes defined
as the 'working class.' " (31)
In 1927 a Mrs. Jackson who had. been elected to the ucation Committee
was asked to speak on her election address to the Women's Co—op Guild,
where it was reported she had a rough time, for she advocated that money
should not be spent on political issues. Clearly the elections had. been
hotly contested, for the report said.
"Several leaflets were quoted which, in the opinion
of members, as expressed during discussion, were merely
printed 'dope' for the uninitiated.. Many questions were
asked and warmly discussed. 	 Owing to the inability to
answer several questions through not being sufficiently
conversant, with the principles of our movement, Mrs.
Jackson said she was not a walking encyclopaedia, and would
prefer to answer them another time." (32)
If this was part of an attempt to wrest control of the Co—op from Labour
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supporters, and. it was seen as such at the time, it died. out in a few years.
A completely different position was put forward. by an influential
group of Labour Party activists, with the co-operation of a number of
Communists. They defended. co-op policy to give credit to strikers and.
their families, and. indeed. criticised. the Coventry society for not doing
enough, and. in particular not being prepared for the 1926 General Strike.
Halliwell, Stringer, Harris and Hodgkinson all took an interest in the
society, and. stood. for posts, but the most active on the left until he died.
in 1930 was probably W.E. Wood., Vice-Chairman of the Management Committee.
He was a member of the ILP for some time, and. although he left it because
he found. it too radical, he still saw the co-operative movement as an in-
tegral part of the working class movement as a whole and. with a political
role to play alongside the Labour Party and. the trade unions. He agreed.
with Mrs. Corrie who was one of a bunch of future Labour women councillors
active in the co-op in the l920s, when she wrote that
"The movement came into existence because of the exploit-
ation of the workers; that exploitation exists today in
a much more subtle fozm." (33)
It is interesting to note that members of this group worked. closely with
Communists in the co-op arid. that the most successful Minority Movement
group was its co-op group.
The final position was that of Harry Wale. He agreed. with Oliver
that the movement was an alternative to a capitalist system, and. agreed
with other members of the Labour Party that it should. have political affil-
iations. But he felt that good. business sense should. come before political
gestures, which should. always be costed.. He wrote in May 1925 that
"We have, I think, learned. our lesson in the past quarter
of a century's experience of onslaught by the private
capitalist. And. that lesson is that co-operative concerns
must use every legitimate device of efficiency and. sound
finance which is used by our competitors. If we attempt
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uneconomic experiments in trade and finance, whilst our
competitors are straining every nerve to reduce cost and
improve distribution we shall go down. We may have dein-
onstrated. some admirable communistic or Utopian principle,
but we shall lose our public. And our splendid co-opera-
tive machine is not to be risked to test doubtful ideals
and. individual dreams. Let the idealist and dreamer work
out his salvation and solve his problem by the methods open
to him as a political unit of the State." (34)
This was a criticism of the left's desire to see that strikers got a lot
of credit, but also of Oliver's ideals, and that person soon replied,
sadly pointing out that
"The ideals of the pioneers have become dimmed by commer-
cial success....So long as the dividend kept high and. came
regularly, no thought Was given as to whether i-b was ob-
tained quite fairly; whether justice had been done to
employees, whether goods had been manufactured under the
principle for production for profit or production for use.
So the self-seeking capitalistic spirit has crept in." (35)
Wale, who was backed by many of the long-serving members of the management
committee and. the Society's management, was the object of some attacks,
principally from the left, who felt that more decisions about the future
of the Society should be taken at members' meetings. He replied attacking
"The outdated and confused idea that democracy means
control of each item of executive action by the mass of
members or people in general."
"Inasmuch as the co-operative movement has chosen to
meet the capitalist system on its own ground, to compete
with i-b from within, with a view to the elimination of
that form of competition which ceaselessly threatens
the hard-earned standards of comfort of the great majority,
then co-operation cannot afford to sacrifice the smallest
measure of energy, brain and initiative - so necessary for
the stniggle, to shibboleths of democracy, ill-defined or
meaningless." (36)
Wale, as the voice of management and. efficiency in the Co-op was extremely
important. He had been influential in the Co-op while he was an employee,
and became President of the Management Committee in 1924. For two years
he was both President and employees, but in 1926 he retired. At a presen-
tation ceremony he was described by Noel-Baker the Parliamentary candidate
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as the "Napoleon of the Co—operative movement in Coventry," but he had
better luck than Napoleon when it cane to sting in power, for he remained
President of the society until
Wale's position had the most success in the 1920s and practice d±d not
change in the 1930s. The other more radical members of the Labour Party
were able to get the Society to work closely with the Party, but not -to use
its full weight in political or industrial matters. Even achieving this
proved to be difficult.
Prior to the ware the Co—op had kept out of involvement in politics,
but it was not immune to the rash of radicalism that spread in the post
war years.	 In 1919 the Society allowed two women members of the Ivlanage-
men-t Board -to stand as Co—op candidates in the Guardian's elections, the
first time it had happened in its history. This was repeated later in
the year, in the municipal elections, when two candidates were put up after
agreement with the Labour Party. But this agreement did not extend to
Alice Arnold, who won her seat against the Co—op candidate. This was the
last time separate candidates stood, but the Co—operative Representation
Committee which had been established in 1919 remained in existence for
several years. The Society had affiliated to the Co—operative Party, and
instructed its Representation Committee to draft a resolution on the aff 11-
iation of the Co—op Union to the Labour Party, which was approved by the
Management ommittee. 8
	The Society also agreed to send a delegate to
the local Council of Action in September 1920, which had been set up to
agitate against British intervention in the Soviet Union, and. this step was
sufficiently radical to attract the attention of the Daily Mail, which made
some hostile comments about the Society's relations with the Council, which
contained trade unions, and socialist and. communist supporters. () However,
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the Society would not openly work with the Labour Party, nor allow its
offices to be used by it.
After the war for the first time, the Society began to extend credit
to strikers and. their families. In the Railway strike in 1919, it was
agreed to supply goods on credit if the need arose, but this was not taken
up.	 It was the fourid.ry workers at the end. of the year who were the first
beneficiaries of the Society's new attitude. Their strike began in Septem-
ber and. lasted for four months. 	 In October officials of the union, the
Friendly Society of Iron Founders, sent a deputation to the Society and
pointed out that they had six hundred members in the district on strike.
It was agreed to allow groceries and provisions up to 10/- per week per
family for an initial period of four weeks. This was eventually extended
throughout the rest of the strike, and mean-b that in all the Society had
given £3,600 worth of credit, at a fairly difficult trading period.° It
was less easy, however, for the Society to recover the money lent out, arid
the Foundry Workers had to be given several extensions of credit. This was
used as a weapon by those members who were opposed to special terms for
trade unions, as was the £1,000 credit given to the Miners' Federation in
the strike of l921.(41) The miners' union found this very difficult to
pay off, and. offered to mortgage the Bedworth office bo pay off the debt.
By the time of the General Strike only a small portion of the debt had been
repaid.
This political and. industrial involvement produced a backlash, prob-
ably based on the costs to the Society, and in July 1921 a motion was
debated and. passed at a members' meeting which committed the Society to
avoid all political action and to disaffiliate from the Co-Operative party.(42)
No political activity took place until 1925, when an attempt was made to
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again affiliate the Society to the Co—operative Party. A members meeting
voted down this proposal once more, but in 1926 a different approach was
made. George Hodgkinson gave notice that he would move a motion at the
next members meeting,
"That -this quarterly meeting of the Coventry and District
Society Ltd.. agrees that £25 be put aside for political
purposes and instructs its Management Committee to seek
affiliation to the Coventry Labour Party."
This was keenly contested, and at the meeting only carried by a vote of
286 to	 Even before the issue had been discussed, the Manage-
ment Committee had. taken legal opinion, and showed some reluctanme to accept
the resolution when carried*
	 Later the Society was advised by solicitors
that it was in order to pay the £25, and that it could affiliate to the
Labour Party, though it was claimed that it would not be affiliated in the
same way as a trade union, and. no delegate could commit it to Labour policy.
F\irther, army more payments would need additional resolutions. The Manage-
ment Committee then voted by a majority to implement the resolution.
Thus at the time of the General Strike the Society was still unclear about
its role, and this was reflected in its contradictory response to the strike
as shown in Chapter Five.
The step formally brought the Coventry Co—op into the local labour
movement, where it remained. for the rest of the inter—war period. At
national level, the Co—op Party soon moved much closer to the Labour Party,
so affiliation became less important. Locally, there were several years
in which the opposition to Labour in the Society fought hard, but by 1929
the battle was over.
	 A sign of the new relationship was the appearance
of regular reports from the City Council in The Wheatsheaf, mostly written
by Sidney Stringer, and giving a labour interpretation of events. 6
 This
close relationship continued throughout the l930s. In Coventry as elsewhere
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there were monthly supplements provided with copies of Reynolds News
which besides giving general information about -the co—operative movement
and political events, publicised the work of the local Society. Many of
the general articles in this supplement put forward Labour policy, and the
supplement that appeared at the time of the local elecU.ons in 1936 was a
Labour election special. The grip of the Labour Party on the Society
attracted a further attempt by other parties to move in, for in the late
1930s, the Conservative Party employed a full time agent to deal with
organisation of party supporters in -the Co—ops in Coventry and surrounding
towns.	 He did met make much progress.
Prom 1929 onwards, the Society therefore played a role in the labour
movement primarily as a consumers' organisation, but with social and educa-
tional attachments. Besides its growing trading concerns there were Mens'
and. Womens' guilds, a Junior Guild, and a variety of groups such as football
teams, an orchestra, and choir. It also had an educational department,
-though most of its provision was vocational training for employees. Its
voluntary education programme included drama and art education. While
associated with the Labour Party, -the Society did not play a major role in
politics, nor did the Labour leadership expect it to.
	 It provided a base
for labour leaders, it brought a number of women co—operators into Labour
ranks on the City Council, and it showed that a large organisation associa-
-ted with Labour could. be
 reasonably successful in commerce. This last
point was the most important, for in a modest way the Society was conscious
of providing an alternative to the shopocracy that so dominated the city
life.
But the challenge was a muted one. Until "disrupted" by the labour
influence, the Society's leadership in and after the war saw it as providing
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a service to its membership and not as presenting any challenge to estab-
lished. authority or values. 	 When the Labour influence was dominant, there
is no evidence of a clear strater for the Society, other than to provide
credit when times were hard. and look after its employees. Yet the influence
of the Society was considerable. It was very much assumed in the unions
and the labour party that the Society was its own special creation, and
that active people in the labour movement would automatically give their
custom to it. PIe vision of profit-free trading of co-operative enter-
prise and. sharing the surplus was an important part of the Labour programme
for the city, which envisaged Coventry as a multi-faceted co-operative society.
But the co-operative venture that already existed was expected to support
Labour without really contributing to it and the Management Committee in
practice was left to put commercial interests before others.
A study of the activities of the Society particularly in the 1920s
is of interest as it shows the growing confidence of some people in the
labour movement in their ability to run the Society as an integral part of
the movement. It shows leaders of a major area of economic activity accept-
ing, albeit reluctantly in some cases, political direction and leadership
from organised labour. It also shows how under the influence of members
like Wale and. Oliver, the Society could be both a pra&tical example of working
class providence and. a repository of untouched. ideals. In both cases, the
Labour leadership expected it to play a subordinate role.
A Labour Majority
In November1937 Labour became the majority group amongst the City
Councillors. In September 1939 the country was at war, and within 14 months
much of the old Coventry was destroyed. Labour did not have sufficient time
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to put most of its plans in-to operation and. -therefore only a provisional
assessment of its performance can be made. The Party began its rule by
breaking some of the old. customs. Half of the Aldermen were up for re-
election, and would normally have been elected. on the basis of seniority.
Bu.t -this would have meant that the Progressives, through having more of
the longer serving Aldermen, would. have had. a majority in Council despite
Labour having a majority of Councillors. This was clearly intolerable to
Labour, and so all of the retiring Aldermen, with the exception of the non-
party Colonel Wyley, were replaced by Labour Councillors, whose numbers
were subsequ.ently made up in by-elections. 	 At the same time, Labour
took -the post of Deputy-Mayor instead, of letting the retiring Mayor take it.
At -the Council meeting that saw these changes, there were enthusiastic
scenes, and. "Vociferous cheers from the body of the Ha1l."
	
Clearly,
there was a new broom sweeping clean.
A special Council meeting was called. to enable Labour to establish a
majority on all the Council Committees. Labour members were appointed to
administer the General Municipal Charities , while Hodgkinson hinted. that
they had been used in the past "with a view to securing a vote or two at
election time."° )
 But the most important decision was to establish a
Policy Advisory Committee of five. This contained. the Liberal Flinn and.
the Conservative Prentice, and three Labour members, George Briggs, George -
Hodgkinson and. Bill Halliwell. Sidney Stringer, who had been leader of
the Labour group, had become Deputy Mayor, so -the post went to Hodgkinson,
with Harris his deputy. In the words of Hodgkinson, the new Committee
"Became the hammer and the anvil, in the forging fires of
controversy which beset the City Fathers, and gave it some
fame in the annals of English local government. The Comm-
ittee became the spearhead. for initiating new policies,
gave head. and tail to them and. when -they took shape, then handed.
the responsibility for administration to the appropriate con-
trolling committee. This scheme-inaking Committee had. two
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great virtues; in the first place as its name implies
i-b "ad.vised" and restricted. its function to one of an
advisory character and secondly it had. no power to spend
money, though it put in train a lot of spending and con-
trolled a lot into the bargain." (51)
The theme running through the changes imposed. on the Council was the firm
establishment of power in the hands of the Labour group, and. its leader-
ship, (Hodgkinson, Stringer, and to a lesser extent Halliwell). Neverthe-
less, the Policy Advisory Committee, which was viewed. with alarm by some
Council Officials, served as a useful forum and mobilising centre.
Throughout 1938 the Party worked. with and on Council officials to
produce a plan for the renovation and. expansion of the city services.
Towards the end of 1938 this took the form of a five year capital works
programme. This was not a comprehensive redevelopment scheme, but was a
much more ambitious drawing together of plans that had been achieved in the
past. Over £l- million were allocated with nearly a third. of this going
to education. New streets, road. and bridge improvements, the extension of
Council premises and the development of parks and open spaces, including
the purchase of Coombe Abbey, were the other major features. The emphasis
was on the planning of the future of the city, and the controlled expansion
of the services provided by the Council in an efficient way.
However, it was a different sort of issue that attracted the most
attention in the first year of the new Labour administration; the establish-
ment of a minimum wage of £3 per week for all Council employees. This was
particularly supported. by Halliwell, who coupled the aim with attacks on the
high wages and. conditions of senior Council employees. Halliwell appears to
have been one of the few Labour members who put more emphasis on using Council
control on behalf of the immediate aims of the workers, rather than on planning
for the city as a whole. But he had the full support of the Labour group
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over the minimum wage, and. this was carried. through, giving some workers
substantial pay increases. It also created. a lot of difficulties with
differentials, got the Council in-to trouble with various Joint Industrial
Councils, and. even provoked. hostility from some trade union leaders.
In its first year, Labour had. taken a number of ambitious programmes
in hand, and. also had. shown it could run the Council without upheavals and
with the support in one form or another, of the Council officials. Its
establishment of an image of responsibility allied to progressive change
helped to secure it in power at the November 1938 elections. The opposition
was clearly d.emoralised, for five Labour seats were not contested, though
Labour did. not gain any extra seats.
All the social reforms that were in hand. were stopped by the ware and.
the social reconstruction that Labour promised had to wait until after 1945.
It is therefore not possible to assess the strategy of the Labour group by
looking at its achievements in this period. There has to be a certain
ount of conjecture as -to the implications of its strategy.	 Its long term
objective was a "Socialist Coventry" and this was construed. as a large
measure of public ownership and. control of land, houses, schools and local
industries such as gas, transport and electricity. Through the operations
of a network of control, the restricted privately owned concerns could be
allowed to run, provided they carried out their public responsibilities.
The Party did not consider a policy that involved extending control to the
big factories. The strategy did. not amount to an attempt to establish
working class power in the city in the sense that the Labour activists,
through the Labour Party, would be able to impose -themselves on other classes.
The development of a specialised, professional group of Labour leaders without
a mass party behind them, had inevitably loosened personal ties between the
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Labour leadership and. the trade unions. This inevitable division, which
occurred at a time when the unions were struggling and the Labour Party
growing in strength, encouraged some of the Labour group, and probably all
of the Labour leadership to see the Party as the sQie centre of political
commitment. The unions were no longer expected to provide political
leadership, nor were they expected to have strong political views. This
point comes over clearly in George llodgkinson's discussion of the problems
facing the new Labour administrators, particularly the problem of loyalty:
"How to be just and. reasonable in the certain conflict
generated. in power politics bedevilled our attempts to
be fair to those who had elected us and to whom we owed
fraternal loyalties. Were to be the milch cow for the
trade unions and to what extent would they share the
responsibility of government? In the city of militant
trade unionism and. with the fighting spirit in our own
blood how could we comport the clashing forces? The
Labour Party had. power in its hands, it had socialist
aims, but could it be said that our affiliates had
socialism in their hearts, and were we to be activated
by "divine discontent" or a scramble for a penny bun?
I sometimes wondered how far a vested interest - we
normally slung at the other side - influenced the
leadership since it appeared to me that they had. not
registered the significance of the switch of power."
(53)
In the circumstances of the late 1930s it was easy for the Labour
leadership to come to see the Labour Party as the repository of socialist
ideals, and. the trade unions as interested only in morey, and to conclude
therefore that the new administration had to stand firm against those who
might "Kick the 'powers that be' into making sectional concessions, of
unilateral advantage.
	 This meant that while recognising that the
trade unions had "a leg in the camp of government" the Labour group would
have to distance itself if need be from the unions and consider the long
term interests of the city as a whole. It also meant a detachment from
the unions, and a view of being above union/management conflict. The
minimum wage for Council workers showed that Labour was prepared to make
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strong gestures of support -to its constituents, but this was an isolated.
event in a period. when Labour was much more concerned. to develop a strater
for urban renewal.
An exple of the uneasy relationship between the new Labour administra-
tion and. the unions is found. in Hodgkinson's account of attempts to involve
workers in the management of the public industries in the city. Joint
Production Committees that were presumably purely consultative were set up
in the gas, water and. electricity undertakings, but it was decided. to go a
step further in public transport and have two trade union liaison officers
who would be "equal partners in -the management of the transport services.
But there was clearly reluctance on both the part of management and union to
make the scheme work successfully, and the Labour administration had. to take
vigorous action to avoid strikes of bus staff. Hodgkinson concluded that
"Despite Labour rule a municipal boss was no different
from any other kind., the worker a wage earner with no other
end. in view than the bottom line in the pay packet." (56)
Another conclusion is that Labour was coming in from the outside, seeking
to reconcile two conflicting bodies with a plan that neither of them had
initiated.
Although a group of Labour Councillors, people such as Halliwell, Lee,
Arnold. and Griffiths, prior to November 1937, had frequently seen issues in
terms of an emotional commitment to the working class, there was no sign of
opposition to the leadership's policy of seeking to put itself above class
commitments. Although Halliwell did. clash with the other leaders during
the war, it may not be correct to see him as one who represented a coherent
opposition to the rest of the leadership, at least not before the War. Lack
of opposition in -the Labour Party meant that insofar as there was controversy
and debate over socialist strategies it was between the Labour Party and the
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ILP and. Communist Party.	 One view based. a s-trater for socialism on a
series of administrative measures in the city, while the other put the
main emphasis on working class seizure of power at the point of production.
What does not appear to be present in the city was an overall policy that
might have gone some way to reconcile these views by seeing control of the
city as the first step in a wider strater of the working class in its
progress towards full state control. As it was, by the late l930s the
gulf between the city Labour Party and. the revolutionary left was of such
an extent that there was little debate; each group was working in its own
field in its own way.
With remarkably little opposition, the inter-war period saw a con-
siderable shift in the relationship between the Labour Party, the trade
unions and. the working class. The Party had moved from being the political
expression of the trade union movement before the war to being a parallel
organisation to the trade unions after the war, to being a body above the
unions in the late l930s. At all stages there was still a strong partner-
ship between Labour and the unions, but in the 1930s this needed to be arti-
culated and exajmined., while in the l920s it was being taken for granted.
This meant a changing relationship with the class as well, from being the
political expression integrated into the social and industrial life of the
class to being the leadership that also claimed the right to administer to
the needs of the class. The Labour group saw itself as a working class
group in the sense that most of its members came from a working class en-
vironment, had ideological commitments to working class points of view and.
sought to redress the balance in civic affairs towards the working class:
the group however 'did not seriously think of itself as the working class in
power, or even as the tribunes of the working class. In power it was a party
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from the working class that yet had responsibilities to other classes.
The mobilisation of the working class, other than at election times, was
not a major aim as it was not essential to Labour's strategy. The Party
expected. al]iegance from the unions and. the Co—op; it required. domination
rather than partnership.
The Labour Party had insufficient time between coming to office at
the end. of 1937 and the outbreak of war in 1939 to demonstrate how great
would be the change between its rule and that of the Coalition. However,
it had. done enough to show that there would be major changes. For the first
time in the history of the city there was in power an administration that
examined the social needs of the citizens and planned a series of measures
to deal with them.
While this was a major achievement for the labour movement, the cir-
cuins-tances of this change jn the fortunes of the city need to be enumerated.
In the first place the collapse of the labour movement after 1920 had kept
the Coalition in power after its social base had. declined. in importance as
the city became a major industrial centre. Labour took control in Coventry
later than in most other industrial centres. 	 Secondly, by the early l930s
the Coalition was more or less finished. It had pretended that Coventry
was a nineteenth century town for many years, but the pretence had to end.
It was incapable of facing up to the needs of an industrial city, and. its
leaders were unwilling to undertake this task. The final point therefore,
was that the Labour Party was the only organisation that could. undertake
the task of bringing Coventry's municipal undertakings into line with the
needs of an industrial city. New housing estates, schools, environmental
services were important if industry was not to outgrow its surroundings.
By 1937 Coalition neglect was in danger of becoming an embarrassment
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to industrial employers. It was ironic that the Labour Party was needed
by the employers to provide a city for industrial workers to live in.
Of course the employers saw Labour as a threat. But the neglect
shown by the Coalition was also a threat. The neglect by the Coalition
produced a Labour Party caught up in the need for social improvement.
This, together with the widening division between Labour Party and. trade
unions pushed the Party into the equivocal position of the Party of modern-
isa-tion and efficiency. This no doubt encouraged working class self—
confidence, but supported rather than challenged the role of the engineering
employers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Housing in Coventry
Chapter Six looked, at the way the education system in Coventry
developed under Coalition leadership, and the way the system was used
to preserve Coalition power. This chapter studies housing policies
in this period in a similar way.
One difference between education and housing was that the Labour
challenge was greater over housing. In the immediate post-war years
"the problem was acu-te and highly visible, and. was seized on by the Labour
opposition. The interest of Labour was further heightened by the exist-
ence of tenants' organisations and the clash at Stoke Heath with the
Housing Committee, with the strong implications of Council corniption.
Unfortunately for Labour, over the period as a whole the issue of
housing was used against it, and. emerged as another bolster to Coalition
social and. political dominance. 	 In 1919 the Coalition, apparently un-
willing to carry out the new Housing Act which gave priority to Council
building, took the daring step of vacating the Housing Committee, and.
leaving Labour in control of the new policy. The policy eventually coll-
apsed, partly due to non-cooperation from private builders, and although
in Coventry Labour could claim a significant achievement it was linked with
this ill-fated scheme. This enabled. the Coalition, when it re-took control
of the Housing Committee, to justify Council neglect of building, leave
the field open to private builders and. concentrate on slum clearance.
Labour came back strongly over the delays in slum clearance and, the mount-
ing waiting lists, but was too late to prevent housing policy appearing to
be a success story for private enterprise.
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I	 Housing Problems
The basic aim of the Labour Party was to increase the stock of
houses available to working people. It was felt that most privately
built houses were out of the reach of workers, so the solution lay in
building council houses for rent. This policy was seen as important
in showing the community as a whole that local intervention in social
conditions could work, and that municipal socialism was a practical prop-
osition.	 In practice, this meant pushing for more housing estates,
trying to break the links between the Council and. the builders, expanding
direct works, and. raising the quality of working class houses.
The Coalition view was that council houses were a burden on the
rates, and. an interfering encroachment on private enterprise. It was
alive to the importance that could be attached to a successful municipal
enterprise, and sought instead to encourage working people to buy their
own houses. This was to be done, as we saw earlier, through the local
building society, the Coventry Peiinanent Economic. The Directors of this
body had to be men of substance, and. contained in their ranks a number of
Aldermen and Councillors, none of them from the Labour Party. A patern-
alistic building society and a strong group of local builders were the
alternatives to council houses. The Coalition believed that market forces
and private enterprise represented. the best value for the working man.
The Labour Party and the trade union movement, in pointing to the inade-
quacies of the city's housing, were challenging the dominance of the
merchants and manufacturers in the running of the city.
The trade union movement attached. as much importance to housing as
did. the Labour Party. Trade unionists had joined with Poole and Farren
and a number of Liberals to push the Councils into providing a small number
391
of houses at Narrow Lane in 1907 and. in 1910, the Trades Council had.
joined with the Co—op and the Labour Party to establish a Joint Comm-
ittee on Housing. The main aim of this body was to push for more and.
better houses from the Council, and for proper tovn planning schemes.(1)
After the war, the Trades Council and a number of unions lobbied the
Housing Committee for more council houses. 	 xiother important initia-
tive had been to campaigu against rent increases during the war, and to
attempt to police the Rent Restriction Act when it was passed, by setting
up a Tenants' Defence League and publishing information about the Act.
The Trades Council claimed in 1920 that "Thanks to the activities of the
Tenants'Defence League, hundreds of exactions of illegal increases of
rent have been thwarted2) It encouraged. the formation of council
tenants' associations which seem to have existed. throughout the period
on most of the council estates.
Although an extension of council housing was the central part of
Labour's programme, it is not clear whether they paid much attention to
the mechanics of council housing. 	 For most of the period they accepted
a policy of excluding undesirable tenants from council property. Only
towards the end of the period did Labour leaders accept the need to dis-
criminate in housing for the people who could not afford to occupy
council homes. Mrs. Thompson, a Labour Councillor, claimed that
"subsjd.jsed houses up and down the country did not meet
the need of people who required houses. 	 It was part of
the inequality of the whole social system...Their Housing
Committee, as a matter of business, had had to institute
something in the way of a means test, not to keep out
people whose wages were too big, but to keep people out
whose wages were so small that they might get into arrears
with their rent. She was utterly dissatisfied with the
whole method of municipal housing." (3)
Several years earlier, Massey, the Medica1 Officer of Health,
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commented on a similar problom:
"Council houses are alloted. to 'suitable' tenants.
It is in the interpretation of the word 'suitable'
that the public health worker and the housing admini-
s-trator do not see eye to eye. By the former the
word is applied, to families who urgently need re-
housing because their present environment is pre-
judicial to health. By the housing administrator
the term 'suitable' is applied to those families
seeking Council dwellings, who can well and regul-.
any pay the rent demanded therefor. These two
views are irreconcilable for the very families
whose existing environment is worst are most em-
barrassed financially." (4)
Thus, until the slum clearance programme got under way, the pro-
vision of council houses did not help the people most in need, and even
the slum programme only dealt with those people who were in the clearance
areas.	 The problems of the low paid, of the socially deprived families,
the problem families, the very large families and the very small families
could not be settled without special provision being made, and there is
little evidence to suggest that the Labour Party had given the issues
much consideration. Instead, with only a small stock of council houses
available, it was the administrative approach rather than the social work
one which was adopted. The result was that council tenants were sometimes
treated as second-class citizens. .An example is the fact that everybody
wishing to move from a clearance area had to have all their possessions
fumigated whether they came from infested homes or not. 	 This was a
humiliation for many working class families.
However, while a vigorous council house building programme by itself
would not have solved all of the city's housing problems, it is clear that
the lack of an adequate pool of council houses put a severe strain on the
city for the whole of the inter-war period. 1Ioreover, as we shall see,
when council houses were built, they were subject to many delays.
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Between 1914 and. 1939 the population of the city nearly doubled
from 119,000 to 234,000. 	 About 37,000 of this increase was due to the
extension of the city's boundaries, but the high birth rate, and most
important o± all, the migration into the city, meant that the population
went up almost every year. Only two falls in population were recorded in
this period, in '1920 and 1921, and this was primarily due to a discrepancy
between the figures kept by the Medical Officer of Health, and. the Census.(6)
There was therefore a constant pressure on the authorities to ensure
that new housing could. be found throughout the period. Though constant,
the pressure was not even, for migration fell sharply between 1919 till the
early l930s. There were two periods of high pressure - the years immediately
after the first war, and the years immediately before the second. The
problem was greatest during the first period, as at both local and national
level there was little experience of conducting house-building programmes.
it is difficult to quantify the extent of overcrowding in Coventry.
Many people who worked in the city lived outside its boundaries, and. al-
though part of the housing problem, they did not figure in any of the stat-
istics.	 In 1921 over 14,000 people, mainly from Bedworth and Exhall areas,
to the north-east of the City, were journeying into Coventry every day.
By 1927 there were over 17,000 of these commuters, and. a growing number of
people who lived in the city and went to work in factories outside.
A major difficulty is the lack of acceptable criteria in defining
overcrowding. It was not until 1935 -that the Government adopted official
standardc.	 There were two possible definitions of overcrowding. In the
first place, overcrowding existed when two persons of above ten years of age,
and of different sexes, not living together as man and wife, had to share
-the same bedroom. 	 Alternatively, overcrowding existed when the 'permitted
_3 91i.
number was exceeded..	 In determining the permitted number, infants under
one did. not count, and children under ten counted. as a half. All rooms
were taken into account when drawing up a permitted number, except those
-that were less than 50 square feet and the number permitted was arrived
at by allocating one or -two people per room depending on marital circum-
stances. If either of these standards were broken, then a home was
overcrowded. Both methods were open to criticism. The first excluded
overcrowding of -the same sex, -the second. allowed for a permitted number
in every room, not just the bedroom. Massey, -the Medical Officer of Health
commented on -the 1936 Housing Act that its standard was low but that a legal
definition of overcrowding was a noticeable advances(8) A thorough aurvey,
using -this definition in 1936, found -that 4,808 people in Coventry, 2.5%
of -the population, were living in overcrowded conditions. The worst over-
crowding was in Longford, Radford and Walsgrave all new suburbs. However,
other surveys suggested. -that overcrowding was a bigger problem. One in
1923 of -the population density in -the city found. that counting every room
in a dwelling and counting every member of a family there were 8,349 people
at more than two to a room - 6.4% of -the popuiation.
Other statistics, to be -treated cautiously, are available as a result
of -the maternity welfare service. Every year, the Annual Health report
no-ted -the number of visits made -to mothers and babies, and recorded -the rent
of the property and whether overcrowding existed.. Several -thousand mothers,
mainly working class, were visited. each year. Overcrowding, defined as
more than -two persons per bedroom, presumably including all ages, was found
to be very common,indeed, in 1921 55.8% of homes visited were labelled. over-
crowded. The proportions fluctuated somewhat from year to year, and
there was a considerable reduction after 1925. By 1931 the figure for
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overcrowding was down to ll.2%.0) This reduction must owe something
to the housing programme, but also to the increased use of maternity beds
in city hospitals, especially after the opening of the Gulson Road City
Hospital in 1930.	 In that year, there were 379 expectant mothers booked
in municipal hospitals, and a survey of their reasons for having children
in hospital showed that 313 or 83% did. so for various reasons connected with
(11)
overcrowding.
Official figures understated the extent of overcrowding. This was
acknowledged by Snell (the predecessor of Massey as Medical Officer of
Health) when he wrote in 1920 "It is common knowledge that a considerable
amount of overcrowding still exists, and that a large number of people
occupy lodgings who would otherwise be accommodated in separate houses12)
These people were sufferers of overcrowding whether they appeared in the
figures or not. That this was common knowledge can be seen by the attention
given to the problem by local politicians and the Medical Officer of Health.
Considerable national attention was given to the whole question of
housing even before the war was over, and it was clear that the Government
was expected to take the initiative in tackling the housing problem as soon
as the opportunity arose. Coventry would clearly have to formulate building
programmes as soon as Government policy was known. However, just at the end
of the war the Council's Housing Committee found itself engaged in a serious
dispute with the tenants from its only large estate, which led to serious
doubts as to whether the Housing Committee was capable f initiating a
housing programme.
The Stoke Heath Rent Strike
The estate of 600 homes at Stoke Heath was built during the war with
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Government assistance, and. occupied. in October 1916. The land was
originally owned. by the Ministry of Munitions and. the houses were built
in the parish of Stoke Heath, outside the city boundary. A tenants'
association was quickly formed. and. a short rent strike in 1917 produced.
a rent reduction. 13)
The tenants still felt, however, that the rents on the estate were
too high, and they were angered at the badly constructed houses and roads.
The May 1917 agreement that had ended the rent strike had. been that there
would be no further reductions until 31st March 1918; having had the
estate in existence for a full year, the Housing Committee would. be  in a
position to see if they could afford another reduction. March 31st came
and went however with no information being sent to the tenants' association.
Complaints to the Housing Committee received the reply that certain matters
were still outstanding with contractors and that final figures were not known.
In the following eight months, the -tenants' association sent a series of
requests for information, without receiving satisfaction. Finally, a mass
meeting of tenants at Stoke Heath decided on 24th November 1918 to begin a
second rent strike.(14)
Initially, the strike was -to get information out of the Housing
Committee, but once under way, it soon became a strike for a rent reduc-.
tion. It -took the tenants' association several weeks to decide how much
they wanted the rents to be reduced to, and. eventually they came up with a
figure of 2/il off all the rents. As the three types of houses on the
estate were assessed at 7/il, 8/il and 9/il, such a demand was so great as
to be unrealistic, and would have made the rents at Stoke Heath much cheaper
than for the other council houses. The Housing Committee offered. to take
the case to arbitration, but this was rejected by the tenants until all the
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information they wanted about the estate was provided for them.
The rent strike was virtually solid, and this no doubt facilitated.
the final appearance of the first full year's figures for the estate, which
caine out eight months later in December 1918. A mass meeting of tenants
elected four delegates to meet the housing Committee to discuss the figures,
and. as it was the day of the election, many of the tenants then formed. up
behind. their banner and went off to vote in the Nunea-ton constituency.
The following day, speakers from the estate visited other council
properties, and it was agreed. at all the other small estates to form a
united Stoke Heath and Municipal Dwellings Tenants' Defence Association.
The newly—organised bo&y began pressing for relief from "the excessive
(16)
high rents" charged for their "Inconvenient dwellings." 	 The meeting
of the deputation and. the Housing Committee made no progress, as the
Committee was not prepared. to offer any reduction.
On January 14th, after seven weeks of the rent strike, Councillor
Collington, Chairman of the Housing Committee presented its repozt to
Council. He estimated that in the year 1919/1920 the expenses of the
estate would come to 113,704 and. the income from rents to 114,365. This
would. give a small profit, but only after knocking of the first £900 of
the repairs bill for the estate. In future years, the tenants would have
to meet the whole cost of repairs through the rents. These were estimated
to be about £1,800 a year, and the one year concession had been made "owing
to the inconvenience caused to Tenants by the unsatisfactory condition of
the Stoke Heath houses." Other items of expenditure that had to be covered
by the rents were poor rates, sewage, water, taxes, street lighting,
insurance, rent collecting and bank charges, plus £2,152 sinking fund to
pay off the capital expenditure, and. £7,207 interest on loans. A tenant
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justly complained that the estate would cost the Council nothing and that
"in some 60 years the ratepayers will have this estate free of all costs
to them, ,,(l7)
The tenants were being made to shoulder the entire burden, including
the extra charges that arose from building during the war. They were
particularly annoyed that repairs were added to the rent bill. As they
were already paying comparatively high rents they felt, not unreasonably,
that they were entitled to trouble free accommodation and a clean environ-
ment. As this was lacking, they not only had -to suffer the inconveniences
but had to pay for them as well.
Before long, complaints about the state of repairs at Stoke Heath
developed into a full scale attack on members of the Housing Committee
and the contractors who had built the estate. However, although the
Housing Committee lmew the strength of feeling, it refused to offer any
reduction. The two Labour Councillors on the Committee, Poole and Wale,
showed concern at the financial burden of the tenants, but made it clear
at two Council meetings that they thought the rent strike should be called
off. Poole in particular was most emphatic; "It was about time," he said,
"the Committee told these tenants quite plainly that
this no rent—strike business had got to come to an end
(Hear Hear).	 It should go forth to the tenants and the
public that whilst the Committee had given every consid-
eration to the matter and. had shown every desire to meet
the tenants - and. they had met them by making two reduc-
tions - it was not at all likely that the rents would be
reduced, and that the Committee would insist on maintain-
ing their position and seeing that these rents were paid.
(Hear Hear)." (18)
But the two Labour Councillors found. themselves in opposition to
large sections of the labour movement as the dispute dragged on and
and
relations between the tenants/the Council deteriorated. The
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leaders were publicly supported by the Trades Council, the CEJC, the WtJ
and other local unions. 	 It also attracted messages of support from
unions and tenants' bodies throughout the country. A. Read, Chairman
of the Stoke Heath tenants was able to declare that "They had thousands
of Coventry Trade Unionists behind them, and the eyes of many parts of the
(19)
country were on Stoke Heath." 	 A mass meeting at Pool Meadow was
attended by 6,000 people, and had a wide range of local labour movement
speakers.	 Speakers pointed to the wider significance of the struggle,
and to the need to strengthen the Trades Councils' Tenants' Defence League.
James Read, the late secretary of the CEJC, attacked -the design and con-
struction of the Stoke Heath houses, saying they "represented the Coventry
City Council's opinion as to what was a suitable house for those people
(20)
commonly known as the working class."
	
The tenants also had the
support of Banning-ton and Hook, the two other Labour Councillors, both of
whom paid visits to the estate - something that Wale and Poole do not
appear to have done during the dispute.
The solidness of the rent strike led to charges from the Mayor and
others that there had been intimidation on the estate. Tenants' leaders
denied this, and pointed out that they knew of a small number who were
paying and. were not being victimised. There was at least one newspaper
report of effigies being burnt, but nothing to suggest that anything other
than strong moral pressure was used. The tenants' association operated
through mass meetings, and these were normally very well attended with as
many as a thousand people at some of them, and. with unanimity of views
between the leaders and the tenants.2	 The estate was still somewhat
isolated from other houses, and. this no doubt strengthened the sense of'
community.	 It also made it easier to have large meetings, which were
called, by ringing bells and blowing bugles.
The Housing Committee, faced with a united front, began to threaten
the tenants. A letter from the Town Clerk on 8th January 1919 concluded
"that unless the arrears of rent are paid at once proceedings by distraint
will be taken for their recovery." This was read. out at a tenants' meeting,
and it was recorded that "when the last paragraph, relating to distraint
was reached. there was much groaning and hissing. ,,(22)
The Council meeting on 14th January called for an enquiry by the
Local Government Board, and the end of the rent strike, and. in sending
this information to the tenants, the Town Clerk wrote that the strike was
very damaging as regards the provision of working class housing in Coventry,
which are so urgently necessary." The tenants' association insisted "that
they were helping the city by insisting that houses like those at Stoke
Heath were not only not worth the rent charged, but were not the sort of
houses that municipal or any other tenants required." 23 In February,
distraint proceedings were taken against 10 of the tenants, including Read.
At the County Court, the Registrar granted the Corporation the right to
distraint, but held the orders over for one month. 	 Councillors were not
pleased with this; ones Gorton, declared "by the time we can execute them
(the distraint orders) we shall find sufficient goods and. chattels to pay
a fortnight's rents" instead of the ten weeks which was owing by this time.
He went on to claim that '!not only did the tenants clear out owing rent but
they even sold the key for 30s.,,(24) These comments did little to resolve
the dispute.
The Council. meeting on 14th January also brought out into the open
charges that some members of the Housing Committee had been acting as sub-
contractors at Stoke Heath, and were partially to blame for the bad state
of houses on the estate. The newspaper report of -the meeting commented.
on the high attendance - some 28 out of 48 being present - a comment on
the state of the Council after five years without an election.
Wale, who had been attacked by the tenants for not calling for a
rent reduction, made a long speech justifying his position, and. launching
an attack on the Chairman and Vice—Chairman of the Housing Commit-tee at
the -time -the contract was placed. These two, Councillors Howells and
Nicholls, while still on the Council, had long since stopped at-tending
either Council or Housing Commit-tee meetings. Wale went on to attack
the contractors, Alban Richards and Co., as "a name of evil repute in the
City of Coventry today." The Government Architect, responsible for the
scheme, had seldom been present, and as a result "a lot of things crept
into the scheme that were never intended by the City or Architect." The
Corporation's fair wages clause was violated, as Was the decision not to
allow sub—contractors to operate without written Corporation consent. The
Chief Clerk of the Works had been very bad., and he cited. cases of bad work
on the houses, including one house where the ceiling had fallen down six
times. He concluded:
"So far as Stoke Heath was concerned, it was a case of
vultures to the feast. Every jerry—builder in South
Wales came here and had a share in building thee houses
and one of the most regrettable features was -that certain
private companies, in which were interested certain mem-
bers of the Council, were also sub—con-tractors."
Councillor Or-ton also criticised. some of the people involved in the
scheme. "Persons who made enquiries as to how the scheme was proceeding
were threatened with proceedings. Personally he was threatened with a
libel action.	 One was not allowed to go into the scheme at all to see what
was going on." He had continued to make enquiries, but "was accused by a
prominent member, (of Council) who was connected with the scheme, of being
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contaminated, by some of the Labour leaders." 4nother Councillor called
for an investigation saying "If something was not done to help and assist
the scheme it would mean the death blow to municipal housing in Coventry."
Poole supported Wale's allegations and declared. that "Disgraceful and. d.is-
honest practices have gone on in connection with the scheme." Eventually,
the Council agreed unanimously on the need. for an enquiry and on arbitra-
tion by the Local Government Board. Although agreeing to go to arbitra-
tion, the Council continued to refuse -to accept a rent reduction, and.
carried on with distraint ord,ers.(25)
The decision by the court to postpone distraint opened. the way to
a settlement. The tenants agreed to go to arbitration, and the first
stage of 'the Inquiry was heard. before a Local Government Board officer on
27th February. The tenants were represented by their own barrister,
while the Town Clerk put the Council's case. He again claimed that any
reduction in rent would. have to be met by ratepayers. He pointed out
that the contract was awarded to Alban Richards and COe because their bid
was much lower than any others.(26)	 The tenants' case was also reiter-
ated. They felt the rents were too high, the buildings poor, and objected
to have to pay for the whole cost of the estate, which included. items such
as a new road. and £2,400 for builders' huts. Both sides agreed that the
Government ought 'to provide more funds for the scheme.
	
Both Poole and
Wale pressed. for a full enquiry into the way the houses had been built:
"Councillor Poole warmly remarked that unless this or
some other enquiry went thoroughly into the question of
construction there were those on the City Council who
would. press for another and full enquiry. (Hear Hear).
'And if we don't get that it will be heard of in the
House of Commons.' "
Nicholls and, Howells were not present, and the Inquiry was postponed to
hear their views. The tenants' association made it clear that they would.
not be bound by the decision of the Inspector from the Local Government
(27)Board, but that a final decision had to be made at a mass meeting.
By the time the Inqiiiry was resumed, on 12th March, a report of
the Clerk of the Works on the repairs done in 1917/18 showed the extent
of the jerry—building that had gone on. Drain covers on the estate had.
all been replaced, the tar pavements were sinking, water stop taps had
been deficient. In over half of the houses the cooking ranges had been
wrongly set; fires were badly built, grates not properly set, while in
many cases bricks in bends of chimneys were causing them to smoke. The
outside brickwork had been so badly done that it took 10 bricklayers four
months work to improve it. One third of all the ceilings on the estate
had to be replaced, when it was discovered. they were 85 per cent sand an
15 per cent plaster instead. of 66 per cent and. 33 per cent. On 196 houses,
ceiling joists had been missing; in most houses, some doors and casements
did not fit. The outside woodwork on the houses had not been primed, and
the paint was peeling off, whily putty was coming off the windows. Instead
of providing proper dressers, the contractors responsible had merely nailed
fronts to fixed shelves and according to the report, had saved. themselves
30/— a time. The report was a strong indictment of the main contractors
(28
for not supervising the work, and the rapacity of many of the sub—contractors.
It also made clear how unfair it was to put the burden on the tenants, who
had had repair workers on the estate ever since they moved in.
The second session of the Inquiry lasted. for seven hours, mainly
because of the presence of Howells and. Nicholls; Howells' opening speech
lasted. for over two hours, and he made several other contributions later.
However, little that was new emerged. Nicholls admitted that his company
had been responsible for much of the plastering work, but denied allegations
lfOL.
of weakening the plaster. Howells tried to exonerate the contractor,
by blanüng the quality of workers on the job, and. praising Alban Richards
and. Co. for tendering such a cheap contract. He later admitted. that he
also had been involved in the sub—contracting work, his son being manager
of a firm that did. much of the concreting work. Poole again complained
of "A policy initiated not by the Committee but through the influence of
the Chairman and. Vice—chairman by pushing sub—contracting to an intolerable
and improper extent. (29)
In light of the revelations, the report of the Inspector was re-
strained.. The Inspector blamed. the contractor for submitting too low a
contract, and. war—time conditions for inferior labour and. materials and
undue haste. He criticised. the excessive sub—contracting, and. referring
to the Councillors who were involved. in the scheme, he exonerated. them
from suggestions of inferior work, but went on to say"It will be generally
agreed., however, that such connection is inadvisable for members of public
authorities."	 It is not possible to discover the full extent of the
involvement of various councillors in the contracting and sub—contracting
of work over the scheme, but it seems reasonable to say that insofar as
anyone was responsible for the scheme it was the coimcillors who were also
sub—contracting, and they were therefore at least partially responsible for
the disastrous state of the houses at Stoke Heath. Howells, who had. been
the Housing Committee Chairman, left the Council soon after the ware bub
Nicholls remained. a Councillor until 1924.
At the end. of the Inquiry the Inspector formally called. for a 5d.
reduction in the Stoke Heath rents. The Council agreed. to accept this,
though with a bad. grace. The tenants' leaders put the offer to a ballot,
and. recommended. acceptance. A reduction of only 5d. was much less than they
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had. asked. for, but it must have been clear to them there was little pros-
pect of improving it. Back at Stoke Heath, the leaders encountered. oppo-
sition; the report back was a rowdy affair that ended. in disorder. It
had not been possible to put the motion for a ballot, but one was carried
out anyway, and showed a majority of 342 to 116 in favour of accepting the
offer and ending the rent strike.	 This was done on 15th Iarch 1919.
It had lasted 16 weeks. Although the majority of the tenants were clearly
against continuing the struggle, the leaders were accused of trickery, and
it is strange that over 100 of the tenants did not register their votes.
Nevertheless, later meetings of the tenants' association reaffirmed support
for their leaders.
III Labour's Building Attempts
The rent strike served to focus attention on the housing needs of
the workers in the city, not only the need for more houses, but for ones
of higher quality. It encouraged tenants on the other estates and in the
Government hutments to push for better conditions, and stimulated the Trades
Council Tenants' Defence League. However, the attempt to get this body
to unite with the Stoke Heath tenants collapsed "fràm inanition. ,,(32)
Despite some fears to the contrary, the strike did not hold up attempts
to build more council houses. Its most important effect, however, was to
question whether the Coalition councillors on the Housing Committee were
capable of carrying through a council housing programme. It also greatly
affected the morale of those on the Committee, and seems to have been respon-
sible for the situation in November 1919, when, after the first election for
six years, every non-Labour member of the Housing Committee resigned, and
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were replaced. by five new Labour Councillors and. one Liberal who had. been
sympathetic to Labour in the past. Labour found itself in a situation
of overall minority, but with a large majority on an important Committee
at a time when a new programme had to be carried out.
	 (It had already
been drawn up).
	 Although the Coalition councillors saw themselves as
generously making way for the new party, their action was an extraordinary
admission that they were either not capable, or did. not have the inclination,
to carry through a vigorous housing policy. Their withdrawal was no doubt
due to the Government giving a new, interventionist role to local authori-
ties.
Thus for the three years from November 1919 to November 1922, the
Labour group on the Council had. the opporunity to develop their housing
programme. However, they were constrained by Government policy, which
abandoned all attempts to encourage council building in mid-1921, and by
the majority on the City Council who were not so demoralised. as to see an
attack on local builders go unfought.
In July 1919, theHousing and Town Planning Act was passed. For the
first time, local authorities were given the responsibility of providing
new homes, and were given assistance to do this. Authorities were to build.
houses and charge rents that working people could afford, and any deficits
from the scheme, over and above the value of ld rate, would be met by the
Government. In other words, Councils were being encouraged to build as
many houses as possible for the cost to them of only ld rate. Unfortunately,
no provision was made to deal with the shortages of finance, materials and
labour, and with financial responsibility removed from local authorities,
they competed against each other for resources, and against private industry
for capital. As a result, the cost of houses rose to an unacceptable 1evel.t33)
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In October 1919 the Housing Committee decided. on a three-year
building programme that would produce 2,000 permanent new homes, later
increased to 2,150. The houses were scheduled to meet the unsatisfied
demand then existing, and the expected growth in population until 1922.
The figure was not arrived at on a scientific basis, and could. be criti-
cised as being inIequate.
	
However, the Town Clerk commented "It did.
not appear to them to be at all likely that more than 2,150 houses could.
(34)
in practice be built during the three years covered by their review."
Most of the houses were to be built at Radford. to the north-west of
the city, the least developed side. Land was acquired there for a 138
acre estate. Some building would be done at Stivichall, Stoke Heath and
Binley Road. In the las± two places, the houses would be outside the city
boundary, and it was agreed to build them first.
At the same time the Housing Committee had to decide what to do with
the munitions hutments and hostels that had been put up to the north of the
city during the war. Although they were meant to be temporary, most of
them were still occupied after the war, and. the Committee decided to take
over the leases from the various Government departments, and convert them
to short-life housing. The Foleshill Tenants' Association protested
against the preservation of the hostels at Holbrook Lane, claiming they
were unhealthy and inconvenient, as well as having high rents. They were
supported on the Housing Committee by George Wickes and. Alice Arnold,
but the majority of Labour members felt that they could. not close down any
accommodation as there was no alternative. Even the hostels at Whitmore
Park, where the dormitories were divided into cubicles, and the tenants had.
to pay 6d a week extra for the use of the kitchen, were kept open.
As well as the Council programme, it was agreed. that private builders
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would be responsible for over 500 houses and would sell -them to the
Council. Despite protests from one of the building unions, it was deci-
ded that 600 of the Council houses would be two—bed.roorned. Most of the
other houses had. -three. The scheme had been drawn up before Labour got
its majority, so its main task was to see that the scheme was carried out.
If it had. had a majority earlier, it is doubtful if it would have increased
the number of houses to be built, as there was a fear that -the Council would.
be overstretching itself.
hat Labour did do was to establish a new Council Committee - -the
Production Committee. 	 It contained representatives of builders and
building workers, as well as members of the Housing Commit-tee, and. its
object was to make sure that labour and materials would be provided for
council buildings. Because of the shortages, and the fact that after the
war a lot of commercial building was going on, the Production Committee had
to try to get priority for house building and. interfere in the commercial
life of the city to a much greater extent than had ever been done before.
It at-tempted to delay and prohibit the construction of inessential buildings,
places of amusement and. recreation in particular being frowned on. This
upset many interests, and the Committee soon found that its work was being
hindered by Council, which overturned. many of its decisions. The Coalition
was prepared. to tolerate an extension of council building, but not at the
expense or interference in the activities of themselves and their friends.
Eventually, after 10 months of frustration, all the members of the Committee
resigned, and the Council did not bother to replace them.
The Housing Committee itself soon ran into problems. Estimates had.
to be increased. for the Binley Road. scheme, and. a three—beciroomed. house with
a parlour and. living room cost £990 15s to build. (The houses at Stoke
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Heath had. cost £270 during the War). By November 1921, despite the fact
that only 328 permanent homes had been built, the deficit on the scheme
was £19,339. This rose to £38,000 by l923.(36) The Council contribution
in each year was only just over £2,000, the product of a penny rate. Even
with the reduced Council commitment, the rents in the new homes were high:
in the large homes the rent was 15/— a week, in the smallest homes it was
lO/6d. However, by 1922 the rents had been reduced slightly due to a fall
in the cost of living, while the rents in other areas, including Stoke Heath,
went up in 1920 and. 1921.
By the summer of 1920, it was clear that the housing programme was
behind schedule, yet it was at this point that Ministry of Health officials
tried to intervene to push for more building. The Housing Commissioner,
having seen the Coventry programme, requested that work begin on another
1,500 houses at once. The request was phrased in such a way that the
Committee was afraid. that "Some coercive action might be taken against
Coventry by the Ministry" if it did not comply. Notwithstanding this,
the Housing Committee decided. that it could. not speed up its programme, and
was able -to finally convince Ministry officials of this. 	 Yet it was a
measure of the extreme shortage of housing in the city, and. of the made-
cuacy of the housing programme.
Although the financial losses of the assisted. housing scheme fell
mainly on the Government, the City still had. to make a heavy capital outlay.
It was this which proved. to be the weakest aspect of the scheme. By July
1920 capital epend.iture had gone over £910,000 and. by March 1921 the Housing
Committee was asking private builders not to build. any more houses for sale
to the Council, as they had. no money left. The scheme at Radford. was put
back, and. it was clear that the programme was slowly running down. Yet the
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abrupt change of Government policy in July 1921 when the Assisted. Housing
Scheme was terminated., came as a shock to the Committee. 	 It reported.
-to the Council -that "The housing position in Coventry is almost as press-
ing as it ever wasp as is shown by the fact that there are still upwards
of 3,000 applicants on the books." It proposed. a motion to Council
strongly protesting against Government action saying "In Coventry, the
result will be that the urgent needs of the population cannot be met, that
many months of labour and expense in preparatory work will be wasted., and
that the Corporation will be left with large areas of land. with which they
(38)
are unable to deal." The motion was defeated..
The final comment on the Council's first post-war venture came from
the Town Clerk. The scheme had. aimed. at 2,150 houses in three years;
"Altogether, in five years, the Assisted. Housing Scheme
has produced a total of 629 permaneirt houses and 738
temporary houses in converted. hostels - a total of 1,367.
During the same period private enterprise has produced.
about 580 houses, not all, of courses of a working class
character.... While this compares favourably with what
most other towns have been able to accomplish, it falls
far below what the Council regarded in 1919 as the abso-
lute minimum, and it is a matter of common knowledge that
the present need. for houses is at least as great as it
has ever been." (39)
it is interesting to note that despite the big effort made nationally and
locally -to stimulate the building of council houses, in Coventry almost
as many privately built houses were completed as those publicly built.
The combination of a flawed. scheme and. a hostile attitude by local build-
ers was responsible for this.
Although the Labour group .remained in the majority on the Housing
Committee for another fourteen months, the collapse of the assisted hous-
ing scheme mean-b the collapse of Labour initiative. There was no new
building and. no new programme. The Labour members came out of the
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experience convinced. that they would. need greater powers to get the build-
ing under way, and. some method. of dealing with what they saw as builders
rings responsible for pushing up the cost of houses. For the rest of the
time, the work of the Housing Committee was routine - fixing rents, meet-
ing tenants' leaders, supervising and. servicing the estates, and. trying
to collect the large arrears that accumulated between 1920 and. 1923 as the
depression hit the city.
By the time the Conservative Government passed. the 1923 Housing Act,
many of the Labour members of the Housing Committee had lost their seats
on-the Council, and. the Committee had. reverted. back to Coalition control.
The new Housing Act aimed at the encouragement of private builders, and. so
was In accordance with the views of the niajority of the Committee. Govern-
ment subsidies of £75 a house were given 'to builders providing working class
houses, and the Committee added. to this its own subsidy of £25 a house, in
the ' hope of subsidising 600 houses built by private enterprise. Most of
the houses were eventually built, but often not completed. until 1925. It
was hoped that well—off workers would buy -them, and. less well—off ones
would be able to move into the vacated houses, a process of "filtering up."
But 'the subsidies only applied when the house cost less than 6OO, and pri-
vate builders, to make sure they collected the subsidies, produced inferior
houses. Most of those built in Coventry under the Act were either two-
s-borey or one—storey cottages, or flats or bungalows. This aspect of the
Act was strongly resented. by the labour movement.
The Housing Act of 1924, a product of the first Labour Government,
offered the Council a new chance to put an ambitious programme into opera-
tion. Subsidies of £9 a year for forty years were to be provided, and
local authorities were expected. to add. half again, making a total subsidy
2of £13 lOs. Rents were to make up the cliff erence between the subsidy
and the cost of the houses. There were a number of special conditions
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necessary for buildings to qaalify for the subsidy; they had to be built
for letting, and the rents should not be above the level of normal pre—war
rents for working class houses.	 In practice, this meant that private
builders reacted in a hostile way to the Act. The Town Clerk commented
in a report to the Housing Committee, "It seems unlikely, however, that
private enterprise will provide houses in any large numbers under the
rather onerous 'special conditions.' ,,(40) Councillor Ivens, a prominent
local builder declared "Government interference made it impossible for
private enterprise to provide houses for the working classes. The report
of the committee provided ample evidence that houses could not be built as
(41)
an economic proposition."	 This provoked other couricillors who had
outside interests to suggest various ways round the problem, either by
selling land. at Radford cheaply to builders, or contracting with builders
to build naller and cheaper houses. But the Housing Committee was bound.
by the Act, and by 1924 again had a Labour Chairman (Moseley) and made no
concessions. Decent houses for working people were to be built, but as
the Committee was still dependent on the need to place contracts with local
builders, it was still possible for these people to ' hold up and slow down
the Committee's scheme.
In considering action under the 1924 Act, the Housing Committee was
influenced by the Council's senior officials. The Town Clerk produced a
report which was fairly favourable to the idea of a building programme, but
Sydney Larkin, as City Treasurer, expressed hostility to it. He felt that
the capital sums required woukl be too great, and that interest rates would
be too big a burden on the rates. He also recorded his view that the
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scheme would break down nationaiiy.(42) He may well have been influenced
by Conservative attacks on the "spendthrift" Labour Government.
Despite this, the Housing Committee again prepared quite ambitious
plans, mindful of the 4,000 names on the housing list.
	 The Radford. estate,
victim of the collapse of previous plans was to be developed, with 1,300
council houses and 900 houses built by private enterprise to qualify for
the housing subsidy. It was intended to complete them within two years,
but, as with the assisted housing scheme, building soon got delayed.
Moseley, Chairman of the Housing Committee, made it clear that he felt that
one of the aims of the Act was "to break the building rings formed under the
Addison Scheme. They did not want any more houses at £1,000."
	 Local
builders in turn made it clear that they would hold out for better terms,
and seek to oppose onerous conditions such as the employment of a particular
quota of apprentices. The result was that the local builders failed to
produce the houses on time. Moseley complained that the Housing Committee
"Offered a square deal to the builders in Coventry, and. they were not pre-
pared to accept it....When they were asked to sign contracts they put for-
ward all manner of excuses." He claimed builders who had contracted. to
provide as little as twenty houses were asking for 6 years to complete
them.
The Housing Committee soon had to produce a revised programme making
concessioxto private builders. The programme of 2,200 houses was re-
duced to 1,907, with an extra 243 houses to be built by private enterprise
outside the Housing Acts, and therefore not for working people. Building
did not start at Radford until 1926, the year that the Committee had hoped
to complete its programme.
	 It was agreed that the first 750 houses were
to be built by 1928, and the rest by 1929, but in the end the scheme was not
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completed until 1930, and the housing list remained as high as ever. The
two—year scheme had taken six years, even in a reduced form.
Although delayed, the Radford estate turned out to be the only major
estate built by the Council in the inter—war years. Building continued
on the estate until 1932 when there was a complete standstill, by which
time Council policy had switched to giving priority to slum clearance.
At the end of 1932 the National Government abruptly ended all the subsidies
payable to local authorities under the various Housing Acts. Henceforth
working class housing was to be the domain of private builders. The rea-
son for this was that the private builders had built enough of the larger
houses to satisfy most of the demand, and were looking for new outlets.
Moreover, lower interest rates and cheaper labour costs made it possible
for private builders to make a profit from the provision of working class
houses. In practice, the new policy meant the end of large—scale council
building, both in Coventry and elsewhere. As an alternative to large—scale
building, the local authorities were encouraged to tackle the slum problem.
The National Government created a campaign led by the Prince of Wales to
switch public attention to slum clearance, which was presented as a great
crusade of the age.
IV	 Slum Clearance
There was certainly a need for slum clearance, though not at the
expense of the development of new housing estates. In Coventry, the shortage
of accommodation had prevented the operation of the parts of the Housing Acts
that concerned the improvement or destruction of sub—standard dwellings for
many years. Between 1916 and 1930 there was an almost complete standstill
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in the improvement in the stock of housing. In the 1928 Annual Report,
Snell concluded "The process of delay and. dilapidation in the older pro-
perty, and perhaps in some of -the newer is such that a larger staff of
sanitary inspectors is called. for. Housing conditions are not as they
should be; nor are they as they might be with a more adequate staff."
In fact the city did. not employ a full-time Housing Inspector until 1930.
The Housing Act of that year gave the opportunity to end the neglect of
fourteen years by providing subsidies for new houses for people moved. from
slums; it would. allow the rehousing of slum dwellers at rents -they could
for the most part afford. Massey in 1930 declared "The stage is now set
for a resolute attack on slum conditions," though he added, in a realistic
vein of caution: "It will take yet a little time for the new machinerr to
gain momentum.
In considering the needs of the city, Massey wrote
"The unfit houses in Coventry are generally so situated
that (1) they are individually scattered. or (2) they
constitute comparatively small groups located here and.
there over the central older parts of the City. The
groups of unfit properties are largely in the form of
'cour-ts' which latter are a legacy of -the early ind.us-
trial era, when the unfortunate policy obtained (f maxi-
mum housing on minimum area of ground." (47)
A 'ive year plan was agreed. on, whereby five smallareas would be cleared.,
as well as a number of individual houses. At least 225 houses were to be
destroyed, 600 repaired or improved, and. 250 new houses built. Although
these figures were to be regarded as the minimum, they did. not represent
a 'assive attack on slum conditions."
There still remained. the hostels. Smith, the Town Clerk, admitted
that it had been necessary -to give "A life for the temporary dwellings far
beyond what had been contemplated, and they degenerated into drab and
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cheerless places before the time came when they could be demolished."8
Massey simply commented "While the hostels are scarcely to be called 'slums'
they are not very desirable places of habitation." By 1930 there were still
649 Council-owned or leased hostels, and 377 privately owned. It was
hoped to clear them all by 1935.
But by 1935, the slum clearance programme had. still not been put
into action.	 Coventry was no different in this respect from many other
local authorities.	 The response to the Housing Act had been so poor that
Circular 1331 had been issued by the Ministry of Health calling for com-
prehensive programme of clearance for five years. As a relt Coventry
drafted a scheme much more ambitious than the previous one. Twenty-four
areas containing 937 dwellings and. 3,600 people were to be cleared, along
with 70 individual houses. This was four times greater than the original
plan. There were also a number of hutments and houses owned. by the Council
awaiting clearance, which made a total of 1,572 homes to be destroyed, a
third of which d±d. not qualify for grants under the 1930 Act. Massey, in
his report congratulated the Council on its ambitious policy declaring "The
year 1933 was an epic year in the annals of the anti-slum movement."
Although a number of houses were demolished in 1934, the programme
did not get fully under way until 1935. By 1938 the worst of the courts
had been swept away, and, most individually unfit houses had been demolished.
It was more difficult to abolish all the hutments, especially those privately
owned, and. it was difficult to step up the building rate for new homes for
the people moving from the slums. At the same time a survey of overcrowd-
ing in the city found it existed for the most part in houses due to be
demolished, so the Council decided to build an extra 200 special houses
for large families. The war intervened before these were put up and
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before the slum programme was completed.. Massey commented. "The war has
forced a temporary suspension -to many cherished, ideals in the sphere of
social reform. The cessation of the slum clearance is a case in point." 50
Although the slum clearance programme was not completed, it was the
first attempt to root out bad. housing since the early days of the Indus-
trial Revolution over a century earlier. In a few years city officials
and. the Housing Committee were able to break -the back of a problem that had.
been neglected for far too long. The fact that slum areas were on a small
scale does not mean that they were not as bad as any that could. be  found. in
the country. Massey, at a public enquiry in-to the plans for No. 1 and.
No. 2 clearance areas, claimed. that all the houses there were dilapidated.
and. some were 300 years old.. They were built 95 to the acre - a few years
later vigorous protests were raised. against Stand.ard. Motors for building
at 18 to the acre, as labour movement spokesmen felt that this was too much.
He went on,
"In Court 20, certain of the houses had. as little as
31- feet of space between -their fronts and the rear walls
of other houses in -the area. Forty of the premises in
the area were grossly dnp, only six had ventilated.
larders, and. the occupiers of the other houses had. to
keep their food in dark damp cupboards or boxes." (51)
He also provided figures which showed that while the birth rate for
-the city as a whole was 14.42 in 1932, it was nearly 24 in No. 1 Clearance
Area and. over 36 in No. 2 Clearance Area. The death rate for the city
was 10.18; for No. 1 Area it was 16.78, for No. 2 Area it was 33.76.
Worst of all, -the infant mor-tali-ty rate in No. 1 Area was 283.2, compared
wi-tb. 63.4 in -the city as a whole - over a quarter of the children born in
the slums died. in infancy.(52) These facts did. not stop the oiers of
the houses taking the Council -to court in an effort to stop the clearance
programme.
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Comparative success in slum clearance was achieved at the cost of
a general intervention by the Council in the field of house building.
A1ter 1932, nearly all Council building was concerned with rehousing slum
dwellers. Other buildings were mainly for houses demolished as a result
of new street schemes, such as the creation of Corporation Street. A few
hundred extra houses were built from 1936 onwards, but these were negligible
compared to the record of private builders.
V	 The Housing Boom
With Government encouragement, the 1930s saw a private building boom
all across the country, but the achievements of builders in Coventry were
spectacular even in these conditions.	 From 1933 to 1938, 17,817 houses
were built by private enterprise in the city, with the annual total growing
year by year. In 1938, well over 4,000 houses were bUilt.	 In 1931
4.2 out of every 1,000 people in EnEland and Wales lived in Coventry, but
between 1933-38, private building in Coventry accounted for 11.2 per thou-
sand. of all the new private buildings throughout the United Kjngdom.
This meant that the age of the housing stoci'z in the city was lower than
elsewhere. In 1939 only 3c$of the population of 'England. and Wales were
living in houses built since 1919, but in Coventry, by 1938 just under half
of the houses, 48.5%, had been built since	 Tables proudly pro-
duced by the Midland Daily Telegraph showed that in the year ending 31st
March 1936, Coventry was the twenty-third. largest county borough in England.,
but outside the London boroughs, was seventh in the number of houses built.
In that year it built only 100 fewer houses than Manchester, despite the
fact that its population was less than a quarter of Manchesterts.(56)
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Coventry was the success story for the private builders in this period..
The ratio of Council houses to private houses in Coventry was very
different from the national one. Between 1933 and 1938 24.6 per cent of
new houses constructed in the United Kingdom were by local authorities.
In Coventry this figure was 8.7 per 	 This was important, for
while the total housing stock was rising rapidly, there was still a
shortage of cheap houses to rent. 	 In April 1937 there were still over
2,200 families on the housing waiting list and it was growing. Given a
rising population the achievements of the builders were not enough to
satisfy all the demand.. Moreover, a small stock of Council houses meant
that the poor suffered, as they could. not afford to buy or rent new houses.
Councillor Bob Cramb claimed that of the seven thousand or so houses built
by private enterprise between 1933 and 31st March 1937, only 700 were built
for ietting.(58) This acted against the interests of the poor, but also
must have meant that many working people were buying their own homes, as
in a predominantly working class city there were not enough middle class
families to buy that many houses.
This is confirmed. by a study of the records of the Coventry Permanent
Economic Society. There was a steady growth in the number of investors
in the inter-war period, from just over 2,000 in 1915 to over 21,000 in
This meant that one household. in three in the city were in-
vesting with the society, and there must have been many other citizens
investing with other societies as well. 	 In the period. 1932 to 1938, the
years of the housing boom, the number of investors rose from 15,133 to
20,583, and there was a much greater proportional rise in borrowers, from
4,161 to l0,763.160) 	 If' there was a similar rise with other building
societies, then thousands of working class people must have been buying
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either new or second—hand houses in these years.
The success of private builders in the mid-1930s was in strong
contrast to their failure to provide houses for the Council at Radford.
and. elsewhere in the l920s.	 With the decline in building costs, and
without -the need to employ union labour, or to employ a high proportion
of apprentices, local builders could make substantial profits from all
types of houses. Though not always cooperating with council programmes,
the builders were not hostile to the Housing Committee for most of the
time.	 On some occasions they were able to establish a close relation-
ship, and. tried to encourage a situation where the Council would do much
of the preliminary work, such as buying and clearing land, granting all
the necessarr permissions, and then selling it cheaply to builders. A
good example of this was in 1937 when the Council decided to encourage
private builders to put up 500 more houses. 	 It was agreed to sell off
parts of the Stoneleigh Estate at £300 an acre, despite Labour protests
that the going price for building land was between £450 and £600.(6
It seems that many councillors who stood for economy in public spending
could reconcile this with making money out of the Council.
Even had. the Housing Committee wanted to, it was difficult to
control and supervise all aspects of -the housing boom, and it was left
for -the most part to the Labour group to protest against abuses. Thus
there was a big row on the Council over granting contracts to W.H.Jones
and Co. as Labour contended -that it did not honour the Council's fair wage
clause, and. had been in dispute with building unions for eighteen months
over payment of apprentices. There was also a row which led to "Scenes
unparalleled in the history of the Coventry City Council" when the Council
defeated. a Labour attempt to withdraw planning pernission for -the building
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of houses by the Standard Motor Company at Canley. Labour Councillors
criticised the building of houbes at 18 to the acre, and the fact that
many of them had. only two bedrooms. 	 The debate was cut short, and. this
provoked violent objections.	 i being challenged., only one of the
councillors supporting the scheme admitted. to having shares in the corn-
pany.(62) Although Labour lost that particular battle, it was able to
discourage employers from making many large scale attempts to provide
company housing estates.	 'Jhen questioned on this point in 1937, the
Town Clerk replied "that wor1'nen had strong objections to being tied down,
and this was so strong that companies would not accept that responsibility. ,,(63)
B.B. Gilbert had concluded. that "of all the missed opportunities of
the inter—war period, perhaps the failures in housing were the most un-
pardonable. (64) In view of the large number of houses that were built
in the city in the 1930s, this condemnation has to be qualified. However,
the housing problem even in Coventry was still a long way from solution in
1 939 .	In 1938 the population grew by more than 23,000; given the then
average size of households, this would have required over 6,600 new houses,
but the total built was just over 4,600, and some of these were required
for rehousing. With growing migration, the city ended the decade with
problems of overcrowding that were similar to the situation after the war.
Nevertheless, ii has to be recognised that private builders made a better
show in Coventry than almost anywhere else, and this was primarily due to
the comparatively higher standard of living in the city than in most other
areas.
The comparative success of house building in Coventry was a potent
weapon used by the Coalition against the Labour Party. Labour had been
given a free hand in the post—war years to develop council estates, but
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the Coalition could point out that these puny attempts were far out-clis-
tanced by the amount of private building in the 1930s. Of course such
a comparison was unfair, as economic conditions had eased in the 1930s,
and Labour has been beset by the Council, the builders and the Government.
This did. not stop it from being a strong argument. 	 hen the Coalition
claimed that council housing was inadequate to the needs of the city, it
was also claiming that municipal enterprise would not work, that socialism
was unrealistic, and that the Labour Party was a group of spendthrift
idealists.	 In practice the Coalition did not go this far, nor was it
opposed to all municipalisation.	 It accepted that there had to be a role
for council housing, aM for the planning of housing schemes. However,
it endeavoureci to see that this was a subordinate role, and that private
enterprise was seen to be working. This policy was regarded as being of
paramount importance, and the awareness of the Coalition to the need to
boost private builders can be seen in the activity of the majority coun-
cillors in holding back municipal houses and direct works, in the hostility
of a section of the Council officials to ambitious programmes, and above
all, in -the refusal of local builders to cooperate with the Housing Comm-
ittee when they felt it did not suit them.
The buying of houses by working people was also of considerable
political siguificance, and served to strengthen existing ideo1ogr. The
phenomenon of large numbers of working people buying their own homes was
a new ones and was used. to persuade people that they were workers of a
different kind to the propertyless labourers of the past. Although diff-
erent pressures can be isolated for separate examination, they were not
felt in isolation, and a rise in the standard. of living for some workers,
and. the acquisition of property was an event that served to bolster the
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existing social system because -to a considerable extent it had. not come
about through trade union pressure.	 In this context, owner occupiers
were potential recruits to a campaign to keep down the rates by avoiding
the expansion of social services. Buying a house was a very concrete
sign of rising standard of living.
In -the 1930s this rise was part of the benefit to working people
that an unfettered industrial policy could achieve. Most workers owed
their rising living standards to increased piece—work earnings, in turn
a product of the employers' success in deskilling the factories. The
higher earnings had not come about as a result of labour movement activity.
Indeed the skilled unions had an equivocal attitude to high earnings, par-
ticularly when it was combined with low basic rates. To many workers the
aims of the unions, particularly unions like the A1U and. NUVB were irrele-
vant. With money to buy their own homes, they could be led to believe
-that Labour's housing policy was irrelevant as well.
Although the housing stock in the city had greatly improved, it was
still possible to point -to unsolved problems, and to claim, as Labour did,
that they could not be solved until a Labour administration was in control.
Thus there still existed. overcrowding, the problem of poor families, and
many others who were unable to get decent rented accommodation. Moreover,
the period had seen the development of a sustained critique by the leaders
of the labour movement, to the housing policy of the Coalition, and the
gradual emergence of an independent alternative, based on the need to extend
the social services, plan the development of the city, and. redress the
balance of investment in housing in the interest of working people. Even-
tually, this policy, together with policies on other issues, won the Labour
Party a majority on the Council. Unfortunately, the new administration
was only just beginning -to make a mark at the -time of the outbreak of
war.	 For most of the period, Labour could only react to the policies
of the Coalition which were aimed at winning over sections of working
people in the l930s. Although in the long rune given the emergence of
Labour as a major political force at national and local level, it was
inevitable that such a working class city as Coventrr should get a Labour
majority, the policies of -the coalition could be significant in holding
up this event, and in limiting the power of the new administration when
elected.
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CHAPTER NINE
The Unions in Recovery
Fom 1934 trade union membership began to revive, and. a gradual
recovery of union activity in the workshops took shape. This chapter
examines the way the revival grew. Despite the partial revival of the
forces of the left - the C? and. Labour Party trade union militants - the
new trade unionists showed different features from that of the early 1920s.
The employers had won the battle over craft union rights in the
workplace. The unions had. been slow to break out of the craft union
mould, even when in isolation. As a result the new trade unionism, at
least up to the outbreak of the Second. World War, confined itself for
the most part to issues concerned with piece—work and payxnent. Although
trade unions extended their influence over women and young workers, there
was no major clash over workshop controls and union rights. The gradual
process of division from the Labour Party also helped to create a narrow
range of action for unions than bad. been the case after the war. The
unions had not yet recovered the confid.ence to make demands over issues
involving control.
The chapter deals firstly with the extension of the car and. aircraft
industry, and the ay the AEU in particular sought to use the new economic
conditions to make gains over piece—work and the right to organise appren-
tices. It then covers the revival of membership in the particular unions,
and. some of the major disputes that helped this revival. Finally, it
assesses the state of the unions prior to the Second World War.
1+29
I	 The Expansion of &igineering
In the autumn of 1929 the world recession in trade began, arid the
unemployment figures of the 1920s, which had looked bad. enough, were
overshadowed, by the years of mass unemployment. The slump was at its
worst in 1931/32, and. full recovery did. not take place until the second
part of the decade. Coventry could not hope to avoid this "economic
blizzard" but it was surprising how quickly it recovered. The motor
industry and. the aircraft industry did. not feel the pinch until 1931, and.
recovery was well under way by 1934. Although unemployment was high
between 1930 and. 1933, it never reached the levels of the depressed areas
or of the country as a whole.
In June 1930 Givens reported to the AEU DC that unemployment in
Coventry had risen from 2,575 to 7,727 in the previous seven months. The
union itself had. 450 out of 3,078 members out of work)'	 This figure
rose in the autumn due to the usual seasonal lay—offs, but fell, in the
antumn. In 1931 the situation was worse, arid, by the summer the union
had over eight hundred. members out of wor.(2) What was particularly
annoying was that because Coventry was better off than most other cities,
there were a number of press reports encouraging people to go there to
find. jobs. In August 1931 the AEtJ DC issued. a statement:
"Coventry District Committee desire members to know that
the articles booming the motor trade published in the
press, stating that firms are unable to cope with, orders
are entirely misleading. So far as Coventry is concerned
25 per cent of our members are unemployed, and in receipt of
benefit instead of wages, the Enp1oyment Exchange figures
being about 17 000 unemployed out of a total population of
170, 000. " (3
The position had improved. only slightly by early 1932. 01 the
2,760 members in the AEU in 1932, 88were apprentices, 98 had. left the
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trade, 584 were unemployed, 47 were sick, and. 168 retired, leaving only
1,775 paying members.	 However, although union membership declined
for another two years, unemployment also fell off. Tbroughout 1932
there was a sue-tamed, recovery, particularly in -the motor trade, and.
although there were over 10,000 out of work in the city in Pebruary 1933
-this figure soon fell, and before long certain shortages of skilled
labour began to show. 1934 was a good year for the motor industrye
Orrell reported in May that
"Trade in Coventry is good at -the moment, and from -the
point of view of orgaziisation, it must be a tzery app-
ropriate -time for propaganda work, and. we are hoping
for good results from our efforts at this time." (5)
By the summer of 1935 he was describing the state of trade as 'ecided1y
good," while 1936 was described as "exceptional]-y prosperous." 6 1937
was also a good year while the two years before the war showed some fluc-.
tuation.
The relative prosperity of the motor trade allowed a number of
companies -to continue to increase rapidly in size. The Standard Motor
Company was the city's success s-tory. In 1930 it was producing 6,000
care a year, and -this increased to 50,000 a year by the end of the decade.
The company had -the land for expansion at Caziley, and concentrated on
small and, medium size cars for the mass market.	 The %wo Rootes
companies, Humber and Hilimazi, also prospered, and by 1937 the combined
output of the two was 52,000 vehicles a year. 8 By the end of the decade,
Roo-tes and. Standard. were secure in their places as part of the "big six"
British producers. Another success a-tory was Swallow Motors, which moved
into -the city in , 1928 and, which changed its name to 5.2. Motors in 1933,
and. later became the Jaguar Co. Thanks mainly to i-ta close links with
Standard, it grew from being a tiny outfit to become a major souree of
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quality cars in thj decade. Lea—francis, Alvis and Daimler all made
progress as
But just as a company could. still make its fortune quickly in the
motor trade, others could. decline from a strong position to near ruin
in a few years. In the 1930s, Singer, Riley, Triumph,an.d. Rover all ran
into trouble. In 1929 Singer was the third largest car producer in
Britain, but it lacked the apace to expand its Coventry base. It bought
a factory in Birmingham that turned out to be a bad. investment, and. its
sales fell quickly. In 1935 it pulled out of Coventry compieteiy.(1
Rover in 1929 had been the fourth largest car company, but had. never been
able to make consistently the sort of profits needed to stay in business.
In the early 1930s its losses accumulated, and. the company was unable to
decide what sort of car it should concentrate on producing. 1931 saw the
company on the edge of bankruptcy, and. it only survived, by undergoing a
severe curtailment of its operations, including the closure of one of its
factories in the city. Reorganisation in the following year saved the
company, which was making good profits by 1934 and. was strong enough to
join the shad.ow factory scheme in l937.(1 	 Triumph, however, had. under-
gone expansion in 1930 but this hail not helped. the fortunes of the company,
which declined throughout the decade. By 1939 -the company only employed
a few hundred workers, and was taken over by the Receiver.2) Riley
underwent a similar decline, and. only survived. by being taken over by
Rootes in l938.	 Thus although the motor industry was expanding, it
Was still a dangerous business. (ie year's trading with a new model
could. completely tiun the company round. Lay—off a in the summer months
continued. for all but the most successful concerns, though not on the same
scale as the 1920s. The impact of lay—off a on the city was also reduced.
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by the expansion of the Armstrong-Whitworth factory in Whitley, the
growth of the Peel-Connor telephone works in Stoke, and the expansion
of Courtauld.s in bleshi11, which was employing over 6,000 workers in
the mid. l930s. The growth of the motor trade also saw a growth of motor
accessory production, and the growth of the G.LC. Company in the city.
This owned. Peel-Connor, and. in the 1930s took over a number of other
factories, including those once used. by Rudge-Whitworth, Lea-ancis and.
Wickmans. The motor trade also stimulated the machine tool industry,
though this industry did not prosper in the way that others did..
In 1936 the Government drew up plans to boost its rearmament pro-
grarnme, as it felt that Royal Ordnance factories were unable to meet the
demand, particularly for aircraft. Seven shadow factories were set up
with Government funds, in each case bringing firms, usually car firma,
into the aircraft industry to run the factories. All of the factories
were in the Midlands, and three were in Coventry, run by Rootes, Rover,
and Standard. Armstrong-Whitworth, which. was a1reasy a merger of a car
company with an airOraft company, and which became Haviker-Siddeley Air-
craft Co. in 1935 was encouraged to expand, and in the same year acquired
land from the Corporations for a new factory at Baginton. Thus in the
late 1930s a number of new, large factories appeared on the outskirts of
the city, and more were added in 1939/40. (tie of the effects of this
expansion was naturally to make Coventry an important target for German
bombers in the war. Before the construction of the shadow factories,
the Midlands was classified by the military authorities as an area vulner-
able to enemy attack. Nevertheless, virtually all of the rearmament
programme took place in the Midlands, while the local and national autho-
rities took no corresponding steps to prepare air defence or for the
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protection of civilians. The citizens of Coventry were to suffer for
this neglect. The official historian of the Second. World. War commented.
that
"The large number of vital factories for aircraft
production around. London and in Birmingham and.
Coventry proved. to be very undesirable concentrw-
tions of aircraft capacity." (14)
Later, in 1938, another group of factories was commissioned. close to the
first group. This was "contrary to all rules of' vulnerability," but
was felt to be unavoidable, as both management and. labour needed. to rtm
the factories efficiently ha4 to come from the motor industry. (15)
The growth of the motor industry and. the effect of rearmament
meant that from 1935 onward Coventry was a refuge for thousands from the
distressed. areas. In fact from 1935 up to the outbreak of war unemploy-
inent seldom fell below 3,000 in the city, but this amounted. to only just
over 3 per cent of the working popuiation. 6 Sometimes unemployment
would fluctuate well above that figure, but given the volatility of the
motor industry and. the increasing stream of new arrivals into Coventry,
it would. appear that there was very little long term unemployment from
1935 onwards. It is not easy to estimate the extent of the migration
to Coventry before the war, especially as there was no Census in 1941,
and. that large scale migration only developed. in the 1930s from 1936
onwards. The estimated. mid-year population for the city in 1936 shows
an increase over the previous year of only just over 2,000 people. The
increase in 1937 is over 14,000 and for 1938 is over 23,000. Thereafter
it began to slow downP	 This migration must have hai a profound.
effect on the social, cultural and. economic life of the city, but this
was only just beginning to make its presence felt at the outbreak of the
war.
Although many of the migrants came from Wales and. Scotland, and.
were often associated. with the militancy of the unions in the mining in-
d.ustry, Coventry trasie unionists were reluctant to see them as benefits
to their organisa-tion. Rather they preferred. to think of -them as
dilu-tees. A report to the J DC, after a reduction in piece—work
prices at the Rover had. not been opposed in 1930, said.
"Membership in shop very poor, very much cheap labour,
including Weishmen from distressed. areas, most of them
have come -to Coventry on their own initiative. Men
like a lot of lambs and. the Chargehands with no guts."
(18)
When the DC interviewed. some chargehands, it was reported. that "Welebmen
had been introduced...." the implication being that cuts must f1low.
In 1933 when a sub—committee of-flie AEtJ met to consider the debt system
at the Daimler, it was reported. that "Machine men were cheap men, mostly
from the country who would accept anything.tt(2) In 1935, the DC heard
from one of its members, Charlie Worrod, about the lack of orgaziisation
in the Humber Machine Tool Repair section:
"B:is experience of the past month had. never been
equalled in his 27 years membership. He was afraid.
of the men and. not the masters, any semblance of
unity was absent, except that the men were like a
lot of paralysed rabbits. Most of them were new
members...." (21)
At the same meeting, the DC resolved to 'iepreoate the importation of
young persons to -the city," as it meant breaking up families, exposing
young people to moral danger, "as well as providing nployers with cheap
labour unless they are compelled to pay wages sufficient to provide ade-
quate maintenance." Norman 1)1wards, who worked a-b -the .}Iumber and who
was one of the first stewards there in the 1930s, claimed that migrants
from the mining areas showed. little understanding of trade unions and lie
and. others claimed that the influx of Welsh and Scottish workers into the
Standard was the reason for the poor organisation there. (22)
Much of this may have been resentment of outsiders who failed to
show proper respect for the natives, and there is some evidence of migrants
playing an important role in some of the industrial disputes of the period -
Sammy Kahn was arrested as one of the leaders of the apprentices strikes
in 1937, and it was pointed out in court that he was newly arrived from
Scotland.. 2
	Ernie Roberts, a young migrant, was sacked at Rootes shadow
factory for union activity. However, there was certainly no iimnediate
increase in militancy and trade unionism as a result of the migration,
which included people from country areas as well as the distressed areas.
One lament to the AEtJ DC stated that
"Dilution was rampant and. that at Rootes Securities Ltd.
(shadow factory) a butcher from Keniworth was working in
his butchers smock. (21)
This was the language of the first world war complaints against the unskilled.
As the migration to the city was only on a large scale for the two
years before the war, Scottish, Welsh and other groups had barely begun
to establish their own particular contributions to the life of Coventry
before the war broke out, and. further study is needed to see their impact
during the war itself.
Young Workers and Piece-work.
The growth of the motor and. associated industries, aircraft arid
rearmament clearly provided a strong basis for the reestablishment of
the trade union movement in the main engineering workshops. Potential
strength can be shown by the instance of Daimler management going to their
newly recognised shop stewards in December 1936 and asking them to recruit
five hundred. machinists for the firm, something they found very difficult
to aohieve.(25) The city was reedy for a new wave of trade wiionism.
In July 1934 the AEtI DC had. a long discussion on the problem con-
cerning recruitment of new members. The discussion took place as the
first signs of resurgence were beginning to show. 	 nplonent was much
improved., and a number of union groups in workplaces had begin to appoint
shop stewards. Nevertheless, organisation was still very weak, and the
National Executive Committee had invited the DC to state the problems it
encountered in recruitment. (hi behalf of the DC Givens wrote a long
letter, which pointed. out that potential membership was 25,000 while actual
membership was 2,653, which represented an increase of 233 in 6 months.
He then listed. no fewer thai ten reasons for the weakness. The first
was the effect of the 1922 lockout, and. the fact that there were 10,000
ex members in the workshops and. only 2,000 members, and the influence of
the ex members had. predominated. The second reason was
"The youthful element in the shops have no conception of
Trade Union influence in reducing hours and maintaining
wages etc. and -take the present hours and conditions
for granted.."
The third reason was the system of piece-work:
"The )nployers wink at excessive piece-work earnings
in order to hide low basic rates, this with overtime
established a.relatively high standard of living and
unthinking content, applies to Coventry in a greater
degree than any other centre."
Allied to this was the roblem of accepting low rated. workers into the
union, The union believed that a machineman's rate should be 48/- a
week, and. men not getting that could not be accepted:
"A very large number of men have accepted 35/- plus
piecework and depend upon their piecework earnings,
but this prohibits admission to the Society."
Other problems included the concessions made by the union at national
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level which "created the impression that we are defeated and also removed
the old local feeling of responsibility for conditions," the National In-
surance Acts taking the administration of state benefits from the hands
of the unions, and. the reductions in the level of union benefits, the
attack on shop stewards, the high contributions for new members, and. the
precarious position of local officials' salaries. The DC approved the
litter, and. also wanted to push for more protection to be given to shop
stewards, and for union rules to make it easier for ex-members to rejoin.(26)
Of particular importance were the problems associated with young
workers and piece-work. The progress made by the unions over the next
five years was crucial to the revival of trade union organisation in the
city.
With, young workers the unions tried, to make a distinction between
boys, youths, and apprentices, while the Engineering E)nployera Association
distinguished. between unskilled boys, boys getting training which would
eventually lead to craftsman status, and. boys who were apprentices, either
by verbal agreement or through inãentures.(27) The different interpre-
tations were of some importance for there was a general understanding to
limit the number of apprentices to a maximum of three to ten adult skilled
men. The unions saw this agreement as restricting the number of boys.
The employers saw it as covering only apprentices, and only relating to
skilled tradesmen. As the large majority of boys were not apprentices
this gave the employers scope for action.
There were three reasons why employers should see the spread of the
use of boys as important. The first one was that they were entirely
outside the scope of union control. Thus Varley, CDEEA. secretary,
commented in 1929,
438
"The attitude of this Association has been consistent
throughout in refusing to allow the Trade Unions to be
recognised as a medium of negotiation in respect of
either
1. Indentured Apprentices, boys and youths, or
2. Non-indentured. Apprentices, boys and youths." (28)
This was not strictly true, as both before and after the war the unions
had met the employers in local conferences over apprentices and their
pay. Although the employers had, given little away, the policy of refus-
ing to discuss the issue dates from the employers' offensive prior to the
managerial functions dispute, and. had been accepted by the unions after
that dispute. There had. been a local conference between the Association
and. the AU in 1930, but this had. been purely concerned with definitions
of apprentices, for the general agreement on the ratio of apprentices to
craftsmen carried on. (i all other matters, the employers had full
control. This meant an increasingly large proportion of the workforce
had. been taken out of the arena of collective bargaining.
The second. reason for preferring young workers was their cheapness,
this was particularly the case in the l930s. Young workers were not
expected to get a man's rate until the age of 21 or 22, and. they could
then be discharged. Union pressure in the 1930s managed to put a few
shillings on the basic rate for all engineering workers, but as there
were no negotiations over apprentices' and. boys' pay, they gradually fell
further behind the men, as the new increases were not passed on to them.
Boys kept the rates down, reduced labour costs, and. took away the bargain-
ing power of skilled workers; they were instruments of dilution. As such
they were sometimes welcomed by workers as well as management. Alfred
Herbert's, despite or because of, its reputation for paternaliem, was
notorious for the excessive use of boys and. young workers instead of men.
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Where gang work existed. in the factory it could. work to the benefit of
the men left. A typical gang would. contain a chargehand., a couple of
skilled. men, and. half a dozen boys. The chargehand would try to nego-
tiate a rate for the gang as if they were all men, and if he was success-
ful this would lead to the boys getting the boys' rate, and. the men shar -
ing out the extra amongst themselves.(29) Such habits made it difficult
for i.mions -to fight for a higher rate. In January 1931 Francis of NUVB
complained. of:
"A marked. tendency on the part of some members to accept
reduced piecework prices and then to attempt to eke out
a decent 'pick—up' by accepting juvenile labour. This
sort of thing should be strongly objected to. Prices
ought to be based on adult labour and. not at a point at
which they can only be made to pay by the help of cheap
juvenile labour."
	 (30)
The third. reason was the need, to develop a first line of management
from aspiring apprentices. Varley wrote in 1928:
"The purpose of the employer towards the apprentice is
to encourage the development of those boys who have
-the ability to acquire that greater knowledge of their
work, and. of other work to which it is related, which
will enable them, in due courses to act in a supervisory
capacity if required to do so. It is therefore to be
understood. that the employers will take, departmentally,
whatever, steps he considers necessary to the operational
training of all his young employees but will give,
officially, his apprentices facilities for a wider
training so as to provide a class of men from whom to
draw for use in wider spheres of work when vacancies
occur." (31)
Just as the attitude of foremen and. maagernent to the unions was important
to the employers, it was necessary to keep the potential foremen away from
union influence.
Enp1oyers were helped in their exploitation of young workers not
only by some of the men, but by the attitudes of the young workers them
selves. After the collapse of trade unionianin the early 1920s these
workers would have had no contact with, the abstract and. confusing world
of unions, and with money in their pockets saw no reason to complain.
Instead it was the union that complained. (ki a reorui-tment visit to
Coventry in 1930, Charles Lamb, AEU National Organiser warned,
"This overtime and payments by results era, blinding as
it does the importance of recognising and. holding out
for a district rate, is producing among the youths of
the industry an indifferent type of individual. Shallow,
they do not see the need. that exists for union member-
ship, and perhaps have few convictions about anything.
They are treated harshly by employers insofar as they
are bribed by comparatively high earnings, then when at
dawn of manhood and. requiring a subsistence wage, they
are turned off and. eventually become a menace to them-
selves and. their fellows in the industry." (32)
This was somewhat unfair, as the district rate was not important any more,
and. the union handicapped. itself by insisting on its importance after its
relevance had largely disappeared..
There were good. reasons, then, for the spreading use of boys, either
as apprentices or not, and. the minutes of the EC of the CDEE recorded in
August 1923
"that general satisfaction was expressed at the efforts
which were apparently being made to introduce quietly
and. unostentatiously indentured. labour into the coach
building trade." (33)
IJhile the Association saw some restriction on the use of apprentices,
it saw none on the use of boys generally, and also pointed out to unions
and others, that
"The vast majority of boys employed. by members of
this Association re engaged. on mere repetition work,
arid, cannot be considered. as receiving a probationary
training." (34)
This was 'bound to produce the problems referred to by Lamb and by the
educational authorities, (Chapter Seven), but the Association refused to
accept any direct responsibility:
41
"It was agreed., however, that the predicament of youths
who emerged at the age of 21 years without any particular
training was not the concern of industry but rather that
the question is one which has a wider application aM might
come within the purview of the local nployment Committee."
(35)
At this committee, however, employers' representatives showed their main
interest was in ensuring a fresh supply of new young labour, and in 1936
Givens reported to the AtJ DC that after a three year long fight, np1oy-
era had. got the Director of i)1uoation -to find boys from distressed areas
(36)
who could be brought to work in Coventry.
The only union that held out against an excessive number of appren-
tices and. boys was the Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers Society, which hal
always put a great degree of importance on controlling entry into the
skilled trades that it covered. Up to 1921 it tolerated no apprentices
at all, and. even in 1924, after the lock—out, it was only prepared to
offer a proportion of one apprentice to every 25 members, while the em-
ployers were trying to establish the normal proportion of three to
Throughout the late 1920s and the l930s the employers tried to increase
the number of apprentices, but with only limited success. Gradually the
union accepted. a few apprentices, but in 1934 Baa-ton, the local official,
was complaining about the excessive number of apprentices in one shop
where -the ration was one to eight, so clearly the employers were not able
to make much progress. 8 In the 1930s however, the Sheet Metal Workers
Society was the only strong union in Coventry, and in this as in other
things they were quite exceptional when compared. -to the other unions. It
is interesting to note -that while all -the unions criticised the number of
untrained boys in the shops, they were forced by employers' actions to
oppose -the same boys when they became indentured apprentices.
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As trade union membership recovered, more attention was paid. to
getting recognition for young workers, and. the pay increases that they
missed. eventually provoked resistenoe. But it was a slow business;
at the beginning of 1936 the AEtJ had. 150 members in section four, which
was its apprentices' section. )
 Buririg that year a Young Members
Fellowship was set up, but at the end. of the year there were only about
400 union apprentices, while there must have been over 1,500 indentured
apprentices in the city, and. thousands of young workers.
The breakthrough took place in more organised cities. In Naroh
1937 apprentices and. others on the Clyde caine out on strike for union
recognition, and the strike spread to other centres. In Glasgow 30,000
adult workers went on strike for a day in sympathy. There is no record.
of axy industrial action at this time in Coventry, but events elsewhere
certainly stimulated. an apprentices' movement in the city. In early
April a deputation of apprentices from Axmstrong—Whitworth went to the
AE(J DC and. complained at not having got the recent pay increases, and.
that as they were often being used. to train unskilled men who were getting
3 to 4 times their wages, there was widespread discontent. Shortly aster-
wards a young union workers' committee was set up at the plant, with DC
blessing, to press jointly with the stewards committee for recognition,
but the management refused. to recognise 	 At the end. of the month,
a meeting of apprentices from a number of workshops set up a committee,
and called on the DC to arrange a local conference to secure a wage increase,
a restriction on overtime and its abolition for boys under 18, and abolition
of week—end. work, and. the full rate at 2l.(42)
The Transport and. General Workers Union, which was recruiting
unskilled. and semi—skilled. workers in engineering offerd to hold a joint
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local conference with the AEU over apprentices, but this was turned down,
as the AEtJ was not prepared to accept that the TGWU had any right to
cover apprentioes.	 The local conference took place at the end. of
May, but saw no progress, With the employers refusing to recognise the
union's right to raise the issue. The .EtJ DC instructed Givens to write
to the Executive Council, to
'iraw attention to the arrogant attitude of the Enployers
and point out that there is a very strong probability of
action being taken in this District, arid asking that the
EC should support ay such action by the youths." (44)
During the summer of 1937, considerable propaganda was carried on
among young workers, with the Trades Council, Labour League of Youth, and
the Communist Party taking the issue up. In September another local
conference heard the union's complaints over young workers, and. employers
denied that they had been deliberately increasing the number of boys in
the shops, pointing out that they could not find men. No progress was
made on recognition.
This turned out to have been the employers' last chance, for on
27th September the young workers' strike began with a walk—out at Armstrong-
hitworth, at the Baginton factory, and. quickly spread to the other fac-
tories in the group at hitley and. Smith Street. The lads had asked for
3/— a week to be put on to the young workers rates, and for the union to
be recognised. 6	Ori 28th Varley claimed in the press that the strike
was quite unconstitutional, and that there was no question of negotiation
until there had been a return to work. He also claimed that the young
workers were on payment by results that was giving them on average £2.l0s
a week.	 The next day several, hundred of the strikers held a march,
and meeting, at which Givens estimated that there were 600 out. The boys
had. their own committee, and. they claimed. 1,000 were out. Givens also
attacked Varley, claiming that the strikers were not unoons-titutional:
"There is no constitution for these boys to break. The
employers have refused to set up a constitution for the
conditions of labour for these young workers, and. that is
one of the big things they are claiming - the right of
the Union -to negotiate on conditions and wages for them
....they are being exploited for gain and. their future
in industry in the matter of proper training is not being
safeguarded." (48)
However, he also made clear that dissatisfaction over pay had been the
main reason for the strike. The boys had been asking for an increase
since June, and. had. given 27th September at a deadline. They struck
shortly after the deadline expired, and. got an offer from management
on the seme afternoon, (probably before Varley intervened), but the offer
was not acceptable and. the strike went on.
On the fourth day of the strike it began to spread, but initially
only within the same company, in this case Arm strong—Siddeley. The
employers there denied it was in sympathy with the strikers at Armstrong—
Whitworth, and. that it was also due to a breakdown in negotiations.
Varley ensured. -that -the strike remained, much in the public eye by launching
an attack on the AEU in the press, claiming that its interference was
entirely -to blame:
"The boys themselves, if left alone, are perfectly happy,
being in receipt of wages in excess of any other engin-
eering centre in the country, coupled. with working con-
ditions and. prospects second -to none in the United King-
dom." (50)
There was some truth in Varley's reference to high pay, for on the day
the strike began the local Association reviewed. the comparative rates of
pay for engineering workers across the country, and. had. finished. by d.ecid-
ing -that Coventry employers should. be
 "severely criticised," for the high
wages they paid..(51) But Varley was wrong -to attribute the strike to
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the LEEr. Although the DC supported the stoppage, it had taken little
initiative over the whole question of organising boys and apprentices,
and had played no part in the authorisation of the strike. This was axi
important point, for if Varley had allowed the Armstrong-lr1hitworth and
Armstrong-Sid.d.eley management to increase their offers, the strike proba-
bly would have ended. However, he saw it as a major challenge by the
union to the Ehiployers' Association, and responded accordingly. The
result was that both sides saw it from then on as about the principle for
recognition rather than pay increases.
Givens repliedto Varley the next day, again through the press,
claiming that the strike was "a case of spontaneous combustion, due to
the attitude of Mr. Varley, the employers and their foremen. (52) i the
same day, 1st October, there was a walk-out of boys at Herberts, followed
by dire threats from the management. They joined the boys from the Daimler
shadow factory, and. others who all over the city were meeting, seeing their
management, and. if failing to get recognition and. an increase, walking out
en masse. However, the fact that there was no action for several days
after the Armstrong-Whitworth walk-out suggests that this movement was
indeed spontaneous. Givens reported to the DC that he had. been over-
whelmed by hundreds of strikers, and had, with difficulty got them to form
Strike, Finance and, Social	 In some places the young workers
were fully supported by the men. At Armstrong-Whitworth, for example,
there was a sit-in in support of the boys, and. all of the workers there
were levied to provide financial backing. 	 In other places, the adults
gave little support. When the boys walked out at B.T.H. Givens had. to
intervene to stop the men from doing the boys' work. This provoked a
crisis with the Stewards Committee there, which felt that the DC was trying
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-to get them all laid. off, and. also blaming them for not supporting -the
boys. They offered their resignation en masse but -the affair was even-
tually smoothed
For the next few days -the strike appeared to grow, though its full
extent can only be gtiessed. at. At its peak there were several thousand.
boys and youths out, and. as an extraordinary coincidence, it took place
at the same time as a mass strike of Courtaulds workers, also demanding
recognition. The majority of these workers were young girls, so for a
few days it must have seemed like a general youth strike in the city.
It was clear -that the years of re-treat for -the unions were over, and. that
a new generation of -trade unionists was emerging. For most of the
strikers in the engineering industry this was their first taste of trade
unionism, for the &EU only had about 400 young members before the strike.
At some concerns the boys came out on strike when even the men were all
ununionised.. The inexperienced. strikers showed. much enthusiasm. There
were daily meetings in the Market Place, and. mass picketing of Herberts
and. elsewhere. Sam Kahn, one of the leaders of the strike, was arrested
at a mass picket. The boys sent speakers to Rugby, and delegates -to a
conference called by striking youths in Manchester and. Glasgow, -to try to
co—ordinate countrywide activity. The DC were infoxmed of this, but
appear to have had no say as to whether they should go or t.(56)
(hi the 10th October the AEIJ DC got a telegram telling it that the
E' had agreed -to reopen negotiations at national level on -the right of
the unions to represent apprentices. Immediately the DC resolved
"That -this DC refuse to consider any suggestion of
requesting the boys to go back to work until such
time as -the Coventry nployers also give us the righ-t
to negotiate on behalf of the boys." (57)
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However, by 14th October it was clear that recognition was likely to be
given, and. the DC recommended. at an aggregate meeting that there be a
return to work on the 18th. A motion that "the boys remain out un-til
the whole of their demand.s are satisfied" got only 12 votes out of the
500-600 members present, and. the resolution to return to work was
"enthusiastically carriei.t(58) By the time the boys returned, a
National Conference had agreed in principle to give union rights to
apprentices, and to increase wages. The strike had lasted. some three
weeks, and. by its finish the President of the Employers Association had
completely changed. his attitude, as he described recognition as "very
gratifying." )
 Although the employers had. resisted for decades the
right of unions to negotiate on -this issues they preferred union recog-
nition -to having -to deal directly with young workers, and it was clear
to them that the strikers were not completely under the control of the
unions. A ballot of the local employers over whether they supported.
implementation of the National greement or not found. a majority in favour
of 30 to 2.(60)
While the local employers were quickly learning -to live with the
new agreement on boys and. apprentices, disillusion was also quickly setting
in on the union side. The national agreement established a special pro-
cedure for young workers; if they had a grievance they could raise it
with the local district organiser or district secretary, who would take
it to Varley. If there was no satisfaction the issue could go to local
or national conferences. The shop stewards, however, were not included
in the agreement, and in theory, could. not raise issues domestically.
Moreover, indentured appren-tices were outside the scope of the agreement,
and. were still not covered. by union nagotiations, though there was an agree-.
mezi-t to see that their -terms and conditions did. not pall behind, other workers.
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In practice, shop stewards made attempts to cover boys and. apprentices,
though it is not clear with how much success. In December the AEXJ DC
resolved,
"In the opinion of this D.C. the Agreement recommended.
in regard to Young Workers is entirely useless as at
present drafted, and. we demand that the provisions for
avoiding dispute and. Shop Stewards Agreement shall be
applied. to the whole of the Male Workers in Federated
Esiablis1uiients. 	 (61)
It called. for a ballot before a final agreement was reached, and. called. a
local meeting of young workers, both members and. non-members of the union
to agitate for something stronger. In the event, the meeting was not
successful, as the minute admitted that it was poorly attended. - the young
workers had. received. more money than they had originally struck for, and.
were content with the	 This concentration on money rather
than union rights is confixned. by AETJ Section IV membership figures.
Although there were more than two thousand. boys on strike for several
weeks in the autumn of 1937, the membership figures given for the begixua-
ing of 1938 was 897.(63) The next year they went over a thousand., but
the majority of those on strike appear to have been not members of any
union. The Transport and General Workers Union appears to have marie
only limited progress in engineering before the war, and. although some of
the boys would. undoubtedly have belonged to it, aiembership amongst boys
would have been a lot less than the AEIJ membership. The strike was an
important breakthrough in texus of reestablishing the status of the unions,
but unions had, to wait for years before establishing, in national agreements
at any rate, the right of shop stewards to negotiate for young workers.
The strike and its outcome was the first step in the campaign, but because
it was -the first step, and. a highly public one at that, it marked a signi-
ficant revival in the fortunes of the unions, and the AEIT in particular.
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The second reason given by Givens for weak union organisation
was the prevalence of piece—work and. the problems connected with it.
This was to some extent a problem imposed by the union on itself. The
.AEtJ DC decided that the rate for a member of the union was 48/—, exclu-
sive of the 10/— war bonus, and that anyone not earning this was ineligible
for membership. This might have made sense for skille1 workers,but there
were thousands of machine workers who were potential members but who were
potential members but were rated well below this level. To make the
situation worse, the actual earnings of these workers because they were
on piece—work would be well in excess of 48/—. Nevertheless, in May
1935 the DC reaffirmed. its position. It would accept .labourere on a
lower rate (but in fact set a rate no labourer was likely to get) but
would not accept any maohinss-t on less than 48/_.(64) Within two months
the impossibility of this position was demonstrated. Givens, in taking
up the issue of workers running into debt at the Daimler, had addressed
a large meeting of Daimler workers, and. as a result had. received nearly
300 applications to join the union, many of them coming from machinists
on lew rates. In -bheory these applications should have been rejected,
but the DC, no doubt menerised by the large number of them, agreed to
admit them on probationary membership for three months in the hope that
they would be able to obtain higher rates.6
This was clearly an unsatisfactory position, and. it was made worse
for the AEtJ in that workers were at last seeking unions to join, and. the
Transport and General Workers Union did. not tiave such restrictions. A
secret meeting of the AEU DC heard that the machine rate for the TGWU was
35/6, and so it was agreed to reduce the minimum rate for machinists from
48/— to 38/3, rising to 40/6 for men with two years experience.(66) This
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reduction was combined with. a further attempt to establish a higher rate
with the local Eknployers' Association. However, a local conference on
the issue saw the employers refuse to budge from the rate of 35/6, the
TGU rate. The DC resolved to take -the issue to Central Conference, "in
order -to clear the way for action" but with earnings running at such a
high rate it must have known that this was unlikely to get azywhere)6
The Coventry stand. on district rates disturbed. the EC of the union.
In March 1936 the EC member for the area and a national official came to
a DC meeting and urged it to relax its rules as this would. enable it to
recruit many more and win increases based on collective strength, and also
(68)keep the TGWU out of engineering. 	 Several further meeti,gs on the
subject took place, and it was clear that there was still a reluctance to
accept a lowering of the rates. At a final meeting in March 1936 it was
moved -thai no one below the rate be accepted. as long as there were men on
the rate who had, not been recruited. This was rejected, and. a resolution
was carried. that stated that no person be admitted, who was below the rate
.Lrom a shop where it was possible to get the rate without a special approval
from the DC. In special circumstances, where a large number applied whp
Weè all getting below the rate, then they would. be
 accepted. if they would
support an attempt by the DC to establish the rate there. 6	This meant
that where Givens got, as he recently had. done, 70 propos1s of membership
from one shop where they were all below the recognised rate, he could now
accept them into membership, albeit in theory with strings attached..
As from Maroh 1936 -the issue was not raised. again at the DC so it is likely
that Givens was tacitly allowed, to -take in a large number of men below the
rate. AEU membership figures in Coventry show a significant change from
1936 onwards, as the number of new members increased. considerably. In
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-the twelve months between March 1935 and. March 1936 membership went up
by just und.er a thousand. while in the next twelve months membership went
(71)
up by more than two thousand. seven hundred..
It is likely that the only real reason why the AEtJ made the con-
cessions it did. was the threat from the TGWU, which was beginning to make
progress in the shops. Even with this stimulus, the .AEU did. not succeed.
before the war in recruiting the 25,000 members that it felt could. be
reached. At the end of 1939 membership was above 13,000, very similar to
what it had. been at the time the AEJ was esiablished..(72) Of course there
were many more engineering workers in the city in 1939, and. it is very
probable that the membership of the TGWU was well below the level of the
WEJ in 1920; indeed. it probably had. only a few thousand members in engin-
eering at the most. The effective level of union membership in the city
at the outbreak of the war was therefore well below the peak after the
first war.
The reason why the AEtJ DC made difficulties about low—rated workers
joining the union was its d.eepseated. distrust of piece—work. Yet by the
1930s piece—work had. been well established in the city for decades. More-
over, the alternative to piece—work -that was put forward, the high basic
rate, would. certainly have led to a large fall in real earnings if it had -
been put into practice. There was no doubt that the piece—work rstem
did create instability and. insecurity of earnings, and also created further
problems for those who were not part of the system.	 It was also used by
employers to stop the spread of trade unioniem. But the inability of the
DC to come to terms with it also amounted. to a barrier to unionisation,
The rhetoric against piece—work combined with the existing and long standing
practice of insisting on the district rate meant that the DC found itself
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discouraging trade union membership aster decades of worrying about the
lack of membership. When the position looked, like being a serious
obstacle to unionisation the DC backed down, but the problem showed that
in the 1920s the DC had. become isolated from the workshops, and found. it
difficult when re-establishing links with them again to accept that times
had. changed. The DC had remained, fairly stable in composition for maiy
years. It had got older and. felt further away from "the younger element,"
it was difficult for it to accept that young workers were not concerned
at revenging the defeat of 1922 or with any of the procedural issues that
were of importance to the union. The new generation of trAe unionists
haci little interest in and. less knowledge of the ideolo of the older
trade unionists. This lack of interest extended to union involvement
in the Labour Party.
In theory, piece-work earnings were linked to the basic day rates,
and allowed, to rise over them on average 'by a certain amount.
	 In 1931
the recognised. average was 33-- per cent above the day rates, and in the
summer of that year this was reduced to 25 per cent. Although unions
were weak at that time, there was some protest action, particularly at
Arm strong-Whitworth, where NUVB members went on strike. The company
secured a return to work when it issued the following notice:
"That while recognising that the new basis for piece
prices is 25% the firm declare that it is not their
intention to fix piece prices to yield only that figure,
but that they will give a liberal interpretation in
fixing piece prices in the future." (73)
Here was a state of affairs that worried both the employers and the unions.
Formal cuts in earnings could be made up comparatively quickly. The cut
to 25 per cent made an actual reduction in earnings in Coventry of only
4.7 per cent, lower than in other engineering oentres. 	 The expanding
motor industry and. the aircraft ind.ustry created the conditions for
wage drift. For -the unions, the ability of workers to increase their
earnings through individual or group effort allied -to bargaining over
prices took away the urgency from the need to combat reductions or fight
for increases. Another problem arising from the spread of piece-work
was the position of workers who were not on it. These were for the
most part unskilled labourers and the highly skilled maintenance men
and toolroom workers. It was easier to give payments in lieu to wi-
skilled workers, but both the employers and the unions found the problem
of the -toolroom workers highly complex. The origin of the problem was
straightforward, and was expressed by the Enployers' Association:
"It was agreed by all present that the root of the
trouble under this head was the fact that semi-
skilled and unskilled machinists engaged on payment
by results, were often times in receipt of wages
comparable or greater than the skilled Tool Room
worker." (75)
In the eyes of the Association, a toolroom worker was one who was a
fully skilled journeyman engaged for not less than 2 years on non-repe-
tition precision tool work. Where possible, it was Association policy
-to devise a rstem of piece-work that would cover toolroom workers as
well as the machine workers, and. in October 1936 it was pointed out that
a number of firms, including Armstrong-Whitwor-th, B.T.H., Alfred Herbert
and. Standard had. their too']room workers on piece-work. (76) These firms
were in a minority however, and the protlem for the employers was how to
compensate the majority on time rates. It was not possible to agree to
a general increase in rates, as this was a national matter and was not
acceptable to the EEF. A position of no general rate was also not accept-
able, as by 1935/6 there was a shortage of too'lroom workers, and the firms
were outbidding each other to get them The union was concerned to esta-
bush basic rate for the district, and failing that to tackle each firm
at a time.
In December 1933 the AE(J at a local conference asked for an in-
crease in the guaranteed. earnings of toolroom workers, pointing out
only 48/— a week of their earnings were secure, the rest being war bonus
and. in ad.d.ition any possible variation in lieu of rates, merit rates,
output bonus or commission. The employers refused to grant an increase
on the basic rate, but agreed. to consider some sort of aliowance.'
In April 1934 the Association decided. that where it was not possible to
get these workers onto piece-work then they should be paid. a lieu, rate
of 25 per cent (i.e. 12/) plus the war bonus plus some form of merit
(78)
payment.	 However, in June 1934 at another local conference the IEU
demanded 2/- an hour total payment. At the time the Association felt
that the average payment was 1/Sd. per 	 The Association applied.
to 'the EEF to get permission to pay a lieu rate, but this was rejected
for fear of consequences elsewhere. Nevertheless the local Association,
referring -to the "vital importance" of the need for its members to act
together, decided to informally introduce a lieu rate, but not until after
the local conference when it would formally reject such a schemeJ(8
The conference with the AEtJ ended in near farce, for after pressure
from the union, Varley instructed the shorthand writer to leave the room,
and then informally offered the 25 per cent lieu rate. 	 Jhen asked if he
would put it in writing, he sent a letter to the union ODD saying the
contents were strictly personal, end not for publication to any member of
the unioni(8) The offer was rejected by the union, which was concerned
to get an tnnrease on the 48/, and a guaranteed. pay of 2/- ax' hour. At
'this time the union appears to have overplayed. its hand. In 1934 recov-
ery in union membership was only just getting under way, and there was no
sign from toolroom workers that they would back up such a demand. The
application went to Central Conference, where there was a failure to
agree, and. the DC hail -to decide what further steps need.ed to be taken.
After two meetings, it was decided, to water down the claim to one of
l/9d. an hour.(82) .&t a meeting of toolroorn workers, the original 2/—
claim was discussed, and dropped instead for a decision to call a
ballot for industrial action over the i/9d.. 8)
 This, however, was
rejected. 'by the Executive Council of the union due to the poor organisa-
tion in the city and the fact that national talks were under way.
Another meeting of toolroom workers decided. instead to press for the
gradual acceptance in the city of l/9d as the minimum rate and asked
the DC that
"intensive organisation should be proceeded. with so
that we should be strong enough to put this into
effect, as without that organisation, it would. not
be possible to carry out this decision." (84)
This was an admittance that 'the union simply was not strong enough to take
the employers on.
Although the matter was not formally taken up by either party for
a couple of years, the lieu rate practice spread, and. this slowly in-
creased. In September 1936 the employers conceded an increase which
they claimed. brought the average earnings of toolr9om workers up 'to
91/.(85) This still did. not satisfy the AEU, and early in 1937
it again began agitating for an increase on the basic rate. Again no
progress was made at local or central conference, and. this time a ballot
for industrial action was taken. The result must have disappointed the
DC, for although there was a small majority in favour, the number voting
was low. There were 165 for action and. 159 against, and, so industrial
action was ruled. out, and. the DC carried. on a local 	 From
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1936 onward, the employers hai taken monthly surveys of rates of pay
for toolroom workers,haavily shroud.ed. in secrecy. The survey showed
the firms by a numbering system, not by name. The information was
restricted. -to members of the Executive Committee of -the Association, and.
copies of -the survey were not allowed. out of the meeting room.(87) The
Association was still concerned. with the problem of competition for
toolroom workers, and. poaching by one member firm from another. 88
 Thie
regiilar monthly survey contained. the germ of the idea from the Tool Room
agreement, which was not signed until 1941 when the wartime conditions
allowed. the union to push a much stronger case.
One less important problem that unions encountered. in reorgani sing
was another effect of piece—work, the system of carrying on debts to the
company. A worker would. agree to a price for a particular job, and. then
get on with it. He would. be credited with having done the job in the
time agreed. If, however, the job took longer -than expected, or if there
were delays over materials or tools, then the worker would. not be entitled.
-to what he had. been credited.. He might be able to make it upon another
job, but -this could not be taken for granted. In many places debts were
settled at the end of a day or week, and the worker at least knew that he
would get the ti.e rate for that week. Ii was generally agreed that
workers must expect -to get some bed jobs as well as good. paying jobs
which would. compensate. However, if the debt were carried on for longer
than a week, it could be used to take money away from -the worker when he
had. a good. job. In other words he paid. every penny of the debt, whereas
if it were calculated. on a daily or weekly basis, he may not have to do
this, as this might reduce his earnings below the guaranteed. time rate.
The debt system therefore meant insecurity and. could be a potent weapon
for controlling workers. It was particularly prevalent at the Daimler,
and was responsible for the poor organisation and. lack of militancy
there. On one occasion a group of workers there complained, to their
M.P. about the position. Orrell, the AEU OuD complained, bitterly about
this:
"Evidence was submitted. that quite a number of workers
are working piecework for day wages and. at the same
time incurring a debt. Instead, of being in a trade
union and bringing their grievances to the proper
quarters, some of them wrote to the Member of Parlia-
ment for the city, asking for his help in the matter.
One could. hardly expect to find, men so stupid. and.
foolish in these times." (89)
Only in 1935 was the union able to improve organisation at -the Daimler.
At a local conference the Euployers' Association declared.
'1he carrying forward of debit balances is an integral
part of the piecework system and. is generally recog-
nised throughout the engineering -trade of this city.
This position has been recognised by all the Trade
unions (including the AEU)." (90)
The AEIJ denied -that it had. ever accepted the position, as it had taken
the matter to Central Conference some thirteen years earlier. After
the 1935 conference, which ended. with Daiinler promising to provide more
information, the AETJ called, a big meeting at Daimler, enrolled. hundreds
of workers, and. set up a shop stewards system. Within a fortnight
there were over thirty shop stewards operating in the faotory.	 in a.
much. stronger position, the union went back -to a works conference, and
got a promise from the firm -to make improvements in the way the system
worked..(92) This seemed to lead to an aid of most abuses, but it -took
further negotiations which were not completed until January 1938 when the
Enployers' Association agreed. with the AEtJ that normally debit balances
would. be
 settled within a
	
Even -then, the agreement was limited
to the &EtJ, and. led to the TGWU taking the ma-ttér up with the employers
over their own members, which shows that the practice still existea..
However, by the outbreak of war the practice was cearly on the wv out,
while -the Daimler factory and. its ebadow factory soon became one of the
best organised. places in the city.
III
	
The Union Revival
The revival of trade unionisn was associated with substantial
progress on the problems of young workers and of piece—work. In another
important area of workshop life, however - that of safety, health and-
welfare policy - little change occurred before the Second. World. War. As
most of -the big factories were fairly modern, working conditions generally
were regarded. as being satisfactory, -though there is no evidence about the
level of accidents or the extent of ill—health. Although local employers
claimed that they followed an enlightened, policy on working conditions,
they -took exception to outside agencies such as the Factory Inspectorate
attempting to intervene in the workshops. Thus when in 1931 the Factory
Inspector asked. Varley for copies of the iarterly Accident Returns of
associated companies, Varley refused on the grounds that they were confi-
d.ential, and. when he found -that some companies were giving their own
figures, he mede -them stop. He claimed
"If the figures were to .be used. simply as figures there
would be no objection but if H.M. Inspector was intending
to use the Returns with the object of harassing -those
firms whose figures were unsatisfactory he thought the
figures should be kept confidential. 8 (95)
Clearly, not all of -the companies were following a safety—conscious
policy.
Cki another occasions the Factory Inspectoxate prosecuted. the Humber
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Company for the employment of girls and. women at weekends outside the
legal hours. The breach, which was proven, was caused. by the rush of
work prior to the Motor Show. The Minutes of the Executive Committee
of the Enployers Association record
"A nominal fine had. been imposed and. the Mayor had.
indicated very forcibly that he regarded the prose-
cution as vexatious." (96)
This attitude was endorsed by the Committee, though not surprisingly it
produced a reaction from the AEZJ DC, as this sort of breach was wide-
spread. There is no record of further prosecutions being brought.
A further example of the employers' sensitivity to health at work
occurred. in 1935, when W. Shepherd from Herbert's reported to the
)nployers' Association that his company was
"Exceedingly perturbed at the attitude which is being
taken by local Penel Doctors in cases of sickness
occurring to workers engaged on ordinary operations
on grinding machines." (97)
Some of the doctors had been telling workers that grinding was 'klanger-
ous and conducive -to Tuberculosis." Varley was instructed to take the
matter up wi-tb. the local health insurance committee to put it "in a proper
perspective." No further complaints were heard, so Varley may have been
successful. In fact, exposure to dust from a grindstone can lead to
pneumoconiosis, and the Grinding of Metals Regulations of 1925 made it
absolutely necessary for employers to fit adequate exhaust ventilation
to grinding machines.
Another health matter that involved employers was the provision of
tea or refreshment breaks during the working day. There was no legal
requirement to provide these, and the local engineering companies were
-therefore reluctant to do so. In 1923, Factory Inspectors and. medical
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advisors went to the Standard and Coventry Chain, and asked the employers
to provide breaks in the morning and. afternoon. Again, the E}nployers'
Association resented outside interference, and. it was agreed. that,
"The satisfactory working of any such system in our
factories is impracticable, and. furthermore that such
'pauses' are invariably abused. by the workpeople, the
result being consequent disorganisation in the various
sbops."	 (98)
Throughout this period. the employers tried. to withhold formal hreaks,but
during the 1930s it became customary to allow workers to take refreshment
without having a formal right to leave the job.
A final example of the lack of resources given by employers to
health matters occurred. in 1936 when the local authority was beginning to
consider the implications of the concentration of important engineering
factories in Coventry in the light of possible enemy air attack. The
Medical Officer of Health asked. -the p1oyers' Association if works' ambu-
lances could be ma1e available for general work in the city in an emer-
gency. Enquiries revealed that twenty firms had. only 49 trained ambu-
lance men, arid, many of these doubled. as firemen, together with only 18
fully qualified. nurses. 	 It was therefore agreed. that they had no
spare capacity for general use, and. that in the event of an emergency
there would. be
 more than enough for them to do in the factories.
The general impression given is -that health and. safety was a neglec-
ted. issue in the workshops in -this period; neglected. by both the unions
and. the employers. The only time the employers showed. great interest in
working conditions was when they felt threatened. or challenged. by outside
interests. Working conditions was an issue that was seen to be the
exclusive domain of the employer.
Despite all the problems associated with excessive piece-work and.
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lack of union feeling, once the d.rive to get workers into the unions
really got under way, progress was quick and. permanent. The first
breakthrough occurred. at Riley Motors, in February 1934. New manage-
ment were introducing a number of changes, and. some workers were sacked
while others were moved around. Co-incidentally, two leading Communists,
Stokes and. Harbourne, were working there, and. they saw the opportunity to
organise a shop meeting addressed by Givens. Two hundred people turned
up to "the best meeting we have held. for years," and 11 shop stewards
were elected., including Stokes and. Harbourne.
	
Within a fortnight
both ha4 been elected to the AEU DC, as shop stewards' representatives,
which gives some idea of the number of active stewards that existed. in
the city at the timel
	 The stewards were able to get recognition,
and. obtained. improvements in rates and. other matters. In July 1934 a
meeting of workers at Riley together with two subsidiaries of -the main
company attracted four hundred. workers, and. more stewards were elected..(102)
As Riley was one of the smaller motor companies, the number of workers
who actually joined, the union was not large. Nevertheless, the events
there were of crucial significance. In the first place they brought in
new members just at the time when membership was at its very lowest level,
that is, 2,415 in February 1934. (it had. been within 5 of that figure
for the last five months).	 Had membership not picked up then undoub-
ted.ly the DC would. have dispensed with Givens' services, at least as.a
full-time secretary because of the expense. The Riley revival saw the
beginning of a gradual trickle in of new members from elsewhere as well.
By the end of the year membership was 2,760, a very modest increase 1
 but
(104)
representing the turn of the -tide after fourteen years of decline.
Secondly, ii brought two Communists, and in particular, Stokes, back on
to the DC. This revival in Stokes' fortunes came after the appeals
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procedure in the union had prevented his expulsion. A few months
earlier he had. been elected District President of the AEU without being
on the DC, and. with the success of the union behind him, he held. that
post for -three years. In 1937 the ODD for the Midlands retired, and
Stokes won the election on the first ballot, getting a majority over all
of the other nine cadidates.
	 He then left the city to be based
in Bthninghaxn, and. a the same time left the Communist Party, as appar-.
ently it had. not supported. his election.
For a -time it looked as if the Riley success was a flash in the pan.
In March 1934 500 leaflets about a meeting of Daimler men were distributed,
but only 6 workers turned up. The DC accepted. that the apathy of workers
was caused by "the present position of the Society in being unable -to
get improved working conditions in the shop." 6	In May a propaganda
campaign was held, and. this produced fairly good attend.ances at factory
gate meetings, but made no progress with evening meetings. However, it
was clear that things were beginning to move. Small groups of members
and non-members were beginning -to meet together and take grievances to
management. One such. meeting was at the B.T.H. toolroom where a meeting
agreed to ask for -the abolition of piece-work in the toolroom, and a 2/-
an hour rate insteaã.( 107 ) A deputation was to see the manager; one of
its members was Cyril Taylor, who played an important part in unionising
the firm. He also got onto the DC in the same year, and later became
Convenor at Armstrong-Whitworth. An ex-member of the Communist Party,
he supported Stokes on the DC, and was elected as District President of
the Union a year after Stokes moved to Birmingham. On the death of
Givens in September 1939 he was elected to the post of District Secretary.
In the summer and autumn of 1934 the DC campaigned for a 2/- an hour
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rate for toolroom workers, awl although this got nowhere, it kept up
interest in the union and brought a few ew members in. However, there
was no sudden increase until there was reorganisation at Armstrong-
Sidd.eley, particularly those sections dealing with aero—engines. As
at Riley, this led to a well attended meeting, and the establishment in
this case of 19 shop stewards.	 Shortly after this, the first
serious shop stewards quarterly meeting for over a decade was held. by
the uion.°	 It was reported here that the B.TJI. now had a func-.
tioning shop stewards committee. In April 1935, after several abortive
attempts, there was a meeting of 600 workers at Coventry Chain, which led.
to the setting up of a shop stewards committee and, the granting by manage-
(iio)ment of one week's paid. hoL.day per year. 	 In July the issue of the
debt at Daimler led to an influ.x of members there and the establishment
of shop stewards, while at more or less the same time the appointment of
new rate—fixers amongst other things led. to a dispute at G.E.C. Peel
Connor Works. This mostly affected women members of the TGWU, but also
led to a strengthening of AEU membership. Because of the dispute, the
DC took a serious interest in what happened there, and Givens complained.
"that the D.C. could not approve Shop Stewards promis-
cuously appointed, but required their particulars of
membership etc., and asked that our members should
elect their own stewards for their particular depart-
ments." (ill)
Although the DC was not seeking the recruitment of women workers, it was
still generally hostile to any involvement by the TGWU in the engineering
industry, and no doubt it also wanted to avoid problems associated with
an unofficial shop stewards movement. Various other shops saw the esta-
blishinent of a shop stewards system, sometimes in a very modest way. At
the Hwnber plant, there were eight shop stewards to begin with, but this
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was gradually built up to a committee of about thirty.(h12) Very fre-
quently, stewards would be elected even when most of the men were not
union members, and. their election led. to the gradual increase in the
number of new members. Thus in June 1936 the DC heard that about half
the union membership was covered. by shop steward.s.(113) 	 tiiis time
there were only just over four and a half thousand members, but the
stewards must have covered. many more workers then this, said so it was
inevitable as stewards became used to their work, that membership would
grow.
Although there were many skilled men in the city who were not members
of the AEtJ, it is interesting to note that the vast majority of the new
members joined the semi-skilled sections of the union. In reviewing the
members who hai joined since February 1934, a DC meeting in September
1935 found. that out of 1,230 new members, only 112 joined either section
I or section II. Sixty joined the apprentices section, and. the rest
joined the semi-skilled section1l4) Even at the beginning of 1939,
when the union had nearly eleven thousand. members, only 3,626 were in
the skilled sections, while over 6,000 were in the semi-skilled sections.
The basic problem was the confusion over the new types of work, which were
basically semi-skilled, and the problems of getting the district rate which
could have forced skilled workers into the semi-skilled sections. The -
figures show that the union was breaking through to semi-skilled. workers,
but it is also possible that skilled workers voluntarily opted. for the
semi-skilled. sections, as they cost less. If this was the case, it
would. show an attitude to trade unions quite different from the tradi-
tional pride of holding a skilled man's card.
om about mid-1936 there was a gradual change in emphasis in
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workplace conflicts with less importance being attached to recruitment,
as this was going ahead fairly automatically, and more attention being
given to getting recognition for shop stewards' committees and convenors.
At BT.H. there was a dispute over Taylor's right as a new convenor -therec6
Management refused to allow him to attend works conferences, as they claimed
that as he was not personally involved in an issue he had. no right to be
present. At the Humber it took nearly two years to get recognition of
the Shop Stewards Committee, where Hamilton Payne, who got on to the DC
(117)in 1937,was the convenor.	 The Committee used to have to meet in a
pub after work. At Riley the men threatened strike action to get recog-
nition for the committee there, and short stoppages did take place in the
years 1937 and. 1938 in particular over the rights of stewards, convenors
(118)
and committees.	 Two of the strongholds for the unions in the early
thirties had been Arms-trong-Whitworth and Armstrong-Sid.deley, as there
was little 1osti1ity shown to the unions by the management. There was
no real battle for recognition needed, but the stewards found it diffi-
cult to get in as many members as they would like, and. to find stewards
(119)for all sections.
Gradually the number of convenors as well as stewards spread. In
early 1938 a shop stewards meeting of the AEU heard. reports from 11 con-
venors in most of the large factories in the city. Even the difficult
factories like Morris :Ekigines and Herberts had some organisation, though
(120)
the unions were still not recognised at Morris, 	 This meeting
appeared to lead to regular meetings of convenors as well as the quarterly
stewards meetings. This was a significant step, as the existence of a
convenor meant that as far as the DC was concerned there was one person
in authority in the workshop, and. it was easier therefore to keep him in
touch with the DC's own wishes. Power in the factory concentrated in
the convenore' hands, and this lessened the danger of a shop stewards
committee that would go against the DC.
]r the outbreak of war union membership for the AEtJ was over 12, 000
and while -this meant tha-t organisation was patchy, and in some places
still very poor, considerable gains had. been made, and on the whole, the
improvement had. gone smoothly. Although the CDEEA. was concerned at the
spread. of membership in the late 1930s, it made no effort to organise
resistance to unions, other -than on the issue of young workers. At
Cornercrof-t, one of the smaller engineering companies, there was a ten
day strike to achieve recognition, but in most cases there was either no
(121)
need for action or else a short sharp walkout.
Although most employers had not had to deal with unions domestically
for some time, most were members of -the Hnployers' Association, and there-
fore in theory recognised unions and the national procedure for dealing
with issues. As this was strengthened from the employers point of view
by the 1922 agreement, there were fewer terrors involved in accepting
unions than there had been in the past. However, acceptance at national
or district level did. not always mean that they were treated with respect
in the factory. The probable reason why the recruitment campaign went
comparatively smoothly was that the union shop steward committees were
toeing the line, accepting the procedure, and. accepting authority from
the DC. The only area of independent organisation was the meeting to-
gether of stewards in the aircraft industry. The p1oyers' Association
had been very sensitive to -the existence of Communist groups in the air-
craft industry,22) and. no doubt saw a shop stewards' movement there as
a threat, but the movement had. made little progress before the outbreak
of war.
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Unions hasi accepted the spread of piece-work, the right of unskilled
and. semi-skilled workers to run machines, the constant need for overtime,
and. in practice the impossibility of substantial increases on basic rates.
Although there were many wage and conditions issues to fight over, and.
the battles were really just beginning before the war, employers did. not
appear to feel that their right to manage was being challenged. Enploy-
ers' attitudes had changed, as well as those of the unions. The motor
industry, and. the aircraft industry and the various components suppliers
were much more established and. successful than they hai been, and. under
piece-work the workshops hasi settled. down to a considerable extent to self-
regulation. In many factories, particularly in -the aircraft industry and
at Standard, Daimler, and. Herberts, self-regulation took the form of gang
work, in which the division of the work would very often be left up to the
men themselves. It would be a mistake to regard this as a shopfloor move-
ment taking power away from management, for it was basically an agreement
between the men as -to how to split up the earnings for a job, and could
sometimes work against union pressure for higher earnings.23) In a
polticially ambitious workforoe, the ambiguities of the gang system could.
no doubt be exploited by shop stewards to establish areas of unilateral
control, but there was no sign of this happening in the city before the
war. Although a number of issues were assuming the proportion of serious
disputes - skilled men's pay, rates for machinists, overtime - and there
was an increase in the number of strikes in the city (see Table 6 ) there
is no evidence of a build-up towards a confrontation over the right to
manage as had occurred in 1922.
Confrontation in the sheet metal shops was around sectional control.
Even in the l920s the Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers Union and. the National
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Union of Sheet Metal Workers, which was less powerful locally, tried with
some success to enforce a closed shop. Moreover, when a closed shop
was in operation there would be strong attempts to impose shop limits.
That is, where piece-work existed, the union would restrict the amount
of work that any one worker could do, and. the amount of earnings that
could be achieved, in order to make it difficult for good. piece prices
to be reduced. This was more difficult to enforce in the 1920s, but
the practice never died out after the lock-out. In 1924 the Sheet
Metal Sub-Committee of the .nployers' Association commented
"Whilst in the case of one or two firms it was
apparent that a 'dead limit' of earnings was being
worked to by the Tinniths employed, it was grati-
fying to note that the practice which obtained in
this District in 1920 whereby 'dead limit' of
earnings was in operation throughout the whole of
the sheet metal shops had now been broken down." (124)
But in 1927 a survey indicated that there was definitely a limit in at
least five out of thirteen shops, and. by the mid 1920s it is likely that
the limit covered, all sheet metal shops, for by then it was spreading
among semi-skilled workers. (125)
In December 1931 a curious incident showed the power of the
Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers.
	
It was reported to the union that two
sheet metal workers were going over the union limit at the George Wilson
Gas Meters factory. H. Baston, the union local official arrived at the
shop, was allowed in by the foreman, who was a union member, and took
the two offenders to the union head office in Birmingham. After several
hours they were returned to work, having agreed to stick to the shop
limit. They also agreed to pay to the union the excess earnings they
had, made. This abduction was done without any reference to the employer,
and the p1oyers' Association complained bitterly of this highhanded
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action, and. blamed. the manager, as he "had apparently in the past allowed
Mr. Baston and. the Society licence to do practically what they liked in
his Sheet Metal Shop." A local conference was called on the issues but
Baston claimed, that he had. no knowledge of axiy shop limit, and. that the
men's trip to Birmingham had nothing -to do with iU The knployers'
Association was told that "it was suspected that a similar state of
affairs existed in many Sheet Metal Shops in Coventry," and. all sheet
metal employers were urged in particular to keep secret the details of
individual workers' earnings.26)
By the late 1930s, the practice of having a production limit in
each shop was widespread. Sheet metal workers tried. to have a common
limit across the city but without success. At .Armstrong-Sid.deley in
1939 the limit was 2/6d an hour; workers who earned. more than that would.
not book ii into their worksheet, 'but put it "at the back of the book. ,,(127)
As earnings went up, this sum in hand. grew, and could. become difficult to
get hold of. A worker leaving Armstrong-Sidd.eley could take away wi-ft him
up to £100 in work previously not booked. Where the gang system operated.,
and. in particular where the ohargehand. was sympathetic to the union, even
larger sums owing to the gang could accrue: in one reported case the gang
kept coming in on Saturdays and Sundays to work it off, but only made It
greater, and had. £450 to come at the time the chargehand left.28) 	 -
payments were linked -to output, the high wage high output system seems to
have been reasonably acceptable -to employers, though no doubt -they would
have liked more control over piece-work prices. Nevertheless, there is
a clear contrast between the strong fight put up by the employers against
union controls at the workplace in the 1920s and the acceptance of produc-.
tion linked pay rises in the late 1930s.
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The Birmingham Sheet Metal Workers in particular not only carried
on a vigorous offensive against the employers, they were equally active
in their straggle against other unions. In the l930s their main target
was the NEJVB. Although this union ha4 come through the traumatic days
of the early 1920s in reasonable shape, it had. long tenn problems due to
the fact that its members until after the war had. been wood arid, leather
workers who had. specialised in assembling these components in the motor
industry. With the development of large scale production pressed steel
replaced wood, and the union had to try to reestablish itself as a union
generally covering skilled motor assembly workers. This produced a
change of relations with various other unions, and. the BSMW tried to
compete with IUJVB for sheet metal assembly workers. Perhaps the worst
clash between the unions occurred at the Standard in September 1936. A
group of sheet metal workers, apparently supported. by a few AEtJ members,
insisted that they should. do the work done by NUVB members. When they
failed to get their way, they took part in a sit—in strike, arid were
sacked. The employer thereupon tried to prevail on both. the EtJ and. the
NUI/B to provide members of' their unions to replace the sacked men. The
PU DC clearly hai reservations about this, and decided to meet both the
BSMW and. NUVB, but separately. When they met Buckle, the 1UVB official,
he gave an eloquent plea as to the destructive effects of the Sheet Metal -
Workers Union:
"this question was not only related to the Standard but
ha1 been brewing for a long time between their Society
and the Sheet Metal Workers, and was now a fight to the
death. He accused the Sheet Metal Workers, not only
of attempting an impossible claim for all metal work on
Motor Car bodies but also of poaching their members....
....He drew attention to their Society being a composite
Society, who were something more than 'Wood Butchers'..."
(129)
In the event, the NUVB were able to replace the Sheet Metal Workers in
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this ease, aM claimed -to have repulsed the BSMW by the end. of 1937. The
union's divisional organiser wrote in the union journal:
"The steel motor car body, pressed in sections, and the
parts then welded together ha4 in very large part super-
seded the wood or composite body and has revolutionised
bodymaking and finishing operations in large scale shops
and. elsewhere.
In Coventry this development was seized upon by certain
Metal Working Unions as a pretert for attempting to compel
the removal of our members from Metal Bodymáking finishing
operations. That attempt failed as did the attempt of
the above Unions to recruit members at our expense. A
good. deal of feeling has been created through these un-
warrantable efforts to deprive our members of work which
they have been doing for a long time and. to which they
have an unquestionable right." (130)
However, membership of the NUVB fell off considerably in the early l930s,
and although it recovered and. stabilised by 1936, it was at a substan-
tially lower level -than it had been at any time in the l920s, so clearly
it was failing to recruit many new members in an expanding industry.
The BSMW clashed from time -to time with other unions as well. Iii
1932 they secured. -the dismissal of an EtJ member at Sunrayn, and. got a
BSMW member to replace him. When challenged by the AEtJ, the union re-
plied that
"they had no wish to offend the AEIJ, but having after
considerable trouble with this firm, succeeded. in es-
tablishing a Shop Hate of 2/- per hour, and the discharge
of 4 cheap men, they intended to maintain this rate, and
as our member was not a skilled man, be had been restarted
as a labourer, which they thought was appropriate." (131)
This incident showed both that the Sheet Metal Workers were able to achieve
rates well in excess of any other groups, but at the expense of the less
fortunate, and. that as a union they were not prepared. to co-operate with
others. The Union remained a maverick in the flesh of both employers
and. -the rest of the labour movement.
Although a craft union, the NUVB sought to avoid. the sectional
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excesses of the BSMW. It had been hard hit by the new production methods.
J. ?rancis, Midlands Organiser of the Vehicle Builders, frequently commen-
ted on the d.e-skilling of the motor industry:
"ice again it ha.s to be said. that each season, nay,
almost every month that comes, sees the necessity for
the skilled man's services becoming smaller. 	 Cice
the jigs and. the experimental bodies are made, out
goes the skilled man and in comes the semi-skilled,
arid he, plus the machine, delivers the goods as the
market demands, the result being, in our connection,
the skilled. man on the funds and the semi-skilled
man on the job." (132)
But as the traditional skills associated. with his union had all but die-
appeared, Francis did. not link this with attacks on the semi-skilled for
taking the skilled man's job away, but instead fought for a place for
the skilled man, albeit in a small minority. This meant criticising
the EU at times. In referring to the aircraft industry, Francis wrote
in his union journal:
"Dilution is being purposely 'talked big' when there
is not the slightest need for it, and one wonders if
there is not something sinister behind it all - a
sort of idea that the skilled and. semi-skilled Trade
Unions may be brought to quarrel with each other, arid.
thus enable the profiteers to get away with the spoils.
Can ii be that the refusal of the AETJ to co-operate Wi-tb.
the Aircraft Committees may have in it the seed of such
development?" (133)
This was a reference to the Coventry Committee of the National Council
of Aircraft Workers, which was a liaison body for trade unions in the
industry. This body was set up in early 1936, and brought about ten
unions together, including the NUVB and -the TGWLT.(134) It may well have
been the existence of the TGWU on the Committee which stopped not only
the .AETJ, but also the BSMW and, the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers
from sending delegates. In the event, the Committee appears not to have
flourished, and wound up at the end of the year. As the largest union
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in the city, the AEU was clearly less prepared. to oountenaxice possible
rivals than was the NtJVB. It was also suffering for its attitude over
semi-skilled. workers. After the war, it, more than any other union in
the city, had realised the dangers of the employers' attempts to deski].l
the industry, and. had. borne the brunt of the employers' offensive. Bu.t
that battle had. been fought and lost, and it was difficult for the
leadership of the union, and. right up to the war every member of the
- A.EU DC was a skilled man, to accept that defeat and. concentrate on the
new opportunities of recruiting across the engineering industry as a
whole.
A feature of the revival of trade unionism in the city was the re-
emergence of the Workers Union branches in the form of the TGWU. For
some years the TGWU engineering branches were referred. to in the Trades
Council records as WtJ branches, despite the fact that the merger had taken
place some seven years earlier. This reflected the maintenance of sep-
arate organisations from the TGWtJ non-engineering branches, in transport
and building. (135) For a time, the latter were the only TGWU branches
in the city, all of the old WU branches having effectively collapsed.
By 1939 there were six engineering branches in Coventry, though most were
fairly small. Although no figures exist, it is unlikely that engineering
membership came to more than a couple of thousand. Relations between the
AEU and. the TGWU were not as bad as they had been between the AE!J and. the
WU, but by no means could they be called cordial. The two unions had
been involved. in a big strike at the GEC plant in Stoke in 1935, where
the TGWU had made the running, and. had. signed up many women workers, and.
the AJ had been highly critical of the settlement. It also refused to
countenance any joint activity with the TGWU over the boys and. apprentices
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dispute, as it refused to recognise the existence of apprentices in the
TGWU. In fact that union had only a few, and during the strike the head
office of the union refused to support it. The Area Committee gave a
small donation, but it was very clear that this was primarily an AEtJ
affair. (1.36) The AEU sought to take in semi—skilled workers, with some
success from 1937, but at the same time still sought to oppose dilution
by semi—skilled workers. Ii also had rio interest in the growing number
of women workers.
Cie of its early gains in women's membership came in 1930 when the
Rover Company tried to introduce the Bed.aux system of payment by results
into the factory. The Bedaux system sought to eliminate any payment for
time rather than for production, and, as such was acceptable to the Enploy-
ers' Association, which pledged to
"give its firm support to any member who is seeking 'by
the aid of Bedaux or otherwise to arrive at a more
scientific appreciation of its managerial responsibil-
ities and rights." (137)
A sub—committee of the Association was set up -to look at the system, and
this concluded that it would have to be based on negotiation like other
payment by results systems, and therefore it and similar schemes were
deemed to "raise no issues of a fundamental characer 'that are of interest
-to the Association as such" and that its introduction was "a purely domes-
tic issue on which the individual firm must make its own arrangements
(138)
with its own labour."	 Rover had. already introduced the system in
its Birminghaxn factory, but found opposition from the workforce in Coventry.
Members of the NUVB, which was in force in the factory, "were quite wlamant
in their refusal to work this system," and. so an attempt was made -to begin
in the unorganised trimming department, which contained mainly women. (39)
As there was a strong I'UVB presence, the women asked that union if they
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could. join, but apparently the union had. decided earlier not to accept
women members. The way was therefore open to -the TGNU to step in and
sign them all up.	 ancis remarked
"When what appeared to be an unjust imposition of a new
system, the Women appealed to us for guidance and. assist-
ance. Our Coventxr Officers recognised that to ignore
their appeal would be disastrous to ourselves, as a.
development of women's work in the Trimming Departments
would. only mean in the end a curtailment of men's labour.
We could. not help them other than by moral support, and
the Workers Union gladly took the opportunity of imme-
diately enrolling them into membership.... Thus the result,
foreseen by those who were in favour of female membership,
of the decision against, has come about, and. another union
has now -the right -to enter in-to negotiations on behalf of
workers in our trade." (140)
Joining the TGWtJ certainly did. not solve all the women's problems.
A works and. local conference failed to agree, and -the -two unions took
the matter to Central Conference. This found against them, for the
issue at this stage had been whether there should be a joint investiga-
tion of the system.41) The National Officers of the TGWU declared.
that they had no objection to the system, and. locally the union followed
suit, provided. that guarantees were given.42) H.re the union seemed
out of touch with its newly recruited. members, for one month later they
came out on strike against the system, claiming it had meant a speed-up
and more work in shorter hours. The strike was made official, and. after
a couple of days the male trimmers, who were not directly involved., and
were members of NUVB came out in sympathy, as they were refusing to do
the women's work. The fixm brought in blackleg women, but with the help
of Alice Arnold, the women strikers organised their own pickets. Alice
Arnold declared, that "the girls are splendid. They know -their work and
are carring out -their duties well. ,,(143) There were about 125 women
on strike, With some 70 men out in support. Much of the publicity given
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to the strikers in the local paper centred. on iwarc1 Buckle, the NUVB
officer, rather than on Morris, -the TGW[J ofuicer. 	 e feature
-that came out was a claim that the nployers' Association was circulat-
jug the names of strikers to other employers, to ensure that they were
not taken on elsewhere. When this charge was raised at the Executive
of the Eployers' Association, the only record in the minutes is that
"certain instructions were given to the Secretary. "045) In their oi
discussion, the employers felt that Rover hasi been in breach of procedure.
It had. got the agreement of the unions, but not of the workers concerned.
In the press, however, the employers claimed that procedure had. been
-	 .	 (146)followed., and that the strike was unconstitutional.	 The women were
out for three weeks, and. the issue was effectively settled over their
heads. The Managing Director of Rover arranged a meeting with Ernest
Bevin and secured. all agreement. This was put to the women the same
evening, and they refused to accept ±t.(147) A farther meeting -took
place the next day, where, according to the employers, the National Offi-
cer of -the union addressed. the women and. "with great difficulty induced
-them to agree."' 8	In fact the agreement did. not satisfy the Thp1oyers'
Association either. It objected because it gave -the same piece-work
prices to workers doing the same job but in different grades, it proposed
a guaranteed minimum of 55/- a week which was felt to be too high, and in
particular, -the union claimed it also agreed that the blackleg women should
be sacked..	 The women, according to the press, had insisted. on this
-	 . .	 . .	 (150)last poin-t as an "overriding cond.i-tion." 	 The Rover management Was
criticised by the local employers, but eventually they claimed that they
would not "victimise" -their blacklegs. In addition, -the agreement was
-that the system should carry on, but only in the trimming ShOpe
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The TGTtU d.jd not come of the dispute too well. It had. not backed.
the women prior to the strike, and. had virtually settled. over their heads.
Nevertheless, it had. gained a foothold in the factory, and there it stayed.
It had begun to show itself as the natural union for the growing number
of women in the motor trade. However, its inability to provide workplace
representatives that could effectively negotiate with management locally
was a drawback. It is also interesting to note that the agreement -to
pay the same rate for the same jobs was regarded as being dangerous by
-the employers, as it was normal practice to go at least part of the way
to placate the AEU by paying a craftsman more for doing the same job as
a semi-skilled worker.
The TG1J also made ground during another strike involving women,
this time in 1935 at GEC Stoke, the old. Peel Connor telephone works.
This employed about 3,000 manual workers, mostly women. The unions were
very poorly organised at the time of the dispute. The EtJ had 13 members
out of 139 toolroom workers, and 12 members out of the 42 workers in the
Model shop.(151) There is no record of union membership among the female
machinists. The dispute occurred because the company wished to go from
a group bonus system to individual payment by results. The E1J had asked
for a works conference on this issue, but had been refused, probably
because it had no members involved, for initially the scheme was -to be
for about 300 workers in the capstan department. The scheme was put
into operation, and led. to a walkout in that department, which over the
next few days spread throughout the factory, until there were over 2,00
out on strike.152) The firm refused a works conference while there was
a strike on but agreed -to an informal conference. Meanwhile Givens and
Orrell for the AEtJ addressed. the strikers, while the TGWTJ sent along a
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(153)
Miss Weaver from another part of the area. 	 Despite -the attempts
by the unions, at first the workers themselves ran -the strike. A
committee of twenty was somehow set up on the second. day, and. this was
(154)
recognised by the company which met it for talks.	 The committee
recommended. to a mass meeting that there be a return to work, and this was
put to the vote and. carried. The return was on the understanding that
there would be a works conference, and. that the new stem would. be
 reviewed..
At the works conference, besides the union officials, there were 3
lay members of the AETJ, and six women workers, who appear to have been
members of the TGWIJ. It was agreed. to try out the system for 12 weeks.
The AEU DC when it received. a report thought that this was unsatisfac-
tory, and. severely criticised. the settlement, presumably feeling that the
Strike Committee could have got the scheme removed altogether. It was
clear that the AEtJ had. not extended its influence over the mass of the
strikers, and. that the TGWtJ had. had. more success, At one point the works
conference was adjourned to allow the TGWtJ officials to deal with a case
of vic-timisation that had occurred as a consequence of the return to
The AEtJ claimed to have enrolled many members, but membership figures went
up for the month as a whole by only two hundred, and not all of -these would.
have come from GEC. 6	 it is likely that the TGWU recruitment was very
much higher.
The phenomenon of unorganised. workers, men and women, going on strike
shows the extent of the collapse of the unions in the 1920s. At some
factories there was no organisa-Lion at all to give a lead, and union offi-
cials had to rush to disputes and. ry to influence them and sign up new
members. In many cases, workers would go on strike and. return to work
without having joined a union.
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A third. large strike involving women arid the TGWEJ took place in
the autumn of 1937, and. coincided, with the apprentices' aM boys' strike.
This Was outside the engineering industry, at Courtaulds. This compa;ny
was a very substantial employer in the city, with about 4,000 workers
at the Foleshill viscose yarn factory, and. another 1,800 at the Little
Heath acetate yarn factory further north. It had. been. company policy
for decades to refuse to recognise unions, and. various attempts to force
recognition had. failed, including brief strikes at the Foleshill plant in
1913 and. 1931.(157)
In 1927 Samuel Courtauld. signed the Mond. letter which called for
industrial peace between unions and. employers, and. led. to the Mond.-Purner
talks. Hoping for a change of heart, the TGJU approached. the Coventry
plant for recognition, and. were again repulsed, though this time not
without some heart-searching. The manager of -the plant sent a telegram
to the strongly anti-union managing director, who was in America at the
time. The telegram read,
'c3nion is being taunted. by extremists -that they have no
organisation among our workers therefore they are anxious
to move. They ask what our attitude will be and. whether
we will assist or at least let it be known amongst workers
we would encourage movement."
This sounds like -the most cap-in-hand. approach for union recognition to
have been taken in the city, and met inevitably with a brutal response.
The managing director, in telling his subordinates to say no, claimed
"Your telegram reads to me an a3.miasion that extremists
are by threats going to be permitted. to rule." (158)
Like many anti-union firms, thet were obsessed. with cases of extremist
activity, and blamed the brief strike in 1931 over -the cuts in wages on
the Minority Movement.
In 1937 the company had. been forced -to give recognition to engineering
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workers, but the bulk of the workforce, mainly women, were un-touched
by the unions. It is unclear how the Courtaulds strike started., but
once it did it spread very quickly with the women claiming they wanted
-the restoration of the 1931 pay reductions. With.in two days of the first
walkout, the local paper estimated that virtually all of -the 6,000
workers at the -two factories were out on strike.
	 The strike lasted
nearly two weeks, and was remarkable for the degree of enthusiasm shown
by the women and girls. ('rorn photographs and press reports it appears
that a high proportion of the strikers were girls or young woinen.)60')
ki the second day of the stoppage at taie Foleshill works, the Midland
Daily Telegraph recorded "remarkable scenes" when hundreds of strikers
returned to collect their pay packets and. found, themselves locked in.
The women from the other factory at Little Heath had just joined the
strike and. turned up at Foleshill in force:
"Crowds of girls from Chapel Lane assembled outside the
gates, and although the police were on the scene, -they
were unable to prevent -them forcing open the gates, in
-the course of which a constable's helmet was knocked
from his head.."	 (161)
At the Little Heath factory there was mass picketing, not just to
stop people getting in, but to try to get in and drive out the few people
left. ()i October 4th the police just contained a charge at the factory,
and on the 5th, when a few girls returned, they were attacked by the pick-
ets, and fighting with the police broke t.62) However, after a few
more days, there was a gradual return to work at Little Health, and by the
end of the strike the majority of workers there were already back at work.
Most of the Foleshill strikers stayed out.
Despite the vigour of the strike, it seemed, even more than the
boys' struggle at the same time, to be a case of "spontaneous combustion."
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After the first two clays the strikers had daily mass meetings, and on the
fourth clay of the strike delegates reported that they had tried to see
-the Courtaulds management three or four times, but had been refused ad-
mission, and therefore were considering calling in the TGJU. 6)
 Had
the company met the request for higher wages quickly, it is very likely
-that it could have stopped the issue of recognition for the union from
taking over. As it was, the management pointed out that they had a
policy of paying some of the highest wages in the city, and that the
cuts of 1931 had been made up through bonus. It is true that the only
organised group, the engineers, got good wages, and they took no part in
the struggle.
It was nearly a week after the strike had. begun that the mass meeting
voted to form a branch of the TGWU, and heard. speeches from local officials. (16
There may have been some opposition,for a couple of days later there was a
-	 -	 .	 -	 -	 .	
-	 (165
vote of confidence in the Strike Committee for co—operating with the union.
Eventually the National Secretary of the Artificial Silk section of the
union negotiated a return -to work for the four thousand still out, on the
basis of recognition of the union and the promise of further talks on pay. (166)
Ironically, the further talks failed to get any pay increases, but the
TGT,U had recruited 1,800 members in two days, and no doubt quite a few
more after -that, and had established itself in the company.
These strikes showed that while the TGWtJ lacked local experience,
it was not handicapped by any sectional attitudes, and was positively
keen to recruit all and every category of worker. This made it espe-
cially attractive to women, who, in the Courtauld. strike in particular,
but also in the others, made it very clear that they were not to be re-
gard.ed for ever as cheap anti—union labour, and. that their determination
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to fight could, on occasion, match that of men. 	 Indeed, at Courtauld.s,
the organised men did. not join the strike, and the men that came out were
amongst the first to go back before the dispute was settled.
It was clear that the potential for growth for the TGU was consid.-
erable. No doubt it would. have grown faster in Coventry before the war
had the resources been there, but although there were a couple of union
officials based in the city, one of them covered much of the South Midlands,
and. Alice Arnold had not been replaced, nor was there a successor to George
Norris then he died. in l933.67) There were a number of complaints from
the Coventry District Committee a.bout the lack of officer coverage, and.
although officers from other areas came into -the city from time to time,
it was only in 1939 that it was decided. to acquire new offices and appoint
(168)
another full time officer.	 There was no suitable applicant for the
post from Coventry, so -the job went -to Jack Jones, who moved. 10 -the city
from Liverpool. By the autumn it was reported that 'he had. settled. down
to his du-ties very well aM was already siowing great promise. ,,0.69)
IV	 The New Trade Unionism
The resurgent trade unionism of the late 1930s was very different
from the trade unions of the immediate post-war years. In the first
place the revolutionary trimmings no longer existed. There was no repe-
tition of the mood of revolutionary fervour that gripped. a part of the
labour movement after the war. The left was, if anything, in a stronger
position within -the union movement, but instead of preparing for the forth-
coming Coventry Soviet, was concerned with more modest aims such as a broad
movement against fascism. Clearly the improved. economic situation made it
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impossible to predict that the collapse of the capitalist system was
well under way, and. the increasingly grim political situation had less
impact on Coventry workers, as their livelihood to a considerable extent
depended on rearmament.
A more important omission from the revived trade union movement
were the Workshop Committees. Individual union activists were concerned.
with building the union as they knew it rather than chaiiging trade union-
i into units organising everyone on the shop floor. The informal
structures had perished in the 1920s, and. the formal structures had. sur-
vived, so there was less experimentation, more asceptance of the exist-
ing unions as the natural order of things. It was generally accepted
that shop stewards would remain loyal to one union and only work with
other unions through the joint shop stewards committees, where these
existed. These sought to unite workers in different unions, but not to
challenge the legitimacy of the unions themselves, which some of the
workers committee had attempted to do. The coming to prominence of
convenors was an important development. A convenor was necessary in
the workplace to bring together the many sectional struggles over piece-
work and to impose some form of strate r on the stewards. He was also
necessary for the union establishments outside the workplace, as a link -
in a chain of authority (later to become a chain of negotiation). As
for the shop stewards, they had both gained, and lost power compared. with
the stewards of the earlier period; gained because piece-work put more
flexibility and negotiating power into the hand of a steward, no longer
tied to the district rate, lost because a narow concentration on earnings
meant that the steward depended on others for information, organisation aM
strate&y. By 1939 there were many shop stewards in the city; there was
as yet little sign of a shop stewards' movement.
The basic issue had changed as well. In the early 1920s, the
engineering unions still had hopes of imposing their vision on the work-
places - a vision of a conservative, stable, hierarchical society, with
fixed grades and common stand.ards. By the late l930s it was clear to
all what an impossible dream this had been. The employers controlled
the workshops, and. employed. the labour they wanted to do the jobs they
wanted. them to do, at the rates they set. The issue of establishing some
order in the chaos of different jobs was still important, but had. the
importance of grading exercise rather than a statement of authority. The
other issues of protecting skills and preserving differentials were of
importance to oniy a minority and. were themselves a consequence of the
defeats of the l920s. A greater concentration on cash rewards was thus
made inevitable. It is not argued that the unions of the late 1930s
were more concerned. with earnings than the earlier unions, as this is the
basic issue that runs through trade unionism. The earlier unions had
been mQre concerned with the conditions under which money was earned; the
later with the cash itself.
Alongside these differentials should be borne in mind the gradual
widening of the gap between the Labour Party and. the unions. Most new
trade unionists did. not join the Labour Party, and as we have seen there
was no corresponding rise in Party membership to match that of the unions.
Despite the lack of militancy, the union revival probably owed more
to the CF and other left forces than had the development of trade unionism
after 1917. While the conditions of almost full employment made a revival
possible, it was the left which provided the personnel in many cases to
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build, the shop stewards' movement in the factories, and, in doing so they
strengthened. the position of the left in the city's unions. With the
reappearance of Stokes on the .AETJ DC the left usually had. the majority
of votes on that committee from the micl-1930s. Its influence was shown
in the election of Stokes and. Taylor for the two full time jobs in the
union. Although little is known about the work of the TGWU in the city
before the war, again it appears 'to have had a number of left activists
prominent in the leadership, such as Jock Gibson, Billy Welling and. Bill
Buxton. The Trades Council quickly got over the disputes that it had.
suffered in 1930, and. the left, in particular the Communist Party, soon
re—established leadership there. In 1935 Billy Wellings, a Communist,
was the President, aM J.H. Ward who was on the AEU DC for much of the
period, and who had been an active Labour Party member of the Minority
Movement,was secretar.'° 	 A year later Wellings became the secretary
and Jock Gibson, another Communist, became President. (171) In 1937 the
Council collected over l,000 for the fund for the striking young workers
in the engineering industry.72) There was not all round improvement
in the Trades Council work; one of its annual obligations was 'to organ-
ise a May Day March and. other activities. In 1933 the nnua1 Report corn-
plained:
"It is becoming increasingly clear that the objects of
May Day are practically unknown to the young worker, and.
the older members have lost faith in its application."
(173)
Reports f or later years show an improvement generally in trade union and
Trades Council work, but support for May Day activity remained low; the
brief tradition of big marches and. events had died out. Despite left
leadership, the militancy of the late thirties was of a much narrower
kind, 'than that of the early twenties. By the outbreak of the war, the
Coventry Communist Party still had less than a hundred members, so it
would be well not to overestimate its influence, but this was probably
more thazi it had at any time since its foundation in 1920, and. unlike
the late 1920s and early 1930s, it was prepared. to work closely with non-
Party members.	 Part of the narrowness of the militancy was due to
the lack of a single issue which united. the unions and. workers in the
different factories. In 1922 the issue had been forced. by employers,
and. the unions were fighting a defensive struggle for trade union rights.
But in the 1930s it was surprisingly easy to establish some basic union
rights, while the offensive on pay and. conditions was fought in an isola-
ted. way within each shop.
A tradition of trade unionism implies that there is a common opinion
on certain issues and. principles that is applied through struggle over a
period of many years. The trade union traditions in the engineering
industry in the city had always been weak. The struggles of the 1920s
in one sense were an attempt to establish a tradition that already existed
in other engineering centres. Its failure meant that the new trade union-
ism of the late l930s was even weaker in its sense of traslition. In more
immediate terms this was likely to lead. to a concentration on those issues
which it knew it Was successful at, an acceptance of the rights of the
employer, and a lack of confidence in the ability of the trade unions and.
working class parties to really change society. This limited. conscious-
ness allowed. room for some of the ideas and. values of the ruling class to
remain.
thile the trade unionism of the late l930s was a somewhat different
creature from the unionism of the post-war period, the leadership of the
craft unions in particular, both full-time officers and. lay officials,
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had changed remarkably little. This provided continuity, but also a
barrier -to realising the full potential of the new situation. Thus the
AEtJ leadership had understood the benefits to its membership of an ordered
workplace with priority given to skill, and had fought vigorously against
the employers ? offensives on skills. The same leadership fifteen years
later was still scarred by this experience, suspicious of semi-skilled
workers, deeply hostile to piece-work, resentful of the fragmentation
of the union movement. It lacked the desire to exploit the power over
production yielded to it by the employers, and the imagination needed to
convert the piece-work system into a weapon for trade unionism as well as
a weapon against it. In 1939 the unions were barely out of the conva-
lescent stage, and the potentials of the shop floor were to be more clearly
seen during the war. Thus the two weaknesses existed together; a diffi-
culty in adjusting -to the new relations of production, axid the failure to
achieve a labour movement with confidence in itself to achieve the goal
of a more just society. The first weakness was to be overcome later,
but the second, the "loss of faith" referred to by the Trades Council
report, was not -to be recovered; after all, it had barely existed for
a few years anyway.
TABLE 6
Inthtstrial Relations Activity in Coventry 1932-1937
No. of Works No. of Local References to
Conferences	 Conferences Central Conference 	 Strikes
1932	 5
	 0	 0	 1
1933	 3	 3	 1
	 3
1934
	 6	 3	 1
	 3
1935	 20	 3	 0
	 2
1936	 22	 11	 3
	 10
1937	 17
	
14	 9
Figures are not available for -the number of central conference references
and. strikes in 1937. As the information comes from the records of the
Coventry and District Engineering Enployers' Association, it is highly
likely that it would underestimate the number of strikes in the city.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been to see the way working-class con-
sciousness developed in Coventry in this period, and in particular, to
see why the working class was unable to challenge capitalist rule. This
raises the need. to deal with the structure of the ruling class in the city.
In Coventry in this period there were two distinct groupings which
complemented each other but which were so far apart as to form a two-
headed ruling class. The first group went under the political heading
of the Coalition, and -this is a useful charac-terisa-tion, for it was also
a social coalition of people engaged in trade, commerce, the professions
and. fairly small-scale manufacturers. The Coalition dominated the social
and. political life of the city for most of this period. It controlled. the
commercial and shopping centre and. was able to sustain a small-scale ana-
chronistic business centre in a large engineering city. It had. access
to patronage through the charities, it had. an important voice in the press,
it controlled, the boys' grammar schools, it controlled the municipal ad.-
ministration and propagated its values through the banks, stores, and
building societies.
The second group consisted. of the employers of labour on a large
or medium scale. Most major engineering companies had senior managers
representing them in the Coventry and District Engineering Thployers
Association, which was the organising force for senior management and
directors, In some cases their relations with their employees were still
paternalist, but in most instances they exercised their control purely by
virtue of the ownership of the machines and. the payment of wages. This
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control was mediated by foremen and chargehands, who were in direct con-
tact with the workers. Power was exercised through either coercion
or persuasion. when necessary there was direct intimidation of those
who opposed the most efficient use of machinery.
	
Jhen necessary, rea-
sonable working conditions and. high wages were allowed. The unfettered
managerial control of techno1or from 1922 onwards meant that the work-
process itself controlled the workforce, in particular where piece-work
prevailed. Most major companies also made attempts to win the loyalty
of the workforce through the use of house journals, and the approval
given to social and. sports clubs.
These two groups occupied separate spheres and. performed separate
functions. The igineering employers were in the most powerful group
in the ruling class, they exercised hegemony over all, and. their decisions
shaped the whole life of the city. But the Coalition exercised the role
of political aM civic leadership, controlling the public and private
municipal institutions. The fact that the groups carried out roles that
were complimentary, and were linked with a broadly similar ideolo,
enabled them to operate from day to day with remarkably little con-tact.
hat contacts there were should not be underestimated, in particular the
key role of John Varley, a local solicitor and scion of the Coalition,
and secretary of the CDEEA., and. E)Iward Iliffe, proprietor of the Midland
Daily Telegraph and. Conservative politician. Iliffe seldom involved
himself in Coventry affairs directly, but used his newpaper to create a
link between the Coalition, from which he came, and. the engineering employ-
era.
Nevertheless, the gulf between the employers and. the Coalition was
large, and it would be a mistake to see the Coalition group purely as the
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front-men for the employers, for although sure -to be sympathetic to the
needs of industry, they had a vigour and personality of their own.
Both social groups derived strength from those parts of the ruling
class that were dominant at national level, and at this level the eng-
ineering employers were seen to be of more sigtificance than the Coalition.
But it was the Coalition that created the particular aspects of social
life in Coventry; the highly elitist boys graimar schools, the develop-
ment of technical education, the gearing of the educational system into
the needs of industry, and. the development of a housing policy in line
with both industrial need and, the aspirations of the Coalition. It was
with the Coalition that the Labour Party fought, rather than with the em-
ployers, for the separation of roles within the ruling class encouraged
a similar specialisation within the labour movement.
Both of the two major groups that created -the ruling class were
stable in their social composition. The working class on the other hand
underwent continual change in this period. During the war, large numbers
of young men and. women came to the city, and their ranks were swollen
again in -the late l930s by another influx. In the war period some came
from country areas or from industries other than engineering. The sudden-
ness of the growth of engineering meant that there was no strong tradition
amongst workers of engineering craftsmanship in the city. Coventry was a
young city, as far as both the engineering industry and. workers were con-
cerned, and. the ways of trade unionism had -to be learnt. Like all other
cities, Coventry had. a trade union movement that went back many years, a
Trades Council and various unions. But the affairs of these bodies seem
to be of little importance in the face of the influx during the war, the
development of a new type of trade unionism in the shop stewards movement,
and the big post-war unrest, culminating in the struggle in 1922. The
labour movement and. the labour tradition as modified. during this period,
carried on during the years of defeat, and provided a basis for the return
to trade unionism in the late 1930s. Overall, however, trade wlionisin
in Coventry achieved only a shallow implantation in the minds of workers.
When conditions were ripe, as in 1917 or 1937, then workers turned
to unions and joined in large numbers. When conditions were difficult
they left, and. their leaving was faster than their joining. A powerful
shop stewards' movement disappeared very quickly, as did other institu-
tions such as the CEJC. Ii is interesting to note that while the shop
stewards' movement was very extensive during the war it did not develop
the independence from the official movement that occurred in some other
areas. A new semi-skilled workforce was content to accept traditional
leadership, and as it saw trade unionism as something that a leadership
did., and. not as self-activity, it was prepared to desert it as well.
There was certainly the development of a basic sympathy for Labour and.
the working class, shown both in the increased labour votes in local and
national elections and in the remarkable response of non-unionists during
the general strike. The basic class loyalty was there, but for much of
the time trade unionism was not a necessary part of that loyalty. Many
of those who had been shop steward.s during the war acquiesced to the spread
of non-unionism after the lock-out. It should be borne in mind that
whereas the CDEE showed. its organising ability to the full in the lock-out
and certainly victimised trade unionists after it, throughout much of the
1920s and 1930s there was no absolute barrier to unionism coming from
managsment. There was also no strong demand for unions coming from the
workshops.
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For many workers, in particular the semi-skilled workers who had.
never been in trade unions for more than a few years at a time, unionism
was skin deep. This meant that the traumatic events that shaped the
labour movement, the war, the look-out and. the general strike, had. a much
smaller impact on those who were not part of the comparatively small group
that made up the core and. active membership of the trade unions and. the
rest of the labour movement. Such events were incidental to the ordi-
nary business of living, and. in most of the situations that made up the
business of living, the ideolor of the ruling class was strong, and. the
influence of the labour movement weak.
The institutions of the working class that had. been thrown up by
the war - shop stewards systems, workers committees, the CEJC - perished
in the conflicts after the war, and. power in the unions returned to the
district committees. These were isolated. from the workshops and rein-
forced the division between activist labour movement worker and uninvolved
non-union worker. Removal from the workshops also constituted a barrier
to the district committees coming to grips with the new situation. This
was particularly true of the AEtJ, the dominant union in the city after the
war. Craft militancy, a tradition which had to be imported into the city,
had. played. an important but ambiguous role in mobilising workers during
the war, and. had fought against the managerial onslaught in the 1922 look-
out. By the late 1920s, however, it had. lost most of its progressi%re
nature. The craft outlook by then served to distance the union leader-
ships from the mass of the workers in the factories, and to hinder the
growth of the unions. Only gradually, in the late 1930s did. the AEU
leadership come to relinquish some of its exclusiveness, redefining the
problems of the skilled minority in terms of differentials rather than in
terms of separate craft organisation. Their failure to adapt craft
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traditions to the new circumstances inhibited the growth of any broader
tradition of militancy and. organisation which might have challenged the
narrow role accepted by shop stewards in the factories during the revival
of the late 1930s. The new unionism of that period concentrated on pay
-ment by results and. neglected. all issues concerned. with question of control,
or with broader political questions. Retention of the craft tradition
had. created. a barrier between the leadership and. the ordinary semi-skilled.
workers, who lacking a strong tradition, and. being practical men, settled.
for what they could. get. As the new trade unionism was not seriously
challenged by employers, and as it could deliver better wages and con-
ditions, that to many, seemed a satisfactory state of affairs.
It would. be
 wrong to overstate the argument; the militancy of the
craft tradition did. survive, and. to some extent was incorporated in the
new unionism; employers still disliked unions, and accepted them only
with reluctance. But the basic problem of an isolated. union leadership
remote from the workplaces and. a new union orgaxiisation that flourished
in an atmosphere of deskilling and. payment by results did. lead to a narrow-
ing of union horizons, and. a de facto acceptance of the managers right
to manage, and. the rulers'.right -to rule.
Just as in the Coalition ruling class there was a clear split
between the employers group and. the Coalition group, so in the working
class there grew to be a division between the industrial wing and. the
political wing. Before the war this division did. not exist; by 1937
it was evident that the capture of power by the Labour Party would. have
little real effect on the position of the trade unions. During the war
and. in the immediate post-war years the Labour Party had only a secondary
role in the struggles in the city. It was not until after the defeat of
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the trasie unions that Labour began to assert itself as the leading body
in the industrial/political alliance, from the late l920s it grew in
importance as its local and parliamentary votes increased, while the
trade unions remained in deep depression. There was, therefore, an en-
couragement for labour movement activists to move from the trade union
movement of the early l920s to the Labour Party in the late l920s. In
establishing an independent role for itself, and. in developing an organ-
isation that could take office and sustain Labour in power, it was necess-
axy for the Party to become more organised and more professional. But
because this happened while the unions were very weak, the Party learnt
the habit of operating without much union support, and this in turn en-
couraged the Labour leadership to see the Party as the dominant force in
the labour movement. Thus while the dominant force in the ruling class
was at all times the engineering employers, the leadership of the labour
movement shifted in the 1920s from the industrial to the political side.
As a result it is possible to say that the election of a Labour team to
control the city in 1937 was a bigger victory for the working class than
it was a defeat for the ruling class. The group that was used to govern-
ing1
 the Coalition 1 lost power for good, but much of its political and social
influence remained. The employers, aloof from the conflict, had. little
to fear from the change.
The dominance of the Labour Party was achieved without massive help
from the unions, and with only a comparatively small active Party member-
ship. In 1937 the activity of the Labour Party was outside the scope of
the large majority of working people. It had grown without the mass move-
ment to back it, and it had. only a weak social and. cultural influence
within the working class. It provided political leadership but left un-
touched the many areas of life where ruling class ideo1or was strong.
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The Labour leadership was aware of the ways in which the ruling class
ruled..	 It suspected. the charities and. building societies, it saw the use
of education as well as the municipal machine, and. was well aware of the
dominance of the big employers. But its political practice was confined
to municipal politics centred on immediate social issues. The aspect of
municipal affairs that attracted most attention from the Labour group on
the City Council was housing. Less attention was given to education,
and. here the emphasis was on the physical state of the schools rather than
on the content of education. The Labour programme was one of fairly
immediate social reforms. There were a number of reasons for this. In
the first place the social problems of' the city had been badly neglected.
by the Coalition, and it was their good fortune that the problems were no
worse. Labour could take up issues directly affecting the standard of
living of many people, and this was likely to help attract support in the
elections. In the second place, Labour tended to accept without question
the constraints put upon local authorities.
	
It did not seek to use local
political power to create a new kind. of socialist city. The Labour leader-
ship prided itself on containing practical men 7 who were concerned with
the technicalities of power rather than the implementation of theories.
The leaders wished to apply their industrial skills to the field of social
engineering, and they shied away from grandiose blueprints for the future.-
The third reason why emphasis was put on immediate social needs was that
the Labour Party in the city had no consistent theory of society, or to
put it another way, was consistently untheoretical. This is not quite
the same as the second point. Labour councillors underestimated the
strength of the ruling class, and. could not develop a strater for removing
all of its power. The Party was capable of developing programmes to meet
social needs, but not capable of developing a programme to maximise the
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power of the working class, and. -therefore could. eliminate -the power of
the ruling class only in -the narrow field of traditional municipal
politics.
Labour did. have some sort of vision of a socialist Coventry
behind its programme of reforms. It was not well developed, and was
based on a policy of municipalising various trades and. professions.
The vision seemed. to be of a city run as a giant co—op. But in 1937
there were no plans as to how municipalisation was to work, and. the only
changes to the structures of local authority politics was to make the
Council system more efficient, and more elitist.
The weakness of the trade union movement meant there was little
to prevent the Labour Party taking a fairly narrow view of local politics.
The fact that the leadership of the party concentrated on reforms meant
that they were reformist, but this characterisation needs to be qualified.
In this period the reformists still believed in a revolution, while the
revolutionaries could not practice what they preached.. Reformism is
normally taken to mean the abandonment of a strategy for a working class
revolutionary seizure of power, arid the acceptance of a policy based. on
immediate reforms with no long term objective. The leaders of the local
Labour Party had. abandoned. a revolutionary strategy, but it was an important
part of their belief that they were working for "full socialism." They
had no programme for achieving socialism, but still clung to a belief in
a socialist future, and. a belief that their actions 'were somehow bringing
this nearer. Criticisms made by the Communist Party, particularly during
its isolationist phase, tended to see reformism as a cynical betrayal of
the workers. This seriously underestimated the strength of reformism;
it could. contain genuine socialist aspirations while having a practical
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appeal, of getting done that which could be done.
In more concrete terms, however, this reformism combined practical
politics with socialist rhetoric, and. this combination was all that the
main stream of the socialist movement amounted to in this period.. The
emergence of the Labour Party had. been achieved by subordinating or d.e-
feating other trends or movements in the labour movement; the IL?, the
CP, the Co—op, the Trades Council arid, the trade unions. The claim by
the Labour Party to be the conscience of the labour movement did nothing
to encourage the new trade unionists of the 1930s, to build. socialist
aims into their trade union practice. A trade unionist carried out his
unionism at work arid, his socialism, if any, in the Labour Party outside
work. This division naturally made it impossible to achieve an overall
critique of the working of the capitalist system, arid a stra-ter for change.
The Communist Party survived. throughout these years as a left al-
ternative to Labour politics, sometimes working with other left—wingers
inside and outside the Labour Party. It sought to avoid any division
between politics and. trade unionism, but like the Labour Party, had. a
narrow view of politics. This did not take the form of municipal politics,
but of economian, a concentration on the industrial struggle 'that was
linked, to a reductionist view that tended. to see all issues as a, ref lec-
tion of a basic class struggle.
In the years after the war the whole of the capitalist system in
Britain went through a period of severe crisis. To the Communists, the
hour of revolution was at hand., and. their policies during the early 1920s
were characterised by considerable over—optimism about the collapse of
capitalism. Policies tended to be short—term, and. the Labour Party was
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attacked for betraying workers. The sec-tariaziism that flourished in
these years died down after the lock-out, but never quite disappeared,
and flourished again in the late 1920s. In the late 1930s the Party
reestablished itself in the city, though it was still very small, and.
contributed to the growth of the unions. However, while it sought to
politicise the union movement it lacked an outlet for political expression,
and. found it very difficult to avoid being more than an industrial ginger
group. Outside the unions it was politically isolated for most of the
period.. In the few years after its formation when it had. its greatest
mass support, it overplayed its hand. by challenging the Labour Party
directly. Its defeat strengthened the Labour Party. Its self-willed
isolation in the late 1920s at the time of the final emergence of the
Coventry Labour Party as a major force meant that it could not contribute
as it might have done to putting up trade union checks to Labour ambition
through the Trades Council or work with the Labour left. Its political
impact on the city, then, was remarkably small.
By the end of this period. the Labour Party was in power in the city,
while the trade union movement was growing rapidly and. showing increasing
signs of militancy. But the engineering employers were also much stronger,
and had used the two decades to equip themselves to contain the -trade union
movement.	 -
This local study has sought to show the main influences on the ae-
velopment of working class consciousness in this period. A number of
factors have been shown to be of particular importance, and their wider
relevance could be dealt with through similar studies of other localities.
In Coventry the structure of -the ruling class, and in particular the divi-
sion between employer and. local politician and. tradesman was of importance,
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as it promoted the division between the industrial wing and the political
wing of the local labour movement. This division was a national phenom-
enom, but the speed and. completeness of its occurrence in Coventry owed
much to the concentration of the engineering industry. Within the trade
union movement the move from the engineering craft tradition to the new
unionism was occasioned by the collapse of the trade unions in the 1920s
and the division of the labour movement helped to ensure the depolitici-
sation of the new unions. 	 FIi.rther local study is needed to see how the
Coventry experience compared. with other localities.
Postcript. Since this thesis was completed, some papers of the late
W.H. Stokes have been presented to the Modern Records Centre at the Univer-
sity of Warwick by Dr. R. Croucher. They include further papers on the
Coventry branch of the Minority Movement, which was set up in 19214., and not
in 1925 as this thesis states.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AEIJ
.AZE
ASW
B.S.A.
BSMW
BSP
BTH
CDEEA
CEJC
CF
OP (BSTI)
Ct-TwC
DC
DORA
EC
EF
ru
GEC
ILP
IRA
LRC
MT
n4
NAG
NALGO
NFDDSS
NF4W
NUR
NTJSMWB
NUB
ODD
RCA
RILTJ
malgamated Engineering Union.
algamated Society of Engineers.
Amalgamated. Society of Toolmakers.
Amalgamated. Society of Wood.workers.
Birmingham Small Arms Co.Ltd..
Birmingham Operative Tinplate, Sheet Metal Workers and
Braziers Society.
British Socialist Party.
British Thomson Houston Co. Ltd.
Coventry and. District Engineering nployers' Association.
Coventry Engineering Joint Committee.
Communist Party.
Communist Party (British Section of the Third International)
Coventry Unemployed Workers Committee - sometimes called
the Central Unemployed Workers Committee.
District Committee.
Defence of the Realm Act.
Executive Committee (Executive Council in the case of ASE/AEU)
Engineering ployers' Federation.
Electrical Trades Union.
General Electric Company Ltd.
Independent Labour Party.
Irish Republican Army.
Labour Representation Committee.
Midland Daily Telegraph.
Minority Movement.
National Asiministrative Council.
National and. Local Government Officers.
National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised. Sailors
aM Soldiers.
National Federation of Women Tgorkers.
National Union of Railwamien.
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers and. Braziers.
National Union of Vehicle Builders.
Organising District Delegate.
Railway Clerks' Association.
Red. International of Labour Unions.
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SEMS	 Steam Engine Makers' Society.
SDF	 Social Democratic Federation.
SLP	 Socialist Labour Party.
TGWU	 Transport and General Wor±cers Union.
TUC	 Tra.es Union Congress.
UNWA	 United Machine Workers' Association.
UPA	 United Patternmakers Association.
WU	 Workers' Union.
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